Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1
- 19)
TUESDAY 20 JUNE 2006
Rt Hon Adam Ingram MP, Lieutenant General Nick Houghton
CBE and Dr Roger Hutton
Q1 Chairman: Minister and gentlemen,
welcome to the Defence Committee and the evidence we are taking
on Iraq. There are a number of questions that we would like to
ask you. We would be most grateful for short questions and for
short answers. Towards the end of the meeting we will wish to
go into private session to ask you things that we feel should
be dealt with only in private session. So we will conduct the
meeting in two parts—first public, second private—and
we will not go back into public session at the end. Minister,
if I may, I would like to ask you, first, if you would introduce
your colleagues and then I will start asking the questions.
Mr Ingram: Thank you very much,
Mr Chairman. On my left is General Nick Houghton, who is Chief
of Joint Operations, and on my right is Dr Roger Hutton, who is
Director of Joint Commitments. I will do my best to give you short
answers, but it depends on how detailed the questions are.
Q2 Chairman: Indeed. Yesterday we
heard that the Muthana Province was going to be handed over to
Iraqi control. When is that going to happen?
Mr Ingram: That is happening now,
so to speak, in the sense that that is a process which is now
under way. The specific date of the handover I do not have off
the top of my head; I do not know whether the General has or not.
Lt General Houghton: The process
involved allows for 45 days for the formal handover to take place
with a ceremony at the end attendant on that, but we do not know
when within that 45 days the firm date is going to be yet.
Q3 Chairman: Thank you. There are
four provinces in which the British are particularly concerned
and Muthana Province is the first. Do you have any suggestions
as to which the next province is likely to be?
Mr Ingram: The plan would be Maysan,
but what we have said consistently, as indeed with Muthana, is
that it is all about the conditions that apply, the capability,
obviously, of the Iraqi security forces, the determination of
the Iraqi Government itself and the conditions on the ground.
So all of these matters have to be considered as to when it is
then appropriate to do so. So it is about the capacity and the
confidence of the Iraqi security forces to do what they are now
seeking to do in al-Amarah and, from our point of view, our confidence
in their capacity and capability to do that as well. So that will
be a progressive process. As we have said, this is one event as
part of a sequence of events, all part of the greater process.
Q4 Chairman: When we were in Iraq
we visited the 10th Division and, clearly, your confidence in
the ability of the 10th Division of the Iraqi Army to carry out
its function is increasing. Would the handing over of control
of Muthana to the Iraqi Army imply that you are confident that
they will be able to do the patrolling work that the British have
been able to do until now?
Mr Ingram: Maybe that is better
addressed from a military perspective, but the answer to that
would be yes. However, there is still the obligation on us to
continue to ensure that we are working with them in terms of the
monitoring of it and, also, in terms of support if required if
it suddenly turns poisonous in a way which we have not expected
or predicted. We have to be able to make sure that we do not have
a reverse, so there would be a joint approach in all of that,
but we will put the delivery by the Iraqi security forces on the
ground. It is not just, of course, the Army, it is also the police
as well; this is a more rounded approach than just an Army response.
Lt General Houghton: I absolutely
endorse your point about the increased confidence we have in the
10th Division of the Iraqi Army. As the Minister has said, the
conditions which are attendant on provincial transfer relate to
a number of different fields: local governance, local security,
the competence of Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police and, also, the position
of coalition forces to re-engage if there was a sudden deterioration
in the security situation. The Iraqi Army themselves will not
be on the front edge of providing the security in al-Amarah; that
will be a police task with the Iraqi Army in support of the police,
but we have every confidence in the competence of the Iraqi Army
to do the task that is expected of it. Hence, the conditions have
been met in Muthana.
Q5 Chairman: The Italian Government
has suggested that it intends to withdraw troops from Iraq over
the coming months, and today we heard that the Japanese are intending
to withdraw their troops. What will be the consequences of those
withdrawals?
Mr Ingram: The consequences of
those withdrawals will be part of what has been envisaged and
planned. This is part of the process of change which is under
way. Probably the best judgment would be that the Japanese have
completed their task and they have made the decision that they
have completed their reconstruction task, which is the prime purpose
they are there. Of course, they will retain a strategic presence
anyway in Iraq; they are not pulling out everything; they have
said they will commit strategic airlift to the Americans in the
North, and that is helpful, so it is not a complete withdrawal
by the Japanese. The Italians are due to be out by 21 December
(I think that is the date they have given), so there is time to
plan all of that process. That then means what we will have to
do with our other coalition partners is look to see what is then
required to be done on the ground when they are no longer there.
So we have time to plan all of that. I think it is a bit early
to be 100% specific but, again, the CJO may want to comment on
some of the evolving thoughts on that.
Lt General Houghton: There is
absolutely no surprise at all about the Japanese withdrawal; it
is more, actually, the conclusion of their redevelopment and reconstruction
mission, and this was part of the planning and is naturally nested
with the transfer of provincial control in Muthana. From the Italian
perspective, clearly there is both a political dynamic behind
that (on which I cannot comment) but, also, we would anticipate
that within the drawdown period of the Italians that Dhi Qar would
also meet the necessary conditions for transfer. Therefore, from
a military perspective, we would be left purely with a requirement
to provide what we are terming "Operation Overwatch"
which just is, as it were, an enduring insurance policy against
something unforeseen going badly wrong there. The actual withdrawal
of the Italian forces themselves should not present us with a
security problem.
Q6 Robert Key: Chairman, we should
not forget that the Royal Navy is also involved here. Given the
porous nature of the Iraqi border and the work that the Royal
Navy is doing very crucially, can you give us some idea of the
assessment made by the Royal Navy of the competence of the Iraqi
Navy and exactly how they are encouraging the Iraqis to take over
that part of the security scene?
Mr Ingram: Again, the CJO is perhaps
best placed to answer that.
Lt General Houghton: I think the
most important thing about the Iraqi Navy will be in its competence
to defend the strategic oil export infrastructure in the northern
Arabian Gulf in the area of operations that we call CTF58. Up
until a couple of months ago the UK commanded this particular
operation, and a subset of that command working with a training
element of the Royal Navy ashore, is to bring the indigenous Iraqi
Navy up to a level of competence where they can secure that infrastructure.
I think that it makes sense, although there have been significant
advancements in the competence and quality of the Iraqi Navy,
not to take risk over that particular security task. So although
we have increasing confidence in the Iraqi Navy, in terms of their
overall equipment and competences to perform what is a vital task
in terms of protection of that key infrastructure, I think it
will be some time before we hand over to the Iraqis the sole responsibility
for that.
Q7 Chairman: How would you describe
the consent of the Iraqi population, in the area of operations
in which the British are particularly interested, to our continued
presence in the area?
Mr Ingram: How do you measure
that? You can do opinion polls, you can do assessment, you can
measure, I suppose, in terms of public reaction on the street.
I think it is very difficult to get the best assessment and the
best feel for that unless you are there on a constant basis, which
of course our troops would be. There is ebb and flow in all of
this, and there is no question at all it is a difficult environment
at the moment. I am conscious of the fact that the first time
I visited Iraq I was on the streets with our soldiers who wore
soft hats and no body armour. I do not think that could happen
now. So, if that is the indication of a change of threat level,
unquestionably that is a very key measure. The people of Iraq
are no different from any other country: they want security, they
do not want troops on the street; they do not want people being
blown up, they want jobs, they want employment and they want a
future for their children—all of which we are seeking to
deliver. It is difficult to deliver that, either through the agency
of the Iraqi Government or through what we are seeking to do through
the developing PRTs or any other reconstruction efforts, because
of the nature of the security environment. That is why we have
to get that security environment stabilised and why we then, at
the same time, have to try and grow all that necessary infrastructure
and social environment and political environment, but it is difficult.
I do not know if it is a percentage you are looking for—I
do not think that is the basis of the question—but it is
a difficult environment we are in at present, and we have to ensure
that we succeed against that. That is how we will win this. This
is, as we keep saying, about hearts and minds, and you do not
win hearts and minds by military presence; you win it by all the
other key ingredients. The hearts and minds are won by what we
can do to ensure security, but the continuation of troops on the
street is an indication that you are not winning in the other
areas.
Q8 Chairman: They also want sovereignty
over their own land and they want their own local elections. We
were told that there might be a delay to the provincial elections
which were expected to be held roughly this summer. Do you expect
the provincial elections to take place this summer or do you expect
them to be delayed?
Mr Ingram: My understanding is
that there was not a drop-dead timescale in all of that. As I
understand it, the elections are scheduled for later in the year
in Basra. There was not a specific time set for all of that, but
clearly the security environment is important to be able to deliver
in all of this. Let us remember what has been achieved in elections.
We have gone through that; that was delivered on the back of the
Iraqi security forces providing a secure environment for those
elections to take place, and is a case of trying to achieve that
type of more stable environment so these elections can then occur.
When you say you were told there was a delay, who said there was
a delay? Who has given an indication there was a delay?
Q9 Chairman: The military people
we spoke to in the British forces said that there might be a delay.
Lt General Houghton: It has been
a hot topic, as it were—the timing of the provincial elections.
There was a time when, for security reasons, it was felt it would
be a good idea to have allied two different electoral events;
one the provincial elections and, secondly, the referendum on
the constitution. Since that time it has been thought better that
the election on the constitution should slip off further into
the future, as that was a matter of still strong internal political
debate. Therefore, the provincial elections, it is deemed, will
be held sometime during this year. It is probably felt better
to hold them in the autumn rather than rush to hold them too quickly,
but this is a wholly political decision to be made by the new
Iraqi Government.
Q10 Mr Havard: The questions come
from the fact that what we were told was that there had previously
been a general acceptance that there was consent from the Iraqi
people; it was now more tolerance, that there had been a shift
in relation to perceptions of the Iraqi people's attitude and,
also, their expectation. The whole point about the timing of elections
was that there were various watersheds in their expectations about
how quickly they could gain control of their own processes as
opposed to deliberately, somehow, avoiding giving them control
and, therefore, stimulating discontent. That is, essentially,
where the questions come from. I do not think there are right
or wrong answers to any of these things, I know there just are
not, but that is why we asked the question.
Mr Ingram: This is a process,
and if you do it too soon and it does not succeed then you have
a problem. So there is a political judgment to be made in all
of this. That is why we are saying there were general expectations
rather than a firm timescale. So when you say "delay"
it was not a case of that was the date on which it was set, and
that is why I was answering in the way in which I was. I can see
where the word "delay" comes in, but if it is delay
it is delay for a purpose—to get the right conditions. We
have to ensure total buy-in to all of this, and you will know
from your own visits that there are issues that have to be addressed
with the Governor in Basra; it is only recently that he has re-engaged
in communications with us. So these are all the key ingredients
that have to be worked at to get to that environment where we
can then move forward. That is why later in the year is the more
likely timescale for those local elections. Important though they
are, they should be done in the right conditions. If we get the
right ingredients then it is another indication of community buy-in
to all of this, but there is not a simple equation or a simple
set of answers for this.
Q11 Mr Crausby: I have an overall
question on the state of emergency in Basra and its effect on
our forces. What is the significance of the Iraqi Prime Minister's
declaration of a state of emergency in Basra in May, what impact
has this had on relations between the multinational forces and
local government and how would you characterise the current security
situation in both the Basra Province and MND South-East as a whole?
Mr Ingram: It is an undesirable
step when you have to declare a state of emergency, but there
is an important element to this because it does show that the
new Prime Minister and his government are now focusing Iraq-wide
and, indeed, on the important city of Basra and the surrounding
provinces. One of the issues is that it has been too Baghdad-centric.
Now there is a greater engagement and a greater focus on looking
at where all the attendant problems are, where there are some
really big issues in the north, but that of itself means that
we should not ignore what is happening elsewhere. So I think it
is very significant that Prime Minister Maliki has turned his
attention to all of this. That is a very positive engagement and
one that unquestionably shows a greater roundness to what is happening
in Iraq from Baghdad. In terms of the immediate impact and how
that has evolved, I think it is better that the CJO addresses
that and gives you a clear indication of the various aspects of
that, and the way it is impacting upon our personnel.
Lt General Houghton: I think,
in respect of the security situation in Basra, there is no doubt
that it has got worse of late due to the protracted period of
time it took to form the government—upwards of five months.
That allowed a period of time when, if you like, politics that
should have been conducted more appropriately actually were conducted
through violent means on the streets—some of this through
rival militia gangs. What we have in the south of the country,
quite different to elsewhere in the north, particularly in the
Baghdad region, is we do not there have an active Sunni insurgency;
we do not there have active signs of the Jihadist terrorist movements
such as AQI (al-Qaeda in Iraq) and Ansar al-Sunna and those sorts
of organisations. So the nature of the security dimension is different
and it is one in which, as it were, there has been inter-faction
rivalry, much of it then reflecting in non-judicial killing between
rival Shia factions struggling for political and economic power.
In relative terms, vis-a"-vis elsewhere in Iraq, the security
situation there is still relatively low or modest. There is always
a statement given that four Iraqi provinces attract over 85% of
the incidents, and Basra is not one of those, but there nevertheless
is a worrying amount of violence and murder carried out between
rival Shia factions. It is in this context of an upturn in the
level of local violence between Shia factions, in the aftermath
of the period, as it were, of political instability whilst the
government was being formed that the Prime Minister has now stepped
forward and wishes to establish his own mark and his own political
involvement and identification with the improvement of the security
situation down there. The most immediate thing that it has actually
seen, as well as that of political involvement, is an increased
use of the Iraqi Army on the streets of Basra because Prime Minister
al-Maliki himself recognises the requirement that the security
situation down there must carry an Iraqi face and actually reinforces
our own plans because the transition, ultimately, of security
responsibility to the Iraqis is a wholly good thing
Mr Ingram: If I can supplement
that briefly, in terms of the way in which the Iraqi security
forces did respond at the tragic loss of the Lynx helicopter and
our five personnel, we do know how very quickly (this was all
said, of course, in the media) the Iraqi security forces took
ownership of that issue. More recently there was the major suicide
bombing in Basra where they took total ownership. That shows:
one, a willingness to engage and, two, a capability to actually
deliver and, I would guess, community buy-in as well, because
if there was not community buy-in to it there would have been
hostility towards the security forces. So those are very good,
solid indicators of change of a substantial nature which is beginning
to take place.
Dr Hutton: If I may just add,
the basic problem in Basra is, as General Houghton and the Minister
have indicated, one of poor governance, and the only way you are
going to fix that in the medium term is to have a stake in Baghdad,
in putting that right, and that is the real significance of Prime
Minister Maliki's intervention. This is Baghdad saying: "We
want to put governance in Basra right". That is its real
significance.
Q12 Chairman: Provided he maintains
attention on it
Mr Ingram: That could be a throwaway
remark as if somehow or other he is not maintaining attention—
Q13 Chairman: He is.
Mr Ingram: That is the point.
Q14 Linda Gilroy: Minister, we met
a range of senior politicians in Baghdad when we were seeking
those reassurances, which I think we got, but we were also told
in Baghdad that the Iranian influence in Basra was endemic. How
would you characterise the extent of the Iranian influence in
the region, and to what extent do you think Iran is supporting
the IED and other attacks against UK and coalition forces?
Mr Ingram: There is no question
at all that there is an indication of Iranian presence. Now, whether
that is Iranian Government-inspired or directed is a moot point—not
provable at this point. The Iranian presence is there and it is
clear in terms of transfer technology in terms of some of the
devices that we are having to deal with. The question is: it is
there and it has to be factored into what we are doing, and we
also have to make it very clear, as we do, to the Iranian Government
that this is not something that they should be so engaging in,
remembering this: that what we are doing there is supported by
UN mandate and resolution. So we do make our views very clearly
known through the FCO to the Iranian Government, and the presence
of an Iranian influence is unquestionably there. Just how extensive
that is is something that has to be tested over time. It is very
easy for some to say: "It is total; it would not happen without
them", remembering that in any political environment, and
Iraq is a very good example where you have a lot of competing
factions, some who owe allegiance to Iran for the support they
gave them at the time of Saddam and others who take a different
point of view, people will say things because there is a lot of
assessment from their history, from their perspective of what
they are trying to achieve in terms of the political objectives.
There is nothing unique about Iraq in that sense. You could say
the same applied in Northern Ireland, where people were saying
there was a whole lot of influence coming into play. It depends
who you talk to amongst particular politicians how they will come
to their conclusion about the influence of external forces.
Q15 Linda Gilroy: In relation to
IEDs, however, have you got an assessment on what the Iranian
involvement maybe?
Mr Ingram: This is, perhaps, something
we are going to discuss in private session. We do know about the
technology; we know where that technology has been developed and
we do know it is extant in Iraq, so the technological capabilities
are there. It is not something which has grown organically, it
has been transferred in and it has come from people who have been
trained in that technology. So it is quite clear that that is
happening. There is nothing unusual about this. That is part of
the global terrorism network—the transfer of knowledge base—and
they will transfer it to anyone who is taking on, in this case,
the coalition forces in Iraq, and they will seek to do it elsewhere
where they can have a threat against us.
Chairman: We may well come back to that.
Q16 John Smith: Following on from
that, Mr Chairman, when the Committee was in Iraq, particular
and deep concern was expressed about the porous nature of the
border between Iran and Iraq, which may not be influencing the
Shia rivalry or the smuggling of arms explosives and technology.
What is being done to try to improve that border security, and
what more needs to be done?
Lt General Houghton: I think the
first thing we have got to do is keep our feet on the ground about
the scale of the problem. I, off the top of my head, forget how
many hundred kilometres this border is long; much of it is marshland
and waterway and, historically, the locals astride that border
have not recognised it and it is impossible to police it in any
way that one might consider an absolute guarantee of control of
all border movement. That is quite impossible. Nevertheless, there
are a whole range of different techniques, physical and technical,
that you can bring to bear to improve one's monitoring, surveillance
and physical presence on the border. The primary one is through
the Department of Border Enforcement, which is an Iraqi institution,
which the coalition has trained and has built a whole string of
border forts which they man and patrol from. There are a number
of technical devices that we use to give technical surveillance
over the border, most of these are aerial surveillance, and then
there are a number of what we would call border "surge"
operations to both act as a mentoring force to the Department
of Border Enforcement, to their forts, as it were, but also to
provide, on an opportunity basis and on a surge basis, physical
presence to interdict likely smuggling routes along the border.
So quite a lot is being done and quite a lot of this is being
done with a view to handing it over to the Iraqis, but I would
put it in the context of a task which will never generate 100%
security of a controlled border.
Q17 John Smith: We know from a previous
report of this Committee that it is recognised that there are
a significant number of small arms in the Iraqi community in our
area of influence. Have we any idea what proportion of those come
from Iran, and is that significant?
Lt General Houghton: My view is
that we could not conceivably police such a statistic. This is
a nation that has always held arms domestically as of right, and
quite where they have come from there is no such statistic, I
am pretty certain, in existence.
Mr Ingram: Nor ever likely to
be. It is impossible to assess that.
Q18 John Smith: On the relative security
situation, it has been argued that 80% of the attacks in Iraq
are against coalition forces but 80% of the casualties are suffered
by civilians. Do you recognise that figure and do you recognise
that figure in the MND South-East area?
Mr Ingram: What is the source
of the figure?
Q19 John Smith: It is military, but
do you recognise it?
Mr Ingram: Which military? Is
it something you have been given when you were there?
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