Examination of Witnesses (Questions 110-119)
RT HON
ADAM INGRAM
MP, AIR VICE
MARSHAL BARRY
THORNTON CB AND
MR NICK
EVANS
29 NOVEMBER 2005
Q110 Chairman: Minister,
welcome to the Committee. This is the first time you have been
in front of this Committee in its new incarnation. I would be
most grateful if you could introduce your team, whom we have met
before but, nevertheless, for the record.
Mr Ingram: Thank
you for the invitation to attend this session, and I look forward
to attending future sessions if it falls to me to be engaged in
your future inquiries. On my left is Air Vice Marshal Barry Thornton,
otherwise known as DG Log/Strike—but we will decide on the
best way to name him through the session. On my right is Nick
Evans, who is the Director General Management and Organisation—DGMO,
as he is known affectionately in the MoD. Those are the two subject
experts; the senior level, an officer, and an official who have
been dealing with this and know the process intimately.
Q111 Chairman: As you
know, we are doing a inquiry into delivering front line capability
to the RAF. I wonder if you could begin by telling us the rationale
for the Ministry of Defence's End to End Review? What prompted
it and how did it begin, please?
Mr Ingram: In a sense it goes
back earlier than that. I came into post in 2001 and inherited
the newly formed Trading Fund of DARA and, of course, ABRO in
terms of line systems. The early processes were about getting
the structures right, the way forward, for DARA overall in terms
of support. At a point in 2002 we then started examining the question
of the new structure that could take place at St Athan that then
became known as the Red Dragon project. What happened with that
was that there was a lot of debate: was this a terrible project?
Was it something that was desirable? Would it deliver the results?
Within the department we chewed over this argument, we took best
advice from every senior player—was this something that
should or should not happen?
Q112 Chairman: Did that
discussion include the Chief Executive of DARA?
Mr Ingram: In terms of Red Dragon?
Very much so. He was lobbying extremely hard for it, understandably,
and not just him; the Welsh Development Agency, the Welsh Assembly
as well were very keen on the project overall. So, again, all
the main players were engaged in that process. That was stimulated,
given what we had, the old and inefficient facilities by their
very nature I was advised, and therefore a new approach consolidating
activity into one major facility was the best way forward in this.
As ever (and, again, I know the Committee will appreciate this)
a series of business cases then had to be built in order to justify
it; it was not a case of someone saying: "This looks good;
we want this off Santa; let's get it off the Christmas tree";
this had to be justified in a hard-nosed business case assessment.
That is exactly what happened. We came to the point where that
was reaching a point of maturity and we had then commissioned
McKinsey to look at the whole question of end-to-end logistics.
That was stimulated as a better way of doing the support in this
case to the RAF and it was all part of the DLO transformation
programme. We were beginning to look at how best we delivered
DLO support overall. So this was part of a wider package. It may
be something you want to look at in the future, as to what stimulated
us to go down that road in terms of the support, because we had
initially kicked off with a warship support modernisation initiative
where fleet had decided over-capacity in terms of support of the
fleet. Was there a better way of delivering that? Was it better
done in a different way and a different structure? The conclusion
to that was yes. We took on some difficult decisions, remembering
within the dockyard support facilities there was over-capacity
which had not been addressed and we are now beginning to address
it. That then set a standard for the other two Services, the RAF
and the Army, and the RAF took that lesson on very clearly, and
I must say they are now pushing the boundaries even further forward
and are now beginning to look at similar types of solutions. So
what I am saying is this was not just motivated by one Service
and one Service solution; it is part of a wider strategy and a
wider drive to deliver logistic support to the front line across
the three Services.
Q113 Chairman: You have
talked about inherent inefficiencies that you were advised about
and other Services taking decisions, which implies that you had
already decided that the RAF support structure was wrong because
of those inherent inefficiencies.
Mr Ingram: No, I had not, because
it had not been proved. What had happened was that it had been
proved in terms of warship support, and similar ingredients were
there: over-capacity and the structure between Service and industry
personnel and MoD direct support personnel. That had already got
under way and had been difficult; there had been a lot of resistance
to it, but as that developed within a very short period of time
the message coming back was this was the right decision. So that,
in my mind, would have given me the concept that there must be
a better way of doing things. That, I think, is the right approach:
at all times we have got to examine the way in which this has
been delivered. However, of course, within, in this case, the
RAF there was the same thinking taking place: can we do this in
a different way, remembering what we had were four levels of maintenance
support? So the question to be answered is: is there a more rational
way to do this? Is there a better way to do this?
Q114 Chairman: You were
already doing it in a different way because DARA had only just
been set up.
Mr Ingram: That does not mean
you do not have continuous improvement. The concept that because
you have done something—you have made a change—that
should be the end of change, when you know that you are having
to drive out significant costs from your overheads and your support
in terms of defence logistics, I do not think would be the right
approach for me to adopt or for the department to adopt. If we
had adopted that—"All the change is finished; we are
not examining anything any more"—we would have rightly
been criticised: "Why are you not examining better means
of delivery?"
Q115 Chairman: So here
you are; you set up a Trading Fund. Do you not think there is
something to be said for giving it a period of stability in which
it can establish whether it can trade profitably?
Mr Ingram: Yes and no to that
question. Yes, if you have the time to allow it to mature; no,
if you find better ways of doing things. That was the dilemma
which we were faced with. What came out of the End to End study
was the examination of how better to restructure and reorganise
with the same outputs at better value for money. Again, you are
faced with a dilemma, both in terms of all the Service Chiefs
and within the DLO organisation. We now know this, in terms of
possible solutions. Do we put this to the test? Do we examine
it, or do we not? Do we let things stand still? Meanwhile, we
are having to then take a major cost penalty because of allowing
what we put in place to have time to mature so you can see the
benefits which could possibly accrue and, therefore, we then had
to take that on board as a process of analysis. That is why we
then undertook, as I say, a hard-nosed business case assessment.
We did the investment appraisal in all of this, and it has been
through all the examination. That investment appraisal was given
to the trade unions at senior level; we exchanged considerable
correspondence with them on that because, rightly so, they tried
to examine us and raise a number of detailed and comprehensive
questions—all of which were answered—and that investment
appraisal, the logic of it (if that is the right description)
has never been broken in terms of where the benefit then flowed.
So I have a Trading Fund (and we had more than one Trading Fund
that had been established), we find a better and more rational
way of delivering that support, and it then goes under an assessment
analysis to see if it does stack up—what are the implications?—because
there are a significant number of decisions in the MoD at the
present time we do not proceed with because the up-front investment
is too heavy to bear. So you say that that, therefore, is not
the best solution because we cannot afford it. I can give, as
an example of that, the support to the MRA4 at Kinloss. The best
solution for support of all of that aircraft type was to go to
Waddington. When we examined it we then decided that to put the
up-front investment cost in there just made it prohibitive. So
the solution then is Waddington retains the surveillance aircraft
that they have and Kinloss has a long-term commitment for the
MRA4. So in one sense there was a better solution, but you cannot
afford it, but if there is a better solution which you can afford,
and you then get measurable payback, the hard logic is that we
have to do it. If we had not done it you would have criticised
us.
Chairman: Almost certainly. Let us now
go into whether you are looking at a better solution. You have
mentioned the investment appraisal. One of the central issues
in the investment appraisal was the Crisis Manpower Requirement.
Q116 John Smith: Could
I ask Air Vice Marshal Barry Thornton why it is that RAF technicians
engaged in depth support need to be deployed to operational front
lines? What is the military case for depth support skills on the
front line?
Air Vice Marshal Thornton: Let
me explain, first of all, the four traditional levels of aircraft
maintenance: three of those were depth and the other was the first
line, forward support; the front line squadrons of the Royal Air
Force. They are not service stations; they are not where we just
refuel aircraft and send them into the air to carry out a mission.
A significant amount of rectification is carried out on a front
line squadron. We tend to take the rectification work away from
a front line squadron when it is too much for them to cope with—the
volume is too much—and it is detracting the from the generation
of other aircraft. So rectification skills are required for the
front line; rectification skills are particularly required when
you are on deployed operations when you do not have, immediately
to hand, the sort of support that we might have back in the UK.
So we require all of our technicians and mechanics to be trained
to a high level. By employment in depth they gain more experience
in deeper rectification tasks/maintenance tasks but they are all
trained to the basic level.
Q117 John Smith: So, in
your opinion, rectification skills, as you describe them, are
the same kind of skills that are needed for depth support. Do
you make any distinction at all between front line support skills
and depth support skills? In the evidence that we have taken on
recent occasions the case has been put forward that there are
distinct differences.
Air Vice Marshal Thornton: We
are able to enhance the skills of the technicians and mechanics
by exposing them to the depth environment. They get more experience
on a day-to-day basis of dismantling an aircraft, rebuilding an
aircraft, component replacement, whereas at the front line it
tends to be more unplug a particular avionics unit and put a serviceable
one in. When you are on a deployed operation you may need to do
structural repair, you may need to do wiring changes. Those sorts
of instances happen all the time. Sadly, combat aircraft tend
to return from any mission with a series of faults that need to
be rectified before they can embark upon the next mission. All
our tradesmen receive the same training: the basic training and
the follow-on training; they are the RAF apprenticeships, they
receive the same, it is just the further development of those
skills which is why we believe it is beneficial to move people
between the forward and the depth organisation—it enhances
skills. Also, we believe it is important because it gives people
a respite from that operational tempo that you find on the front
line squadrons. We have what we call Harmony Rules that direct
how much time any of our individuals should spend away from home
in a given period. That, and the logistics footprint that we need
to send out to support our aircraft, determines the Crisis Manpower
Requirement.
Q118 John Smith: Just
to confirm that the front line serving technicians need major
depth experience—major servicing not just minor servicing.
Air Vice Marshal Thornton: I think
it might be useful if I help the Committee, who probably are not
experienced with the way that we service aircraft. I have looked
back to try and understand when it was that we labelled servicing
as minor and major, and I am sure that leaves you with the impression
that what we do in a minor is actually quite superficial aircraft
maintenance and what we do in a major is deep. That is not the
case. If I look at the instance of the Harrier, the difference
between what we call "minor star" servicing (and the
servicing cycle goes: minor, minor star, minor, major, and that
is the way servicings are conducted throughout an aircraft's life)
and a major is 8%—it is 500 hours. So we are using the skills
today that would be used on a major. The only real difference
between a major and a minor or a minor star is more components
are taken off the aircraft and perhaps more structural examination,
but in the main it is taking it back down to bare metal and repainting
it. That happens on a major. There is not a significant difference
in terms of the skills employed between the various levels of
the depth organisation.
Q119 Mr Jones: I am very
interested in what you say and I do not dispute what you have
said in any way, shape or form, but when was this discovered,
in terms of when you needed this? DARA was set up three years
earlier and, surely, if it is a case now was it a case then?
Air Vice Marshal Thornton: Let
us start with the history of DARA. DARA St Athan, for instance,
has been a maintenance unit for 30-odd years. Most of that period
it has been manned by a significant number of RAF people; the
majority, in the early days. As the previous Chief Executive said,
when he took over there were some 1,800 Servicemen in DARA. So
we have always employed Servicemen in DARA. The reason we were
able to take Servicemen out of DARA and only employ them in the
depth organisations the hangars and servicing bays on all of our
stations, was that our Crisis Manpower Requirement had come down.
The size of the Air Force has come down; it is a different posture;
we are an expeditionary Air Force now, we are not a Cold War Air
Force. In the Cold War we needed lots of people throughout the
whole of the organisation to supplement—
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