Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20-39)
RT HON
JOHN REID,
MP, MR DESMOND
BOWEN, MR
IAN ANDREWS
AND LIEUTENANT
GENERAL SIR
ROB FRY
KCB CBE
1 NOVEMBER 2005
Q20 Mr Jones: I have to concur with
your view about the media's interpretation of events happening
in Iraq. I have been there three times now and I was in a Basra
police station with a journalist from a well known national newspaper.
Having seen the report when we got back, it was completely different
to the meeting that took place with myself and other colleagues,
but that is an aside. Some of this Committee first went to Iraq
in July 2003. The situation is complex in the south because there
are provinces that have always had problems, even under Saddam's
regime. The situation has deteriorated. To what extent is that
holding up the work that you have outlined in terms of reconstruction?
Is there any truth in the rumour that troops are now not to go
by road or patrols but are moving around the south by air?
John Reid: I do not think the
situation in general is worse in Basra than it was. It has had
peaks and troughs and one of them was 19 September. On the question
of policing in Basra and elsewhere, policing is slower in terms
of its training and capability than the Army is. There appears
to be a greater problem among the police of split loyalties which
would range from a natural affinity of support for your local
ethnic or religious group through to, at the other extreme, some
attempt to enter the policing from militias in order to get authority
and arms. Although this reared its ugly head on 19 September,
I do not think we should assume that all Iraqi police are like
that. I would like to place on record my appreciation—and
hopefully yours—for the courage of many Iraqis who, from
the day they stand in a queue for recruitment through to the day
that they put on the uniform and go out, are countenancing and
facing death and mutilation by the terrorists. Many, many of them
have died in the fighting both as soldiers and as police. In terms
of the general situation there, I do not think it is generally
worse. I am going to ask General Sir Rob Fry, if you will allow
me, about the general situation in terms of transportation and
travel down there. I know that on several occasions we have had
lock down because it can get difficult. Anyone, like you or I,
who has flown into Basra or Baghdad at night with the lights off,
manoeuvring lest there be a welcome from the terrorists knows
how the level of adrenaline and concern runs. I am not pretending
for a moment that this is a normal day trip to Blackpool. It is
not. This is pretty dangerous stuff. However, I do not think it
is getting a lot worse in general.
Lieutenant General Sir Rob Fry:
If you went to Basra today—and maybe if you went there a
short while ago—you would have seen British troops operating
on their feet, operating from vehicles and also deploying by air.
That is exactly the way it is now and it is the way we see it
going into the immediate future. You would also have seen a lot
of British troops operating with Iraqi counterparts, both in the
Army and the police. We cannot give the collective protection
that we might want, under certain circumstances, to give to British
troops to an entire Iraqi division, so clearly recourse simply
to travel by air is not part of our plan at all. You would also,
had you visited Northern Ireland at any time over the last 20
years, have seen exactly the same mix of techniques there that
you see in Basra at the present time. The answer to your question
is that there are well worn, well worked procedures for this and
the British Army is merely building on the experience it has had
for a very long time.
Q21 Mr Jones: It was very interesting.
The last time we were there we went for a walk in downtown Basra
and the journalist did not come with us. He preferred to stay
in his armoured car. Can I ask about two specific issues around
the threat that troops are facing? One is about the improvised
explosive device and what measures are being taken to counteract
that. In terms of protection for our troops travelling around,
particularly for example the snatch Land Rovers and the Saxon
armoured vehicles, is there a need for an upgrade or a new type
of vehicle in terms of the threat they are now facing in the south,
which was not there when we first went there in July 2003?
John Reid: First of all, can I
say how much I appreciate the efforts which are made by Members
of your Committee like Mr Jones to go there, to meet with our
troops? We want informed opinion to see things as they are. When
people go there, it is not a burden. Our troops like the fact
that somebody seems to be interested and supportive of them because
what they read does not always suggest that. Can I exempt from
that several of the newspapers in this country who have gone out
of their way to try and show the other side, the bravery and fortitude,
of our soldiers there. On IEDs, you are right. There is a particular
worry about the development of IEDs. I will not rehearse here
what I have said in other places but one of those worries is where
they come from because they seem to be using a technology associated
with Hezbollah or elements of Iranian background. That would be
very worrying if that was being given any succour or comfort by
the Iranian Government. Of course they say it is not and we certainly
hope that is the case. There has been an increase of those types
of IEDs, improvised explosive devices or bombs to the layman.
Secondly, the nature of them is particularly sophisticated. We
would need a particularly sophisticated response. I would ask
for your understanding that we do not particularly want to get
into any greater detail of that other than to say we are doing
all that we can as quickly as we can. Very often these things
are a race between us and the terrorists for us to employ our
skills, expertise, different training routines, different ways
of approaching not just the question of IEDs but how we patrol
and so on. I do not want to go into excessive detail on that but
it is among my very highest priorities to see that this issue
is addressed and that we keep ahead of this rather terrible terrorist
game. The other question you asked was about protection in vehicles.
I think I am correct in saying that we upped the number of armoured
vehicles in January of last year, around the time of the elections.
We have retained them there and they will be handed over to the
new roulement troops who are going in at present.
Lieutenant General Sir Rob Fry:
As the Secretary of State has said, this is a constant, technological
race. There is nothing new in this. Look at the bomber offensive
between 1942 and 1944. Exactly the same thing took place. The
best protection we have against these sorts of attacks is the
quality of our tactics, techniques and procedures. That is what
really defends you rather than any technological, magical solution.
John Reid: These have been developed
alongside the technological and manufacturing side of things.
Q22 Derek Conway: I have considerable
sympathy with the Secretary of State's view on how the media reports
things. For those of us who have not visited Iraq, what I find
difficult to square with the comments we have just heard are the
statements that we then read from the commanding officer serving
in Iraq who had very different views on the sort of vehicles that
were available to his infantrymen. I am sure the Secretary of
State will understand that I completely share his scepticism about
some of the media reports but they do seem at odds with the reported
observations of a serving commanding officer of an infantry unit.
I find it a bit confusing relating the two when it comes to the
protection that infantrymen have on the ground.
John Reid: It might be helpful
if we identify who we are talking about.
Q23 Derek Conway: It was the commanding
officer of the Coldstream Guards. It was reported a fortnight
ago.
John Reid: Is this the report
that said that the commanding officer had taken early retirement
because he had made a request and had it turned down? It is a
completely inaccurate report. It was some considerable time ago
and certainly before the improvised explosive devices had been
come across that the chance of early retirement had been extended
to quite a large number of officers. That particular officer had
accepted it then. That was later portrayed, unfortunately—and
it is part of the problem Mr Key was talking about—in a
newspaper wrongly, misleadingly, one hopes not maliciously, as
a decision that had been taken at a later date to resign because
he had had a request refused. The officer in question is on the
record as denying that report so I hope that explains how you
should read these things, I think with a degree of scepticism.
Q24 Derek Conway: It is good to have
that sorted out. The Secretary of State is assuring the Committee
that those who are in operational command on the ground have no
concerns about the protection vehicles available for our infantrymen?
John Reid: I beg your pardon.
I did not say that. I have concerns. I am sure every serving soldier
and every officer has concerns. Certainly General Fry has concerns.
We are concerned to make sure that the new threats as they develop
are adequately countered. Sometimes that is by existing equipment,
which is the point you make about armoured vehicles. Sometimes
it is by developing new technology and responses. Sometimes the
best method is different techniques which we do not particularly
want to go into, but it just means you carry out your operations
in a different fashion to minimise the chances. I would not want
to say for a moment that we go home at night without a huge deal
of concern. I believe we are doing everything physically and humanly
possible to meet those concerns which I share along with others.
It is among my very highest priorities, with regard to anything
that needs to be done to protect and safeguard the lives of our
troops.
Q25 Chairman: There were two issues
in those newspaper reports. One was that the commanding officer
might have taken early retirement as a result of this. I think
you have told the Committee that, completely and satisfactorily,
there is no question of that. The second issue was that he had
asked for Warriors and had not been given them. That is the important
issue that we need to look into. Was that the case?
John Reid: Yes. I thought I had
answered that. I thought that the additional Warriors which had
been asked for had been deployed earlier in January of this year
for the elections and, after the elections, had not been returned
and had been maintained there. For instance, in the present roulement
where the mechanised brigade is coming out and the armoured brigade
is going in, the Warriors are not coming back with the soldiers.
The Warriors are staying there and will be taken over by the incoming
troops. That is my understanding of it. Because it is an important
issue, I will ask General Fry to confirm my understanding of this
position because I did ask about it at the time this story appeared.
Lieutenant General Sir Rob Fry:
What the Secretary of State has said is entirely correct. What
we in the Ministry of Defence and also the chief of joint operations
at Northwood do is constantly look at the mix of different capabilities
that exists across all theatres but particularly in Iraq at the
present time. There is a process which we title internally a force
level review which looks at the level of troops and the equipment
that they have. That is an infinitely variable mix. We did leave
some Warriors in Iraq during one of our roulements. We have recently
sent out some more Warriors and we have also sent out additional
Warrior crews which allows the tempo of operations to be maintained
at a greater level. None of this was in response to the views
of a single commanding officer. It was as a result of the synthesis
of all of the advice and views of both those on the grounds and
those who regulate operations here in order to bring about the
best tactical effects on the ground.
John Reid: I can quite understand
the concern that has been raised by Members. I read the day before
yesterday in the papers, at the end of one story, there was another
item tucked in that said I had had a request for 2,000 extra troops
and had turned it down for political reasons and General Casey
and the Americans were upset. It was one sentence that contained
three untruths. To the best of my knowledge—and I checked
in case I had had a request for 2,000 extra troops and forgotten
about it—that never happened. I did not turn it down for
reasons political or otherwise. The Americans are not worried
about something that did not happen. Constantly we read these
things and I understand that people will be concerned. They are
perfectly legitimate questions to ask. As far as I am aware, we
have given what was asked for and will continue to do so.
Q26 Mr Havard: Can I talk about Afghanistan
and the ISAF move to the south? If we deal with the politics of
it, one of the suggestions is that this move is coming about really
as a trigger for a rundown of the Americans out of Afghanistan
as opposed to its motivation being something else.
John Reid: No, it is not.
Q27 Mr Havard: I was there about
12 months ago and even at that point the suggestion was that there
was going to be a change because the Americans wanted to come
out of Afghanistan; and since that period there has been a process
put in place in order to allow that.
John Reid: It just is not true.
Let us recall why we are in Afghanistan. We are in Afghanistan
to deny the terrorists a Trojan horse, an empty state in which
they can shelter for attacks on the west, potentially us. Secondly,
if we are gong to do that in the longer term as well as in the
short term, we have to do more than expel the terrorists which
has been largely the job of the Americans. The Americans have
been involved in counter-terrorism lead-up but we have to do more
than that because, if that is all we do, we leave Afghanistan
as an unviable state and the terrorists will come back. Therefore,
alongside the American mission of counter-terrorism, we have had
a reconstruction mission through NATO which has been building
democracy, the Afghanistan security forces and the infrastructure.
If we are going to do that, we have to do it for the whole of
Afghanistan. At present we are in the north and the west and it
was always envisaged that phase three would take us to the south.
There are three things that are likely to happen next year; though
I have not made final decisions on all of them, I have made final
decisions on some of them. The first is we the British will go
in, as head of the ISAF forces there through the Allied Rapid
Reaction Corps and take over the role of the Italians. The second
is that we will be part of phase three in the south if we can
satisfy ourselves that we will have the resources, the necessary
social, economic and humanitarian back-up and the multinational
allies. Subject to those caveats, we would like to extend phase
three so that we are on three-quarters of the Afghanistan map.
The Americans will still be countering terrorism which is mainly
in the eastern province, the province which is bordering Pakistan
next to their north-west provinces. The third thing that is liable
to happen is that the two operations will come closer together.
Q28 Mr Havard: Specifically in relation
to that, one of the things said to me was that what was the one
star NATO coordinator—I think he was a Brit—came back
from that and it has not been continued. If the description is
that the Americans will still be there operating together with
NATO, how are the coordination arrangements going to happen? What
is this relationship between the coalition and ISAF? Is the British
commander of the ARRC, for example, going to become the commander
of both of these operations? If not, how is the coordination going
to work?
John Reid: ISAF will expand geographically
and in numbers. The American counter-terrorism effort will probably
be concentrated more in a smaller area and they will probably
reduce in numbers, but they will not be going away and leave us
taking over alone. The operations will have a greater degree of
synergy. We are still discussing exactly what the mechanisms for
that might be but the Supreme Allied Commander has put forward
a proposition which would enable us to bring the operations, the
American one and ISAF, closer together ultimately under a double-hatted
general at the top but two chains of command which would lead
to him. Technically you would still have two chains of command
but you would have a double hatted deputy SAC for instance who
would be at the head of both of those operations. That is the
structural problem addressed. Personally, I do not think the structural
problem is the main problem. The problem is the political problem
and that is how do you bring together a counter-terrorist operation
where the Americans do not have all the caveats, qualifications
and restrictions on their rules of engagement and activity, with
a reconstruction mission of ISAF where there are varying degrees
of caveats, restrictions and some people would say handcuffs on
what the various multinational contingents could do in a way that
allows both to be comfortable. That is partly a job of politics
for people like us to do, particularly if it starts at a time
when we are leaving the headquarters. Op plan 10304 is now under
discussion in NATO so that is one of the matters we are discussing
I think I am accurate in the description of the Supreme Allied
Commander's potential resolution of this.
Chairman: As you know, we will be doing
a full inquiry into Afghanistan starting in two weeks' time.
Q29 Mr Havard: There is a lot of
speculation in the press about who is going to go for the British
as part of the ARRC. There is talk about the 16th Air Assault
Brigade, the 19th Light Brigade and all the rest of it. Can you
say anything today about what that formation is going to look
like?
John Reid: I do not think there
is a great deal of speculation about the ARRC, the Allied Rapid
Reaction Corps headquarters, that are going in. The speculation
is about the second element of that and that is the move to the
south. How many Brits will there be? What will be the configuration?
What will be the tasks? Where will the Dutch and Australians be
and so on? I am not in a position to say that today other than
what I have said. That is that we would like to go in there but
I am not committing us to going there until I am satisfied that
we have our own configuration, the multinational allies, the capabilities
and resources that we need and, very importantly, that we have
the humanitarian aid and so on. DFID has plans which we are working
with them on now. There is a very constructive relationship because
it is no good going in, attempting to counter narcotics, for instance,
in the south which is corrupting all the politics and commerce
in Afghanistan and saying to the farmers, "We will either
prohibit or dissuade you from producing poppies" unless there
are some alternative, economic livelihoods for the farmers, some
other source of income. That is an essential element of it. It
will also need a political drive from the centre. I was in Kabul
recently. I met with both Minister Wardak and President Karzai.
They say it will be there. They are very keen for the British
troops to be staying. They want us to play a greater role there.
We will do it but only if the conditions are right and the configuration
is right.
Q30 Mr Havard: I agree with you.
To stop narcotics, there is a lead on that. There is the military
and all these different civil support activities. This narcotic,
as you will know, is ending up in the veins of some of my constituents
so I have a particular interest. The declared intention, as I
understand it though, is by sending the ARRC in the way that it
is going and doing what is being planned in some ways will make
a step change. The move to the south and so on will make a step
change in the process. As I understand it, that is only planned
to be there for nine months. I agree with the general intention,
which is to make that step change, to stop the narcotics and so
on but is all of that achievable within the plan that is being
set out here? The Brits are the lead for stopping narcotics but
we have to do the stabilisation. Apparently there is a declared
intention to move something in there for a nine month period.
Is that going to work in that sort of time frame?
John Reid: You are right about
the heroin in this country. The reason we went in there was to
counter terrorism and the threat to this country but it also raises
almost incidentally but importantly this question of the production
of opium. Ninety per cent of the heroin taken in the streets of
this country originates in Afghanistan. That is important for
people as well. No one believes that this is going to be finished
within the period of the British leadership of the Allied Rapid
Reaction Corps.
Q31 Mr Havard: Is it going to provide
the stability for it to happen, for the criminal justice system
to develop and do all the other things you describe?
John Reid: Where we look upon
this as a step change is that it is possible for three things
to happen around the middle of next year, possibly. The first
is that we take over from the Italians as leaders and therefore
we are in a better position to shape the overall theatre, operations
and politics. The second is that we may be going into the south
which means that we cover three-quarters of the country. The Americans
to the east mean all of the country is then getting covered because
we are close up to the Americans on that. Thirdly, that might
be the time to try and get closer synergy between the two operations
which would give us a more effective drive throughout the country.
The confluence of those three things allows the possibility of
reinvigorating, I believe, the complementary assets to counter-terrorism,
to counter narcotics, the judicial system, the training of the
police and so on. I do not think any of us have ever suggested
that that would be completed by the time we pass on the leadership
of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. We are saying that that is
a window of opportunity to start this thing again, reinvigorate
it, but it is going to take a lot, lot longer than nine months
before we get some of these here. We are dealing with a society
there which is the third poorest country outside sub-Saharan Africa
so the idea that in a very short period you are going to build
democratic institutions out of what was essentially a pre-feudal
society or that you are going to get massive economic growth out
of a society that is as poor as that very quickly is not going
to happen.
Q32 Mr Crausby: In your opening remarks
you said that the Ministry of Defence must produce a fighting
power and yet UK forces are increasingly being asked to carry
out very different roles from war fighting with an emphasis more
on peacekeeping and peacemaking. I know we have lots of experience
from Northern Ireland which is hopefully fading into the distance
but what are we doing to ensure that our troops are properly trained
in these roles and that we continue to retain the skills that
we have so effectively gained with our experience in Northern
Ireland?
John Reid: In the post Cold War
period the nature and range of the threats we faced to our security
were far greater than when we had the old Cold War together. It
is almost as if the two great glaciers have shifted apart, one
of them has melted and there is a torrent of problems. You are
right. We have to keep a range of attributes inside the military
configuration and capabilities and also outside. I mentioned some
of those and I have tried to say why encouraging free and fair
trade, giving aid, diplomatic, financial and political elements
are all part of addressing underlying security problems. You are
right. Within defence, which is one of those elements, you have
to have a range of attributes as well. The point I made is that
the starting point for the British armed forces and the Ministry
of Defence is the production of fighting power. That is what we
do. Everything else comes out of that. The humanitarian interventions,
the disarmament, the reconstruction, the training of Iraqi forces,
all of that at what you would call the lighter end of the spectrum,
is absolutely essential and we train for it but it cannot be a
substitute for retaining the capacity to fight at the heavy end
of the spectrum as well. That is why we need not only those trained
skills but we also need, in my view, the best equipment on land,
sea and air in order to retain us as combat forces.
Q33 Mr Crausby: What about equipment?
Do we need very different equipment from the point of view of
our forces? Are we turning ourselves into a super police force?
Is that advisable? I remember when we first went to America prior
to the Iraq war the Americans said, "We do war fighting,
not peacekeeping." They have learnt quite a serious lesson
on that eventually, that peacekeeping is very important in the
long run, as has been demonstrated. How prepared are we to maintain
the peace?
John Reid: We do both. We do war
fighting. Touch wood, we do it well. Pound for pound, I happen
to think we have the best, most capable forces in the world. We
also do defence diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace promotion, disarmament,
and just about everything else in between. In the combat role,
do we need to change in terms of the strategy and the threat we
face? Yes. That is what the Strategic Defence Review was about.
Does that have implications for the type of equipment we get?
Yes. We go from being a static Army which has massed tank regiments
through to a high readiness, deployable, expeditionary force and
a more great use of the traditional type of activity that General
Fry did in the Marines; Reach in terms of sustainability; carriers,
agility—not only the air to ground attack precision—hence
Typhoons; the special forces against terrorism—hence the
new reconnaissance regiment. The answer is yes. In terms of deployment,
configuration and our equipment, we need to change to keep ahead
of the game. Did we get it right, the direction in the Strategic
Defence Review? I declare an interest since I presided over it
for George Robertson. Yes, I think we did get it right. I think
the direction is right. Did we get the pace of the change right?
No. I think it was even more dramatically shifting than we thought,
which is why after I had done the Strategic Defence Review Geoff
Hoon and the military carried out the new chapter. We did not
envisage that terrorism would get to this scale and so on. Yes
is the answer to the question do we need to keep changing equipment
and do we need to have a range of skills that goes from war fighting
through to peacekeeping.
Lieutenant General Sir Rob Fry:
Can I give Mr Crausby a reassurance on this? One of the things
we spend a great deal of time doing is constantly trying to intellectually
reduce the changes that are taking place. In the Joint Doctrine
and Concept Centre, we probably have a world leader in this. Perhaps
it would be of some assistance if I send the Committee some of
the publications that it produces. In particular work on peace
support operations is widely regarded as the best there is and
widely emulated by most of our other allies. Having intellectually
defined it, we then try and make all the necessary preparations
in terms of the training and equipping of our people so there
is an internal process that constantly looks at the shifting patterns
of warfare and constantly tries to bring about an appropriate
response.
John Reid: Wherever possible,
I try to commend our services. We often hear about their bravery,
not often enough, their sacrifices, heroism and so on, physically
and that is true but never underestimate the intellectual integrity
and the intellectual rigour of the British armed forces. In terms
of doctrine, analysis and so on I think they are absolutely superb.
Part of this is a willingness to constantly have a permanent revision
questioning the world and the posture we have at present. I spend
a lot of time with the generals and my policy advisers like Desmond
Bowen talking about these very things. Are we getting this right?
Is the world changing faster than we are? That goes from IEDs
right up to the biggest piece of equipment but including doctrine
from war fighting right through to peacekeeping.
Q34 Mr Crausby: What about our relationship
with other government departments and NGOs? Are you satisfied
that there is enough cooperation there? I was disappointed when
we visited Afghanistan to hear some of our troops say that NGOs
in particular were reluctant to completely cooperate with the
military because they thought that was not a field that they wanted
to get involved in. It seems to me that there needs to be absolute
cooperation with some of the absolutely excellent work that our
troops are doing in peacekeeping.
John Reid: I agree with you. Complex
threats need complex responses. A complex response runs from aid,
trade, politics, diplomacy, finance, right through military capability,
warfare and down to peacekeeping. If that is going to work, we
have to work together inside government. Jack Straw and I and
Hilary Benn work very closely together indeed. Kim Howells will
be speaking to me this afternoon. He has just returned from discussions
with some of our European colleagues. I spoke to Jack twice at
the weekend before he went off to New York. That is because inside
government we are trying to get that whole range of security responses
working together. Sometimes it will need to be at the heavy end
with combat. Sometimes it will depend on the diplomacy at the
United Nations. Sometimes it will be aid. Sometimes different
parties will take the lead, for instance, in Pakistan and the
tragedy there. What you are saying is absolutely right. It is
also true we have to get better cooperation with the NGOs outside
of government. What ought to be very effective I think sometimes
is less effective than it ought to be.
Q35 Chairman: We still have the major
issues of recruitment, retention and overstretch to cover. The
answers you were giving before in relation to Iraq which suggested
that we would be unlikely to have withdrawn from Iraq by 2006—possibly
not even by 2007—and the deployment to Afghanistan suggest
that there might be a degree of overstretch on the armed forces
that might put pressures on that they would find it very difficult
to sustain. What would be your answer to that?
John Reid: The assumptions of
the timescales are yours. You are entitled to make them. I have
not indicated a timescale. I have been assured—and I have
asked several times—that our deployment, if we were to go
ahead with it in the way that we would like to, to Afghanistan
does not require the drawing in of forces in Iraq. I have also
been assured by those who advise me on these things, which includes
the chiefs of staff, that the current running level, the foot
on the accelerator, the capacity versus the commitments, is something
that we can sustain. Thirdly, notwithstanding the assurance that
it is within our planning assumptions and the present level of
sustainability, it is very challenging and very taxing for the
men and women who serve in our armed forces. In terms of where
we are compared to trained strength requirements versus trained
strength, we are at the moment at 99% of our training requirements
in terms of our trained strength. In the Army, for instance, if
you compare the identified requirements for troop numbers against
the trained strength of our Army as of 1 September this year,
they are almost identical. There are about 80 short out of 101,720,
so there are 101,650 or thereabouts.
Q36 Chairman: Concentrating you on
overstretch, do you think the harmony that is required within
the intervals of service is acceptable at the moment?
John Reid: Nothing less than perfection
is ultimately acceptable. Do I think it is tolerable? The changes
that have been brought about in the Army will ease the challenges
which soldiers face at present and ease the question of harmony
by making a more efficient and flexible system. That is large
regiments of multi-battalions. I will stand corrected on this
if it is incorrect but I think the position of harmony in the
Navy is better now than it was when I was Armed Forces Minister
some seven years ago. I think the position in the RAF is probably
similar. I gave the figure for the training requirements against
trained strength as an indication of manning and personnel, which
is one indicator of overstretch. We are just about precisely matching
requirements to trained strength. In the Navy it has eased harmony;
in the RAF it is about the same. In the Army, we have gone through
a difficult period. I think it is going to get less taxing after
the next couple of years in terms of the tour intervals and certainly
the reformation, reconstruction and reconfiguration of the Army
in the future Army structure with the large regiments and battalions
should ease that further. I think that is an accurate position.
Q37 Chairman: What about airlift
and rotary aircraft. If we have Iraq and Afghanistan at the same
time, is that going to be sustainable?
John Reid: I think it is. On heavy
airlift we now have a greater range than ever before. One of the
successes of the SDR incidentally was the purchase of the C17,
the subject of great debate at the time. The C17 has turned out
to be a large success. The C130J transport planes are fulfilling
continually their role in a satisfactory fashion. In terms of
fixed wing and in terms of air mobile attack, Apaches and so on,
if you are asking me whether or not we would have the cover necessary
if we went into the south in Afghanistan, the answer is I would
not go in there unless we had it. The answer is yes. We have been
discussing that recently. I do not want to go into further details
at the moment about the configuration of rotary and fixed wing
on the deployment to the south in Afghanistan because if I do
I will give the impression that we have reached a final decision.
We have not. One of my concerns has been to see that, if we were
to do that, we would have both the air mobility for the troops
and the air cover that was necessary in both rotary and fixed
wing.
Q38 Derek Conway: On the point about
the harmony guidelines, the government's response to the previous
Committee's report on future capabilities identified and accepted
that there was a problem with the department's methodology for
monitoring specialisms. I wonder if you have some advice for the
Committee on overstretch so far as it relates to the individuals,
people like the medics, the linguists and those sorts of sole
traders who move within the units. Is that now resolved or is
it still an issue?
John Reid: There are certainly
some skills in some pinch points. The overall figures which I
gave earlier on would conceal some difficulties we have and some
particular recruitment challenges we face. As regards your general
question, perhaps I can ask Mr Andrews and General Fry from the
military and the administrative perspective to give you as succinct
an answer as we can.
Lieutenant General Sir Rob Fry:
To a certain extent I am in double jeopardy here. When the Secretary
of State turns to advice, it is clearly me and others in the Ministry
of Defence he turns to. I feel I have to answer a certain degree
of parliamentary scrutiny but also, just as important, perhaps
more important for me, is to answer to the constituency that I
represent which is the soldiers, sailors and airmen who are currently
serving. We look at the harmony guidelines. We also look at the
assumptions which the department makes about the scales of its
deployment. This is a complicated equation and in general terms
what the Secretary of State has said is exactly correct. Your
question on the specific issue of small population trades is not
completely addressed but is on the way to being addressed. One
of the reasons why it is not completely addressed is that, for
example, to produce Pashtu linguists or a greater number of Arabists
or to produce those who have the requisite skills in order to
lead a field HUMIT team is not done overnight. Therefore, the
capacity building that we have to create to go through that process
is underway. Those measures are in place and my judgment is that
we will be able to reach an equitable level of deployment and
employment at home for particularly those areas over the next
couple of years.
Q39 Mr Hancock: You mentioned the
Navy right at the beginning today. Congratulations to the ship's
company in the Caribbean on the drug bust. As there is not a problem
in the Navy relating to harmony, are the Ministry of Defence going
to reconsider the decision of not having that ship available there
for much longer periods of time?
John Reid: In agreeing with you
and joining with you in congratulating the Navy on that particular
operation, it does illustrate that you do not have to be there
all the time in order to score big hits. We keep these things
under constant review but we have no intention at present of changing
that. We constantly look at what is needed. For instance in helicopters,
there is some £4 billion available over the next 10 years.
On pinch points, one of the reasons why we are reconfiguring the
infantry is to free up manpower to address the pinch points and
we will continue to look at the Navy as well.
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