Examination of Witnesses (Questions 60
- 79)
TUESDAY 20 JUNE 2006
Rt Hon Adam Ingram MP, Lieutenant General Nick Houghton
CBE and Dr Roger Hutton
Q60 Chairman: Could I just pick you
up on something you said, that the people who are being held are
very dangerous people. That would generally be the case in most
British prisons, that there are a lot of very dangerous people
in there. This is a detention facility that is in the centre of
the Shaibah camp, so there are a lot of soldiers around about
to cope with any military activity that was needed. The idea that
it should be the Grenadier Guards looking after these detainees
as opposed to the Military Provost Staff does not seem to me to
have achieved an answer, from what you said just now.
Mr Ingram: I do not have the precise
management arrangements as to who is doing that and as to why.
Lt General Houghton: Currently
the Grenadier Guards are used there in a supervisory and close
security role working alongside formally trained military prisoner
officers, as it were, so it is a combination of the two. I am
not quite certain what the origin of the change has been because,
as far as I am aware, this has been the case for some time.
Q61 Chairman: Anyway there are formally
trained military prison officers?
Mr Ingram: Can I again give another
good example. At the Maze Prison we had military personnel, when
required, doing perimeter guarding. I appreciate that was a much
more open environment, but, by the very nature of the prisoners
themselves, if there was a prison break-out or violence, then
who has to attend to them, because of other troops around unnecessarily
focused on that incident, so you need people who are aware of
what the potential may be and in a position then to immediately
and professionally react to that, so again, if there is a proposed
change, we will give it to you and I do not know of any changes
being muted?
Q62 Chairman: Dr Hutton, is there
anything you would like to add?
Dr Hutton: First of all, we are
talking about small numbers of people here. It varies between
seven and 140 and at the moment it is 78 people held in that centre.
There is some Iraqi involvement in the review in that there is
a committee chaired by the Iraqi Prime Minister and the multinational
forces which reviews cases at the 18-month point. It could be
that we might be able to build a bit more review in lower down
the chain, but I would point out that, as most of these detainees
are held on intelligence grounds, that could be complicated.
Q63 Mr Holloway: It was very interesting
when we met the Prime Minister, that we were all trying to talk
about what you do about the Governor and he wanted to talk about
15 detainees, and it was kind of a big issue to him. I think we
found it quite bizarre.
Mr Ingram: What is he focusing
on? Is he saying that it is something that could give more political
buy-in in the region, something that could help him in his objectives?
Are those people known to him? Does he have a view about them?
Generally, I do not think that is being bizarre, I think that
is focusing in on the political equations he has to deal with
and we then have to satisfy him as to why we cannot comply with
that if we cannot comply with it.
Lt General Houghton: In the specific
instance of your visit, I am led to believe that Prime Minister
Maliki had been slightly misled to the point that a number of
the detainees in the UK facility were being held without any evidence
and he got very emotive about that because it seemed to be completely
in contravention of Iraqi national sovereignty. The fact is that
there may not be specific evidence, but they are allowed to be
held against an intelligence portfolio and that was not very clear
to him, so the substantive grounds for their detention exist,
but they are based on an intelligence case, not an evidential
case, if you see the difference. I am told that he was not made
aware at the time of your meeting of that specific difference.
Q64 Chairman: But there is a substantial
difference, I think, between the way the United States handle
their review process and the way that the British handle the review
process and the United States involve Iraqis at a much lower level
than the Prime Minister whereas the British do not. I would have
thought that it might well be helpful to local buy-in to have
more Iraqi involvement at the review process.
Mr Ingram: We are looking at getting
compatibility in the handling arrangements. Again I am conscious
of the fact that the Secretary of State is out there and that
might have been part of his discussions, but I have not seen the
read-out from that yet.
Q65 Mr Havard: Perhaps at some point
you could tell us how it is going to be dealt with in relation
to the renewal of the UN mandate or the replacement of the UN
mandate at the end of the year. Last time it was catered for in
an exchange of letters which went alongside the Resolution and,
if you could give us some detail about that as that becomes known,
that would be very helpful.
Dr Hutton: I think we would want
the renewed UN mandate to roll over the ability to detain.
Q66 Mr Havard: So would there be
another exchange of letters, for example?
Dr Hutton: I do not think there
would necessarily need to be an exchange of letters. We would
have to look at the detail at the time, but what we want is the
basic rollover.
Q67 Mr Havard: The reason I ask is
partly because I want to be very clear that the people who are
actually being asked to engage in this activity and do it are
also individually protected in relation to the law as well as
the general question being dealt with in the proper way.
Mr Ingram: I can give you that
absolute assurance, that one of the issues which we will always
attend to is our compliance with international law.
Chairman: We are just about to go into
private session, but, before we do, I would like to make one comment
which is that I think the overall impression that we got while
we were in Iraq was of British troops performing in comparatively
small numbers under extremely difficult conditions, heat that
I had certainly never experienced before, and performing to a
standard that was perhaps as expected, but nevertheless utterly
outstanding, and I think we all came away feeling what a huge
debt we owe to them.
Linda Gilroy: Hear! Hear!
Q68 Chairman: My colleagues clearly
agree with that.
Mr Ingram: I would echo that.
That is my experience too, and not only that, but when I visited
7th Armoured Brigade it was very significant how much all of those
soldiers, experienced, young and old, all of them felt they were
making a difference and had a purpose to what they were seeking
to do in Iraq. They were not just saying this, but they realised
the enormity of the task they faced and will continue to face
for some time, but they were making a difference and that is important,
and it shows the professionalism of our people.
Mr Havard: I think the other thing which
struck me, Chairman, was the clarity of understanding about how
they could draw back, rather than immediately withdraw, and support
and consolidate the process as it moved forward.
Linda Gilroy: I think morale was very
high. When you read the briefings going out, you wondered what
to expect, but it is certainly one of the abiding recollections
I will have just on an individual level of how they were meeting
that challenge.
Q69 Robert Key: Could I just add
on behalf of hundreds of my constituents in the Salisbury Plain
Garrison area that there is a stark contrast between the acknowledged
professionalism of the task our Forces are performing in theatre
and the pressure on wives and families and the need for the Army
Families Federation and for the welfare services of the Army because
every day every one of their families switches on the television
and radio and there is a constant drip, drip, drip of criticism,
contrasting with the excellence which is really happening on the
ground, and that is very, very corrosive to Army families. I simply
ask you, Minister, to bear that in mind and do all you can to
support the families.
Mr Ingram: Chairman, again just
to comment, and I agree entirely with all of that, those who make
critical comments are not making a difference in Iraq. They are
not actually making it better. The people who are making it better
are those who are delivering on the international missions. When
I visited 7th Armoured Brigade, they had put in place a very effective
family wrap-around system, called `Home Rat'. They are the Desert
Rats, as you know, and they had this system, called `Home Rat',
and everything was focused on making sure the families, mainly
in Germany, had a whole range of support mechanisms so that no
one should feel, if they had a problem, that they could not go
and talk to someone. Talking to the families as well about the
way in which they put their own wrap around people was truly significant
and it really was immense to see this, it was very satisfying
to see this, and I know that happens in different brigades in
different deployments. The families are very important and those
who make the critical comments should realise that there are worried
mothers and wives and others back home and they should just condition
their remarks in remembering what we are asking our people to
do and balance that against the point I made about the soldiers
themselves believing they are making a difference, and we can
see the difference in Iraq and that is with some of the things
we have discussed today.
Linda Gilroy: I would just add to what
Robert said that, although I say morale is high out there, there
were many expressions of puzzlement as to why more positive stories
are not written about what is going on out there because they
are just doing an amazing job.
Chairman: On that note, we will now go
into private session.
Resolved, That the Committee
should sit in private.
The witnesses gave further oral evidence.
Asterisks denote that part of the oral evidence
which, for security reasons, has not been reported at the request
of the Ministry of Defence and with the agreement of the Committee.
Q70 Chairman: Minister, may I ask
if you can vouch for those who remain?
Mr Ingram: They are all mine,
yes. In fact they are all ours.
Q71 Chairman: May I remind the Committee
that the usual practice is to publish the transcript of the evidence
in private session as well as the evidence that is given in the
public session in due course, but there is a bit of negotiation
with the Ministry of Defence about whether bits are too sensitive
to be published, so you ought to be aware that everything you
say will be written down and used in evidence. Now, let us move
into some of the questions that did arise while we were there
in relation particularly to equipment. It may be that you are
not able to answer all of these questions, Minister. Helicopters—a
critical enabler and yet we found that in the heat there, particularly
in the afternoons, they could not be used, so I am wondering whether
there is a shortage of helicopters in Iraq and what is being done
to increase their numbers?
Mr Ingram: I was not aware of
their non-use in the heat of the day. That is in maybe extreme
temperatures when maybe there is a judicious judgment made by
the crew in terms of that.
Q72 Chairman: ***
Lt General Houghton: ***
Mr Ingram: If there is ever any
platform which can be pushed to extreme in any set of given circumstances,
the judgment obviously will be made as to what is the best utilisation.
If there are limits because of heat, it does not matter how many
you have, is an obvious response to that, if they are limited
by the environment in which they are. In terms of helicopter availability,
we do not hide from the fact that we are using them very extensively
and the crews are well over the harmony guidelines. There is no
question about this at all and we recognise that. The hard logic
to this is that, given the resources we have and the requirements
that we place upon them and the availability of the various platforms,
if it is said that we have an insufficiency, then it means that
something will not be done, and at the moment we are not at that
point. I would not say that the piece of elastic is not very taut,
it is, and I cannot hide that from you.
Q73 Mr Holloway: Both in Iraq and
Afghanistan senior commanders are saying that it is actually preventing
them from doing things. It is not a function of harmony guidelines
or anything else. They do not believe they have enough helicopters.
Mr Ingram: It is a function of
harmony guidelines because availability of crew and platforms,
and there is no question at all that again probably things will
not be done because of non-availability of resource, that is a
judgment that the field commander then has to make, what he should
be doing, and what we try to do is to give an appropriate level
of platforms to meet the broad objectives. If additional demands
are then raised, it has to be judged as to what platforms are
available, what crews are available and, as I said, if they are
not there or we do not have them, we cannot use them.
Q74 Chairman: Do you know how many
helicopters we have in Iraq?
Mr Ingram: Off the top of my head,
I do not know, but we can give you the figures on that. There
may actually be figures coming as we go. We do know it, but we
just do not have the figure to give you at the moment.[8]
Lt General Houghton: ***
Q75 Chairman: A staggering story
we heard while we were in Baghdad was that the Americans had found
in a warehouse 147 helicopters of theirs which they had not realised
they had lost. By comparison, we have 17 helicopters in the whole
of Iraq, I think. Our British troops are working alongside the
Americans and they can see the fantastic surplus of men, equipment,
money, everything that the Americans have and it is tough on them.
Mr Ingram: It is tough on them,
but we can only deploy that which we have both in platforms and
in personnel and the personnel are way beyond the harmony guidelines
in some areas. It gets to the point of criticality as well. We
have not reached that yet, but we have to be conscious of all
of that. We also have to be conscious of the fact that it is about
recuperation, it is about refreshment of those crews and these
are the judgments which have to be made. If it gets to the point
where we do not have the resource, then we cannot use it. We are
not at that point yet.
Linda Gilroy: I just wanted to say, in
addition to what Adam was saying, that there were mixed messages
as between some of the official briefings and some of the informal
information which we were able to discuss with some of the personnel
and I would say that bears out what you are saying up to a point.
Q76 Mr Havard: A lot of it was about
the capability of each of the platforms and the guidelines under
which they have to operate, *** but we are going to learn from
this and the new kit that we are going to have, some *** the Americans
have them, and obviously in extremis the damned thing will
fly, no matter what, it will just get people out, and we understood
all of that. I think it was the question about what lessons we
have been learning and ***.
Lt General Houghton: ***
Q77 Mr Havard: So that is being reviewed
then?
Lt General Houghton: Yes.
Q78 Chairman: When do you expect
to announce a replacement for the Sea King?
Mr Ingram: When we are ready to
do so. It is being looked at. You are aware that it is being looked
at. That is one of the encouraging things, that we have a very
sizeable rotary wing programme which is currently being evaluated
as to what we need, how many and what the cost is going to be,
so we will just have to wait and see and we will announce it when
we are ready to announce it.
Q79 Chairman: Moving on to Hercules,
you have assured us that you are taking appropriate action about
the Hercules flight safety concerns and it seemed to be an area
of concern to the pilots in theatre, and I wondered whether you
were aware that they were concerned about the vulnerability of
the Hercules aircraft that they were flying.
Mr Ingram: I am trying to think
if I have spoken to any pilots recently about that. I have not
had any personal point of contact, but again, given some of the
prominence which has been given to the issue, then it would not
surprise me that they would be thinking that they are now flying
a piece of kit that should have something fitted to it. That is
what we are seeking to do. We are all experienced enough to know
that there has to be a balance of risk in all of this. It goes
back to the point that, if we were not to use those aircraft,
we could not deliver on our mission in Iraq and, therefore, while
we build up that new protective measure, we have to again use
aircraft in the most effective and judicious way. A lot of those
aircraft have very substantial fit on them now in terms of DAS
and if the requirement is justified, it will then be procured.
It takes time in any procurement stream to go through that process
and one big success we have in procurement of course is on the
urgent operational requirement process. Everyone who looks at
this recognises the success of it, but, because you identify a
shortfall or a requirement, it does not mean to say you can deliver
it overnight. It is not because of lack of money, but it is then
because of availability within industry to upgrade. In terms of
what we are trying to do with that particular fit on the Hercules,
and we are considering whether we now need that to be fitted to
aircraft other than those which operate in the highest threat
environment, that then has an impact on the rest of the Hercules
maintenance programme, and it is trying to get the balance right
because, if we start losing airframes because we are doing that
particular fit, then we have another operational problem. That
is where the balance of discussion is taking place at the moment
as well as trying to ensure that industry can deliver on the schedules
that we are giving them.
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