Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1-19)
RT HON
JOHN REID,
MP, MR DESMOND
BOWEN, MR
IAN ANDREWS
AND LIEUTENANT
GENERAL SIR
ROB FRY
KCB CBE
1 NOVEMBER 2005
Q1 Chairman: I would like to welcome
everyone to the Committee. This is our first briefing with you,
Secretary of State, and it is a general evidence taking session
in which I hope we will be able to cover a lot of ground. This
means, if I can address particularly the Members of the Committee,
short, snappy questions and, if I could address particularly the
witnesses, short, snappy answers would be much appreciated. Perhaps
I may begin, Secretary of State, by saying that by all accounts
this is the job you wanted. This is an area in which you have
had a lot of previous experience. Can you tell us what your major
aims have been to cover during your period as Secretary of State
for Defence, which we very much hope will be a long one?
John Reid: Thank you very much.
May I just place on record my condolences to the families of all
those servicemen and women who have lost their life or been injured
in service to their country since you were first established and
I became Secretary of State and, also, to remind us of the threats
and dangers which they face which have been exhibited in the last
48 hours by an action to deprive this country of the poison of
masses of drugs. I am delighted that the Navy has succeeded in
that. It is the latest illustration of just how the servicemen
and women in our Armed Forces serve this country. That is precisely
one of the reasons I wanted this job. I cannot think of any group
of people for whom public service is more serious, more dangerous
and more comprehensive than the men and women who serve our country.
To have a contract that says "I will serve my country even
until death" is a very exceptional and rare thing and I am
honoured to be able to play some part with them in defence. That
is why I wanted to come back and why today I am working with my
colleagues: the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, General Sir Robert
Fry who covers operations, Desmond Bowen who is my Policy Director
and, on my right, Ian Andrews is my Second PUS who covers finance
and other issues. The Ministry of Defence exists to produce fighting
power. It does many other things, but essentially the main product
of the Ministry of Defence ought to be fighting power. My job
is to make sure that that is relevant to today's threats, it is
capable of meeting those threats and it is sufficient in terms
of all of the elements of fighting power to so do. The first element,
as you will know, Chairman, is the intellectual element, which
is doctrine, training and so on. The second element of fighting
power is the physical, that is equipment, tanks, ships, planes,
and the third element is morale and it is probably the most important
element, which means a bonding together, a feeling of trust in
each other and in the leadership, a sense of history and family
as well as a sense of country and a sense of belonging together
as a fighting unit. It is my job to make sure that all of those
elements, the intellectual, the physical and the morale element,
are sufficient for today's tasks.
Chairman: Thank you. There are a lot
of issues we are going to have to cover this morning and the first
one that we would like to go into is the nuclear deterrent.
Q2 Robert Key: Secretary of State,
you say in your Department's report published last week, paragraph
171, that in a recent poll undertaken by Ipsos 81% of people said
that the UK needs strong Armed Forces. That is no surprise. When
it comes to the nuclear deterrent and the fact that you are going
to have to make decisions with the Government during the lifetime
of this Parliament and given the answer yesterday in the House
of Lords from Lord Drayson about nuclear weapons in which he laid
out what I can only describe as a very large number of nuclear
weapons still around in the world, do you think it is going to
be very difficult to persuade the British people that we need
to renew our nuclear deterrent?
John Reid: Let us be absolutely
clear on what the present position of the Government is and then
I will turn to a replacement because the question you are asking
me is very relevant but it concerns events 15 years away and up
to 50 years away. I think what the public is most interested in
is what the present position is and the present position has been
laid out quite clearly by the Government, ie we will retain Britain's
minimum nuclear deterrent. That is a pledge that we made in the
last manifesto nearly six months ago and one that we will keep.
You may ask how long that manifesto pledge lasts. Technically
it is for the life of a Parliament, but I think all reasonable
people would assume it to apply for the life of the Trident system.
That is where we are, we intend, at the same time as minimising
our deterrent, which we have done, and keeping our obligations
under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to maintain the nuclear deterrent.
The question to which we must now turn is what we might do in
15 years' time in terms of addressing the situation when the present
warheads or missile system or nuclear submarines from which they
are launched come to the end of their useful life. That is precisely
the discussion on which we are now embarking. There are a great
many questions to be asked about the nature of the threats we
might face then, about the assumptions on which we work at present
and being willing to take part in multilateral negotiations at
the right time. We have always maintained that as long as some
other nuclear state which is a potential threat has nuclear weapons
we will retain ours. That is the assumption from which we start
but it has to be tested in discussions with others and it will
be. Even if we decide that we want to keep the nuclear deterrent,
we then have to ask whether we want to keep it in the same form,
submarine launched, sea launched, or in air launched or land-based
nuclear weapons; and then we have to ask ourselves about the cost,
and we will work through those points. For the foreseeable future
we will be maintaining the nuclear deterrent. We are now entering
a discussion about whether that foreseeable future will extend
beyond the 15 to the 50-year point.
Q3 Robert Key: The Prime Minister
has said that decisions are likely to have to be taken in the
life of this Parliament, although we are looking a long time into
the future. I understand why you have to be very discreet about
the information that can be made public. Do you agree that if
we are to have a proper debate, and it must be an informed debate,
it will be necessary to come clean with people and to give a certain
amount of information about the basis for the discussion that
you have said already that you wish to have? How far can we go?
John Reid: I have tried to do
that not only in Defence Questions and defence debates in the
House and I am sure that will continue but, also, last night with
my colleagues in the Parliamentary Labour Party and today in front
of this Committee. I am sure this is something that will continue
to be discussed and debated. In a sense the decision is really
quite simple and that is whether we stand by the assumptions that
we have used so far, which are that we should minimise the nature
of our deterrent; that we should be prepared at a given stage,
if the Russians and the Americans get down to a certain level
of nuclear capacity, to hand our nuclear weapon in, that throughout
this process complying with the NPT and along with those assumptions
also to have the other assumption, which is that as long as another
potential enemy has nuclear weapons we will retain ours. That
is the decision in principle. That has to be taken in practical
terms against what we think will be the threats in 15, 25, 30
years' time and then we have to decide, if we want to go ahead
and if we can afford it, what the nature of our deterrent would
be. I would merely make one point. I have heard it said that because
there are new threats from terrorism that in itself makes the
nuclear deterrent redundant because, of course, it is said you
cannot use the nuclear weapon against terrorists. It is equally
true that you cannot use Special Forces to deter a nuclear attack.
That does not mean to say that Special Forces are redundant. The
truth of the matter is we face a range of threats at this moment
running from individual acts of terrorism to nuclear threats.
We need a range of responses that include Special Forces, individual
acts of dynamic heroism if you like, right through to nuclear
deterrent. Not all of those responses are responses to every threat
but the range of response is necessary in order to meet the range
of threats. That is the assumption we have at the moment and it
is that assumption that we will test against our analysis of what
might be future threats.
Q4 Robert Key: Secretary of State,
I wonder if you would agree with me that maybe for the last decade
there have been discussions about battlefield nuclear weapons,
a little nuclear weapon that would somehow do much less damage,
but that that actually is a trap and that if you have a very small
nuclear weapon it would be just as dangerous and much less effective
than a big one. Is it not a good idea to start educating us, the
general public, 81% of whom want to see a strong defence? How
are you going to do that? How do you see this process evolving
over the next two or three years, up to the time when you are
going to have to take a decision during the lifetime of this Parliament?
John Reid: You are right to say
that there has been a discussion about the types and nature of
nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrent. You are also right to imply
that among our major colleagues in the Security Council they retain
multiple systems of nuclear deterrence. The French have got two,
the Russian have got three and the Americans have got a range
of nuclear deterrents as well. We have reduced ours to the absolute
minimum. Under this Government we have reduced our fire power
by 70%; we have reduced the number of warheads to less than 200;
we have reduced the number of warheads per boat to no more than
48; we have reduced the number of boats at sea and we have reduced
the state of readiness and targeting and so on. We are the only
country in the world which has actually got rid of a complete
system of nuclear deterrents[1]
because up until this Government came in we had two systems, one
of them was the WE177 airborne free-fall bomb and the other one
was the submarine launched Trident D5. We got rid of the former.
We have reduced ours to a minimum. Unfortunately over recent years,
despite the fact that we have contained the number of new states
that have developed nuclear weapons and therefore we have got
less than, say, John F Kennedy would have expected 30 or 40 years
ago when he predicted that by the turn of the century we might
have 40 states, as we have been reducing other states have been
acquiring. We know that India has nuclear weapons, Pakistan has
nuclear weapons, North Korea and so on. Probably more worrying
is the fact that some countries have been trying to develop nuclear
weapons by deceiving the world and not complying with their own
obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, for instance Iran.
Therefore, you are right to point to the need for an informed
discussion on this because if we are looking at trends over the
past 10 or 20 years and looking forward 20 years, I think it would
be naive to believe inevitably that there will be no further proliferation,
however hard we are committed to that.
Q5 Mr Borrow: It seems to me that this
is a crucial decision which is for the medium to long term. If
it has not to be made during this Parliament and by this Labour
Government, it may well be a decision which comes in under a different
government altogether and therefore any public debate needs to
lead to a public consensus and ideally a cross-party consensus
on what happens after Trident. Do you agree that that can only
happen if there is the maximum amount of information in the public
domain to allow the public to reach a public consensus which politicians
can then use in making any decision?
John Reid: It is not absolutely
essential that the decision is taken during this Parliament but
it would be highly desirable in my view. It is not absolutely
essential that you have a cross-party consensus but in my view
that would be desirable. It is also desirable with any such important
issues that there is the maximum information and consensus across
the public as well as across Parliament. The history of these
matters is, despite the raging controversies that have been going
on for 25, 30 or 40 years, that there has been a fairly consistent
two-thirds majority who believe in the simple proposition that
as long as a potential enemy has a nuclear weapon we should retain
one. That is not to say that is necessarily right or that it will
not change, but that has been the traditional position in terms
of what we can take out of the scientific evidence from opinion
polls. Let me just comment on the timescale. If you leave aside
any replacement in 15 or 20 years' time—whether that replacement
is an update or a renewed type of system with new submarines or
whatever or whether it is a completely new system—we still
have to maintain the safety and reliability of our present deterrent.
That means that the various elements of the deterrent have to
be maintained, that is the warhead, the missile system and the
boats in simple terms. That involves a degree of expenditure which
any government that succeeds this one would have to pay anyway
otherwise we would be losing the key obligation of Government,
which is to keep safe, reliable and secure our means of security.
There will be an ongoing need for governments to maintain our
present deterrent until the end of its useful life while we have
the discussion and decision about how and when we replace the
present system.
Chairman: This will lead us on to a long
debate over the coming years and this Committee will play a part
in that. Let us move on to the issue of European defence and NATO.
Q6 Mr Hancock: How do you expect
European Security and Defence Policy to develop over the course
of this Parliament? What are the implications of a strengthened
ESDP for our defence relationship with the United States and the
future of NATO bearing in mind that we are under considerable
criticism from the United States about Europe's lack of commitment
to defence expenditure? Where countries currently are spending
money on defence, much of that is simply going to pay long pension
commitments and not much in the way of developing new technology
or indeed bringing into place the sort of troops and equipment
replacements that were required.
John Reid: This is a very big
question to which snappy answers carry a risk of their own. Let
me try and answer the three things that I think you raised. The
first one is what is a general, philosophical and practical approach
to European defence? Secondly, what about the defence configurations
inside the ESDP, and thirdly, what about equipment? On the first
one, the cornerstone of our defence is NATO. It is well tried
and tested and it is also developing in terms of the NATO Response
Force, but it needs to transform itself even more and at a greater
pace. It needs to do at the NATO level what we did in 1997-98
and that is a thorough transformation. We did it through a Strategic
Defence Review. A transformed NATO is the cornerstone of our defence.
The European Security and Defence Policy ought to develop in partnership
as a complementary means of applying power or addressing some
of the threats and challenges we face in NATO. Therefore, I do
not see this as a zero-sum game whereby if NATO does well the
European Union is diminished or if the European Union develops
its particular prowess and attributes, that NATO has diminished.
I have never seen it in that way. Therefore, as President of the
European Defence Ministers at present I want to see the ESDP become
more coherent, more capable and more active. I mean more capable
in the sense of having forces we can use. It is no good having
shop window forces. It is no good having forces on paper if they
are not deployable. Therefore, we want to make it more capable
by identifying what it is we need in Europe and then, through
the Force catalogue, identifying where we are going to get those
resources and developing issues like the battle group concept.
By more coherent I mean that today's security threats are much
more complex than the old defence threats. Today we have migrations,
internal genocides, natural disasters, disputes between states
and we also have states breaking up internally: we have ethnic
tensions, we have failed states and that means that we need a
complex response to those complex security challenges; and that
complex response runs from the political—civil response,
intervening between parties, helping them to come together, rehabilitation,
building security forces, building the police, building the judicial
systems, extending politics, right through to the heavy combat
side. Given that range of responses necessary, I think Europe
is particularly well placed because of the range of forces at
its disposal, provided we can be coherent in the management of
them and, taking the example of Bosnia, learn the lessons of that
and apply them. The final area is activity. If we are more capable,
more coherent and more active—for instance, we are making
a contribution to Darfur in the Sudan, to the peace process in
Indonesia, in Aceh—then even out-of-area we can make a contribution
to countering today's threats. I think we can be more capable,
more coherent, more active and complementary to NATO. On defence
weaponry, there is obviously a problem in Europe with everybody
doing their own thing and too many suppliers for too little demand.
Despite the fact that we in this country have been increasing
our defence budget every year since the Labour Government came
in, the truth is that as a percentage of our GDP it has been decreasing.
At one time it was 5.4% of GDP; it is now about 2.4%. That is
similar in a lot of countries as you pointed out. To have a total
demand in Europe for 10,000 armoured vehicles but to have 23 different
projects trying to supply them shows a mismatch at the European
level. That is one of the things the European Defence Agency ought
to be able to help with as is the development of common approaches
to technology. That is a very long answer, it was not snappy,
but I hope it addresses all the points you raised.
Q7 Mr Hancock: I think it is a fair
reflection. You say the European Defence Agency "ought"
to be able to work towards giving a common policy on procurement,
but ought to against the reality of whether they could actually
ever deliver is a different matter. NATO did a capability study
which it promised would be published, it took three years or more
to create and it still has not been put in the public domain.
The capability that counts is that the number of countries prepared
to put soldiers' lives on the line has not increased and the responsibility
for doing the actual fighting in a crisis situation is once again
heavily dependent on countries like the United Kingdom. Others
have not rushed to join a commitment to put their soldiers in
harm's way readily. The equipment issue is a classic example where
natural restraint on countries to buy a capability which would
be common across NATO would invariably mean buying from the United
States or possibly from the United Kingdom and nobody is going
to rush to sign up for that. How do you expect Europe to be able
to deliver what you are seeking here in a realistic way?
John Reid: I think you know that
I am as proud as anyone could be of the contribution the British
Armed Forces have made to all we have been doing. I will let that
stand. I think people know where I come from on that position.
I think it is a bit unfair to suggest that we are the only ones
in Europe—
Q8 Mr Hancock: I did not say we are
the only ones, I said there are the same consistent few.
John Reid: I think that is unfair
as well because there are others now who are contributing towards
it from Europe, and not just the French. Whatever the rivalries
in politics, whatever the differences we have at present in Europe
on the constitution and on the budget, actually on defence I think
we probably do have a closer relationship with the French than
we have had for a long while and I want to see that develop. I
think they have fine fighting forces and I think they contribute
a great deal. The Dutch Minister Henk Kamp and I discuss these
things regularly. I think the Dutch, and not just the Marines,
have been prepared to contribute and are prepared to contribute
in many ways and indeed are joining with us in one of the Marine-based
battle groups in two or three years' time. Italy is playing a
far bigger role than they did a few years ago. I was in Kosovo
recently and it is an Italian General who is in charge there.
At the moment in Afghanistan the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps is
being taken over by an Italian General. It is an Italian General
who is the Head of the Military Committee at present, Mosca Moschini.
In terms of the European dimension, Italy is playing a great role.
The Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland and Norway, where the outgoing
minister was one of the major contributors to European defence,
are also playing a great role. I do not think it is right to diminish
the contribution they are making. However, I will concede this
to you. In terms of their financial contribution, not every country
is paying what is required nowadays. In terms of their forces,
a lot of these countries who have come in from Eastern Europe
in particular have very static forces. As it happens, they were
on the other side of the Iron Curtain facing us, but they were
like our forces, static, based on the plains of northern Germany,
waiting for the war to come to them as we were to us. They need
to reform and transform those forces into more mobile, flexible,
high readiness forces that can take part in what we could call
expeditionary warfare. That limits the amount they can contribute
at the moment. I think the intention to transform is there.
Q9 Mr Hancock: I want to ask about
the changing situation in the Balkans generally. With the future
of Kosovo as one of the big questions, whether Serbia and Montenegro
will break up and the ramifications of what that will do for stability
in the whole area and whether it is possible to hold Bosnia together
and what sort of commitment that will have on our Armed Forces
bearing in mind commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans,
where do you see that going and what do you feel Europe's contribution
has to be to that and possibly even the worsening situation in
the Black Sea generally, in the Caucuses and Europe's role there?
John Reid: That is another big
question. Europe's role in Bosnia is very significant indeed because,
of course, in Bosnia it is now the European Force that is in there.
I recently discussed the situation with our leading officer there,
General David Leakey, and the position is this. We have about
1,000 soldiers in EUFOR. We are there for deterrence and reassurance.
I think in the immediate future, that is the course of next year,
we will be staying at or about that level. I think deterrence
and reassurance have worked. There is still a need there, but
I think in the course of next year we should take stock of whether
or not we ought to be handing over a little more, including the
fight against organised crime, to the Bosnians themselves. Why
do I think that the situation is getting a little more optimistic
in Bosnia? It is because two of the very, very sensitive areas
between the entities are shifting towards resolution. The first
of these is a Bosnian Army. If you had said to me 10 or 12 years
ago that there would not only be a Bosnian Army at the Bosnian
level, admittedly made up of regiments from the different entities,
Serbs and Croats, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats and Bosniac
themselves, but agreement that from the beginning of next year
that will be the Bosnian Army rather than the entity armies and
that it would be pushed above all by a Bosnian Serb Defence Minister
by the name of Radovanovic, who has either just arrived on a visit
here or just about to , you and I would have found all that difficult
to believe, but it is true. So there has been a big advance in
the Army and some advance in policing and I pay tribute to Paddy
Ashdown for the job that he has done there because there is now
a move in policing to move it up to the state and down to the
local level. That will not be resolved until next year, but these
are moves in the right direction in Bosnia. On Kosovo, we have
now had the standards report and we go on to the status talks.
It will be difficult. It is very sensitive. It is potentially
very controversial between the Albanian Kosovars on the one hand
and the Serbs in the north and also Belgrade, but I do think that
with goodwill all round it is possible to settle this politically.
There is a final thing to say about the Balkans. Croatia is now
entering discussions about Europe, I hope Serbia at some stage
in the not too distant future will get there and Bosnia will become
more stable. Kosovo is still sensitive but it is getting there.
I think the solution to all of these problems lies in two things.
One is a feeling of security, which comes ultimately with entry
into the European Union, and the other one is an opportunity for
personal and social advance which is enhanced by entry into the
European Union. The break-up of the state there and its circumstances
caused terrible problems. I think that the greater unity of the
European Union offers an opportunity to give the stability and
reduce the paranoia and give the opportunity for prosperity, both
of which are essential elements at mitigating the worst excesses
of nationalism. I think in the short, the medium and the longer
term we do have a route map there, we are making progress on it
and I trust that things continue in that direction.
Q10 Mr Swayne: Secretary of State,
it will cost us two and a half times more to equip a formation
with the Future Rapid Defence System than it will for a corresponding
formation to be equipped with the USFCS system and we will still
be less well equipped. Is this the premium that we have to pay
for Europeanisation?
John Reid: No. With great respect,
Mr Swayne, I listen to the Chiefs of Staff and my military advisers
on these matters. They do not take the same views as you. No final
decision has been made as to where we are going to place these
contracts or indeed to the final shape and configuration of the
armoured vehicles or the technology with which we equip individual
soldiers, but the decision will not be made on the basis of a
political decision irrespective of the wishes of the military
themselves, far less against the wishes of the military. Indeed
the people who are looking at these things just now—I think
General Mike Jackson was recently in Sweden looking at these things—are
taking a deep and close interest in it and they will let me know
their views. Anybody who thinks people like General Jackson will
take second, far less third, best on these things because of my
whim do not know Mike Jackson or Mike Walker or the Chief of the
Naval Staff or the Chief of Air Staff.
Chairman: Secretary of State, we are
covering quite a lot of ground. I know you have to leave by 12.30
so we will try to finish by 12.25. We are now moving on to Iraq,
another huge subject.
Q11 Mr Breed: Secretary of State,
could you share with us the MoD's planning assumptions in respect
of the timetable for run-down of UK forces in Iraq?
John Reid: Yes. I can tell you
in precise terms what our objectives are and what our assumptions
are. They are not based on an immutible timetable; they are based
on the achievement of certain conditions. Basically we are in
Iraq now, whatever the controversy was surrounding the original
intervention, under the United Nations Security Council Resolution
1546 and acting alongside the United Nations and the multinational
forces who are there, with three objectives. First of all, it
is to assist the Iraqis in the building of their own democratic
institutions and democratic control of their own country. Secondly,
it is to build up the security forces necessary to protect that
democracy and, thirdly, to build an economic and civil infrastructure
and civil society. The second one of those, which is really what
you are asking me about, although the other two are relevant,
the Iraqis are making big advances in terms of building their
democratic institutions and processes. They have just had a bigger
turnout in a referendum—despite threats from terrorists—than
we had in this country for our general election. The infrastructure
is proceeding despite the terrorists, although very slowly. Water
supplies, electricity and oil are under constant terror attacks
in order to disrupt economic and social advance. Our objective
is to help the Iraqis build security forces to the extent that
they can begin to participate in counter-terrorist and other operations.
Then they can begin to take the lead in such operations. And then
they can act autonomously in such operations. How are we doing
on that? At the moment we have over 200,000 security forces, from
the Army through the Ministry of Interior to the police, who are
trained and capable of taking part in operations. Secondly, they
are increasingly taking part in operations although not in the
lead on operations. Thirdly, they are not yet ready to act autonomously.
They need better officer training, command and control, logistics
back-up, intelligence support and so on. However, it is possible
that in the course of next year they could begin to take the lead
in different parts of Iraq at different times. In other words,
the planning assumption would be that the handover to the Iraqis
themselves will not be a one-off event, it will be a process that
will occur over time, starting in different areas at different
times. That is a process of handover to the Iraqis which could
occur in the course of next year in some places. As it does that
then our handover will take place in stages as well. In other
words, we will begin to participate alongside the Iraqis, then
we will draw back to barracks or to central areas as a local or
theatre reserve and then eventually we will withdraw. That is
a process that I said in July of this year I thought could start
next year and I see no reason to change that view. There are nine
Iraqi Brigades running operations with United States mentors at
the moment. In our area, in the Multi-National Division South
East, I have visited the 10th Division Iraqi Army just outside
of Basra. There are many, many more Iraqi security forces trained
and capable than there were even 18 months ago. But they are not
yet able to act without some support.
Q12 Mr Breed: You seemed to indicate
that the timetable will not be influenced by the situation as
a whole in Iraq but by particular parts. Is it conceivable that
there could be a UK withdrawal or at least a run-down in the southern
part of Iraq in advance of any US withdrawal?
John Reid: Perhaps I have given
the wrong impression. There will be a number of factors which
will influence the decision as to the timing of handover in different
areas. One of them will be the level of a terrorist threat locally
as well as nationally and in that sense the terrorist activity
that is taking place is not having the effect of pushing us out
of Iraq quicker than would otherwise be the case. Its only effect
is to keep us there longer than would otherwise be the case. That
is one of the terrible, tragic ironies of this position, that
one of the elements that will help us to move from Iraq early
is a diminution of acts of terrorism; but there are other elements,
one is local government and one is the national government, the
progress, the democracy and so on. So there will be a national
element. You are right in the sense that there will be local features
which will be involved in this as well and at the moment there
are different configurations with different strengths and different
force postures in different parts of Iraq. In some areas, particularly
the heavy Sunni populated areas, the level of terrorist attacks
is much higher than in others. I do not think people understand
that the vast majority of attacks in Iraq are occurring in four
provinces; over 80% of terrorist attacks are in four provinces.
Fourteen provinces are relatively peaceful compared to the rest.
So in those areas things could move a little quicker than they
would in other areas of Iraq, but we would want to do all of this
with complete transparency and in consultation with the Iraqi
Government themselves who have established a committee under the
Prime Minister to look at the criteria for transition and with
our allies, not least our major ally who have suffered such losses
there and shown such fortitude and bravery, the United States
Armed Forces under General Casey. But, of course, there are other
colleagues there, Australians, the Japanese and we will discuss
these matters with them as well.
Q13 Mr Breed: Whilst it might be
conceivable that UK forces may be able, because the process has
gone slightly better in our sector, to be brought home, it is
equally as likely that they may be redeployed to other parts of
Iraq rather than be withdrawn, is it not?
John Reid: No, I do not think
anybody is envisaging such redeployment out of our traditional
area. I am certainly not considering such an option at present
if that is what you are asking me. I would point out to you that
even within MND South East there are different levels of threat
and different levels of activity and different levels of progress.
We have Maysan and Dhi Qar and I was discussing events there recently
with Antonio Martino last Monday, the Italian Minister, where
again the Italians are playing a tremendous role in police reform.
In our own area there are different levels of activity and there
could be a degree of flexibility inside our own area, but I am
not envisaging that we will be going in great numbers to other
parts of Iraq. In the past we have gone through specific operations
and I regard it as an important element of what we are doing there
to maintain the solidarity of the coalition. We are a sovereign
state, we can take our own decisions, as we always can do when
we enter obligations, but we are a sovereign nation with honour
and so when we enter obligations with colleagues and allies then
that international solidarity is very important to a nation like
the United Kingdom. We do not go back on our word and, therefore,
we will discuss all these matters with our international allies
as well as have our opinions shaped by the opinions of the Iraqis
themselves who have established a committee to look at the criteria
and then decide which areas they think are ready for the handover.
We want them to have confidence they can lead on these matters.
Q14 Robert Key: Secretary of State,
public opinion in this country and around the world is conditioned
by the news that people hear on a daily basis coming out of Iraq.
In this country no BBC news bulletin would be complete without
the daily drip of bad news from Iraq. Representing a lot of military
families as I do, I know the impact that has on military families
and indeed military personnel in this country. I wonder if you
could explain whether it is just that news editors decide only
to report bad news or is it that they cannot report the good news
that you and I know that our forces and the civilian contractors
and the voluntary organisations are doing in Iraq because they
are not allowed into those areas. Do you put any barriers in the
way of news or do you, on the other hand, try and facilitate access
to good news stories, or is it just that there is a sort of death
wish about the way the news is reported coming out of Iraq?
John Reid: You are tempting me
in a very interesting direction.
Q15 Robert Key: Good!
John Reid: This is not an unimportant
issue because, as I mentioned at the beginning and you know well,
this question of morale is an essential element of fighting power.
When we face a world in which we are not fighting on equal terms
with dictators or terrorists, because they are accountable to
no one, they are answerable to no one, they have transparency
for no one, they are not open to this type of questioning, it
is very easy, if we do not try to get a balanced picture, to show
only the deficiencies or downsides of one side in this. The casual
observer might come to the conclusion that sometimes our media
falls into that trap. Certainly soldiers remark to me when I am
in theatre about the contrast between the sort of reception they
very often get there and appreciation they get for what they are
doing on operations and the sort of apparent "condemnation"
for all of this in the press back home. All I try to do is to
point out constantly the fact that in Afghanistan and in Iraq
those who are elected by the people to speak on behalf of the
people are hugely supportive of our presence in their countries
because we are helping them to have the freedoms that we value
so greatly in this country. I wish that a little more attention
was paid to that than to those who would try to undermine our
morale by presenting an unbalanced picture. I do not think it
is useful to go down the road of who has got what agenda on what,
but I did notice that in one weekend newspaper there was a front
page story about some leaked anonymous report saying the Iraqis
did not want us there, whereas an exclusive interview with the
President of Iraq opening with the words "The President of
Iraq today appealed to the United Kingdom's forces to stay in
Iraq and help the Iraqi people" was relegated to page 29.
I do not make these editorial decisions. You must make your own
decisions about why they are being made in that fashion and whether
there is a balanced picture. I am all in favour of a balanced
picture. I do not want anybody to be complacent. Things are tough
in Iraq, there is no question about that. The terrorists are going
to huge lengths of terrorism by the destruction of human life,
of Children and women, including ordinary Muslims going to the
mosque, not American or British and multi-national politicians
or soldiers but children trying to take sweets are being massacred,
innocents as they were last night in Basra. The terrorists are
trying to stop the majority of people in Iraq building their own
future democratically, taking care of their own society in a civilised
fashion, getting a better job and getting electricity. We are
helping the people of Iraq to do that and every one of the democratically
elected spokesmen says that whenever they get the opportunity.
But when they say it they do not hit the headlines. When the terrorists
say something they do hit the headlines. You must make your own
judgment about why people choose which headline.
Q16 Robert Key: I am sure that, like
me, you believe it is a strength of our democracy that we have
an independent, free press media, of course we do and I do not
wish to see propaganda coming out of Iraq either. I want to press
you on the point I made about what facilities you give to the
national and international press and media in Iraq. Are you able
to assist them, to take them to see projects or is everybody just
confined to the green zone and not allowed to see what is going
on as physically it is unsafe for them to do so?
John Reid: No. We constantly take
journalists out to Iraq and into other fields of operation. We
try to be as open as possible in who they can speak to given the
security implications. I have no doubt some people think this
is just a brainwashing or propaganda exercise. Having listened
to Mr Simon Jenkins who has been on such visits, if it is intending
to do that then it is singularly failing. But that is not the
intention. The intention is to try and place before people the
reality on the ground, warts and all, and the reality on the ground
is difficult, it is dangerous for our troops, it is dangerous
for people to go there, including journalists and, occasionally,
ministers. But despite all of the efforts of the terrorists progress
is being made on democracy. We have gone from 8.5 million people
taking part in elections on the constitution to 10.5 million people
in the referendum and now the elections. Progress is being made
on security. We now have over 200,000 trained and capable Iraqi
security forces. They now participate in 80% of the operations.
Progress is being made on the social and civil side of society.
We now have something like 230 hospitals, we have several thousand
schools operating, we have an immunization programme going, but
that is not represented in the press. You will have to address
your questions, Mr Key, to the editors who choose not to illustrate
that side of the equation.
Q17 Mr Swayne: Secretary of State,
in your recent statement you agreed that Iraq is now meeting engagement
with terrorism and that as political progress is made so that
battle will intensify, so if we are going to lick the terrorists
we have to lick them here in Iraq. Can you just reassure us that
we really have got the political will to do that? It is going
to take more troops rather than fewer troops. If, for example,
we need those troops to undertake the disarmament of militias,
have we got the will to do it?
John Reid: First of all, let me
take your general question about the nature of the struggle in
which we are engaged. I am under no illusions about that. There
is a struggle going on, at the heart of which is an ideological
and international one between 21st Century values and 7th Century
values. There are people who would seek to impose upon us and
others a dictatorship of a nature that is counter to all our democratic
freedoms and all our modern instincts. I will not go into the
details of it, you will know them. You will know that in Afghanistan,
for instance, it was not only not encouraged to educate a young
girl, it was a criminal offence so to do. In terms of whether
there is an ideological struggle going on, I am in no doubt that
that is there and unfortunately it manifests itself on one side
by the use of means of terrorism unconstrained by conscience or
convention, on a scale that we have never seen before and it will
require a great deal of resolution and endurance over a long period
of time, using every conceivable weapon in our armoury—military
and non-military, diplomatic, financial and political, which is
why aid, trade and the G8 process is a necessary concomitant of
the preparedness to use military power. I think that will be necessary
over a long period of time. It is a long, wide and deep struggle.
It will be fought in many theatres, sometimes with attacks upon
us in our home towns, in London, Madrid, Egypt, Tanzania, Africa,
New York, Bali and sometimes in theatres like Iraq. There is an
international dimension to what is going on in Iraq. If the terrorists
win and they stop a Muslim Arab nation developing democracy, they
will have a huge strategic victory. If, on the other hand, the
terrorists do not win and an Arab Muslim country like Iraq develops
its own democracy, it will be a huge blow to those extremists
who argue that democracy is incompatible with Islam or with the
status of being Arab. Having said all that, we would be wrong
not to recognise that there are specific internal issues in Iraq
that have to be addressed as well. Not all terrorism is imported.
There is an insurgency inside Iraq which consists of elements
of the former Fascist regime that led Iraq under Saddam Hussein
and elements of Sunnis who feel dispossessed, alienated—they
have lost power and jobs—and we have to reach out to them.
There is an unmitigated and unmitigating struggle against international
terrorism to meet force with force when necessary, but there is
also the need for us to look at the underlying political problems,
whether in the Middle East, Kashmir or elsewhere, the poverty,
the exploitation, the perceived injustice and a need to recognise
that within each area like Iraq itself there are not just the
imported terrorists like Zaqawi from Jordan, Al Quaeda and so
on, and are the former regime elements with whom we cannot talk.
But there are many ordinary Sunnis whom we should try to engage
in the political process. I think that effort is a necessary concomitant
of the preparedness to use force. Again, that is a complicated
answer because it is a complex situation. You cannot just say
this is a global war on terror any more than you can say it is
just a little, local difficulty. It is not. There is both an Iraqi
dimension and an international dimension to this.
Q18 Linda Gilroy: I want to ask a
question about recruitment and retention in the context of Iraq.
Iraq, and the rather more simple version of Iraq that you have
just been discussing with us in terms of how it is reported, tends
to be the prism through which people see our armed services. Are
you concerned that the controversial nature of the deployment,
the sort of press coverage, the abuse, the scandals, the fatalities
is having an impact on recruitment and retention? If so, what
are we able to do about that?
John Reid: I genuinely do not
think they are the main issue. There is a deeper and longer problem
in recruiting, particularly to the infantry or to what we call
the pinch points of certain skills. That is the changed employment
market.
Q19 Chairman: We will come on to
the broad issue of recruitment and retention a little later on.
I wonder if you could concentrate on the question in relation
to Iraq.
John Reid: I do not think it is
the main issue.
1 Note by witness: France has dismantled her
land-based ballistic missiles. Back
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