Appendix: Government response
1. The Government welcomes the Committee's report
on UK Operations in Iraq. The Government's response to the conclusions
and recommendations contained in the Committee's report is set
out below.
We are disturbed by the deterioration in the security
situation in MND(SE) over the past months. Coalition forces in
the region now operate in the context of a significantly higher
threat than they did during the initial post-conflict phase of
operations. And for ordinary Iraqis, lawlessness remains a particular
difficulty. We recognise that the security in South Eastern Iraq
is very different from, and more benign than, in some areas beyond
the UK's area of responsibility. We accept that the increase in
violence in the region is due largely to the local struggle for
political and economic power, rather than from a sectarian-based
insurgency. But we remain concerned about the implications for
UK Forces of the steady escalation of violence in the region.
(Paragraph 15)
2. The security situation in Basra deteriorated in
February and the levels of violence peaked in July and August.
As the Committee accepts, much of the violence is attributable
to armed militia vying for power and wealth. However the overall
position is that the four Provinces of MND(SE) account for less
than 4% of the total attacks in Iraq. The Al-Muthanna and Dhi
Qar Provinces have satisfied the conditions required to transfer
security to Iraqi control. In Maysan we have repositioned UK forces
to allow us to address border security and reduce the threat of
attacks on UK forces in the province by adopting a lower profile
presence without fixed bases.
3. It is important to remember the role of British
and coalition forces is to help hold the security ring while the
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) develop and until the Government of
Iraq and local authorities are able to take full charge of the
country's security.
It is essential that the central Government in
Baghdad, as a whole, maintains its interest in Basra and the wider
region and has the capability to deliver its intentions. (Paragraph
16)
4. The Committee's conclusion reflects our on-going
policy of engagement with the Government of Iraq to act in the
interests of all Iraqis and, in particular, to support our efforts
in Basra. Prime Minister Maliki visited Basra soon after taking
office and the Iraqi Government has undertaken to deliver a security
plan for Basra under the name OP SINBAD. This aims to implement
measures that will improve the day-to-day lives of those living
in the city and has already seen an increase in Iraqi Security
Forces' presence on the streets. Alongside this, efforts will
be made to deliver other benefits, such as clean drinking water,
reliable electricity, and refuse collection, by providing local
people with the know-how to deliver these services for themselves.
We were given differing assessments of the extent
of the smuggling of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) across
the border from Iran but we remain troubled about the implications
of any such smuggling for the security of our forces and Iraqi
civilians. Given the apparent ease with which IED technology can
be smuggled across the border with Iran, we were pleased to hear
of plans to support and develop both the Iraqi Navy and the Border
Forces to help contain this threat. (Paragraph 22)
5. The nature of some explosive devices being used,
against British troops and elsewhere in Iraq, suggests the involvement
of Iranian elements, including through Lebanese Hezbollah. We
support the Government of Iraq's recent initiative to press Iran
to cut its links with armed groups operating in Iraq, and to do
more to improve border security and fight terrorism.
6. UK forces will continue their training and mentoring
of the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement (DBE). The recent
re-posturing of UK forces in Maysan province has maximised our
engagement with the DBE, while also providing a visible coalition
presence on known smuggling routes.
7. The UK has played a lead role in developing both
the Iraqi Navy and the Coast Guard and Inland Waterways Department.
Our efforts focus upon encouraging Iraqi responsibility for maritime
security, including deterrence and disruption of piracy, smuggling
and terrorist activity. Iraqi forces are supported in this role
by a significant coalition presence, and are increasingly operating
in collaboration with their Kuwaiti partners.
Security sector reform will be crucial to the
drawback, and the eventual withdrawal, of UK Forces from Iraq.
UK and Coalition forces have achieved considerable successes in
training the new Iraqi army. We hope that the Iraqi 10th
Division will soon gain full operational readiness and progressively
assume responsibility for the security of the region, with Multi-National
Forces in a mentoring and supporting role. But we are concerned
at the serious challenges that remain in training the Iraqi Police
Service (IPS). Corruption, militia infiltration and politicization
of the IPS should be addressed as a matter of priority. Sustainable
progress for both the Iraqi Army and Police will only come about
if problems in the Iraqi Defence and Interior Ministries are addressed.
(Paragraph 27)
8. Intensive training of the Iraqi police continues
(we expect 135,000 officers will have been trained by the end
of 2006). The Coalition is assisting by providing professional
skills training and infrastructure support in recruitment, vetting,
internal affairs investigation and prosecution services. As a
result, the Iraqi Police are discharging their basic duties in
most provinces. Their performance is not, however, as effective
as we would like and is not as developed as the Iraqi Army. There
are concerns over the professionalism and loyalties of some elements
of the Iraq Police and these remain serious challenges. We welcome,
therefore, the announcement by Interior Minister Boulani of his
intention to professionalise the service through training, including
on human rights, and by taking measures against those who have
acted illegally. This has been followed through—over 1000
corrupt officers were sacked from the Ministry of Interior and
Iraqi Police Service in August.
9. In those MND(SE) provinces which have transferred
to Provincial Iraqi Control, the Iraqi Police Service has been
assessed as being capable of taking on the security role along
with the other elements of the Iraqi Security Forces. This assessment
of the Iraqi Security Force has been agreed at both provincial
level and by the Ministerial Committee for National Security,
which includes the Iraqi Prime Minister. MND(SE)'s efforts to
ensure that the Basra Iraqi Police Service reaches the standard
required for Provincial Iraqi Control, has seen a marked Security
Sector Reform surge into the city as part of Op SINBAD. A Government
of Iraq cross-departmental team is preparing to visit all Provincial
Directors of Police between August and October 06 with the purpose
of removing "ghost" employees from the payroll, dismissing
all those found to have criminal records and removing those with
inappropriate associations with known militia.
10. The 10th Division of the Iraqi Army
will be fully operational by December 2006 and the intention is
to have transferred operational command to the Iraqi Ground Forces
Command by this date. This will mark a significant step forward
in the Iraqi Ministry of Defence taking responsibility for the
command and control from the coalition.
11. HMG recognises the need for reform in both the
Iraqi Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior. We have taken
a leading role in the coalition's capacity building programmes
within both Ministries. The Ministries are improving slowly,
particularly in functional areas such as policy and plans, life
support, inspectorate general and public relations/media etc.
We pushed for the appointment of non-sectarian ministers to these
Ministries and for regular meetings of the Iraqi Ministerial Committee
on National Security—to exercise Iraqi political control
over security issues, both of which have been achieved.
It is not clear how the four elements of the local
transition assessment will be measured and what level of threat,
or capability, will be required prior to transition. We call upon
the MoD to clarify, in detail, the criteria for transition. (Paragraph
29)
12. There are four measures of assessment in deciding
the readiness of the Iraqi civilian authorities to take on the
responsibility for security. First, the level of threat, including
that from militia. Second, the capability of the Iraqi security
forces to deal with that threat. Third, the capacity of the national
and provincial government. Fourth, the coalition's capacity to
step in to support the Iraqi security forces if as needed.
13. Each of these assessments is underpinned by metrics,
and recommendations made jointly by Provincial Governors and MNF-I
representatives are passed finally to the Iraqi's Ministerial
Committee for National Security, which includes the Iraqi Prime
Minister, for final decision. In the case of the ISF there are
detailed assessments of personnel, equipment, levels of training,
leadership and support. The Transitional Readiness Assessment
(TRA) process regularly grades each element across Iraq with the
aim of each province achieving TRA Level 2—capable of conducting
independent operations with some support from coalition forces.
14. The decision to transition a province is ultimately
a political one based on the assessments and a balance of risks.
We welcome the recent hand-over of Muthanna province
to Provincial Iraq Control, as a first step in the transition
process in MND(SE). The next 12 months will be critical in setting
the conditions necessary for long-term Iraqi self-reliance. The
key test in MND(SE) will be the transition of Basra, where significant
problems remain. (Paragraph 31)
15. We recognise that there is progress to be made
before Basra can handover to Provincial Iraqi Control and as a
result we are taking the opportunity to promote stability in support
of a series of immediate, short, medium and long term civil effects
projects. The formation of Basra Security Committee and the Basra
Security Plan shows the high priority that the Iraqi Government
has given to Basra. We are working in partnership with the Iraqis
to improve the conditions in Basra through a focused Iraqi-led
security operation and associated immediate impact projects known
as OP SINBAD.
16. Establishing the right conditions for a successful
transfer of security responsibility depends largely on an Iraqi
political solution that limits the ability of militia and other
malign influences to affect the security environment.
Transition to Provincial Iraqi Control will allow
UK Forces to draw back and assume a supporting role to Iraqi Security
Forces. It does not mean that UK Forces will be able to withdraw
from theatre, although we would expect some consequent reduction.
We call upon the MoD to clarify the role which UK Forces will
fulfil following transition and the implications for troop numbers
in theatre. (Paragraph 32)
17. After the transfer of provinces to Iraqi provincial
control, as is the case in Al-Muthanna and Dhi Qar, MND(SE) forces
will re-posture and Iraqi forces will have the lead for day to
day security on the ground with UK forces ready to deploy to assist
should the Iraqi authorities request help. We will also continue
to train and mentor the ISF. This will involve some centralisation
of forces and the closure of some bases will free up troops and
allow a more concentrated effect in support of the Iraqi security
forces. The new posture will involve a more mobile Coalition profile
to carry on monitoring the situation, mentoring the Iraqi authorities,
supporting developmental activity and exceptionally by providing
back up to local security forces when they ask for it. The intent
is to provide a greater degree of support initially, and then
reduce it over time.
18. The implication is a reduction in troop numbers
but force levels are subject to regular conditions based assessments.
While we would expect the MoD to make reasonable
efforts to recover equipment of high value, we support the pragmatic
cost/value approach being taken, with equipment and bases passed
on to the Iraqi Army where appropriate. (Paragraph 35)
19. The Government thanks the Committee for its recognition
of the pragmatic approach.
We continue to be uncertain about the role of
the PRT and believe that its value remains to be demonstrated.
It is essential that the PRT should serve to enhance, rather than
replace or duplicate, Iraqi decision making. (Paragraph 37)
20. The UK-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)
in Basra is a multi-national, inter-agency operation which aims
to build the capacity of Iraqi provincial government to govern
itself. It is guided by the principle of strengthening and using
Iraqi structures and processes wherever possible. Key PRT objectives
are:
- To improve the delivery of
UK and international civil and military assistance to southern
Iraq by planning, co-ordinating and sequencing existing and planned
interventions behind Iraqi strategies, priorities and processes;
- To develop the capacity of local government (including
the Provincial Council and the Provincial Development and Reconstruction
Committees) in southern Iraq, especially Basra Province;
- To strengthen the links between Iraqi Central
and Provincial governance structures.
- To ensure that provincial structures can effectively
disburse the increasingly large quantities of Iraqi money available
to them from the Government of Iraq, in a manner consistent with
their own development strategy.
21. So far the PRT has supported the Provincial Council
in the development of the Provincial Development Strategy; helped
align UK, US, Danish, MND(SE) and other international programming
and plans; produced a Baseline Assessment of Basra against which
progress can be measured; and is currently working to develop
the Governance, Rule of Law, Economic and Reconstruction components
of HMG's Better Basra Action Plan. This early groundwork has established
a robust foundation for further sustainable development.
Iraq is potentially a wealthy country and we share
the view that it should not be a priority for UK development funding,
if this is at the expense of development support to poorer countries.
Nevertheless, the Government should consider whether an injection
of funding would help the Basra PRT deliver quickly. (Paragraph
38)
22. We believe that the PRT has sufficient financial
resources to meet its objectives. The Committee may wish to note
that since their visit, DFID has transferred administrative resources
previously attached to their Governorate Capacity-Building Programme
to the PRT. These include: six international experts; a flexible
pool of technical assistance to respond to emerging priorities;
and DFID's Governance Development Fund (currently £949,182
uncommitted).
23. On programme funding, the US has recently confirmed
that they have increased their contribution to the Basra PRT from
US$15 million to US$40 million. The UK is providing some £24
million in additional funding in support of projects as part of
the Basra Security Plan.
We call upon the MoD to make public, on a regular
basis, the number of detainees UK Forces hold in Iraq, how those
figures have fluctuated since the opening of the Divisional Temporary
Detention Facility at Shaibah, and the grounds for detention.
Detention without trial is, of itself, undesirable, though we
understand the reasons for it. (Paragraph 49)
24. The MOD notes that the Committee recognises the
necessity of detention as authorised by UNSCR 1637. It has always
been MOD policy to make available the number of individuals interned
in the Divisional Temporary Detention Facility (DTDF). The MOD
Press office is provided with a regular update of the numbers
of internees currently held for briefing to journalists. All individuals
in the DTDF are held for imperative reasons of security on the
basis of the assessment of the Divisional Internment Review Committee,
in line with UNSCR 1637.
We are pleased that the MoD is considering new
ways of incorporating local Iraqi representatives in the review
process for detainees held at the UK's Divisional Temporary Detention
Facility. (Paragraph 49)
25. We are pleased the Committee supports our efforts
to include Iraqi representation in our internee review procedures
in Iraq. The first sitting of the joint UK-Iraqi Combined Review
and Release Board took place in Baghdad on 11th September
2006. The Board will review the cases of internees held in the
Divisional Temporary Detention Facility on a three monthly basis
and the UK DIRC will continue to review on a monthly basis.
We call upon the MoD to explain what its plans
are for the future of the DTDF after the closure of the Shaibah
Logistics Base. (Paragraph 50)
26. Once we have removed all remaining useful materiel
from Shaibah Logistics Base, our plan is to gift the remaining
infrastructure to the Provincial Iraqi Authorities. It is our
intention to retain a capability to use detention as part of our
approach to security including through retaining our own dedicated
facility, which will be located at Basra Air Station, as well
as examining what scope there might be for joint facilities.
We are concerned at the increasingly sophisticated
nature of the threat and the consequent vulnerability of UK Forces
travelling in Snatch Land Rovers. We welcome the Secretary of
State's review of the use of Snatch vehicles in Iraq and believe
it is essential that this review be completed as quickly as possible.
In the long-term, FRES may offer a solution to the difficulties
associated with the Snatch, but its introduction is too far off
to offer an answer to current operational needs in Iraq. The MoD
should consider an "off the shelf" purchase as an immediate
and interim replacement for Snatch, even if it does not fulfil
the long-term capability requirement. It is unsatisfactory that
the lack of capability was not addressed with greater urgency
much earlier. (Paragraph 59)
27. The Secretary of State announced to Parliament
on 24 July, before the HCDC report was published, the results
of a review of our armoured vehicle fleet, against the background
of the evolving operational situation in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The review, in response to a changing threat, was completed in
a matter of weeks and confirmed a requirement for a suite of vehicles
to allow commanders increased flexibility. It recognised the requirement
for new and improved protected vehicles with capabilities between
our heavy armoured vehicles, such as Warrior and lighter patrol
vehicles, such as Snatch Land Rovers.
28. As a consequence we are rapidly procuring around
100 Cougar vehicles from a United States company, Force Protection
Inc. The Cougar will meet our requirement for a well protected,
wheeled patrol vehicle but with a less intimidating profile than
a tracked vehicle such as Warrior or FV430. Once fitted with Bowman
radios and additional armour beyond the standard level of protection,
which we believe will make them among the best in theatre but
necessarily takes time they will be deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan
under the name 'Mastiff'. We currently expect to deliver a capability
by the end of the year.
29. We are also increasing our existing order for
the VECTOR patrol vehicle. Before July 62 were on order which
will now be supplemented by around 100 extra vehicles. VECTOR
is planned to be delivered incrementally between January and August
2007, and we currently expect to have an effective capability
in theatre by the end of January. VECTOR is manufactured by Pinzgauer
and offers increased mobility and capacity compared to Snatch
Land Rovers as well as good protection, making it well suited
for operational requirements in Afghanistan, particularly long-range
patrols.
30. We also announced that an additional 70 FV430
tracked vehicles will be up-armoured and upgraded so that they
will have a similar level of protection to the Warrior vehicle;
again, this is on top of the 54 we have already ordered. This
will relieve some of the pressure on the heavily committed Warrior
as the FV430 can undertake similar tasks, but with a less intimidating
profile. FV430 will also be delivered incrementally, with the
first up-armoured vehicles expected to be in theatre in the autumn.
31. Together, these additional and accelerated options
will now provide Commanders with increased flexibility to deal
with the situations and threats they face. It is important to
appreciate, however, that the Snatch Land Rover still has a role
to play and these new vehicles will complement, not replace Snatch
and Warrior. Maintaining a low patrol profile in Iraq and Afghanistan
can be helpful, so where appropriate, a more mobile and less aggressive
patrol vehicle such as Snatch, which enables us to engage with
local people, could be the best vehicle to use. It is vital that
our commanders have a choice, so that they can select a type of
vehicle that will both meet the threat and achieve the desired
force profile.
32. Even 'off the shelf' solutions take many months
to deliver at the appropriate specification including the fitting
of additional technical kit. The three programmes above have been
addressed with significant urgency and will deliver in a timeframe
which those who are familiar with the complexities of defence
procurement will recognise as impressive.
We are concerned by the extreme temperatures to
which our troops are subjected in armoured vehicles in Iraq. We
call upon the MoD to investigate as a matter of urgency how the
threat of heat exhaustion can be most effectively overcome, including
examining the feasibility of equipping vehicles with air conditioning.
UK troops have been operating in Iraq for over three years: it
is unacceptable that resources have not yet been provided to combat
the high temperatures. (Paragraph 62)
33. We are providing resources to combat high temperatures
Of the Armoured vehicles currently serving in Iraq, air conditioning
is already provided in SNATCH 1.5, SNATCH 2 and the desertised
variant of the Battlefield Ambulance. An Urgent Operational Requirement
was generated to install air conditioning in the driver's compartment
- this was achieved by the end of 2005 and now all Warrior vehicles
in Iraq have air conditioned driver's compartments.
34. A plan is in place to fit all Armoured Fighting
Vehicles with Air Conditioning Units (ACUs) for deployment to
Iraq on Op TELIC 10 (March 2007); this includes the FV430 series
BULLDOG. In addition, the VECTOR and PANTHER vehicles are also
being fitted with ACUs. Furthermore, air conditioning is a requirement
that is being built into future vehicle specifications, including
Mastiff.
We are also concerned that attention is given
to the position of cooks and kitchen staff and that measures are
taken to provide sufficient ventilation and to maintain properly
adequate air-conditioning equipment. More broadly, we believe
that our troops require adequate air-conditioned environments
not only while they are on duty but when they are at rest so that
they can recover from the excessive heat. Effective recuperation
is crucial to troops' alertness and hence to the avoidance of
casualties. (Paragraph 63)
35. The Committee's recommendation that our troops
require adequate air-conditioned environments when they are at
rest is already recognised. Air conditioning is extensively used
in accommodation, business offices, facilities such as welfare
and catering, and medical facilities within any of the main camps.
36. It is important that air conditioning does not
hinder acclimatisation which helps to prevent heat related illnesses.
37. Air conditioning is used in accommodation afforded
to personnel within MND(SE), including leisure facilities. It
is acknowledged that the areas where contracted chefs and kitchen
staff work are obviously hotter than the others and work is ongoing
to address this requirement.
We were impressed by the work of the Joint Helicopter
Forces-Iraq (JHF-I) which fulfils an essential role in enabling
UK operations on the ground. But we are deeply concerned at the
shortage of helicopters in theatre and believe that unless measures
are taken to increase the number of helicopters and to reduce
pressure on crews, the effectiveness and coherence of UK operations
on the ground will suffer. We call upon the MoD to examine what
steps it can take to remedy the shortage of helicopters and implement
them as a matter of urgency. (Paragraph 68)
38. There are sufficient numbers of helicopters in
Iraq to carry out the allocated tasks though as with many areas
of military capability, commanders will always desire more. These
requirements are currently met from within our existing fleet
of operational Battlefield Helicopters (BH). We acknowledge that
against our planning assumptions for potential future operations
we have less medium and heavy lift capability than we would ideally
wish for, and that crews are operating outside planned Harmony
guidelines. Such shortfalls do not, however, mean that we are
unable to conduct our current and future operations successfully,
which we do by careful management of our helicopter fleets and
aircrews.
39. We expect the number of Lift helicopters to remain
broadly constant over the next five years. However, work is under
way now to improve the way support helicopters are used and maintained,
particularly Chinook, Merlin and Sea King, with the aim of increasing
their availability.
40. Flying hours are reviewed on a regular basis
and are flexed in accordance with the operational requirements.
For the longer term, the future size and shape of our support
helicopter fleet is currently being studied in the Future Rotorcraft
Capability programme.
41. This programme is looking at building our helicopter
fleets for the future in both the land and maritime environments.
It will involve a mixture of new buy aircraft and life extension
for some in-service helicopters. The significant investment in
more reliable and capable helicopters will help to address the
shortfalls in Lift capability we have identified.
It is unacceptable that Servicemen and women,
many of whom are serving greatly in excess of Harmony Guidelines,
should have their leave disrupted by the MoD's inability to provide
a reliable airbridge. (Paragraph 69)
42. We fully acknowledge the importance of periods
of rest and recuperation from operations and make exhaustive efforts
to provide a service which is as reliable as possible. Further
information is provided below in response to points 19 and 22.
We call upon the MoD to address the issue of airbridge
unreliability as a matter of priority. Although we recognise the
improvements already made in this area, we believe additional
steps must be taken to address the shortage of available aircraft.
(Paragraph 71)
43. To help provide more platforms that can support
the airbridge, we are increasing the number of aircraft we currently
have with defensive measures so that they can operate in the highest
threat environments. Specifically C-130J Hercules and Tristar
aircraft are being fitted with further defensive measures; the
work to fit C-130J airframes was completed in August with work
ongoing as a priority on Tristar.
44. The passenger airbridge is provided by a combination
of civil charter, primarily completing the long-distance leg,
and RAF air transport aircraft flying into the operational theatre.
The reliability of the airbridge depends on a range of factors
including aircraft serviceability, availability of aircraft with
necessary defensive measures, diplomatic clearances, and weather.
Clearly some of these factors are outside the MOD's control. Nevertheless,
we have contracts in place with commercial brokers for airlift
charter that can be activated at very short notice when required
in order to maintain a reliable service. These arrangements have
proved to be highly effective during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
We note that the safety of C-130 Hercules remains
an issue of concern to aircrew in theatre. While we welcome the
decision to fit Explosion Suppressant Foam (ESF) to some Hercules,
we believe that it should be fitted to all Hercules in operational
theatres. We are alarmed by the suggestion that the MoD might
not be fitting protective systems because of the impact on other
priorities. The protection of our Armed Forces should be given
the highest priority. (Paragraph 74)
45. The protection of our Armed Forces is given the
highest priority.
46. We are fitting ESF to the majority of our Hercules
aircraft, those aircraft that operate in the highest threat environment.
The work to fit ESF to our aircraft is being undertaken as quickly
as possible commensurate with the need to maintain a capability
to meet operational tasks. The first aircraft was modified last
month (September 06).
47. All air transport aircraft, including the Hercules,
that operate in Iraq and Afghanistan are fitted with appropriate
defensive systems, although these vary between platforms. It is
important to recognise that ESF may enhance an aircraft's survivability
after it has been hit but it does not reduce the risk of an aircraft
being hit in the first place; however, this risk is mitigated
by tactics and, in the case of guided weapons, by other defensive
systems.
We seek reassurance from the MoD that lessons
will be learnt and safety features will be integrated in the plans
for the A-400M. (Paragraph 75)
48. The MOD continuously reviews the mix of defensive
measures that are required for our air transport fleet. We will
ensure that A-400M will have the appropriate level of defensive
measures to allow it to operate and meet current and future threats.
The MoD's confidence that the UK Armed Forces
are not overstretched contrasts with what we are hearing from
Service personnel on the ground. We are concerned that the "can-do"
attitude of which our Services are rightly proud may be leading
Service commanders to underplay the pressure on Service personnel
and their families. The Armed Force can tolerate short-term pressure
but sustained breaches of Harmony Guidelines will damage the Services'
operational capability. This is a matter of crucial importance.
We intend to take evidence on the MoD's Annual Report and Accounts
in autumn and will give close attention to the data on Harmony
Guidelines. (Paragraph 79)
49. Harmony Guidelines act as warning indicators
to alert the planners to likely manning issues and potential areas
of overstretch; and to the broad impact that operational plans
will have on Service people. They are expressed in terms of unit
harmony and individual harmony.
50. Unit Harmony Guidelines are based on elements
that regularly deploy as formed units and are expressed as the
number of months spent between tours (tour intervals) to allow
sufficient time for unit recovery, recuperation and preparation
for subsequent deployment. They are also used by the Department's
planners to assess the manpower requirements necessary to undertake
the full range of military tasks and to calculate the force structures
required to meet the expected level of commitments.
51. Individual Harmony Guidelines apply to Service
personnel and set the limits to how long they should be away from
home within a specific period. Each Service operates different
harmony guidelines - Royal Naval personnel should not exceed 660
days deployed in 36 months, the Army 415 days in 30 months and
the Royal Air Force no greater than 2.5% of personnel to exceed
140 days detached in 12 months. Against these criteria 1% of the
Royal Navy, 15% of the Army and 4% of the RAF currently exceed
Individual Harmony Guidelines.
We are concerned that the MoD's reliance on reservists
may not be sustainable: this is a matter we intend to return to
when we examine the MoD's Annual Report and Accounts. (Paragraph
81)
52. Our reservists have an important part to play
and contribute valuable sets of skills. Around 10% of our forces
deployed since the mid-1990s have been from the Armed Forces Reserves.
The Call Out of reservists is undertaken in accordance with the
legal framework provided under the Reserve Forces Act 1996. That
Act provides a number of legal safeguards for reservists including
limitations on the duration of mobilised (permanent) service and
a formal right for reservists and their employers to seek exemption
from, or deferral of, Call Out. Regarding the duration of mobilised
service, the maximum obligatory period of service permitted under
the Act for reservists called out to support operations in Iraq
or elsewhere is 12 months in any three years. Reservists, may,
however, volunteer to enter agreements to extend their period
of mobilised service.
53. Legal safeguards are complemented by additional
management safeguards which apply to the Call Out of reservists
to ensure that the combined effect of the demands from operations
in Iraq and elsewhere generally do not place an unacceptable burden
on the reserve forces as a group. Currently, the management process
to support enduring operations uses a policy of 'Intelligent Selection'
that identifies those individuals who wish to be mobilised. The
intention behind this approach is to aim only to mobilise individuals
who are 'willing'. This pre-condition is only lifted in cases
where the nature of operations has put pressure on numbers and
the Services believe no valid reason exists for a nominated individual
to avoid mobilised service. These cases are limited and are very
carefully monitored and managed. Additionally, the Army has currently
applied a generic 'supply-led' policy to restrict the provision
of Territorial Army members to operations (Navy and RAF Reserves
are currently provided under a 'demand-led' approach). This means
that the sustainability of the Army Reserves' current output to
operations is not in question.
There is clearly concern among UK personnel about
the structure and level of allowances. It is not unreasonable
that our Servicemen and women should expect some financial recognition
for active service overseas: we intend to pursue this issue further.
(Paragraph 82)
54. The British Armed Forces are a voluntary, expeditionary
force and are remunerated as such. As a result, Service personnel
are not currently paid additional monies specifically aimed at
active service overseas. Our view has been that recompense is
better provided by a package that supports their whole service
with some financial enhancements while separated from family and
friends, and by other means targeted at the needs of those on
operations. This package is carefully constructed and reviewed
on a regular basis.
Over recent years, the MoD has been quick to implement
changes that produce savings but it does not appear to have addressed
the growing number of capability gaps with the same or sufficient
urgency. Long-term procurement projects are failing to deliver
mission-critical capabilities on time. Capability gaps are opening
up and these need to be met by the MoD as a matter of urgency,
even if that means opting for interim solutions. We intend to
return to this issue when we take evidence from the Chief of Defence
Procurement in October. (Paragraph 87)
55. The MOD does not accept that capability gaps
are not being addressed with urgency. There is a well-defined
process, as noted in the Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) at
Chapter A2, for determining its priorities for equipment investment
to deliver future military capability. In some cases, there can
be a very short gestation period in devising a capability solution
and bringing it into service quickly, perhaps via an upgrade or
modification rather than a new piece of equipment or platform.
For other, particularly larger, projects, given the scale of technical
challenges involved, time is required to ensure a capability fulfils
the identified requirement, is technically sufficiently mature
and is a value for money solution. This is particularly the case
for equipment that is likely to have a long service-life.
56. For capability requirements needed to support
current operations there is a well-defined Urgent Operational
Requirements (UOR) process. The Department has been praised by
the National Audit Office (NAO) report "The Rapid Procurement
of Capability to Support Operations", published in November
2004, for its flexibility, speed and ingenuity in its approach
to UORs. Over 98% of UORs procured for the warfighting phase of
Operation TELIC were assessed as effective or highly effective
by the troops in theatre. The use of UORs does not, however, imply
shortcomings in the Equipment Programme. The Equipment Programme
is designed to deliver the long-term core capabilities our forces
need.
57. Nevertheless, the Department does accept that
sometimes interim solutions can be the best option to fill capability
gaps; the lease of four C-17 aircraft in 2000 (now purchased outright
with a fifth) is an example of such a solution that met an air
transport capability gap.
The Defence Industrial Strategy seeks to make
a quantum difference to procurement on time and to cost. Given
the tasks which our Armed Forces personnel now face, it is vital
that it should succeed. However, the DIS will take some time to
deliver the capabilities required (Paragraph 88)
58. We are pleased that the Committee recognises
the importance of the Defence Industrial Strategy.
59. We have set an ambitious timetable to deliver
real improvements in the way we achieve the delivery of capability
to the armed forces. We have described the DIS implementation
as a two year programme with 2006 the year for implementation
of the changes described in the DIS and 2007 the year when we
expect to see a real difference to our defence capability and
strength of defence industry.
60. The Ministry of Defence believes it has suitable
process in place to meet the long term needs of the armed forces
and has demonstrated sufficient flexibility to address short term
requirements generated by operational experience. For example
well over £500m of Force Protection Urgent Operational Requirements
have been approved for Iraq and Afghanistan in response to the
specific conditions and changing threat in theatre. The urgent
provision of around 270 additional vehicles represents considerable
further investment.
The issues raised in this report give rise to
a fundamental question: are our Armed Forces structures, trained
and equipped to fulfil the role envisaged for them in the Strategic
Defence Review and its successor policy documents? This is a question
of very great importance, going to the heart of the Government's
defence policy. We believe this question needs to be addressed:
we will return to it. (Paragraph 89)
61. The MOD continually reviews the strategic environment
and how the Armed Forces are best placed to respond and shape
it, including the development of the capabilities as envisaged
by the Strategic Defence Review and successor policy documents.
62. We welcome the Committee's intention to make
a valuable contribution to the continuing debate about the structures
of our Armed Forces.
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