Conclusions and recommendations
1. We
welcome MoD's decision to embrace modern production techniques
that are designed to achieve savings and efficiencies. The performance
of the pulse line system can only be judged over time. The success
of the pulse line will be dependent on industry's ability to ensure
aircraft components are readily available. Any delay in the availability
of components would severely undermine the effectiveness of the
pulse line. The RAF will have to ensure this risk is managed robustly.
(Paragraph 32)
2. Given that MoD
believes the pulse line will deliver significant improvements
to the provision of support to RAF aircraft, it is surprising
that it was not introduced sooner at St Athan. We recommend that
MoD carefully monitor and evaluate its pulse lines supporting
aircraft, giving particular attention to ensuring that supplies
of components and technical support are provided in a timely fashion.
(Paragraph 33)
3. We note the apparent
success of the leaning programme at RAF Marham. We also note that
this is still at its early stages and that the full transfer of
Tornado support has yet to take place. We are concerned about
the sustainability of leaning once it has done so. We are concerned
that leaning programmes either have a tendency to lose impetus
with inefficiencies re-entering the system or prove counter-productive
in leaning out vital processes. (Paragraph 35)
4. We recommend that
MoD continue to seek out and eliminate inefficiencies in all its
aircraft support processes but that it ensure that leaning does
not go so far that the quality of maintenance is undermined by
efforts to meet efficiency targets. (Paragraph 36)
5. We recognise that
close partnerships with industry in the provision of aircraft
support through "gain-share" agreements may result in
real benefits for the RAF and value for money for the taxpayer
not least by reducing perverse incentives for industry. We note
Air Vice Marshal Thornton's concerns about the difficulties of
sustaining gain-share over the long term and we expect MoD to
monitor and evaluate these agreements very carefully. Beginning
in January 2006, we intend to consider the wider issue of MoD's
partnerships with industry in our inquiry into MoD's Defence Industrial
Strategy. (Paragraph 39)
6. We note both the
Unions' claims of problems with the Harrier JUMP at RAF Cottesmore
and MoD's clear refutation of these claims. We pressed MoD particularly
strongly on the impact of Harrier flying times and were assured
that the decision to extend them was taken only after a long consultation
with the Harrier design authority and that there was no increased
risk to Harrier pilot safety. (Paragraph 50)
7. We recommend that
MoD commission an independent audit of the Joint Upgrade Maintenance
Programme at RAF Cottesmore to identify any issues and learn lessons
which may impact on the programme to concentrate support of Tornado
GR4 at RAF Marham. We further recommend that MoD adopt a more
flexible timetable for rolling forward the Tornado GR4 to ensure
sufficient time to upgrade the deep repair facilities at RAF Marham
and to take advantage of any recommendations or information that
may arise from the audit of the Harrier JUMP programme at RAF
Cottesmore. (Paragraph 51)
8. It seems perverse
and wasteful for MoD to invest large amounts of public money to
renovate the facilities at RAF Marham when it has at its disposal
a state-of-the-art facility at St Athan. It is doubtful that the
facilities at RAF Marham will ever match those at DARA St Athan,
but given the decision to base Tornado GR4 support at RAF Marham,
it is essential that MoD ensure that those who work there have
the facilities they need. (Paragraph 62)
9. We reiterate the
concerns of our predecessors, that Tornado support at RAF Marham
should match that provided at DARA St Athan. For this to be so,
the RAF must ensure that its tradesmen are trained to the highest
standard and that all tradesmen are given the opportunity to develop
their skills through regular rotation between the forward and
depth environments. (Paragraph 63)
10. The retention
by the RAF of sufficient numbers of Senior NCOs will be fundamental
to the long term success of this process. (Paragraph 65)
11. We are concerned
about potential difficulties that over-leaning of processes at
RAF Marham may bring. We expect MoD to monitor the pulse line,
particularly during surges of demand, and to make credible contingencies
in case of overload. We do not consider the reduction of leave
entitlement or training to meet surge demand to be credible contingencies
for meeting demand surges. We regret the loss of the flexibility
to meet demand surges which the support arrangements at DARA St
Athan currently provide. (Paragraph 68)
12. While the RAF's
Crisis Manpower Requirement was the major factor in the decision
to shift responsibility for depth support from civilian to RAF
tradesmen, the decision of where to base depth support was taken
largely on cost grounds. In the case of fast jets, it was considered
cost-effective to move depth support to RAF MOBs: for rotary wing
support, it was not. (Paragraph 78)
13. We are concerned
that MoD's decision about its aircraft support provision was not
founded on consistent principles. MoD's emphasis on CMR as the
driver for rationalising its support arrangements is undermined
by its later acknowledgement that the decision was taken on cost
grounds. This leads us to conclude that the new arrangements will
not stand the test of time. (Paragraph 80)
14. During the course
of our inquiry, neither the performance of DARA as a trading fund
nor the quality of its workforce and support for RAF aircraft
has ever been brought into question. (Paragraph 85)
15. Despite its protests,
DARA management was not fully included from the outset in the
End to End Review process. That was wrong. (Paragraph 86)
16. It is striking
that MoD has reconfigured its air logistic provision only four
years after a similarly significant reconfiguration had been completed.
This suggests that either the original decision to establish DARA
was unsound or the recent decisions affecting its future are misjudged.
Either way, it is hard to escape the conclusion that MoD has in
recent years contributed to a period of unnecessary turbulence
and uncertainty in aviation logistics provision. (Paragraph 90)
17. We recommend that
MoD provide more detail of what the 'market testing' of DARA Fleetlands
and DARA Almondbank will entail. The longer the period of market
testing, the more uncertainty there will be for DARA management
and employees. This will inevitably impact on DARA's business
planning and ability to attract commercial work. It is vital that
the future arrangements for RAF aircraft are of the highest possible
standard and, at the very least, match the service provided by
the current arrangements. (Paragraph 91)
18. We are concerned
about the sustainability of MoD's commitment to concentrating
rotary wing support at DARA Fleetlands. It is crucial that MoD
give DARA Fleetlands the necessary time, resources, and backing
it requires to establish itself as a first class provider of rotary
wing depth support. (Paragraph 92)
19. We remain concerned
about the long term viability of the St Athan site. In light of
the end of the fast jet business and the VC10 having an Out of
Service Date of 2011, Government departments must work with the
National Assembly for Wales and its agencies in encouraging alternative
commercial investment to guarantee the long term viability of
St Athan as a matter of urgency. (Paragraph 97)
20. We consider that
the decision to go ahead with the funding for the Red Dragon project
in 2003 was incomprehensible given the uncertainty surrounding
air logistic provision at the time. MoD admits that the viability
of DARA was an issue even before the decision to commit £104m
of public money to Red Dragon and the decision on support for
fast jets were taken. With the future so uncertain it was extraordinary
to go ahead with Red Dragon in the knowledge that the provision
for future support was under review. The decision is a clear example
of a lack of joined-up government within Whitehall and between
MoD and the National Assembly for Wales and its agencies. As things
currently stand, the Superhangar is a valuable facility with no
clear future. We recommend that the National Audit Office and
the Wales Audit Office examine whether public money was properly
spent on the Superhangar. (Paragraph 100)
21. Nevertheless we
believe that the combination of state-of-the-art facilities and
an enthusiastic and skilled workforce at St Athan provide a tremendously
attractive opportunity for commercial investment. We expect government
departments to work energetically to attract commercial investment
to the St Athan site. (Paragraph 101)
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