Government response
The Government welcomes the House of Commons Defence
Select Committee's report, "Iraq: An Initial Assessment of
Post-Conflict Operations" published on 24 March 2005 (HC
65-I). This memorandum sets out the Government's response to each
of the main points of the Committee's report in the order in which
they were raised.
Pre-war Planning for the Post-Combat Phase
1. The post-conflict situation with which
the Coalition was faced did not match the pre-conflict expectations.
The strategic centre of the Coalition in Iraq was inevitably the
Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. To some extent this
complicated the task of British forces in the south. Taken together
these factors contributed to delays in post-war stabilisation.
It is not difficult to understand how mistakes could have been
made in planning and executing Iraq's post conflict reconstruction.
No post-conflict mission in the last 60 years has been as challenging
as that which faced the Coalition in June 2003. (Paragraph 26)
The post combat operations phase of operations in
Iraq has been particularly challenging. Not only have coalition
forces been faced by a determined insurgency attempting to undermine
an emerging Iraqi government and inflict casualties on coalition
and Iraqi security forces, but this has also been one of the first
times in recent history that the UK has had to take on the obligations
of an occupying power, and operated as a junior partner in a counter-insurgency.
As the Committee recognises, UK forces in MND(SE) have also been
operating in a situation where the link between tactical success
in MND(SE) and the achievement of a favourable strategic outcome
in Iraq is limited.
Nevertheless, we accept that there are lessons to
be learnt in terms of improving the way that we conduct post-conflict
planning, and much effort has been put into this over the last
two years.
2. The considerable success that has been
achieved in Iraq—especially in the areas controlled by the
UK—can, in large part, be traced to the British forces'
ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Suppleness and pragmatism
are at the heart of the British forces' professionalism. (Paragraph
26)
We welcome the Committee's comments on the considerable
success that has been achieved in Iraq through the hard work and
professionalism of British Armed Forces.
The Insurgency
3. It is difficult to avoid concluding that
the Coalition, including British forces, were insufficiently prepared
for the challenge represented by the insurgency. A wide range
of predictions for the post-conflict situation in Iraq were made
in advance of the conflict. We are concerned that there is some
evidence that the extensive planning, which we know took place
in both the US and the UK, did not fully reflect the extent of
that range. We also believe that the Coalition should have foreseen
that its presence would be resented by some Iraqis, particularly
Sunni Arabs and some Shia nationalist elements, and portrayed
as cultural and economic imperialism. (Paragraph 36)
4. We note that there is not one anti-Coalition
insurgency in Iraq, as frequently portrayed in the media, but
several, anti-Coalition, anti-Iraqi Government movements. These
different movements are conducting operations with very different
objectives. (Paragraph 43)
5. We note that the scale of the anti-Coalition,
anti-Iraqi Government insurgency movements was underestimated
by the Coalition. At the same time, we acknowledge that a fixation
simply on the number of insurgents does not necessarily, by itself,
provide insight into their effectiveness and resilience. (Paragraph
47)
6. We are concerned at the continued influx
of foreign fighters into Iraq through neighbouring countries,
particularly Syria and Iran, and note that this was probably facilitated
by the inadequate attention paid to border security by the Coalition
immediately following the invasion. More broadly, it appears to
us that the Coalition failed to appreciate the potential for an
insurgency in Iraq to attract foreign fighters, both from the
Middle East and further afield (e.g. Chechnya). (Paragraph 51)
We note the Committee's comments. We have already
acknowledged in the report we published on the lessons from Op
TELIC that while some planning took place to deal with likely
disaffection following the invasion of Iraq, an insurgency on
the scale that subsequently followed was not foreseen before the
end of major combat operations. As part of our efforts to improve
Iraq's border security, we are assisting in the development of
the Department of Border Security (DBE) through training and mentoring
DBE personnel in MND(SE). We have also supported infrastructure
projects to rebuild border security posts.
7. We note that the various insurgency movements
have been structured, motivated and resourced to inflict significant
military and civilian causalities. They have employed a range
of tactics from assassinations to suicide bombings depending on
their motivations and goals, but foreign fighters, such as Musab
al-Zarqawi and other Islamic extremists, have been particularly
skilled at using psychological operations such as kidnappings
and beheadings. In the foreseeable future, MNF-I and the Iraqi
Government will continue to be attacked, but the various insurgency
movements have not developed into a genuine national war of liberation
and are unlikely to do so in the future. (Paragraph 56)
We note the Committee's comments.
8. We commend British forces for their approach
to counter-insurgency in their areas of operations. We are convinced
that their approach has been a contributing factor in the development
of the more permissive environment in southern Iraq, which has
resulted in relatively little insurgent activity. We do, however,
remain concerned about a number of tactics employed by the MNF-I
generally. We urge MoD to use its influence to affect MNF-I's
posture and approach. We also encourage MoD to ensure that the
Iraqi civilian powers are given a prominent role in the counter-insurgency
campaign. Finally, we emphasise and endorse the need to combine
politico-economic and military strands of the counter-insurgency
campaign. We have been told that this approach was adopted following
the appointments of General Casey and Ambassador Negroponte, but
we are concerned about the state of civil-military cooperation
in the counter-insurgency campaign preceding their appointments,
i.e. from May 2003 until June 2004 when Ambassador Bremer was
head of the Coalition Provisional Authority. (Paragraph 73)
We welcome the report's commendation of British Armed
Forces for their approach to tackling counter-insurgency. It is
important to recognise, however, that the security environment
in which British Armed Forces are operating in south-east Iraq
is quite different to that faced by MNF-I forces in the Sunni
triangle of Iraq, and there is necessarily a need to adopt different
procedures and tactics in these areas.
The current MNF-I campaign plan fully recognises
that campaign success will only be achieved through progress along
political and economic as well as security lines of operation,
and coalition strategy in Iraq is configured to reflect this.
We also agree with the Committee on the importance
of the Iraqi Government playing a prominent role in the counter-insurgency
campaign. Ultimately, only the Iraqis can bring about campaign
success in Iraq, with the coalition playing a supporting role.
The coalition is therefore focussing on helping Iraqis—from
the top levels of government to troops on the ground—develop
the capacity to take responsibility for security. While this process
will take time, the planning and direction of major counter-insurgency
operations is, for example, now conducted jointly between MNF-I,
Iraqi Ministers and senior Iraqi Military officers, with Iraqi
Ministers finally responsible for setting strategic direction.
Challenges in Southern Iraq
9. We note that the relatively stable security
environment in southern Iraq has been caused by a number of factors,
including population density, topography and the attitude of the
Shia population to Coalition forces. But we are also in no doubt
that the approach and tactics of the British Armed Forces have
played a major part. (Paragraph 84)
We agree with the Committee's comments on the successful
role played by British Armed Forces in southern Iraq.
10. We condemn any abuse of Iraqi civilians
by British forces. We believe, however, that coverage given to
these cases has been magnified because British forces are known—both
in Iraq and beyond—for the professionalism and sensitivity
which they bring to their tasks. As such, we trust that the actions
of a few soldiers will not be allowed to overshadow the contribution
made by the many soldiers who have served in Iraq. (Paragraph
90)
We welcome the report's recognition that the vast
majority of British Servicemen and women who have served in Iraq
have done and continue to do an outstanding job in Southern Iraq.
Over 85,000 personnel have served on Operation TELIC, and only
a tiny minority have been involved in incidents involving the
alleged ill-treatment of Iraqi civilians. A number of these have
already been cleared of any wrong-doing.
Nonetheless, our troops in Iraq are not above the
law. All allegations or suspicions involving activity of a criminal
nature are taken seriously, particularly when they cast doubts
on the good name of the British Armed Forces throughout the world.
It is MOD policy to initiate an independent Service police investigation
into every instance where the action of British service personnel
may have led to the injury or death of Iraqi civilians, and ensure
that if Rules of Engagement have not been followed, appropriate
action is taken in every case.
11. We welcome a review of the circumstances
that led to the incidents in March 2003. We have noted previously
that the Coalition did not expect—and did not have adequate
facilities to deal with—large-scale looting and looters.
The consequent pressure on individuals may have been a contributing
factor in some of the cases. But we are also concerned that the
incidents may have been connected to the way in which soldiers
and officers are instructed in their legal obligations during
post-conflict operations. We therefore urge the senior officer
leading the lessons-learned process established by the Chief of
the General Staff to approach the review of the issue of abuse
by British service personnel in Iraq as broadly as possible, examining
not only the circumstances in Iraq, but also more generic questions
related to the Iraq policies, preparations and pre-deployment
training provided for Peace Support Operations. (Paragraph 91)
On 25 February 2005 the Chief of the General Staff
announced that in light of the recent courts-martial of four members
of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, a senior experienced officer
had been asked to review the issues arising from the trial and
assess their impact on the Army's operational effectiveness. Any
lessons identified will be applied to future operations. The review
can only complete after courts-martial and any other legal processes
are over. Findings will be published in due course.
The lessons learned process will be wide ranging
in tracking matters arising out of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers
courts-martial and any other similar cases in future. Such matters
might include:
· allegations
of widespread abuse, made by some of the witnesses,
· technical breaches
of the Geneva Conventions;
· the Army's
level of preparedness for dealing with looters.
12. We accept that circumstances in Iraq currently
call for the limited use of internment of civilians by MNF-I.
We believe, however, that this extraordinary power needs to be
reviewed regularly and should only be maintained for as long as
there is a compelling operational need for it. MNF-I should, as
matter of priority, assist the Iraqi Government in developing
the capabilities to detain, prosecute and imprison those who are
judged to present a serious threat to the country. (Paragraph
101)
At present we consider that the power of internment
is necessary for maintaining security in Iraq. We agree with the
Committee that this power should be maintained only for as long
as there is an operational need for it, and that it is important
to assist the Iraqis develop their own capacity to detain, prosecute
and imprison.
The authority to intern has its foundation in UNSCR
1546, which authorises coalition forces to use 'all necessary
measures' to maintain security in Iraq. UNSCR 1546 will lapse
once the political process in Iraq reaches the stage at which
a permanent government is elected, currently anticipated to be
December 2005. At that stage, the continuing coalition presence
in Iraq will require a new mandate. The power of internment will
be reassessed at that point.
The coalition fully recognises the importance of
assisting the Iraqis develop the capabilities to detain, prosecute
and imprison. As part of the coalition effort to support the development
of these capabilities, the UK government has spent over £2
million on training for the Iraqi judicial sector, and £1.7m
on prisons mentoring in the south of Iraq, and has also deployed
a justice adviser with human rights law experience to Basra. In
Basra, the Consulate is supporting a Ministry of Human Rights
Office Detention Centre Monitoring Programme for 12 months. They
will be mentored and assisted by the UK Justice Adviser and Police
and Prison Advisers.
13. The cost of UK military operations in
Iraq for the three years 2002-03 to 2004-05 is expected to be
in excess of £3.1 billion—equivalent to the target
acquisition cost for the two future aircraft carriers for the
Royal Navy. The 2004-05 Spring Supplementary Estimates provide
only limited information on the costs of operations in Iraq. We
consider that a more detailed breakdown of costs, for operations
involving such substantial sums of money, should be provided in
future to facilitate effective parliamentary scrutiny. (Paragraph
109)
The costs in Iraq vary according to the operational
tempo. Whilst MOD forecasts future costs for planning purposes
the costs remain uncertain and to publish them would be misleading.
Actual annual costs for Iraq are reported at the end of the year
and will be published in July in a Public Expenditure White Paper.
These costs are then audited by the National Audit Office and
the finalised figures published in the MOD's Annual Report and
Accounts for 2004/05 in the Autumn.
Security Sector Reform
14. We conclude that the successful conduct
of the elections to the Iraqi Transitional National Assembly on
30 January 2005 will go down as a turning point in Iraq's post
conflict development. Their success demonstrated not only that
Iraqis have an appetite for democracy and an enthusiasm to be
involved in shaping their country's future, but also that the
Iraqi Security Forces have begun to develop the capabilities to
provide effective security for their own people. (Paragraph 120)
We agree that the successful conduct of the Iraqi
elections marked a significant step forward, not only for the
political process, but also for the Iraqi Security Forces, particularly
the police. They were widely perceived to have done a good job
in preventing the bloodshed promised by insurgents on election
day, and this has boosted their own self-confidence, as well as
public confidence in them. No police stations were abandoned either
during or immediately after the elections, and there were many
individual acts of great bravery by Iraqi Security Force personnel
on the day.
The work on election security was also evidence of
the growing capacity in Iraqi Ministries to plan and direct their
forces. The Iraqi Security Ministries and Security Forces have
since applied and developed the lessons learnt in planning for
election security to provide security for other events.
15. We believe that Security Sector Reform
should have been given greater priority by Coalition and British
forces before and immediately after the invasion in March 2003.
Only belatedly, did the Coalition begin building the Iraqi Security
Forces. Even then, a bottom-up, numerically-focused approach meant
that the Iraqi military, security, and police did not develop
in a well-coordinated manner. We are pleased to see that a more
realistic approach to the build-up of the Iraqi Security Forces
is now being taken with much greater emphasis on capability, effectiveness
and long term sustainability. (Paragraph 129)
The extent to which all of Iraq's security apparatus
would dissolve—particularly the police—was not predicted
before the invasion, though there was an expectation that Commanders
would be tasked with some security sector reform tasks. With the
end of combat operations and the immediate transitional period
there were no Iraqi governmental structures to decide on security
force policies. In consequence the immediate need was to build
Iraqi Security Forces from the bottom up. Only with greater Iraqi
engagement and the emergence of an Iraqi Government and establishment
of Iraqi Ministries has it become possible for appropriate dialogue
on policies.
The initial aim was to deliver significant numbers
of ISF as quickly as possible. As the nature of the terrorist
threat has grown and evolved the need for better capabilities
has naturally emerged. Now that large numbers of ISF have been
recruited and have basic training and equipment, it is possible
to concentrate on developing capability, particularly the key
ones—leadership, command and control, intelligence, logistics—which
will enable the Iraqis to take over control of security themselves.
This will, of course, take time and effort.
16. The need for political oversight by the
Iraqi Ministry of Defence over the Iraqi Security Forces is a
crucial part of Iraq's post-Saddam Security Sector Reform and
we remain concerned about the slow institutional development of
the Ministry. (Paragraph 135)
We agree that it is important for the Iraqi Ministry
of Defence to have political oversight over the Iraqi Security
Forces. There is an international team of advisers headed by a
UK MOD civil servant working with Ministers and officials in the
Ministry to help them build the institutional capacity that will
enable the Ministry to maintain oversight over its forces.
While the Ministry still needs to develop in a number
of areas—notably command and control, and resource management—it
has nevertheless made considerable progress since it was established
in spring 2004. The Ministry has developed a Defence Strategy
identifying the functions of the ministry, the principles under
which it should operate, and institutional objectives. Cross-cutting
committees with civilian and military representation have been
set up to bring together different functional areas of the Department
and facilitate coherent planning and implementation. The current
challenge for the Ministry is ensuring that these mechanisms work
effectively.
17. We welcome the creation of the Ministerial
Committee of National Security as a mechanism for the Iraqi Government
to begin taking control of the Iraqi Security Forces and to coordinate
military and security policy with political and economic policies.
These mechanisms now need to be developed further by the Transitional
Iraqi Government as well as at working-level. (Paragraph 139)
We note the Committee's comments.
18. Parliamentary oversight must be a central
feature of the 'new' Iraq's security arrangements, and we call
on Coalition partners and the UK Government to provide assistance
to the Transitional National Assembly in establishing mechanisms
for parliamentary oversight of the Iraqi Security Forces. (Paragraph
142)
We continue support for the Iraqi Transitional Government
to develop its capacity to govern effectively, through our Embassy
and through UK civilian and military advisers working with Iraqi
Ministries. As a sovereign country, it is for the Iraqi Government
to decide what mechanisms it wishes to establish for parliamentary
oversight of the Iraqi Security Forces.
19. Ensuring appropriate oversight over, and
coordination mechanisms for, the Iraqi Security Forces that mirror
Iraq's decentralised political system is important, but we believe
care needs to be taken not to undermine the Iraqi Government's
control of its national security apparatus. (Paragraph 145)
Iraq has traditionally had a highly centralised political
system, and we do not expect this to change significantly. Obviously,
the situation in Iraq following the end of combat operations,
as mentioned in the response to paragraph 15, meant that Iraqi
Security Forces were generated from the bottom up, on a regional
basis. MNF-I is assisting the Iraqi government and security forces
to develop the command and control, communications and logistics
infrastructure, that will link the National government with troops
on the ground. It is, however, for the Iraqi Government and population,
not the coalition, to decide on the nature of their political
system, and the security structures they wish to put in place.
20. The command chain of the Iraqi Security
Forces cannot yet sustain responsibility for operations carried
out in its name. At this stage of the Iraqi Security Forces' development
this is unsurprising. It is important, however, that we recognise
the limitations which this places on the current and future capabilities
of the Iraqi Security Forces. (Paragraph 150)
Although it will take some time for the Iraqis to
develop a comprehensive and effective command and control capability,
and to build up all the support structures needed to sustain their
forces on operations, the Iraqi government does already have some
ability to plan and conduct independent operations. For example,
two recent operations, Al Barqh (Lightning) inside Baghdad, and
Maharabeen Kudmaa (Veterans Forward) in the north-west, are of
note due to the competence shown by the Iraqis during the planning.
Both Interior Minister Jabr and Defence Minister Dulaimi played
a full part in the process, as did senior military officers and
officials.
While Coalition forces will continue to assist the
Iraqis to conduct counter-insurgency operations as required, we
expect the Iraqis to become increasingly capable of taking on
greater levels of responsibility including independent, intelligence-led
counter-insurgency operations.
Naval Forces
21. It seems clear to us that MNF-I—and,
by extension the UK—will need to assist Iraq in protecting
its sea-based assets and territorial waters from terrorist attack
or incursion for the foreseeable future. (Paragraph 153)
Development of the Iraqi Navy is well underway with
their vessels making a continuous contribution to coalition maritime
security operations in Iraqi territorial waters. Training is provided
by a UK-led Assistance Support Team based at Umm Qasr, which is
shifting its emphasis towards mentoring Iraqi staff as operational
capability increases. Iraqi forces play a full part in the security
of the offshore oil platforms, and are expected to take responsibility
for these assets later this year. With the arrival of new vessels
over the next 12 months, Iraqi influence will extend and the Iraqi
Navy is expected to take control of territorial waters before
the end of 2006. The extent to which MNF-I are able to disengage
from maritime security operations in the Northern Arabian Gulf,
will not simply depend on the rate of Iraqi Navy development;
other issues such as the incidence of piracy, smuggling and the
behaviour of the Iranians, will affect the transfer of responsibility.
Iraqi Police Service
22. The Coalition's early efforts at Security
Sector Reform—particularly in the civil policing area—were
characterised by short-termism and indecision. Weaknesses in that
reform programme came close to undermining the success of the
initial military operations. We are disappointed that two years
after the start of those operations the Government's response
to the systemic shortcomings, which contributed to those weaknesses,
has amounted only to the establishment of a 'Strategic Task Force'
to examine the deployment of UK police to post-conflict situations.
(Paragraph 169)
In the period immediately after the end of combat
operations there were no Iraqi government structures to decide
on security force policies. As a result, while ad hoc police groups
had been reformed by local coalition military commanders no organised
reconstitution of the police was undertaken for six to eight weeks
after the cessation of fighting in mid-April 2003. The immediate
need at that stage was to build a police service from the bottom
up, and it was only later, once the Iraqi Interim Government and
Iraqi government Ministries had been established, that it was
possible for appropriate dialogue on national policing policies
to take place.
The Cross-Departmental Strategic Task Force mentioned
in the report was set up to address the identified shortcomings
in international UK policing assistance, including the generation
of personnel with appropriate skills to deploy to post-conflict
situations. The Task Force has been meeting for about five months,
and is expected to put forward their recommendations to Ministers
in the near future.
23. We welcome recent initiatives by the Government
and the EU to train the Iraqi Police Service in complex policing
techniques. We note, however, that assistance to develop Iraq's
policing arrangements was not incorporated in the post-conflict
planning. As a result, there was an absence of strategic policing
advice at senior levels in the Coalition while the policing policy
was unduly 'militarised'. Consequently, the kind of police forces
that were established in Iraq were unprepared for the complex
policing tasks subsequently expected of them. (Paragraph 170)
The report correctly identifies the strategic vacuum
at the post-conflict stage. There have, however, been senior UK
police advisers embedded with the Ministry of Interior for over
18 months, providing advice to the Minister of the Interior.
Responsibility for the development of the Iraqi Police
Service (IPS) has evolved over the last two years through a process
of review aimed at ensuring the size and capability of the IPS
reflects the requirements. Initially responsibility for generating
a community-based police force was vested with the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) and the Senior CPA Adviser to the Iraqi Minister
of the Interior. As the nature of the insurgent and terrorist
threat has grown and evolved, the need for better capabilities
has naturally emerged. This has required a change from a purely
community based force towards the development of a paramilitary
capability. Following a study by a senior MNF officer in February
2004, the responsibility for training, equipping and mentoring
the Iraqi police moved from the CPA to MNF-I. Although this gave
IPS development a military lead, the policy lead has stayed with
the Iraqi Ministry of Interior.
It is ultimately for the Iraqi Government to decide
whether paramilitary capability should rest with the police or
the army. The need to have an effective counter-insurgency capability
does not remove the need for a community-based policing function.
Iraqi National Intelligence Service
24. We accept that there was good reason for
the Coalition not to retain the intelligence apparatus, which
Saddam Hussein used to terrorise Iraq's citizens. At the same
time, we acknowledge that developing indigenous Iraqi intelligence
capabilities is necessary for the Iraqi Security Forces to engage
the insurgency. We call on MoD to provide assistance to the Iraqi
Transitional Government and National Assembly so that the need
for intelligence is balanced with the need to maintain judicial
and political oversight of all intelligence activities. (Paragraph
177)
MOD is currently providing assistance to the Iraqi
Ministry of Defence by training and mentoring intelligence analysts
and senior personnel working within the defence intelligence area.
The intelligence assessments that are produced by these analysts
are intended to be used to inform Iraqi Ministers, and to plan
intelligence-led operations. MND(SE) also share intelligence assessments
with the Iraqi Security Forces as part of their partnership arrangements.
Our objective is to help the Iraqis develop an intelligence capability
that is not only effective but also accountable; operating within
the law and with respect for human rights. The support we provide
is shaped accordingly. Ultimately, however, it is for the Iraqis
to decide what kind of intelligence structures they wish to have.
Iraqi Army
25. The Iraqi Army is a central element of
the Iraqi Security Forces both at the present time and in the
future. We note that time has been lost in establishing the Iraqi
Army and that changes in policy have slowed down its full establishment.
It will be important to ensure that the future development of
the Iraqi Army, including its prospective merger with the Iraqi
National Guard, does not compromise its operational effectiveness
or organisational coherence. (Paragraph 183)
The development of the Iraqi Army remains on track,
with the smooth transition of the Iraqi National Guard into the
Iraqi Army structure taking place early this year. The Coalition
is steadily delivering increasing numbers of operationally capable
Iraqi military personnel. At the beginning of July 2005, there
are approximately 70,000 trained and equipped personnel in the
Iraqi Army, with additional numbers in Special Forces and support
units. A few leading units are capable of conducting independent
counter-insurgency operations. An example of this is the ongoing
Operation Al Barq (Lightning) to establish security in Baghdad,
which is being jointly conducted by Iraqi Police and Army units,
and has resulted in the capture of many insurgents, the discovery
of arms caches, and the interdiction of vehicle-borne improvised
explosive devices.
We fully expect this progress to continue, with the
Iraqi military increasingly taking the lead for operations, or
supporting operations led by the Iraqi police, and the Iraqi Ministry
of Defence playing an every greater role in the planning. Obviously,
establishing the command and control structures, logistics and
support structures for the Iraqi Army will take some time.
Judicial Reform
26. Reforming the Iraqi judicial system is
key to the country's post-Saddam transition. We welcome MoD's
assurance that progress is being made. It is moreover essential
that Iraqi Security Forces act within the parameters of the judicial
process and it is incumbent upon MNF-I to do what they can to
ensure that they do. (Paragraph 190)
The lead Government Department providing assistance
to the Iraqi Justice sector is the Department for International
Development (DFID). DFID is providing over £2 million to
support training for judges, prosecutors and lawyers to support
the rehabilitation of Iraq's judicial system, to increase independence,
professionalism and respect for human rights.
To date, 267 judges, prosecutors, lawyers and justice
department officials have been trained in International Human
Rights Law with a focus on fair trial and due process.
Iraqi trainers have been trained in International Human Rights
Laws and adult education techniques, and have in turn been able
to train Iraqi lawyers in International Human Rights Law with
support from the Iraqi Bar Council in Iraq.
As well as training Iraqi Security Forces on international
human rights as part of their basic training, we also provide
more specific training and advice where appropriate. For example,
senior UK prison and police officers in Basra regularly visit
police and prison detention facilities and monitor whether detainees
are being legally held and that custody time limits are observed.
In addition, there are plans in Basra to introduce specialised
training for custody officers, focussing on how to process and
look after detainees.
Militias
27. Paramilitary militias continue to exercise
considerable power in Iraq. We understand the need to prioritise
MNF-I's limited forces in the counter-insurgency campaign and
we realise that some militias made a contribution to the stabilisation
of the country. But militias exist to protect particular sectional
interests and we believe that until all Iraq's militias are disbanded,
questions will continue to hang over the Iraqi Security Forces'
authority. We welcome MoD's assurance that MNF-I will be willing
to assist the Iraqi Government in dismantling the militias if
circumstances should so require. (Paragraph 195)
We note the Committee's comments.
Disarmament and Small Arms
28. Understandably, small arms were low on
the list of Coalition priorities, which, in the initial stages,
were focused on finding weapons of mass destruction and securing
heavier conventional weapons. But the well-armed insurgency, which
subsequently emerged, suggests that focusing on small arms could
have been beneficial in the longer-term and that in the medium-term
ways must be found to reduce the very large amounts of small arms
in circulation. It also appears that more planning and resources
should have been devoted by the Coalition to securing Iraq's many
arms depots immediately following the invasion. These arms depots
have now become a key source of the insurgency's material for
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and heavy weapons. (Paragraph
200)
Steps were taken following the invasion to secure
arms caches. UK armed forces launched operations in April 2003
in Basra and Maysan to secure arms caches though our priority
remained maintenance of security.
The keeping of small arms is, however, a very common
feature of Iraqi society, and before the invasion the former regime
attempted through distribution of weapons to create conditions
for insurrection. Any attempt by the coalition to systematically
take away small arms from the general Iraqi population would have
met with stiff resistance. While some arms depots were raided
by Iraqis soon after the invasion, it is unlikely to have made
a significant difference to the level of violence.
Private security companies
29. It is now three years since the Government
published its Green Paper on private military companies. We recommend
the Government urgently brings forward proposals for the regulation
of the overseas activities of private security and military companies.
We do not believe that the current reliance on contracts is sufficient.
We are well aware of the complexities involved in a licensing
regime for individual contracts not least from our experience
of the export control regime. We suggest that the FCO should enter
into discussions with the Security Industry Authority to find
ways in which its offices could be used. Once a mechanism has
been established to regulate these companies, Parliament should
consider how best it could undertake the necessary oversight.
(Paragraph 211)
The report highlights well known problems surrounding
the accountability of private military and security companies
operating in Iraq. In part because of these problems, and as a
follow up to the Green Paper on Private Military Companies of
2002, the Foreign Secretary initiated a review of options for
regulation of private military and security companies last autumn.
This review has now been completed and its recommendations will
be considered by Ministers.
Civil-Military issues
30. Non-governmental organisations, the private
sector, international organisations, all have a crucial role to
play in addressing matters of governance, justice and reconciliation,
and economic and social needs in Peace Support Operations. (Paragraph
215)
We note the Committee's comments.
31. In MND (SE), British forces have carried
out their reconstruction-related tasks admirably. But we remain
concerned about the support offered by other departments. (Paragraph
220)
We welcome the Committee's positive comments on the
achievements of the British Armed Forces in MND(SE). UK Forces
have committed around £30 million through Quick Impact Projects.
Examples include assistance with road resurfacing tasks, completion
of over 300 projects in education, and improvements to water and
power supply.
Other Government Departments, in particular the Department
for International Development (DFID), have made substantial contributions
towards reconstruction in Iraq. The UK Government has pledged
a total of £544 million for reconstruction in Iraq from 2003
until 2006. Of this, DFID has committed over £391 million
for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq since the
conflict in 2003, and disbursed over £268 million.
As well as their reconstruction efforts elsewhere
in Iraq, DFID have undertaken, and continue to undertake several
projects in the South. These include £30 million worth of
infrastructure projects during 2003 and 2004, and £16.5 million
towards employment generation projects. Recently, DFID have launched
a new £40 million power infrastructure rehabilitation project,
and contributed $40 million to a point power electricity generating
scheme in MND(SE) in close coordination with the UK military.
Of course, the security situation restricts the freedom
of movement of DFID and FCO personnel. However, an increasingly
close working relationship in-theatre (there are, for example,
DFID personnel working in the UK military headquarters) as well
as in Whitehall, has meant that we are able to make real progress
with reconstruction tasks.
32. We are pleased to hear of the improved
cooperation between DFID and MoD since the publication of our
Lessons of Iraq Report in March 2004. In this light, we welcome
DFID's participation in planning and command exercises. Once the
Government has made a commitment to post-conflict stabilisation,
as it has in Iraq, that commitment will only be effectively delivered
through the planned and coordinated effort of all the relevant
government departments. (Paragraph 227)
We agree with the Committee that good planning and
coordination between Government Departments is a vital part of
delivering an effective contribution towards post-conflict stabilisation.
As the report acknowledges, there has been a lot of work across
government to further improve our capacity to deal with post-conflict
situations—in particular, establishing the Post-Conflict
Reconstruction Unit.
33. New ways of describing military activity
in the transition from war-fighting to Peace Support Operations,
i.e. the "three-block war", illustrate how the Armed
Forces are presented with a more complex range of tasks than previously;
they require the military to work more closely with NGOs and other
non-military actors to fulfil their objectives. This, in turn,
requires a level of mutual understanding, which has not always
been present. We hope Operation Telic has provided a degree of
mutual insight as well as an opportunity to improve cooperation
between British forces and key NGOs. (Paragraph 231)
While Operation TELIC has provided the opportunity
to learn a number of lessons relating to the post-conflict operations,
not least improved coordination between MOD and DFID, the security
situation in Iraq has meant that there are few NGOs working in
theatre. The relationship between the military and NGOs has therefore
not been a key feature of the operation. However, the MOD
has supported DFID in helping to build links between donors' organisations
and the Provincial Reconstruction Committees which guide the reconstruction
effort in the four provinces of MND (SE).
Broadening the Coalition
34. We strongly urge the United Nations to
expand its presence in Iraq especially in the southern governorates,
and engage actively in the reconstruction effort. (Paragraph 235)
The UN have an important role to play assisting the
Iraqi people in the political transition, advising on the constitution
and with the reconstruction and economic development of Iraq.
The UN played a key role in making the January elections a success,
working closely with the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq
(IECI). The UN has opened an Office of Constitutional Support,
headed by Nicholas "Fink" Haysom (a South African),
and is already engaged with the Iraqi Constitutional Committee
at the invitation of the Transitional National Assembly. The United
Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) currently has 49 staff
members in Baghdad with 150 Fijian guards, plus a small number
of staff members in Basra and Irbil. The UK continues to urge
the UN to expand its presence in Iraq and we are working closely
with them in Basra in particular.
35. We welcome the Government's support for
NATO's technical assistance programmes in Iraq. We remain concerned
by the slow manning of NATO's mission and the fact that the majority
of assistance provided by NATO takes place outside Iraq. We urge
the Government to lobby for an expansion of NATO's programmes
in-theatre. We are also concerned that the countries contributing
to MNF-I may be tempted to 'switch' their support to the NATO
mission and thereby deprive the MNF-I of front-line capabilities
before the Iraqi Security Forces are ready for the increased responsibilities.
We also urge the Government to examine the scope for offering
the prospect of Partnership-for-Peace-like arrangements to Iraq.
(Paragraph 241)
In addition to existing Multinational Force (MNF)
efforts to train the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the UK supports
the expansion of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I). The
majority of out of country assistance by NATO Allies is done on
a bilateral, rather than NATO basis. NATO itself undertakes some
training at its training facilities in Europe (Oberammergau, Stavangar
and Rome) but so far only a small number of officers have been
trained there. The main NATO effort remains Baghdad, where NTM-I
currently has 119 personnel who have trained nearly 400 Iraqi
officers in the joint operations centres. The UK welcomes Allied
agreement to expand this effort later this year to create a Training
Education and Doctrine Centre (TEDC) that will provide a centre
of excellence for the Iraqi officer corps. The NATO Secretary
General intends for NATO to train approximately 1000 Iraqi officers
each year at the TEDC. NTM-I has an important role to play in
training and we welcome all contributions to the mission.
While some states have refocused their effort through
the NATO training mission (notably Hungary and Portugal), there
are still 27 states in the MNF including Bosnia which has recently
deployed troops. The UK continues to encourage our allies to maintain
their forces in Iraq until the ISF are fully capable of taking
over security.
On Partnership for Peace, there has been some informal
discussion on whether Iraq could usefully be invited to join NATO's
Istanbul Co-operation Initiative (ICI). Current members include
Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar. Our own concerns are that while politically
valuable, such an invitation may be premature and may place additional
bureaucratic burden on Iraq's Defence Ministry while delivering
little more than NATO is already offering through NTM-I. There
is unlikely to be consensus at this stage, but we shall continue
to keep the idea under review.
36. We urge the Government and our NATO allies
to give early consideration as to how NATO might be able to assist
a democratic Iraq to play some role in a regional security arrangement.
(Paragraph 242)
Under Article 59 of the Transitional Administrative
Law (TAL) the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) has the power
to conclude international agreements. Any decision to negotiate
a regional security agreement would clearly be a matter for Iraq.
The Iraqi Defence Minister has just announced the signing of a
Memorandum of Understanding with the Iranian MOD to provide for
improved security on the Iran-Iraq border.
37. We welcome the increased involvement by
the EU in the non-financial aspects of Iraq's reconstruction,
including the deployment of a mission to train Iraqi judicial,
police and prison personnel. We note, however, that this training
is to take place primarily outside Iraq and we urge the Government
to lobby for an expansion of the EU's programmes in-theatre as
soon as possible. (Paragraph 246)
The EU is currently undertaking a single, clearly
defined twelve month, cross sectoral rule of law training mission.
The concept of operations for the programme acknowledges that
it would be preferable to undertake training inside Iraq, but
rules out the possibility given the current security environment.
Unless there is a significant reduction in the levels of violence
the EU is unlikely to undertake in-theatre training.
Future Commitment to Iraq
38. Until such time as the private sector
is confident that the necessary security can be provided by the
Iraqi Security Forces, British troops are likely to be invited
by the Iraqi Government to stay in Iraq. This may be a substantial
period of time. (Paragraph 254)
We agree that British troops are likely to be invited
by the Iraqi Government to stay in Iraq until they are confident
that Iraqi Security Forces can provide the necessary security.
We believe, however, that this judgement will be based on the
Iraqi Government's assessment of the threats facing them, and
the capabilities of their security forces to deal with these threats,
rather than the attitude of private companies and investors.
39. In light of the state of the insurgency
and the condition of the Iraqi Security Forces, and subject to
the continuing agreement of the Iraqi Government, it seems likely
that British forces will be present in Iraq in broadly similar
numbers to the current deployment into 2006. We support this commitment
and believe that calls for a withdrawal of British forces are
premature. Experience has taught us that, if nation-building exercises,
such as that in Iraq, are to succeed, they must have a serious
commitment of time, energy, financial resources and political
resolve. (Paragraph 255)
We welcome the Committee's support for our commitment
in Iraq to continue until the job is done. We will remain in Iraq
for as long as the Iraqi Government judge that our forces are
required to provide security and assist in the development of
the Iraqi Security Forces. Progress towards withdrawal will depend
on achieving certain conditions, as the Iraqi Security Forces
become more and more able to take on the full range of security
tasks, not on reaching certain dates.
40. We welcome the Government's announcement
that the lump sum benefits under the existing Armed Forces pension
scheme are to be at least doubled. We also welcome the announcement
in the Budget that compensation payments for injured serving personnel
will not be taxed in future. We regret, however, that these changes
are effective only from 6 April 2005. We urge MoD to consider
making them retrospective to the start of combat operations in
Iraq. (Paragraph 257)
The Government does not introduce pension and compensation
improvements retrospectively. It would be inequitable to draw
the line at any particular conflict or point in history. Therefore,
the new pension and compensation arrangements will only apply
to injuries and deaths from 6 April 2005.
Whitehall Issues
41. The first step to achieve a systematic
and multifaceted post-conflict planning process will be for MoD
to conduct and publish a comprehensive study on all the lessons
of the post-conflict period in Operation Telic. Such a report
should cover the post-conflict challenges faced not only by British
forces, but also by British civilian organisations that have operated
in Iraq alongside the military. In particular it should examine
relationships with other Coalition partners, including the United
States, and what lessons can be learned for future Coalition operations.
Without a clear baseline of the problems encountered, it is near-impossible
to correct failures. (Paragraph 260)
The MOD does conduct a rigorous and comprehensive
internal lessons learnt process on all operations. The Directorate
of Operational Capability (DOC) produced a report (Operation TELIC
Lessons Study Volume 2) which covered the post-conflict period
from 1 August 2003 to 30 November 2004. This report was endorsed
by the Chiefs of Staff committee earlier this year and included
dedicated sections on Coalition Relationships with a focus on
the UK/US relationship, as well as post-conflict reconstruction
including our relationship with DFID. DOC are also about to embark
on a third volume (to report in the Autumn) in which relationships
with coalition partners within MND(SE) will be addressed.
Conclusions and analysis are shared with other government
departments as appropriate, and will be made public as appropriate.
42. MoD's own analysis of the international
security environment 'Delivering Security in a Changing World'
envisages that the UK will be regularly engaged in stabilisation
and post-conflict efforts for the foreseeable future. Successfully
meeting this challenge will require effective planning and preparations
well in advance of the outbreak of hostilities. The establishment
of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) should contribute
significantly to the creation of capabilities to do this. But
the PCRU faces a number of challenges in establishing itself.
We are concerned that it may not achieve its initial operating
capability by the target date of Spring 2005. (Paragraph 270)
The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit achieved its
Initial Operating Capability, on schedule, this spring. It is
now working hard to build up full capacity, in order to contribute
successfully to the significant stabilisation challenges faced in
post conflict environments. The unit is on target to reach full
capability in spring 2006.
43. If the Government manages to establish
a cross-departmental capacity to coordinate the UK's post-conflict
activities, then the House of Commons will need to consider how
best to provide oversight of this work. This is likely to include
the Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees.
(Paragraph 271)
We note the Committee's comments, and would respond
appropriately to any new arrangements put in place to provide
appropriate parliamentary oversight of the UK's post-conflict
activities.
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