Further memorandum from the Ministry of
Defence
The Committee requested further information
to our memorandum submitted in September 05. [28]
DARA ST ATHAN/RAF
MARHAM/RAF COTTESMORE
What, if any, preparations have been made for
the sale of the DARA site?
No preparations have been made for the sale
of any of the DARA sites. As part of DARA's "Red Dragon"
new build project, the Welsh Development Agency (WDA) acquired
a 125 year lease on the St Athan site in Jul 2003, with the exception
of West Camp, occupied by the Army, for which MoD has retained
the freehold.
How much public money was spent by MoD on developing
the DARA site as part of the Red Dragon project?
Public money spent by MoD on developing the DARA
site as part of the Red Dragon project is as follows: DARA Project
costs £5.3 million.
And subsequent to construction: DARA Fixtures and
Fittings £10.9 million.
There were DARA removal costs which were paid by
Defence Estates of £1.2 million.
The Red Dragon project was funded via a commercial
operating lease, payable annually by DARA commencing in December
2004.
What investment has been necessary to upgrade
facilities at RAF Marham to make it suitable for depth support?
The End to End Review recognised the need for financial
investment in logistic support facilities at RAF Marham as part
of the decision to concentrate "forward" the logistic
support of the Tornado GR4 to the Main Operating Base. The financial
analysis which supported the Ministerial announcement on Air Depth
support took into account the potential investment of some £8
million at RAF Marham over the period 2004-05 to 2006-07. Latest
estimates indicate the need to spend £5.9 million on Depth
Support facilities such as hangar floor resurfacing, gantry cranes
and upgrading electrical power supplies.
Is there currently a full complement of engineering
posts at RAF Marham?
RAF Marham has its full complement of engineering
posts in Forward and Depth. 1,476 engineering posts are established
at RAF Marham to meet its tasking, at present there are 1,487
personnel in post plus an additional 117 overborne personnel.
Has Harrier flying time between servicing been
extended? If so how by how much and what risk appraisal has taken
place?
The flying time interval for the maintenance cycle
of Harrier GR7/GR9 aircraft has recently been extended by 44%.
The most notable effect in the Depth domain is that the scheduled
maintenance interval for Minor maintenance has been extended from
500 to 720 flying hours and from 2,000 to 2,880 flying hours for
Major maintenance. The extension was approved in July 2005 following
a two-year study and in-depth analysis carried out in consultation
with the aircraft, engine and equipment design authorities; there
is no increase in engineering or operational risk.
Have any Harriers had to be sent to BAE Systems
for major repair since Harrier support has been based at RAF Cottesmore?
If so, how many and what was the nature of the repairs? And at
what cost?
No Harrier aircraft have been sent to BAE Systems
Warton for major repair since the commencement of the Harrier
Pulse Line in February 2003.
A contract was let with BAE Systems Warton for 11
aircraft to be upgraded to Harrier GR9/T12 standard. This requirement
was identified in 2003 to ensure the Harrrier GR9 in-service date
would be achieved. The last six aircraft undergoing the upgrade
are all due to be delivered to front line service by the end of
this financial year. Two other Harriers are currently at Warton;
one aircraft is being used for trials work for future capability,
and one T Mk 10 is the final aircraft of 11 two-seaters being
modified to improve the aircraft's structural integrity and avionics
fit under a contract awarded in 1999.
FLEETLANDS/ROTARY
WING
MoD's submission states that the decision to concentrate
Rotary-Wing "depth" maintenance at DARA Fleetlands is
"not without risks". What are these risks and how are
they being managed?
The risks to the programme to concentrate Rotary-Wing
(RW) depth maintenance at DARA Fleetlands are primarily:
(a) Provision of support from the customer base:
(i) Volume of work: The commitment to provide
DARA with 700 million hours in 2005-06, 850K hours in 2006-07
and 1 million hours of work in 2007-08 is challenging. Current
estimates for the total depth task across the Lynx, Chinook and
Sea King platforms adds up to only c 900 million. There is a risk
that we won't fly enough hours to generate the maintenance requirement,
which is very dependant on the operational situation; in addition
the DLO is constantly striving to reduce man-hours per maintenance
event in order to improve efficiency. The Rotary Wing Cluster
leader, together with each platform IPT leader, are investigating
all possible options to move work to DARA.
(ii) Efficient operation of the new, lean
pulse lines will be critically dependant on the timely provision
of spare parts. On site support teams are being established at
Fleetlands to mitigate this risk.
(b) Benefits Realisation:
(iii) DARA Prices not only depend on volume
of work, but also on achieving an internal transformation within
DARA, who have adopted Lean principles to reduce waste and drive
through effectiveness and efficiency improvements. The lean transformation
programme being implemented by DARA is recognised as one of the
most challenging in Europe. DARA has committed the resources of
senior Board-level management to oversee the successful delivery
of the programme. A full-time Programme Director, along with IPT
support at the highest level, is ensuring the programme plan is
on track for a successful delivery of the agreed £per hour
rate. However, it will remain dependent on the IPTs delivering
the agreed hours.
(iv) Full benefits realisation of transferring
work to DARA Fleetlands, which was previously undertaken by military
personnel at 2nd Line in Front Line Commands, is reliant on the
timely redeployment of those personnel elsewhere within their
respective Service or release through premature voluntary retirement,
natural wastage or where necessary redundancy.
Why is the RAF's support policy, which requires
a sufficient number of tradesmen capable of being deployed to
operation theatres to provide support, not being applied in the
case of Rotary Wing aircraft?
There is no difference between RAF support policy
for Fixed and Rotary Wing aircraft: each is based on the concept
of "Forward" and "Depth"' support for each
platform, with depth support being concentrated at the most cost-effective
location. Just as with fixed-wing platforms and stations, each
of the RAF Rotary Wing stations has examined their requirements
for manpower in order to meet the Service harmony guidelines.
The requirement is driven by the number of personnel who are deployed
on operations to support a particular platform type. The number
of people deployed will depend on the surge of the operational
fleet, the complexity of the platform and its support arrangements,
and the intensity of operations. In the case of Chinook and Puma
forces, the conclusion was that there were sufficient numbers
employed forward on the station to meet these requirements without
the need to embed any additional personnel in Depth. This is not
the case for the Fast Jet Force.
Who will be responsible for maintaining rotary-wing
aircraft on operations? Will the RAF have a sufficient number
of tradesmen capable of deploying to operational theatres to support
rotary-wing aircraft?
Support at the Deployed Forward Operating Base will
be provided by RAF manpower from the home station, whilst more
complicated and time consuming maintenance effort will be provided
by personnel from all three services working jointly and, where
feasible, deployed contractor support. More complicated and time
consuming maintenance is that which is conducted in the forward
area, but is not possible within the six hour notice to move times
of the forward operating bases. Such work includes both scheduled
maintenance and the repair of a very limited number of components;
in particular composite repairs.
Following this concept of operations the Joint Helicopter
Command does have sufficient support personnel to meet all contingency
operations. There is no plan for "Depth" activity to
be carried out at "Deployed Forward" locations.
Who were the "experienced consultants"
referred to in the MoD submission?
The consultants employed to assist DARA prepare for
roll back are a US-based company, Simpler. DARA selected Simpler
Consultants to provide external assistance because they were already
a proven supplier to the DLO (Harrier and Sea King) with considerable
expertise in the aviation business. They have applied the principles
successfully achieved by the Toyota Company to remove all non-value
added activity and create a "flow" line of work similar
to a production line.
Where does MoD plan to provide depth support for
Puma and Merlin rotary-wing aircraft?
Puma depth support will be provided at RAF Benson
and is a roll forward solution. Merlin support for the RAFs Mk3
aircraft will take place as part of the joint roll forward solution
at RNAS Culdrose along side the larger RN Mk1 fleet.
Why, given the fact that Chinooks form part of
RAF expeditionary forces, was Crisis Manpower Requirement (CMR)
not considered a critical factor in deciding where its support
was located?
CMR consists of more than just the personnel required
to deploy, it also takes account of personnel required to defend
and support a Station during a crisis. The Joint Helicopter Command
sees no requirement for additional support staff other than those
required to deploy. RAF Odiham examined their requirements for
manpower in order to meet the requirements of expeditionary forces
and concluded that there were sufficient numbers on the station
to meet these requirements without the need to embed personnel
in Depth.
When does MoD expect the savings from Lynx, Chinook
and Sea King depth support, referred to in the submission, to
be realised?
Expected savings will be realised from 2006-07.
GENERAL
MoD's submission states that a key reason for
concentrating support of the RAFs Harrier and GR4 Tornado fleets
forward onto the RAFs Main Operating Bases is that RAF Aircraft
support policy is underpinned by a requirement to have a sufficient
number of tradesmen capable of deploying to operational theatres
to support aircraft—referred to as the RAF Crisis Manpower
Requirement (CMR). Has there been sufficient RAF personnel to
support the Harrier and GR4 Tornado in recent operations? Given
that depth maintenance was undertaken at DARA St Athan is this
a change in RAF support policy?
Yes there has been sufficient RAF personnel
to support the Harrier and GR4 Tornado in recent operations.
This is not a change in RAF support policy. Under
the old structure of 4 Lines of Maintenance, what is now classified
as Depth maintenance for the Harrier and Tornado GR4 was carried
out in three locations: Second Line on the MOB, Third Line at
DARA St Athan and Fourth Line at BAES. The RAF tradesmen within
what was Second Line provided sufficient manpower to meet the
Crisis Manpower Requirement (CMR), which is why there has been
sufficient RAF personnel to support Harrier and the Tornado GR
4 in recent operations. In collapsing the original three lines
of Depth maintenance into single Depth hubs at RAF Cottesmore
and RAF Marham respectively, the RAF will retain sufficient numbers
of what was Second Line manpower in Depth to meet its Crisis Manpower
Requirement.
When considering the best way to provide depth support
for air platforms, we considered whether the Depth hub should
be based at St Athan or MOBs and the IA concluded MOBs were significantly
more cost-effective. Even if the Depth hubs were to be based at
St Athan, second line military personnel would have been transferred
in, resulting in a significant number of redundancies.
What are MoD's trade/engineer officer recruitment
targets per annum until 2008-09?
The RAF's recruitment targets for the Engineering
Branch and On-Aircraft Engineering Ground Trades until 2008-09
are shown in the table below:
Provisional Recruiting Targets
| FY 2005-06 | FU 2006-07
| FY 2007-08 | FY 2008-09
|
| Engineering Officers | 50
| 39 | 117 | 101
|
| On-aircraft Engineer Trades |
| | | |
| Aircraft Technician Mechanic (A Tech M) |
125 | 125 | 125
| 180 |
| Aircraft Technician Avionics (A Tech Av) |
96 | 82 | 165
| 350 |
| Aircraft Technician Weapons (Eng Tech W) |
40 | 35 | 70
| 70 |
| | |
| |
Notes:
1. Future recruiting targets are reviewed at least annually
and adjusted to reflect the latest forecast of requirement and
outflow.
2. Given the nature of the current RAF drawdown programme,
the above targets should be viewed as provisional.
3. Engineering Officer Targets are a combination of civil
life intakes and recruitment from serving airmen.
4. Ground engineering and Communication and Information Systems
trades are not included.
The submission states that Tranche 3 of the redundancy programme
will be complete by September 2007. What risk assessment has been
done concerning the RAF's future capacity to react to surge demands
as a result of operational demands?
The future levels of trained manpower that the Service will
need to meet the range of operational commitments that are likely
to be placed on it are assessed on a regular basis, in line with
Defence Planning Assumptions. This analysis helps to assess the
RAFs Crisis Manpower Requirement (CMR) for all branches and trades
across all platforms and supporting functions. The CMR comprises
regulars and reserves, and includes the minimum number of RAF
regular personnel required in the future to enable it to meet
its likely operational commitments. In constructing the RAFs current
redundancy programme, which will culminate in Tranche 3 in 2007,
full account is being taken of the CMR to ensure that the overall
pool of trained and available manpower will be sufficient for
the RAF to meet the operational commitments placed upon it. Tranche
3 final selections will be announced in September 2006, and the
RAF manpower situation will continue to be scrutinised in advance
of that date, to ensure that the final quotas protect the RAFs
future operational needs.
October 2005
28
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