Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20-39)
AIR VICE
MARSHAL CHRIS
NICKOLS CBE, AND
MR MARTIN
HOWARD
17 JANUARY 2006
Q20 John Smith: So it would not matter
what aircraft they ended up working with if it were to be different
from what they had prepared for, if they prepared for it?
Air Vice Marshal Nickols: No,
in fact of course the ARRC is not just a national headquarters,
it has representatives from almost all NATO nations, and in NATO
exercises and in all the work that NATO does, it works multi-nationally
all the time. If anything, the air environment is perhaps the
most multi-national environment. If you visit a NATO exercise
it is quite common to see a package of 20 aircraft made up of
aircraft from five different nations. They all use the same processes
and procedures, they all of course use the same language, and
it has been done for 40 or 50 years very regularly.
Q21 John Smith: So it would not matter
if it was F16s or Harriers?
Air Vice Marshal Nickols: No,
absolutely not. As far as the ARRC is concerned, it knows the
capabilities of the aircraft and the procedures and processes
are NATO-wide processes and procedures so it is well used to that.
Q22 Chairman: Air Vice Marshal, you have
just said that the ARRC deployment will be about 1,300. To what
will that bring the total number of troops in Afghanistan from
the UK?
Air Vice Marshal Nickols: Once
the ARRC . . .
Q23 Chairman: Once the ARRC has deployed?
Air Vice Marshal Nickols: Well,
at the moment we have around 1,000 people in Afghanistan so with
the ARRC added that would be about 2,300. Clearly when we get
to the stage of deploying further forces into the stage three
area that will another addition on top of that.
Mr Howard: Not all 1,300 are British.
I think it is about 900 so it is around about 2,000 will be the
answer when the ARRC deploys.
Q24 Chairman: Okay, so from your last
answer, stage three is not considered part of the ARRC deployment?
Air Vice Marshal Nickols: No,
the ARRC deployment will happen anyway because it is the next
headquarters to command ISAF and it is on the roster to do that.
Chairman: Thank you. Colin Breed.
Q25 Mr Breed: Could you tell us where
you expect the contributions to the ISAF deployment to the south
to actually come from?
Mr Howard: Which formations?
Q26 Mr Breed: Yes.
Mr Howard: The precise ISAF force
package is being put together and I do not want to pre-empt any
announcement by the Secretary of State, but it will be a robust
force and I think it will have a very substantial ground element
because that will be necessary and it will have a substantial
aviation element within it, but I do not think it is really appropriate
for me to be drawn on the details of that because we have not
reached final decisions.
Q27 Mr Breed: It would be true to say
that this has been going on for quite some while now and we getting
rather close to the deployment date as such. Have you got any
indications as to when this will be finally achieved?
Mr Howard: It is linked to the
force generation process that Chris talked about which is going
on now. At the risk of making predictions, which is always a rash
thing to do, I would hope that we would reach decisions on this
within the next few weeks in a relatively short period of time.
I cannot guarantee that because ultimately it is a matter for
the Ministers to decide, but that is where I think we are looking
to be.
Q28 Mr Breed: Can we just push you a
little bit further. Do you think the Dutch are still committed
to providing additional troops to this ISAF deployment?
Mr Howard: The Dutch Cabinet have
made a decision to deploy and they have now written to their Parliament
saying this and there is a process of parliamentary debate in
the Dutch system which has to be gone through. I would not claim
to be an expert on that but that process is underway, very properly.
We would hope that the parliamentary part of that process would
be complete by the early part of next month.
Q29 Mr Breed: Right. You said that the
progress so far of our deployment has been 230 or so personnel
who have been deployed down to Helmand to start the whole process.
Can you tell us when you expect to be able to confirm the make-up
of the British deployment in total when that actually comes about
and perhaps tell us what has caused the delay in providing this
further detail of this particular deployment now? As you know,
we went to visit the ARRC in Germany in November and we came back
with the impression of course that it is fairly important for
everyone to have some feeling and understanding of what is planned
because it involves our troops going to an area which we all accept
is a much more difficult and potentially dangerous part of the
country. Can you give us some idea of when all those decisions
are going to be made?
Mr Howard: Hopefully within the
same broad timescale I talked about in terms of the force generation
process being completed. Obviously we have been working on this
for some months, as you say, and the Secretary of State is being
briefed all the time. It is an intricate process. He asks question,
we give him answers. I would like to think we are coming to the
culmination of that process. It would wrong for me to say that
this unit is going to go or that unit is going to because (a)
we have not decided and (b) it would be wrong for me to pre-empt
what Mr Reid says in the House of Commons. You ask why there has
been a delay. The Secretary of State has said on several occasions
that for the UK deployment to go ahead he needs to be satisfied
on three counts. The first is that there was a viable UK military
plan that we put together and so far he has expressed himself
satisfied. Obviously there are still some details to be sorted
out but he is satisfied on that front. Secondly, he wants to be
satisfied that the non-military part of our deployment into the
south was also well-developed and working in parallel with what
we are doing. He is pretty satisfied that is the case. The final
condition was that there was a properly populated NATO plan. There
is a NATO plan which everybody has agreed to but, as the Air Vice
Marshal has pointed out, it is a question of populating the force
packages within that plan. It is that process which we need to
try and finalise before all three of his conditions are satisfied
and then he can make a final decision and make an announcement.
Q30 Mr Havard: Can I ask a quick supplementary
to that. Okay, we are satisfied with the non-military bit of the
UK and we have got a set of options anyway on the British component
to fill the British bit of the NATO plan. Other parts of the NATO
plan are yet to be completed. Let's assume that somebody does
not turn up. Are we then going to see an additional set of British
troops in order to fill someone else's gaps?
Mr Howard: The force generation
process is a matter for NATO and that is going on and that has
happened over a period of several months. Obviously if, for whatever
reason, a nation pulls out that would be a gap that NATO would
have to fill and NATO would have to go to other nations. We have
not reached that point. They have not come to us in any sense
like that. I think it would be unhelpful to speculate in too much
detail but I would have thought that we would find it quite difficult
to take on another additional task if that were the case. We have
not got to the point yet and we are really looking to see how
the force generation process progresses and obviously the Dutch
angle, as you described it, is a factor within that.
Mr Havard: Thank you.
Chairman: Moving on then to the co-ordination
of ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom operations, John Smith?
Q31 John Smith: What do you consider
to be the advantages and the disadvantages and possibly dangers
of ISAF being much more closely integrated with Operation Enduring
Freedom?
Mr Howard: I do not see too many
disadvantages. The advantages are that you will get a clearer
international community security entity within Afghanistan, one
entity with which the Afghan Government can deal. I think in terms
of the way the missions might evolve it will be more that the
OEF components in terms of missions would move more towards ISAF
than the other way round, but there is a balance to be struck.
I think the advantage in political terms is that it will give
a clearer, more coherent and single security authority to work
with the Afghan Government and indeed with the Afghan Forces,
but there are also I think military advantages and Chris may want
to say something about that.
Air Vice Marshal Nickols: I think
there are a number of military advantages. Clearly a single command
structure not only helps you in terms of efficiencies and in terms
of the number of people you have to have deployed but obviously
in terms of operational unity as well. Clearly there will remain
some operations outside the remit of the ISAF forces. Some American
forces will still conduct counter-terrorist operations and it
is expected that a senior American will hold a double hat, as
we call it, for those operations which again will provide an advantage
because he will also be part of the ISAF headquarters and so he
will see the totality of the operations in the area.
Q32 John Smith: How do you see the co-ordination
working between in particular air and ground both at a tactical
level and even at a strategic level given this integrated command
structure? Being aware of the past difficulties in operational
environments is this going to be an improvement or is there a
risk because there is a little bit of an arm's length relationship,
the double-hatted nature of the deputy commander could you envisage
problems, given your extensive experience?
Air Vice Marshal Nickols: No,
it will improve the air Command and Control because at the moment
effectively you have the OEF asking for air support and ISAF occasionally
asking for air support. That of course is put together and prioritised
and such like but under the new arrangements you will have a single
headquarters asking for air support. Clearly one of the ways you
manage the air support and the co-ordination of it is you need
to have an air cell at all levels to make sure that the co-ordination
works not only at the top level headquarters but all the way down
to the troops on the ground where you have tactical air control
parties and things like that to make sure that co-ordination works.
Those are very well tried and tested procedures. They have been
in place for many years and are continually improved, and I think
the results in Afghanistan, where you occasionally see air support,
prove that that works.
Q33 John Smith: What about General Richards's
actual role, how will that work in practice given that one of
his deputies will be answerable to two commands? It does not seem
clear to me as a layman.
Air Vice Marshal Nickols: I think
because that deputy is in headquarters then that allows everyone
to see the requirement and prioritise the requirement so it is
an improvement on the current situation, if you like. General
Richards will be acting as a joint commander. He will have an
air Command and Control organisation within his headquarters which
will pass the detailed requirements for air support across to
the air operations centre. The air operations centre is based
in Qatar. It will have representatives from all of the nations
taking part in the operations and it manages all of the air support,
not only to Afghanistan but to Iraq as well.
Q34 Mr Hancock: Is that commanded by
an American officer?
Air Vice Marshal Nickols: Yes,
it is.
Q35 Mr Hancock: A three-star General.
Air Vice Marshal Nickols: Yes,
correct.
Q36 Chairman: Do you think there would
be resistance within NATO in principle to expanding into counter-terrorism?
Mr Howard: I think at the moment
there would be. I think the concept of ISAF is to assist with
stablisation. It is not a counter-terrorism mission in the sense
it is not out there looking proactively for terrorists and going
to attack them. That is not the same as dealing with insurgency
in areas where NATO is operating. Clearly ISAF will have to deal
with that but I think it is unlikely that NATO would move into
a proactive counter-terrorist targeted set of operations. I believe
that would remain largely an American responsibility with some
coalition partners.
Q37 Chairman: Is that not precisely what
we are talking about here?
Mr Howard: What we have at the
moment in the stage four area in the east of Afghanistan (which
is under Operation Enduring Freedom, the US-led Coalition) is
provincial reconstruction teams operating in the same way that
NATO is doing it elsewhere in Afghanistan. It is dealing with
the situation on the ground inside Afghanistan so it is also dealing
with the insurgency operation. It is both supporting stability
and dealing with insurgency and it is also carrying out counter
terrorist activities, some of which are in Afghanistan but some
of which are also working with the Pakistanis across the border,
so it is that last bit of the mission that seems to me to be unlikely
to come under NATO's purview.
Q38 Mr Hancock: Can I ask then what actually
is General Richards in charge of or is he just the token front-man
for NATO but really it is all being commanded by an American General
sitting somewhere in the Arabian Gulf? If he is in command of
the whole operation in Afghanistan but he does not have the last
word on the use of air assets, for example, who does? The American
General sitting in the Gulf?
Air Vice Marshal Nickols: Sorry,
I may have given you the wrong impression. In terms of air support
to ISAF the American General answers to him.
Mr Hancock: Yes, but he also answers
to his superior officer sitting somewhere in the Gulf, you said.
He reports to two.
John Smith: No, it is different.
Q39 Mr Hancock: Are you telling me that
if the CIA requested an air strike General Richards could say
no to that?
Mr Howard: We are not into that
situation yet.
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