Memorandum from Afghan Drugs Inter-Departmental
Unit (ADIDU)
INTRODUCTION
1. Despite a 21% reduction in opium poppy
cultivation in 2005 (130,000 hectares in 2003-04 to 104,000 hectares
in 2004-05), the drugs trade remains a significant challenge to
Afghanistan's long-term security, development and effective governance.
It undermines stability of the region and accounts for almost
90% of the world supply of opiates.
2. The Afghan Government has, with support
from the UK as key partner nation for counter narcotics, recently
reviewed and updated its National Drug Control Strategy.
The Strategy focuses on four key priorities: disrupting the drugs
trade by targeting traffickers and their backers; strengthening
and diversifying legal rural livelihoods; reducing the demand
for illicit drugs and treatment of drug users; and developing
effective state institutions to combat drugs at the central and
provincial level.
3. We believe that focusing on these priorities
will make a greater impact on the drugs trade and sustain the
reduction in cultivation we have seen in 2005. But sustainable
drug elimination strategies take time—particularly when
the challenges are as severe as those in Afghanistan. The UK remains
committed to the challenge and to supporting the delivery of the
National Drug Control Strategy.
PROGRESS TO
DATE
4. The London Conference on Afghanistan
held on 31 January-1 February saw the launch of three key documents:
the Afghan Compact, the National Drug Control Strategy
and the interim National Development Strategy. In recognition
of the serious threat that narcotics pose to the broader reconstruction
of Afghanistan, counter narcotics is included as a cross-cutting
theme in the Afghan Compact between the Afghan Government
and the international community and in the interim National
Development Strategy. The Afghan Compact includes high level
benchmarks to measure progess in the counter narcotics effort.
These benchmarks are underpinned by the more detailed planning
in the National Drug Control Strategy and the interim Afghan
National Development Strategy.
5. The UK has helped to establish and provide
training for the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)
—the lead drugs law enforcement agency, headquartered in
Kabul. The UK is also providing training for the Afghan Special
Narcotics Force (ASNF), an elite and highly trained force,
equipped to tackle high value targets across the country. Since
January 2004, the CNPA and ASNF have seized approximately 165
tonnes of opiates, destroyed an estimated 317 drugs labs and made
a significant number of arrests. We are also working with the
international community to recruit and train a counter narcotics
Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) of Afghan investigators,
prosecutors and judges to work with the Counter Narcotics Police,
to be able to push through successful drugs investigations and
prosecutions. There are currently 80 specially trained members
of the CJTF. Since May 2005, there have been over 170 prosecutions
resulting in over 90 individuals being convicted.
6. The UK is also funding a £12.5 million
(US$22 million) Institutional Development project to strengthen
the Ministry of Counter Narcotics and other counter narcotics
institutions in Afghanistan. Two Deputy Ministers have now been
appointed to support the Counter Narcotics Minister. We are also
helping the Afghans to build up a viable economy and rebuild Afghanistan's
infrastructure through National Programmes (Micro-finance, the
National Rural Access Programme and the National Solidarity Programme),
to help develop Alternative Livelihoods. Through these programmes
7,000 kilometres of secondary roads have been rehabilitated, helping
farmers get their produce to markets, and nearly $50 million of
micro-credit has been made available to 264,000 people to invest
in legal livelihoods. Over 10,000 Community Development Councils
have been elected and over $161 million has been granted for over
16,000 projects to rehabilitate irrigation and small scale infrastructure.
7. Furthermore, the UK has also funded the
development of five drug treatment centres. We are working
with the Ministry of Counter Narcotics to determine how best to
support activity in this area following the completion of the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime's survey on drug use
within Afghanistan late last year. The survey identified 3.8%
of the Afghan population as being drug addicts. We are also supporting
the Poppy Elimination Programme by funding the salaries of Afghan
staff charged with raising awareness of the illegality of the
opium industry and monitoring Governor-led eradication in priority
poppy growing provinces.
UK RESOURCES
8. The Afghan Drugs Inter-Departmental
Unit (ADIDU), operating out of the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, was created in February 2005, following approval by the
Prime Minister. The Unit's role is to co-ordinate the Whitehall
effort on Afghan counter narcotics. Meanwhile, the British
Embassy Drugs Team (BEDT) manages the UK's counter narcotics
work in Afghanistan. They work closely with law enforcement and
intelligence agencies to support the Government of Afghanistan
in the implementation the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy.
Both ADIDU and BEDT include staff from the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, HM Revenue and Customs, the Department for International
Development, the Home Office and the Ministry of Defence. ADIDU
is overseen by a Stakeholder Group. This Group is chaired by the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Director for Afghanistan and
South Asia Directorate and comprises one member, mostly at Director
level, from each of the Stakeholder departments and the Cabinet
Office.
9. In September 2005, the UK announced new
UK funding to be spent on counter narcotics activity supporting
the Afghan Government in the delivery of their National Drugs
Control Strategy. In total, we will provide more than £270
million over the next three years (financial years 2005-06, 2006-07
and 2007-08). The Department for International Development will
provide around £130 million of the funding, which will be
spent on rural livelihoods and institutional development. The
rest will come from other government departments including the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence and the Home
Office. A top priority for this funding will be targeting traffickers
and disrupting the trade.
COUNTER NARCOTICS
TRUST FUND
10. The Counter Narcotics Trust Fund
has been created to bring counter narcotics funding on budget;
give the Afghans greater ownership over this important agenda;
and ensure that assistance is targeted as effectively as possible.
The United Nations Development Programme will administer the Fund,
which will ensure transparency and accountability.
11. At the London Conference on Afghanistan,
several delegations, including the US (US$2 million), Sweden (US$2
million) and the UK (at least £30 million (US$52.9 million)
announced contributions to the Fund. The UK commitment of £30
million includes an initial £10 million from our Afghan Drugs
Inter-Departmental Unit and £20 million from the Department
for International Development (DFID). These contributions added
to those already committed by Australia, New Zealand, the EC and
Estonia (US$1.5 million. US$338k, US$18.4 million and US$50k respectively),
giving a total of US$77 million pledged so far.
CULTIVATION/PRODUCTION
FIGURES
12. In November 2005, the UN Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC) confirmed the poppy cultivation and production
figures for 2004-05 from their annual survey. UNODC reported
a 21% reduction in poppy cultivation from 131,000 hectares (ha)
in 2004-04 to 104,000 ha in 2004-05. These overall percentages,
however, mask significant variations between provinces. For example,
Nangarhar (¸96%), Badakshan (¸53%) and Helmand (¸10%)
saw the most significant decreases. But other provinces, such
as Balkh and Farah, saw increases. The US Office of National Drug
Control Policy (ONDCP) also publicly released its cultivation
figures in November, which match those of UNODC.
13. UNODC also estimated that opium production
in 2004-05 was around 4,100 metric tonnes (mt), a decrease of
only 100 tonnes (2.4%) compared to 2004. Good weather and an absence
of crop disease were responsible for a significant increase in
yield in 2004-05.
14. While the UNODC and US figures were
encouraging, we need to be cautious about the future. An early
indication of this year's possible cultivation levels is reflected
in the UNODC's Rapid Assessment Survey, which was released
in March. The survey shows that overall cultivation levels are
unlikely to decrease below 104,000 hectares in 2005-06. Trends
indicate a possible increase in cultivation in 13 of 31 provinces
(particularly in the south), a decrease in three, with 16 remaining
stable. It seems that it is the areas where governance and access
to livelihoods has improved where progress last year may have
been consolidated. Whatever the overall cultivation figure this
year, we need to build on these successes and ensure that the
downward trend in cultivation is maintained in the long term.
LICENSED CULTIVATION
15. The Senlis Council has put forward a
proposal to promote the licensing of Afghan poppy farmers to produce
the raw materials for the manufacture of diamorphine and codeine
in their "Feasibility Study on Opium Licensing in Afghanistan
for the Production of Morphine and Other Essential Medicines".
The production of opium is contrary to Afghanistan's Constitution.
The Afghan Government has expressed its opposition to licit
cultivation in Afghanistan. When the Senlis Council presented
its study in Afghanistan in September 2005, the Afghan Minister
for Counter Narcotics, Habibullah Qaderi said, "The poor
security situation in the country means there can simply be no
guarantee that opium will not be smuggled out of the country for
the illicit narcotics trade abroad. Without an effective control
mechanism, a lot of opium will still be refined into heroin for
illicit markets in the West and elsewhere. We could not accept
this."
16. We share the view that licensing opium
cultivation in Afghanistan is not a realistic solution to the
problems of opium cultivation in Afghanistan, not least because
it risks a high level of diversion of licit opium into illegal
channels. It is clear from the feasibility study, as well as expert
opinion that Afghanistan currently does not meet the prerequisites
necessary to control licit cultivation. There is also a risk that
prices would risk attracting new entrants into the illicit market.
Peter Holland
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
2 March 2006
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