Examination of Witnesses (Questions 140-159)
RT HON
ADAM INGRAM
MP, AIR MARSHAL
SIR GLENN
TORPY KCB CBE, DR
ROGER HUTTON
AND MR
PETER HOLLAND
7 MARCH 2006
Q140 Mr Borrow: You mentioned earlier,
Minister, that you were reluctant to deal with an exit strategy;
and I accept from where we are now it is difficult to set a date
for the withdrawal of troops etc; but are you actually saying
to the Committee you anticipate international involvement, including
UK involvement, in Afghanistan for a long period of time in the
future?
Mr Ingram: We are committed to
the three years' commitment. There are 36 nations currently engaged.
This can only be measured as a policy in the future, but as we
begin to achieve success the mission will change anyway once the
ISAF Stage 3 mission in the south does deliver (and I have every
confidence it will because of the capabilities put there); and
the direction in which it will move will create conditions and
therefore Stage 4 then comes into the ambit of ISAF. I have given
an indication there will probably still be a threat out there
from terrorist elements that will have to be dealt with and that
again is at some point in the future. When people talk about an
"exit strategy", I think the entrance strategy defines
the exit and that is what we are doing. That is why we have spent
so long defining what it is we are seeking to achieve in the south,
which is less benign, which has a lot of elements that have to
be dealt with. If we can achieve that (and I am very positive
that can be achieved) then that creates a flavour of success.
It will be foolhardy to say, "At the end of three years it's
over"; I think that would be wrong; or, "At the end
of five years it's over". We do not know this will develop.
All the indicators are of improvements that could suddenly become
very rapid and then we would have to consider: why are we there;
what more should we be doing; what less should we be doing, what
the balance of all of this is; where is the threat; how we are
achieving success in terms of counter-narcotics; and what other
elements are out there that still have to be addressed? It is
too futuristic to give definitions now.
Q141 Mr Hancock: If I could ask two quick
questions. One is about the quality of intelligence. You said
rightly, Minister, that some of the groups in Afghanistan decide
in the morning when they get up which side they are going to be
on. What does that do for our forces there and who they have to
work with; and how good is the quality and nature of the intelligence
we are working to? Secondly, when the Secretary General of the
UN was in this room speaking he said that the biggest mistake
in Afghanistan was not disarming the warlords. Do you really believe
it is possible for an Afghan military force to have countrywide
quality control of the country while there are so many armed groups
who are significantly opposed to the central government and, unless
they are removed in one way or another, the situation will be
that an under-resourced army will never be able to compete with
that situation?
Mr Ingram: I do not take your
last point of an "under-resourced army" if you mean
the force we are putting in.
Q142 Mr Hancock: No, not our army, the
Afghan Army. You said, Minister, that there was a lack of resources
for the Afghan Army and that was part of the failure at the present
time?
Mr Ingram: It is part of the issue
which has to be addressed. This failure at the present time, remember
we are only a short number of years away from the end of the removal
of the Taliban regime and for them to grow a modern army with
all the attributes in that timescale is just not realistic and
anyone who made such a demand would be living in a fantasy world,
to think that someone could so produce it. The question of intelligence
on the ground and the way in which the threat can reshape and
refocus, that is what we seek best to do, to best understand that.
It is what much of the activity of the PRT will be able to do,
about getting buy-in from what wider community. There are a whole
lot of things we will go into to encourage all of that, and engagement
of the people to give us information so we have a better understanding
and, indeed, that will mean talking to some of those people who
are posing the threat. It is no different from any other approach
we have had to adopt from Northern Ireland onwards, and perhaps
even before Northern Ireland. You have to understand what is causing
the problem; you have to see what measure you can put in place
to mitigate that and deal with it; and to create the conditions
so that does not continue to grow and manifest itself. It has
taken us 30 years in Northern Ireland, which one would have thought
was a much easier equation; but I do not want that to be used
as an indicator that it is 30 years' commitment to Afghanistan,
but I point out the problems. I think our knowledge now of dealing
with all of this is so much better, by and large because we do
not have the great standoffs that applied at the time of the Cold
War and all the geopolitical manoeuvring that went on which allowed
a lot of unrest to foster for other purposes. Those conditions
do not really apply globally now the way they once did. There
is a much clearer international focus to try and resolve these
problems because everyone is at threat from that—everyone;
because the minute they topple one part of the temple they will
come for the next bit.
Chairman: We are falling behind. Could
I ask for both short questions and for shorter answers please,
Minister.
Q143 Mr Holloway: Notwithstanding the
huge damage done by heroin in this country, are we not slightly
confusing our aims? If we want to have stability in Afghanistan
and also reduce the quantity of drugs coming into this and other
countries, how can you do that? How can you get buy-in from the
Afghan people if you are assisting the ANA in destroying their
livelihoods?
Mr Holland: The first point is
that the vast majority of Afghan people actually are not involved
in the drugs trade themselves—it is only about eight or
9% of the population who are directly involved in the trade. All
the surveys which have been carried out do indicate that, there
again, the majority of the population would like to see the back
of the drugs trade. That said clearly there is a risk where you
are tackling the trade, and particularly eradicating crops, that
that does have a response. Eradication of crops is only one element
of a much wider strategy in terms of tackling the drugs trade,
and that encompasses building government institutions, building
law enforcement capacity, the justice system as well as putting
in place alternative livelihoods and development in those areas.
Chairman: We will come onto this in much
greater detail. I keep saying this but we will, I promise. Can
I move on to John Smith and NATO?
Q144 John Smith: NATO and the Stage 3
expansion. Minister, the delays experienced in the NATO force
generation process, do you think that reveals a reluctance or
an unwillingness on some contributor nations to get involved in
the more dangerous work in the less benign south of Afghanistan?
Mr Ingram: I suppose every contributing
nation, ourselves included, has to examine what it is they are
seeking to do. Do we have the capability to do it? What is the
public mood? Winning that public mood in some countries may be
more difficult than here. It may even become difficult here in
relation to what David Borrow asked about how you justify it.
That is where I think we all have an obligation to play in this—to
make sure that, hopefully, the way in which I have articulated
it, the way in which the Secretary of State has and, even more
so, the Prime Minister, as to the vitality of what we are seeking
to do and the absolute importance of what we are seeking, encourages
our own people in the UK, but also internationally as well. I
do not think we need to convince the United States—being
the victim of what happened I think they are very focussed and
targeted—but there will still be noises off in the United
States about it, but it is about the steely determination of government
to define what the mission is and then do we have the capability?
I think in many ways the way in which we have gone about it shows
that we have not just jumped at the problem and I have participated
in most of the discussions, if not all of the discussions, as
this has begun to be put in place. It has been carefully analysed
and there is not a military solution alone; there is no point
just putting a military force into the country and expecting it
all to be resolved; we have to have all of those other ingredients
in place. The London conference was a good example and I am sure
that encouraged other contributing nations to see the strength
of the case; and that will then encourage both parliaments and,
hopefully, the people to understand the importance of it. Will
it go up and down? Yes, it will. It is the very nature of this,
but the NATO force generation has unquestionably put in place
a very importance force; and those who are preparing to resist
it should well understand that. This is a powerful force that
has been put in place here which will deliver on that mission
and will create the conditions to let other things grow.
Q145 John Smith: Good. I think the answer
was, yes!
Mr Ingram: I did not know you
wanted that short an answer!
Chairman: We do want short answers!
Q146 John Smith: A good answer nonetheless!
Are we confident that ISAF rules of engagement are sufficiently
robust to help us tackle the challenges in the south? Is there
any concern about national caveats undermining the consistency
of response to insurgents across Afghanistan?
Mr Ingram: Yes, to the first part.
We will have to see what caveats prevail, if any do prevail, and
to encourage those (if they were coming in and putting caveats
that were just making everybody else's job more difficult) not
to do so. I think we have learnt considerably from some of those
problems in the Balkans where the national caveats really were
a constraint. People who are committing want to achieve the mission.
I do not think they are there just for the tokenism of it.
Q147 John Smith: On the rules of engagement
and the remit to protect and deter, will that allow our forces
to take offensive action against forces that are threatening ours
and pursue and destroy such forces if they attack us and then
flee?
Mr Ingram: I think the answer
to that is, yes, but we never discuss rules of engagement. I think
it is wrong to explore it in any great detail. I think the way
in which I have understood the question if you want a quick answer,
then the answer to that would be, yes.
Q148 John Smith: You are satisfied?
Mr Ingram: We would not be doing
it if we were not satisfied.
Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: If
I could reinforce the Minister's point. From a military perspective,
and that is clearly where I focus in the PJHQ, we are content
that the rules of engagement that are now contained in the NATO
OPLAN are sufficient to match the tasks that we are going to be
asked to do.
Q149 John Smith: Good. Are we prepared
to reinforce UK troops if the numbers that we deploy prove to
be insufficient?
Mr Ingram: We have said that we
have to measure what the threat is and we have to have enough
flexibility to deal with that threat; but it will be a NATO response
and not a UK response.
Q150 John Smith: Finally, Chairman, when
do we anticipate that the Stage 4 expansion will take place, and
will we require more troops for that?
Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: As
I am sure the Committee understand Stage 3 expansion, the transfer
of authority, is set against certain criteria. We anticipate that
is going to happen probably in the late summer. Transfer of the
Stage 4 area, again there are a number of conditions which will
have to be met before that actually happens and NATO and the US
coalition force at the moment will decide, depending on how the
transition of Stage 3 goes, whether they are willing to transfer
the Stage 4 area.
Q151 John Smith: They will decide the
troop numbers?
Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: Stage
4 effectively is a re-badging of the current US forces which are
contained in that area underneath a NATO banner. I do not anticipate
any significant change in the force levels which are contained
in the Stage 4 area, which are predominantly US.
Dr Hutton: If I could just add
to that, Chairman. We would be very keen for that transfer of
authority to Stage 4 to take place during the tenure of HQ ARRC,
as commander of ISAF, which ends in February next year.
Chairman: That was a very interesting
answer you gave, Air Marshal, about a re-badging.
Q152 Mr Hancock: If I could ask a couple
of brief questions relating to the relationship between ISAF and
Operation Enduring Freedom. In the memorandum[1]
you said that the command and control elements there still needed
to be finalised and brought up to a better understanding. Can
you tell us how that will be achieved, and when you would expect
that to be in place? Are you satisfied that the "double-hatted"
arrangements—for the US officer embedded in the ISAF command,
your senior officers and, indeed, the British general who will
command the whole operation—are clearly understood by all
sides; and our general or NATO's general will not have to take
second place to the American command structure back in the United
States? Finally, can I ask about reinforcements? If reinforcements
were required, do you believe that any other country (other than
the UK) in NATO currently (excluding the Americans) would be able
to furnish further troops if they were needed; or would it solely
be down to the UK?
Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: If
I can deal, first of all, with the command control. I know the
Committee has received a note following the last session which
articulates that and things have moved on slightly in terms of
clarification.[2]
Basically, as the Committee is aware, Stage 1 and Stage 2 areas
come under the current ISAF headquarters which is based around
the Italian High Readiness Headquarters at the moment; and that
will transfer to COMARRC in May of this year. The Stage 3 and
Stage 4 areas are under the American coalition-led headquarters.
The command and control structure which will be put in place in
ARRC's tenure to transfer the Stage 3 and Stage 4 area, we hope,
will basically consist of the three-star ISAF commander, which
will be Lieutenant General David Richards, a British commander,
and his headquarters. Underneath that will be three two-star officers:
one will be responsible for managing all of the air resources;
one will be responsible for stability operations, and that really
focuses on the PRTs and enabling the PRTs. The final two-star
officer will be responsible for security, and that will be a US
two-star officer, and his responsibility under ISAF will be providing
a secure environment under which the PRTs can carry out their
reconstruction and redevelopment work; but he will also be responsible
for coordinating the activity of the relatively small US force
which will be conducting counterterrorist operations. Within one
headquarters we will have the ability to ensure that there is
a proper level of de-confliction and coordination of both the
ISAF force and the relatively small American force which will
be conducting counterterrorist operations.
Q153 Mr Hancock: Before you answer the
other parts of my question could I ask (as I asked the Secretary
of State in questions in the House last week) about the use of
NATO assets in Afghanistan. They will be solely at the discretion
of the commander of ISAF, including the American-deployed NATO
assets?
Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: That
is absolutely correct.
Q154 Mr Hancock: So he can make a decision
to use those without having that countermanded by an American
officer who says, "No, these are American assets and they
are not to be deployed"?
Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: That
is exactly right.
Q155 Mr Hancock: That is fine. What about
the second half of the question, about the reinforcements?
Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: The
point about the reinforcements, this is very much a job for NATO.
It is a NATO commanded and generated force. COMISAF David Richards
will clearly have the ability to move forces around Afghanistan
to take account of a deteriorating security situation in any particular
area. If he believes that he needs reinforcement from out of the
theatre then he would go back to NATO and seek NATO to secure
those forces from nations, exactly as it will be done during the
Force Generation Process.
Q156 Mr Hancock: Are you saying, Air
Marshal, that NATO troops or service personnel deployed in any
part of Afghanistan can be deployed if necessary to Helmand Province?
Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: This
is where some national contingents will have caveats on the use
of their forces. What NATO is seeking to do is ensure that there
are an absolute minimum number of caveats, and that is what we
are seeing from the bulk of the nations.
Q157 Mr Hancock: It would be helpful
from this Committee's point of view and this report if we had
that information about those countries which have caveated the
use of NATO-deployed troops to Afghanistan to areas where only
they will agree when they are deployed; because it makes the burden
on the British troops deployed there greater, does it not?
Mr Ingram: I do not know whether
that is information we are in a position to release. These are
matters for individual governments. It is not a matter for this
Committee to decide to comment on the lay-down of other countries.
We always say that it is a matter for that country. We do not
comment publicly adversely on what is happening. It is a matter
for those governments and for military commanders who have responsibility
reporting to those governments, and ultimately the people of those
countries to determine what it is they are seeking to do. I think
everyone has learnt lessons about national caveats and we cannot
deliver effective capabilities if they are too restrictive. All
of those discussions go on all of the time to try and ensure there
are no disconnects between what the overall mission is what a
particular country may be putting in place.
Q158 Mr Hancock: It is a fair question,
Minister, is it not? If NATO deployed troops in Afghanistan under
a unified NATO commander and if some of the troops have restrictions
placed upon them by their national government about where they
can and cannot be deployed, and there are troops there from the
UK who have an agreement that they will go anywhere and do anything,
then the burden on reinforcements falls surely on the shoulders
of those who will fall into that category. That is unfair if you
are in a shared alliance, is it not?
Mr Ingram: What you are asking
is a fair question although you have come to a conclusion. I do
not think that is appropriate because that is not a given—what
you have said. What we see all the time is all of the contributing
nations having to talk about what it is they are doing, and if
a particular country puts a condition on their participation then
that has to be dealt with by the force commanders. They have to
try and make sure that does not cause points of conflict and threat
to other people. This is then into the military assessment of
all of that and all the efforts are to minimise that and we do
not have those worry lines. If you want to prove there are worry
lines then I think you have got to take evidence from someone
else in this, probably the most contributing nations.
Q159 Chairman: But the consequence might
be, might it not, getting onto the question that John Smith asked,
that there might be a need for reinforcement from the UK if other
member nations of NATO are exercising these caveats?
Mr Ingram: Yes.
Dr Hutton: I would just make one
point there. There is an over-the-horizon option already available
for reinforcement in Afghanistan and that is the Strategic Reserve
Force that NATO keeps for all its operational theatres. There
is also the NATO Response Force for which reinforcement in Afghanistan
is not a primary mission but in extremis you could use
the NRF to reinforce Afghanistan. As you are well aware, that
is a considerable force.
Mr Ingram: The point is that here
we have a very concerted international focus in dealing with this
problem. A lot of effort has been thrown into it. It is not just
a military arrangement; it is all those other ingredients that
come into play. People are not going in here for tokenistic reasons
or simply flag-waving to say, "Well, I'm here". This
is a non-benign environment; the prospects of success are high
if we get all of those aspects right. To talk about failure without
any evidence that there is even an indication of failure and then
saying, "What if?"—I know, if military planners
then look at a range of factors, what we do not do is play out
those issues in a public way. This is why that support mechanism
is in place within NATO to achieve any immediate demand that may
arise. It is easy to say that if such-and-such a thing applies
you could then have strategic failure because those things do
not apply, so therefore why examine it.
1 Note: See Ev 46. Back
2
Note: See Ev 47. Back
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