Memorandum from Remote Airworks
My Name is Ingo Massey. I run a small company,
which has developed a range of VSTOL remote aviation. I have some
UAV experience both here and overseas.
Over the last decade the MoD (previously DERA
& DPA) have been approached on several occasions, some by
appointment, some by mail, in order to view the products, with
negative result. In fact, over the last five years I have never
succeeded in generating sufficient interest for the MoD/DPA even
to visit our product, nor for them to adopt a competitive, comparative
fly off policy as part of a procurement process; to compare flight
envelope, safety, efficiency, capacity, purchase and operating
cost. This is to me an obvious commercial first step in a procurement
process, even more so when one considers that we have a range
of one design airplanes, producing commonality in a number of
areas, which results in further efficiencies thereby, logically,
reducing costs. Some comparative costings are included and attached[18].
Therefore, I find it difficult to understand Defence procurement
purchase of Israeli Elbit systems Hermes/Watchkeeper, (an obsolete,
expensive, single engine pusher design), without a UK product
investigation.
I was advised only yesterday that underwriting
loss ratios for single engine UAV (most of them) is 100%. All
single engine pusher designs are inefficient with limited agility,
increased fuel costs, require long runways or specialist launch
(Phoenix), which requires additional logistic transport cost.
Additionally, identified elsewhere here, competition equipment
cannot be used for anything else, unlike ours, which were designed
as multi purpose from the outset.
I read, therefore, with interest the various
reporting and dissertation of the Defence Review; it would seem
that instead of widening the competition, our champion is going
to be BAE Systems and the like. In terms of my own industry, for
reasons of intellectual property, payload safety, payload comparison
and driving down costs, one requires direct access to the buyer.
Additionally, there is the question of ongoing technology advances,
(eg—4kg weight, side scan radar with its ability to see
through cloud and foliage can be fitted within our 3M wingspan
twin engine bird; 2.5M, if we were pushed), which we deal with,
via modular payloads, coupled with procurement lead-time. Also,
we are a small country, with a reducing manufacturing base, yet
we have to have effective, and be seen to have, effective global
reach.
Back when HMS Ocean was launched, we asked whether
it had configured UAV spaces and an operating criteria, to protect
it. Certainly our equipment can operate from it, providing up
to a 1,000 mile radius defence envelope. As a country, we cannot
afford a conventional task force; to achieve our aims, this means
lateral thinking, unless you would wish to hand over long range
maritime applications to Javier at E.D.A. Like it or not, well
within the next decade civil aviation will operate remotely via
a digital highway. Why? three reasons:
2. Aerial congestion; and
American Remote admitted expenditure per year
is $4.2 billion. What are we doing? In comparison, very little
at all and I find it hard to understand this, particularly in
the light of current and future deployment. Another factor here
was the finding of a Chinese UAV in Afghanistan, late 2005. On
searching the remains, recoverable imagery showed American search
team detail and, one has to assume, this to be an increasing trend.
Considerable, close, suitable air surveillance,
with some offensive capability, is essential for force protection;
also covering supply routes, and with vehicle/foot patrols controlling
the air vehicle. Close, is defined as below 1,000 ft and, in some
circumstances, down to 50 ft. This requires structural and propulsion
redundancy, along with both decoy and air egress capable resupply
drones. In other words, three different types of remote aviation.
Ground teams would also benefit from cheap, losable, remote, ground
vehicles, to act as decoys and detonate, improvised explosive
devices.
I understand that we have a number of our service
people learning to drive Predator—48.5 ft wingspan single
engine (1st Series); $4 million each, flight hour cost between
$4,000-$7,000.
Eight hours assembly, with four men and 1,500
ft of runway. Global Hawk—$40 million; $100,000 per flight
hour, 1,800 ft of runway.
Watchkeeper/Hermes—single engine—$2
to $3.5 million—38 ft wingspan—single engine. $1,381
per flight hour, 1,400 ft of runway.
Hunter—wingspan, single engine, ratio
or 700 ft of runway, $936 per flight hour. Pricing does not include
the ground control station and is on a per airplane basis. So
why does it cost so much? Well, the payload equipment is expensive
but coming down, but a significant cost is the voracious appetite
for the bottom line. Equipment from large industrial conglomerates,
who have enormous sales resources, can create an illusion greater
than the final result. No doubt, also, Defence Procurement are
overloaded. Our product is twin engine, very short take off and
landing (between 2 and 5% length, compared to the competition)
and we know what it costs to build and operate (dependant on payload
and control range). Our product, we believe, is better and costing
detail for our equipment is attached. [19]
At least, if our equipment is used to drive down competition pricing,
it achieves something. Encouraging small companies can speed up
innovative development, at worst, and, at best, may come up with
a better product, generally, at much lower cost.
Currently there is, and has been for decades,
secondment of service people to the CAA. The effect of this both
retains UK airspace as a WWII airfield and huge military airspace
zones, along with the military low flying demands. Block plans
for commercial aviation, both for existing and projected usage,
illustrate clearly increasing airspace congestion, albeit at higher
levels for commercial aviation.
America is currently certificating remote aviation.
The CAA have, in over a decade, progressed to 500 metres, providing
one gets through their moving goalposts; by no means certain,
for what is termed a commercial exemption. Interestingly, the
CAA, I understand, have, at best, limited experience in the design,
build, standards definition, flight operator requirements and
flight operations for remote aviation. Full flight commercial
certification is still designed around manned aircraft; priced
by decree, with no negotiation accepted, requiring deep pockets
(up to £65,000.00 for noise tests) and an open cheque book
(we tried, last year). We wasted our time in objecting to the
Minister of Transport.
It has been estimated, by others, that this
industry can support between 12,000 and 14,000 employees in both
defending our interests and civil aviation. The FAA is currently
certificating (for free). The CAA, by persistent commercial refusal
for over a decade, have, and continue to have, sabotaged the industry.
It has been incredibly difficult for a small company to develop
any form of remote aviation here due to CAA policy, compared to
Europe. The people that I dealt with all those years ago (a significant
number are pilots) are still there, halfway to their pensions,
but now at least Europe have authority for UAVs over 150KG.
1 March 2006
18 Not printed. Back
19
Not printed.
Back
|
