Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1-19)
RT HON
DES BROWNE
MP, BRIGADIER STEPHEN
ANDREWS CBE AND
MR DAVID
GOULD CB
11 JULY 2006
Q1 Chairman: Secretary of State, you
are most welcome to your first evidence session in front of the
Defence Committee. Could I ask you to begin by introducing your
colleagues, who I am sure we know already but nevertheless it
would be helpful if you could for the record?
Des Browne: Thank you very much
indeed, Chairman. Can I thank you for inviting me here today.
Can I just say I am a strong believer in democratic accountability,
and having been a member of select committees myself, as I am
sure you are aware, I think they have a real role to play in holding
the Executive to account. I have with me to my right Brigadier
Stephen Andrews, who is the Director of Service Personnel Policy
Strategy; and David Gould, who is the Deputy Chief Executive of
the Defence Procurement Agency.
Q2 Chairman: Thank you very much.
You have been Secretary of State for two months. Could you say
very briefly please what your top three priorities are?
Des Browne: As you point out,
I have been in this job for two months now, or 10 weeks as I reminded
myself this morning. I have made it my priority over those 10
weeks to focus on the key strategic issues that defence is facing,
and top of the list is of course Iraq and Afghanistan, and ensuring
that our forces have the clear direction that they need and also
the support, including force protection, that they need in both
theatres, which I know is an issue that members of this Committee
have taken a close interest in, and I am sure we will come on
to that over the course of this session. There are also key issues
in defence spending and procurement and of course the vital business
of protecting the reputation of our Armed Forces. If that meets
your requirement for three: our deployment in theatre; spending
and procurement; and reputation.
Q3 Chairman: Thank you. How will
we know whether you have succeeded?
Des Browne: I am absolutely certain
that over the course of my term of office many people will make
it their business to set exam questions for me and will also mark
those papers and decide whether or not I have succeeded. I think
that in terms of Iraq and Afghanistan our strategic approach to
both is clear. There is in Iraq a developing opportunity with
the standing up of the Government in Iraq for us to move to the
position of transition to a democratic and, hopefully, peaceful
Iraq. In Afghanistan I fear that our commitment may be significantly
long term and it will be some time before we know whether we have
a sustainable long-term position in Afghanistan, given the nature
of that country. The test in relation to defence spending and
procurement is whether we can achieve the ability to be able to
deliver to our forces at the front-line the resources that they
need and the support for those resources throughout the life of
those resources, if they are platforms or more substantial capabilities,
and also the ability to respond with the flexibility with which
we will need to respond in this changing world and the terms of
deployment of our expeditionary forces. Of course, the challenge
in terms of defence spending will be to ensure that we have enough
financial support to achieve those objectives.
Q4 Chairman: Those are not very hard-edged
criteria, would you not agree, as to whether you have succeeded
or not as Secretary of State?
Des Browne: Well, with respect
Chairman, from where I am sitting 10 weeks into this job I think
they are very challenging and hard-edged criteria. I have of course
inherited, as you are aware, within the structure of government
a number of performance targets which were with the Department
before I came and we are, of course, in the process of a Comprehensive
Spending Review which will generate other measures of success
or failure or challenge going forward, but from the perspective
that I have at the moment, I think these are very challenging
and hard-edged. I have to accept, however, Chairman, that it seems
to be that in the changing world in which we live there is not
going to come a time when we are going to be able to say that
the challenges that we face now and the issues in defence are
completed. We will be looking at them long term and I am looking,
from where I am at the moment, as these being long-term challenges.
Chairman: Okay, thank you. You mentioned
Iraq just now and moving on to that, Mark Lancaster?
Q5 Mr Lancaster: Secretary of State,
you will be aware that the Committee went to Iraq last month and
I want to first explore, if I can, the handover of control of
security for the four provinces for which we are currently responsible.
On 19 June you announced that some time in July the Al Muthanna
Province will be handed over to Iraqi control. We are now in the
middle of July; is that still on schedule?
Des Browne: As far as I understand
it, the Iraqi Government intend to formally take over responsibility
for Al Muthanna Province on 13 July.
Q6 Mr Lancaster: Right, so literally
within the next two days, hopefully. When we were there we visited
Ten Division, which is the Iraqi division in the south there,
and met Major General Abdul Al Latif Taban Mohammed. One of his
principal concerns was that he lacked any great logistical support
or equipment. Whilst his soldiers were making rapid progress,
he lacked that support. Given that he lacked that support, are
you still confident that the Iraqi Armed Forces as well as the
Police are in a position to take over control of that province?
Des Browne: I am satisfied that
the process that was gone through to make the decision to commence
the transition to local Iraqi forces in Al Muthanna was conducted
properly and was exhaustive. I have to say that this is the beginning
of the process. I recognise that while 10th Division of the Iraqi
Army has made considerable progress, and quite a significant amount
of it under our tutelage, because we have, we believe, trained
90% of that force to a very high standard—and can I just
say slightly tangentially that I appreciate greatly the visits
of your Committee both to Iraq and to Afghanistan and the very
strong message that that gives to our forces on the ground of
interest by parliamentarians cross-party to what they are doing
and is very important to morale there. I, too, have visited Iraq
now twice in the 10 weeks that I have been the Secretary of State
and met with Major General Latif to discuss these very issues.
I recognise that there are still challenges in relation to logistics
but I am satisfied that we are making progress with regard to
them. During the process of handover we will need to satisfy ourselves
with our coalition partners that the logistical support that is
necessary for the Iraqi Army to be able to play the role, as it
will, in Al Muthanna Province is available to them. Bear in mind,
of course, that while we and others who are with us—the
Japanese in particular—will remove our small force from
Al Muthanna, we will continue to overwatch and ensure that the
forces get the support that they need.
Q7 Mr Lancaster: If I can move on to
the other three provinces briefly, Chairman, if I may, the first
two, Maysan and Dhi Qar; where are we with those provinces. If
I were a cynic I would say that one of the considerations would
be whether or not there were any provinces in the north that could
also be handed over at the same time to balance them. Is that
a factor?
Des Browne: I am not sure that,
with respect Mr Lancaster, I fully understand the question of
balance. You may want to supplement that question and perhaps
you should do it now because I am not entirely sure—
Q8 Mr Lancaster: From a political
point of view, it would be advantageous to the Iraqi Government
to have perhaps Kurdish provinces in the north handed over at
the same time to give balance.
Des Browne: I think the Committee
will be aware of this from those whom they have spoken to in Iraq.
In my second visit to Iraq, I spent a considerable amount of time
speaking to ministers in Iraq in the new Government, to establish
from my own point of view how well this Government was working
together to get some sense of whether it had a coherent programme
moving forward, but that is another matter. The point I want to
make is that in your meetings with Iraqi ministers and your observation
of what they have said, you will see that there is an ambition
in the Iraqi Government, particularly expressed by the Prime Minister,
to see substantial progress in relation to transition across Iraq,
having announced at the beginning that they have a significant
ambition to achieve transition in a substantial number of provinces
within the next 12 months or thereabouts. I think that process
as it evolves, with the Iraqi Government in the lead, will provide
the level of balance that you think is politically important—and
I agree with you that it will be politically important to see
that this is not just happening in one part of Iraq because there
are, arguably, 14 out of the 18 provinces that could be considered
for inclusion in that process. As far as Maysan and Dhi Qar are
concerned, it is our view, and I have expressed this view, that
significant progress has been made in relation to both of those
provinces. Dhi Qar, where the Italians were based, is, in my view,
an early contender for inclusion in the process. I would be disappointed
if the Iraqi Government, in consultation with the coalition, did
not announce relatively soon that Dhi Qar was to be included.
That is the same view as I take about Maysan but I recognise that
Maysan has a particular geographical feature which requires some
consideration, and that is the border with Iran. Of course, Maysan
Province has always had that geographical feature. It has always
been positioned where it is, and the history over centuries of
that part of the world has meant that that border has not been
recognised by a significant number of the people who live there
because they believe that historically it was imposed on them
by others who did not understand their culture. In terms of advance
and in terms of suitability and inclusion for discussion in the
process of transition, then my view is that Maysan Province ought
to be included in those early discussions, too.
Q9 Mr Lancaster: Finally, Chairman,
just to complete the picture, can we look at Basra. When we were
there we saw—and you will be aware, Secretary of State—that
they are using this traffic light system of red, amber and green
to assess whether or not a province is ready for handover, and
Basra was red so the least likely to be handed over, but we are
told hopefully they were looking at a date in October or November,
which is really quite soon considering it is currently at red.
We are also assured that any decision will be conditions-based,
based on the effects on the ground. Is it just a coincidence that
we seem to be aiming towards an October/November handover of Basra
which happens to coincide with the next movement of our troops
and perhaps an opportunity to downsize the number of troops? If
I were a cynic I would say that apart from being conditions-based
perhaps it is also politically-based and that there may be a connection
to freeing up troops in Iraq to go elsewhere?
Des Browne: Obviously, Mr Lancaster,
you are free to be as cynical or otherwise as you choose to be.
You can search anything that I have said or my predecessor has
said or indeed any minister has said in relation to this and you
will not find anywhere that we have put a date on any of these
transitions. I am not in the business of putting dates on transition
because we have been very clear from the outset—and this
has been agreed with the Iraqi Government and with our allies
there, the coalition forces—that the readiness or otherwise
of a province for transition will be dependent upon conditions.
It would probably be gratuitously boring of me to repeat those
conditions because I am sure that every member of the Committee
is familiar with the four of them. I see the Chairman nodding
so I will resist the temptation that I am putting in front of
myself to do that. It is undoubtedly the case that Basra, of the
four provinces for which we have responsibility in MND(SE) in
terms of command, is the most challenging. It is undoubtedly the
case that there has been a significant amount of Shia on Shia
violence there in the context of a power struggle in the political
and economic situation, particularly in the period before the
Government stood up. It is undoubtedly the case that although
it is not nearly as bad as this sort of violence has proved to
be in Baghdad, that there is also violence between the Shia and
Sunni communities there. All of those issues, in my view, have
to be addressed by a combination of a security plan which has
been agreed almost in its totality with the central government,
supported politically by the central government of Baghdad, reflecting
hands-on leadership and direction by the government in Baghdad
for the application and implementation of that security plan.
It has partly been implemented in the sense that the Iraqi Army
has been deployed to provide security in the streets of Basra,
to some effect, although there continues to be violence, and I
do not deny that and I suggest that that violence continues to
create a challenge for us. Our ability to be able to deal with
that and our ability to be able to reduce the threat to the point
where their forces, including the Police (which needs significant
reform) can deal with it, will be the beginning of us beginning
to discuss the possibility of transition.
Mr Lancaster: Thank you.
Q10 Mr Holloway: Slightly following
on from that, when we were there, I do not know what others felt
but I found it slightly surreal that three years after the invasion
we were still conducting patrols without an Iraqi face. I know
that was down to the particular local political circumstances
but what are we doing now in order to maintain the tolerance of
the Iraqi civilian population and not look like an army of occupation?
To what extent are we now wandering around with Iraqis?
Des Browne: As I have already
said to Mr Lancaster, we have in the context of the Basra security
plan, although it is not properly completely formed and not properly
completely supported in my view by the central government yet
(although there is no lack of will to support it, there are details
that have to be worked out) a significant deployment on the ground
of the Iraqi Army, and we are supporting that Army in its patrolling
on the ground in Basra in the hope that we can instil and build
a level of security to create an opportunity for us to deal with
the elements in the Police that need to be dealt with. Of course,
that requires a degree of political coverage. These steps are
now being taken but it is a transitional process.
Q11 Mr Holloway: Do all our patrols
have an Iraqi face now?
Des Browne: I am not in a position
to answer that question specifically but I will write to the Committee
with the specific answer to that.[1]
I have an impression but I would like to just check with the commanders
on the ground what the specific answer is to that very specific
question.
Q12 Chairman: Could you do so because
I think we have had the impression that that has improved quite
significantly in the last three weeks or so, but it would be helpful
if you would write to the Committee.
Des Browne: Chairman, can I say
I know it has improved significantly and I know that substantially
the answer is yes. So the simple answer to the question is yes
but I will establish whether or not it is absolute.
Chairman: Thank you. Dai Havard?
Q13 Mr Havard: Can I ask you about
Provincial Reconstruction Teams. I have made three visits to Iraq
in the last two years and the one thing that has been concerning
not just me but a lot of other people is the mantra which we are
all chanting which is that there is no military solution and that
you also have to have reconstruction and politics put together
with it in order to achieve anything. Over a period of time we
have now got elected processes and Iraqis apparently in control
of certain things. What were to me dysfunctional processes like
the CPA and the Project Contract Office, have gone away. The latest
idea to try and knit these things together is Provincial Reconstruction
Teams. I was pleased to see some sort of intent—and the
essential idea has come from our experience in Afghanistan presumably—but
what is the process? Is it a way of us simply being able to better
co-ordinate our responses in relation to that or is it a way of
driving forward what ought to be the Iraqi national development
and redevelopment plans?
Des Browne: The Provincial Reconstruction
Teams are primarily a focus for bringing together the assets that
we have in Basra, which is what you are asking me about, not only
from the military, from the MoD, but also from the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office and from the Department for International
Development, to focus our collective attention on reconstruction.
I think the Committee will understand and certainly will understand
clearly from their recent visit to Afghanistan that there is a
correlation between the ability to be able to deliver security
and to be able to deliver reconstruction. Those reconstruction
teams also work in conjunction with the development arms of the
Iraqi Government in order to deliver improvement and change. Can
I just say that there are a number of very specific projects being
led by the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Basra that have made
significant progress.
Q14 Chairman: Could you give an example?
Des Browne: There are two projects
in particular, one in relation to water and sewerage and the other
in relation to electricity that have been long, involved projects
that are within months of delivery. The difficulty is that they
will not show until all of the work is done but all of the work
is almost complete and they will be able to show significant progress.
The second problem is that what work has been done, for example
reconstruction work in relation to the electricity infrastructure,
has been significant and improving work, but the security situation
in parts of Iraq is such that we cannot advertise that that work
has been done, because we have done it with Iraqi partners and
we recognise that there is a danger if we advertise that work
has been done with the coalition forces it might identify potential
targets for other people, and we have to be very careful in terms
of the personal security of Iraqis who work with us. That is a
limiting factor in terms of being able to celebrate and brand
improvements that have taken place but they are taking place inexorably.
Q15 Mr Havard: Can I just follow
that through for a second. That is part of the problem, is it
not? One of the questions I was going to ask you was about finance.
As I understand it, it is a way of drawing on a whole raft of
different types of finances from all the organisations to which
you have alluded, and maybe others later, but the whole business
about who you involve in the process and the fact these are seen
to be Iraqi plants at the end of the day and that the Iraqis are
benefitting, not contractors from somewhere else, is a real problem,
is it not, because you want to show to Iraqis that it is they
who are doing it and they who have had successes, and yet we seem
to be pretending that it is going to be some separate agency that
has come in and delivered for them rather than with them or that
they have done it?
Des Browne: I do not think there
is any sense of pretence about this at all. The one factor which
will meet all of our needs in terms of Basra is to be able to
see the improvements taking place and to be able to allow the
local governments at provincial level or alternatively the central
government to be able to take credit for that.
Q16 Mr Havard: They should be claiming
the victory.
Des Browne: With respect, Mr Havard,
it is not a question of victory; it is a question of improving
the situation and showing to the people of Basra and the south
east of Iraq, and indeed other parts of Iraq, that democratically
elected government and good governance will deliver opportunities
for them in terms of not only security but developmental opportunities
and economic advance. It is that virtuous circle of security providing
development providing security providing development that will
eventually embed the democracy which is already well established
in Iraq.
Q17 Mr Havard: The PRT will be a
driver for that? That is its intention?
Des Browne: The PRT is making
a significant contribution to that, yes.
Chairman: We have a lot of ground to
cover. I want to move on to Afghanistan.
Q18 Mr Hancock: I want to ask one
small question. It is about the assets once they are provided,
the electricity, sewerage and water, which are vitally important.
Are you satisfied that once they are commissioned and in place
that there is an adequate force available to protect those assets
or will that be a job for the coalition?
Des Browne: I would say to you,
Mr Hancock, that since the Iraqi Government stood up there has
been a significant reduction in attacks upon the electricity infrastructure.
We have argued from here that there was a relationship between
the ability of the Government to be able to take control of its
own country and the level of insurgency, and that includes attacks
on infrastructure. The early indications are that—and it
is maybe too early to say whether that will be sustained—there
is progress in that direction.
Chairman: Moving on to Afghanistan, David
Hamilton?
Q19 Mr Hamilton: Minister, yesterday
you announced a substantial increase in the number of troops going
into Afghanistan. Will that force us to reduce our commitments
in Iraq, Bosnia or Kosovo?
Des Browne: I think the answer
to that is that we will take decisions in relation to the level
of our deployment in all of those theatres in relation to the
circumstances of the theatres themselves, and they will not influence
each other.
1 Note: See Ev 22 Back
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