Appendix: Government response
Introduction
1. The Government is pleased to present its response
to the House of Commons Defence Committee's Eighth Report of Session
2005-06 on the Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent.
MOD Engagement
We welcome the Government's promise of a full
and open debate in Parliament and in the country at large, on
the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. We are surprised
and disappointed that the Ministry of Defence has refused to participate
in our inquiry. We believe that a genuine and meaningful debate
is only possible with the active participation of the MOD. We
call upon the MOD to engage fully in our forthcoming inquiries
into the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. We hope
the MOD will make a substantive response to this report and that
it will address openly the issues we have raised. (Paragraph 12)
2. The Ministry of Defence does not accept these
criticisms. We are disappointed that the Committee chose in its
report not to recognise the substantive contributions that we
made to its considerations. We provided an initial memorandum
in November 2005, setting out the expected life of the current
system, the possible legal constraints on our decision-making
and more detail on the programme of investment at the Atomic Weapons
Establishment, Aldermaston. The then Defence Secretary also covered
this issue in some detail during his introductory session with
the Committee on 1 November 2005. We also wrote to the Clerk
of the Committee on three occasions (on 26 September 2005, 24
November 2005 and 29 November 2005) indicating the limitations
on the information that could be made available in support of
an early inquiry, given that work by officials on this issue was
then at a very early stage and that Ministers had not yet become
involved. The timing of the inquiry was for the Committee to
decide, but this made it difficult for the Department to meet
all of the Committee's requests for information.
3. We will continue to do all we can to support future
inquiries by the Committee in this area. This document aims to
provide the substantive response to the report which the Committee
requested.
4. The Government has promised a full debate on this
issue and the publication of a White Paper. We have also made
clear that decisions will be taken this year. The means of consulting
Parliament will be made clear when we publish the White Paper.
The Size of the UK's Nuclear Arsenal
The UK's strategic nuclear arsenal is small in
comparison with the other established nuclear powers. (Paragraph
45)
5. The MOD agrees that the UK's strategic nuclear
arsenal is small in comparison with the other established nuclear
powers. This comparison is, however, not necessarily a useful
one, as the UK pursues a strategy of minimum nuclear deterrence.
We do not see Trident as a weapon system for fighting wars, but
as having a fundamentally political role in deterring aggression.
We would only ever contemplate its use in extreme circumstances
of self-defence. The extent of our nuclear capabilities is therefore
maintained at the minimum level required to deter aggressors,
rather than by the number of warheads held by other countries.
6. The UK has an extremely good record of meeting
our obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since
the end of the Cold War we have:
- withdrawn and dismantled the
RAF's WE177 nuclear bomb without replacement, so that Trident
is our only nuclear weapons system. The UK is the only Nuclear
Weapon State to have reduced to a deterrent based on a single
platform, a single delivery system and a single warhead design.
- dismantled all of our remaining
Chevaline (Polaris) warheads demonstrating our commitment to irreversible
reductions in the UK's nuclear weapons.
- reduced our operationally available
stockpile of nuclear weapons to fewer than 200 warheads, (a 70%
reduction in the potential explosive power of our nuclear forces
since the end of the Cold War).
- reduced the readiness of our
nuclear forces. Only one Trident submarine at a time is on deterrent
patrol, carrying 48 warheads (compared to a previously planned
total of 96), normally on several days' "notice to fire".
Its missiles are not targeted at any country.
7. We noted one minor error in the report on this
subject. It is not the case (as stated in para 38 of the report)
that the Strategic Defence Review stipulated that no more than
3 warheads would be fitted to each UK Trident D5 missile or that
the precise number of warheads carried on patrol at any given
time remains classified. The SDR in fact said simply the following:
"We will have only one submarine on patrol at
a time, carrying a reduced load of 48 warheads." (SDR Chapter
4 Para 67)
The role of the Nuclear Deterrent
In considering the future of the strategic nuclear
deterrent, the UK will need to examine whether the concept of
nuclear deterrence remains useful in the current strategic environment
and in the context of the existing and emerging threats to the
security of the country. We will have to consider whether those
states and non-state actors posing such threats can, in reality,
be deterred from instigating acts of aggression by either existing
or new approaches to nuclear deterrence. We will also have to
consider how the UK's nuclear capability should be adjusted to
meet new strategic realities. Trident was developed during the
final decade of the Cold War, and was designed to counter the
threat posed by the size and technical capabilities of the Soviet
strategic nuclear arsenal: we need to consider whether the form
of the UK's current nuclear deterrent is best suited to today's
and tomorrow's strategic challenges. (Paragraph 55)
We believe that it is essential that, before making
any decisions on the future of the strategic nuclear deterrent,
the MOD should explain its understanding of the purpose and continuing
relevance of nuclear deterrence now and over the lifetime of any
potential Trident successor system. (Paragraph 56)
8. The Department notes these conclusions. In terms
of the current system and current security threats, the Strategic
Defence Review considered carefully the relevance of nuclear deterrence
in the post-Cold War world. It concluded that:
"the continuing risk from the proliferation
of nuclear weapons, and the certainty that a number of other countries
will retain substantial nuclear arsenals, mean that our minimum
nuclear deterrent capability, currently represented by Trident,
is likely to remain a necessary element of our security."
9. The SDR did, however, lead to some reductions
in the scale of our nuclear capabilities, as set out in our response
to Conclusion 2 above.
10. Work is currently underway by officials to consider
the potential role of the UK strategic nuclear deterrent over
the lifetime of any potential successor system. The White Paper
will set out the conclusions of our analysis on future risks and
threats, the extent of any enduring requirements for a minimum
nuclear deterrent, the possible options and costs.
International Impact
Before any decisions on the future of the deterrent
are made, it will be important to consider whether the possession
of nuclear weapons enhances the UK's international influence and
status and whether this contributes to the justification for retention
of a strategic nuclear capability. (Paragraph 57)
It is clear that there is a difference of views
and no clear consensus that international influence is, of itself,
a reason to retain the strategic nuclear deterrent. We recommend
that the MOD make clear whether the Government believes the possession
of a nuclear deterrent is an important contributor to the UK's
international influence. (Paragraph 65)
11. We maintain the current nuclear deterrent, not
because of the status it gives us, but because of its role in
deterring acts of aggression, in insuring against the re-emergence
of major strategic military threats, in preventing nuclear coercion,
and in preserving peace and stability. We will set out more fully
the factors we believe are relevant to the current and any possible
future minimum nuclear deterrent by the UK when we publish a White
Paper.
Independence
The public debate over the future of the UK's
strategic nuclear deterrent should address:
- the independence of the
UK's current system; and
- the operational and diplomatic
impact of any potential dependency on the United States of any
future UK nuclear deterrent. (Paragraph 66)
It is important to distinguish between two different
types of independence: independence of acquisition and independence
of operation. We heard that independence of acquisition is what
the French have opted for at a significantly higher cost to the
defence budget. Independence of operation is an alternative concept
of independence and it is this which the UK has opted for at a
lower price. (Paragraph 80)
We call upon the MOD to clarify the technical
dependencies of the UK's Trident system upon the United States
and to respond to the argument that the UK's nuclear deterrent
is not truly independent. In weighing the importance of maintaining
independence, attention needs to be paid to the differing concepts
of independence adopted by the UK and France. (Paragraph 84)
12. The Department notes these remarks and we would
disagree with much of the evidence given to the Committee on this
question. In terms of the current system, as we have made clear
on many occasions, the UK Trident system is fully
operationally independent of the US or any other state. Decision-making
and use of the system remains entirely sovereign to the UK. Only
the Prime Minister can authorise the use of the UK's nuclear deterrent,
even if the missiles are to be fired as part of a NATO response.
The instruction to fire would be transmitted to the submarine
using entirely UK codes and UK equipment. All the command and
control procedures are totally independent. The Vanguard-class
submarines can readily operate without the Global Positioning
by Satellite (GPS) system and the Trident D5 missile does not
use GPS at all: it has an inertial guidance system. We would
require no lesser degree of operational independence for any successor
system should the Government decide to replace Trident.
Future Threats
The public debate about the future of the UK's
strategic nuclear deterrent must take into account:
- the nature of the threats
facing the UK;
- how these threats could
evolve over the lifetime of any potential Trident successor system;
and
- in what ways retention of
a strategic nuclear deterrent might assist the UK in addressing
these threats. (Paragraph 85)
The most pressing threat currently facing the
UK is that of international terrorism. Witnesses to our inquiry
overwhelmingly argued that the strategic nuclear deterrent could
serve no useful or practical purpose in countering this kind of
threat. (Paragraph 88)
Witnesses to our inquiry did not believe that
the UK currently faced a direct or impending military threat from
any of the established nuclear weapons states, including Russia,
China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, or, of course, from
France or the United States. (Paragraph 95)
There are difficulties inherent in anticipating
future threats to the security of the UK. It is not possible
to predict accurately the nature of the future strategic international
environment and to identify with any certainty the threats the
UK is likely to face. (Paragraph 96)
We call upon the MOD to consider publicly the
threats the UK faces today and how those threats may evolve in
the future. Such a threat assessment will shape any decision
on the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. We accept
that future threats are unknowable, but, clearly, a world in which
nuclear proliferation had taken hold would create deep uncertainties
in international relations. For this reason, the UK may wish
to retain a strategic nuclear capability as a guard against the
unknown. If the MOD believes in the value of the nuclear deterrent
as an insurance policy, rather than in response to any specific
threat, we believe it is important to say clearly that this is
the reason for needing the deterrent. (Paragraph 103)
13. The debate about the future of the UK's nuclear
deterrent is less about the security position now than about the
extent to which we can be confident about the nature of the risks
and threats to our defence and security interests that we might
face over the next 20-50 years
14. Our overall assessment of potential long-term
security challenges will be set out in a paper on the future strategic
context, which is due to be published by the MOD later this year.
We will set out the conclusions of our analysis of the risks
and threats over the period directly relevant to our nuclear deterrent
capabilities, and therefore any replacement for the Trident system,
in the forthcoming White Paper.
Timetable for Decisions
The Government has stated that decisions on the
future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent will be required
during the course of the current Parliament. To date, it has offered
no explanation of the nature of those decisions. If there is to
be a meaningful debate on the future of the UK's strategic nuclear
deterrent, the public should know what decisions will be required,
when they must be taken and implemented, and what factors are
driving consideration of the issue now. (Paragraph 104)
A fundamental political decision needs to be made
on whether or not the UK should retain a strategic nuclear deterrent.
There is no clear point at which this decision has to be made
and there is a risk that—by taking a series of decisions
to keep options open—we could find that we have in practice
taken the decision to keep the deterrent. Conversely, if we do
not keep those options open, we could find we are left without
a deterrent. In our view, the UK should make a clear decision
on whether to retain the strategic nuclear deterrent. It is important
that a decision of this magnitude is not taken by default. It
should be made only after a full public debate. It must not be
made by the Government in secret. (Paragraph 106)
A service life extension programme would allow
the UK to postpone decisions on whether to replace Trident until
around 2010, on the basis that a service life extension programme
would add an additional five years to the existing system and
that procurement of a Trident replacement would take approximately
14 years. By this time, it is possible that the strategic environment
might be clearer. But it is likely to be an expensive process.
Such an expensive option should not be used only as a means of
deferring a decision on the future of the UK's strategic nuclear
deterrent. (Paragraph 110)
Given the new investment at Aldermaston, and the
widespread expectation that a new warhead will not be required
until well into the 2020s, the timelines for manufacturing a replacement
warhead is not a key driver of the current debate. (Paragraph
121)
Since the Trident II D5 missile will be in service
in the United States until 2042, this component of the system
is not a key driver of the current debate. (Paragraph 124)
The platform is generally regarded as the crucial
factor driving the current debate on the future of the UK's strategic
nuclear deterrent. (Paragraph 126)
15. The Department notes these conclusions and recommendations.
In the memorandum forwarded to the Committee in November
2005, the Department made the following comments on the expected
life of each element of the current system:
a) The Warhead:
The current warhead came into service with the
Trident system in 1994. An extensive research programme to assure
the safety and effectiveness of the warhead stockpile, coupled
with the additional investment at AWE Aldermaston announced on
19 July 2005, gives a high level of confidence that the current
warhead design can, if required, be maintained in service at least
into the 2020s, with some relatively minor upgrading and refurbishment
during the first half of the next decade.
b) The Ballistic Missiles:
The Trident D5 missile came into service with
the Royal Navy in 1994, with a planned life of some 25 years.
The US Navy has recently announced plans for a life extension
programme for the D5 missile, which will ensure it can remain
in-service with the US Navy into the 2040s. The UK Government
has yet to decide whether or not to participate in this programme.
c) The Submarines:
HMS VANGUARD entered operational service with
the Royal Navy in 1994, with the other three submarines in its
class following in 1995, 1998 and 2001. The submarines were procured
with a designed operational life of 25 years and on this basis,
they would start to be withdrawn from service late in the next
decade. A series of studies have considered whether it would be
practicable and cost effective to continue to operate the submarines
beyond the original design intent. We now believe that, if required,
this would be possible, albeit with gradually increasing cost
and some increasing risk of reduced availability, perhaps out
to the mid-2020s.
16. The time-table for decision making is driven
by the life span of the current system and the lead-time that
would be required for the acquisition of any replacement. Given
our assessment of the time it might take to develop any replacements,
we believe the key decisions that are required in the near term
relate to:
a) participation in the life extension programme
for the Trident D5 missile; and
b) extension of the life of, and any replacement
for, the Vanguard-class submarines.
17. Other decisions will be necessary beyond this
point. The background to this position will be set out in more
detail in the White Paper. We do not share the assessment, set
out at conclusion 17 of the report, that extending the life of
the Vanguard-class submarines means that we can postpone decisions
on any replacement for the Vanguard class submarines until around
2010. We believe that it would be imprudent to assume that any
successor to the Vanguard-class could be designed, procured and
deployed within 14 years.
Skills and Infrastructure
It is important that the Government continue to
invest in the UK infrastructure and skills base until a decision
on whether to retain or abolish the nuclear deterrent is made.
Unless this investment is forthcoming, the Government is likely
to find that its options will be constrained and that certain
choices for the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent will no longer
be viable. (Paragraph 115)
We believe that the maintenance of onshore infrastructure
and the domestic UK skills base is an issue of paramount importance
in considering the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent. We have
decided that this will be the focus of the next in our series
of inquiries into the future of the strategic nuclear deterrent.
In that inquiry we will also address the linkage between the Government's
Defence Industrial Strategy and the decision on retention, replacement,
or abolition of the UK's Trident system. (Paragraph 138)
18. The Department remains committed to keeping options
open in advance of decisions on the future of the deterrent.
The Defence Industrial Strategy states that for the foreseeable
future we will retain on-shore:
"all of those capabilities unique to submarines
and their Nuclear Steam Raising Plant, to enable their design,
build, support, operation and decommissioning".
The Department has therefore funded work to sustain
submarine design capability across a broad range of industrial
and technology areas, including BAE Systems and Rolls Royce design
teams. For example, the need to maintain key skills in the area
of nuclear propulsion is being addressed through focused work
aimed at addressing both current fleet issues as well as the planned
and any potential future submarine programmes. Some £20M
was invested last year in Rolls-Royce and other key partners in
this respect and we anticipate investing similar sums this year
and next.
19. Furthermore, as we announced in July 2005, we
are making an additional investment averaging around £350M
per year over each of the three years to 2007/08 at the Atomic
Weapons Establishment. This investment is aimed at sustaining
facilities and skills that are required to maintain the safety
and effectiveness of the current Trident warhead stockpile without
recourse to nuclear testing, in compliance with the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and also to keep options open for the
future.
20. We note and welcome the Committee's intention
to make these and related issues the focus of the next stage of
their inquiry into the Strategic Nuclear Deterrent.
Deterrent Posture
If the MoD believes that the UK should retain
the Continuous-at-Sea Deterrent cycle, it must either extend the
life of the Vanguard-class submarine or procure a new platform
to be in service by 2020. In the light of the reduced threat we
currently face, an alternative possibility would be to retain
a deterrent, but not continuously at sea. (Paragraph 130)
21. The question of the operational posture of the
existing UK nuclear deterrent was considered in detail during
the Strategic Defence Review. It was then concluded that:
"ending continuous deterrent patrols would create
new risks of crisis escalation if it proved necessary to sail
a Trident submarine in a period of rising tension or crisis.
This is a particular concern given our reduction to a single nuclear
system. It could force a government into earlier and hastier decision
making if strategic circumstances were to deteriorate. Either
step would undermine the stabilising role that Britain's nuclear
deterrent forces would otherwise play in a developing crisis".
22. The posture to be adopted by any successor system
will need to be considered carefully against our perceptions of
the operational requirement. This will be addressed in the White
Paper to be published following the decisions to be taken later
this year. However, the ability of any deterrent system to survive
pre-emptive action by an adversary is likely to remain an important
aspect of its credibility.
| 
