Annex C
INVESTMENT AT THE ATOMIC WEAPONS ESTABLISHMENT
BACKGROUND
1. In the early 1950s, the main research
and development activity in support of the UK's atomic weapons
programme were transferred from Fort Halstead near Sevenoaks to
a former air base near the village of Aldermaston in Berkshire.
Since then, all the UK's atomic and nuclear weapons have been
designed and manufactured by the Atomic Weapons Establishment
(AWE, formerly Atomic Weapons Research Establishment) on this
site and a neighbouring facility near Burghfield.
2. In 1993, AWE moved from its position
as a Government establishment to one which was still Government-owned
but operated by a private contractor. Nuclear licensing was introduced
in 1997: site licenses and discharge authorities for Aldermaston
and Burghfield were granted by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate
and the Environment Agency. This brought the AWE sites under the
same regulatory controls as the civil nuclear industry. On 1 April
2000—co-incidentally, 50 years to the day after its foundation—and
following a competition, the Ministry of Defence placed a contract
with a new company, AWE Management Limited (a consortium comprising
Lockheed Martin, Serco and BNFL) to manage and operate the two
sites at Aldermaston and Burghfield. The contract was initially
awarded for an initial period of 10 years with an option to extend
to 25 years with access to private finance. This option was taken
up in 2003.
CAPABILITY AT
THE ATOMIC
WEAPONS ESTABLISHMENT
3. A major feature of this new contract
was for the replacement of many of the major science, manufacturing
and assembly facilities on the two sites. This was driven by three
factors. First, over 80% of the infrastructure at Aldermaston
and Burghfield pre-dates 1960 and was becoming increasingly difficult
and expensive to sustain. Second, the introduction of a moratorium
on nuclear weapons testing required the introduction of significant
new methods to underwrite the safety and reliability of the UK's
nuclear weapons stockpile. This is all the more important as the
UK is the only recognised Nuclear Weapon State whose nuclear deterrent
is wholly dependent on a single warhead design. As has been reported
in detail elsewhere, [1]the
UK has introduced a major science-based programme to ensure we
can retain the current very high levels of confidence in the safety
and performance of the stockpile. This approach requires investment
in a range of new facilities, such as super-computers, high energy
lasers and hydrodynamics facilities. The nuclear regulatory regime
also rightly imposes stringent safety requirements on the establishment
itself, which are increasingly challenging to meet without additional
investment in facilities built to modern safety standards.
4. When AWE ML's initial contract was awarded,
it was recognised that a detailed appraisal would be required
of the condition of the infrastructure and skills base within
the establishment to ascertain whether this was sufficient to
deliver the requirement set out in the 1998 Strategic Defence
Review, specifically:
"For as long as Britain has nuclear forces,
we will ensure that we have a robust capability at the Atomic
Weapons Establishment to underwrite the safety and reliability
of our nuclear warheads, without recourse to nuclear testing.
There are no current plans for any replacement for Trident, and
no decision on any possible successor system would be needed for
several years. But we have concluded that it would be premature
to abandon a minimum capability to design and produce a successor
to Trident should this prove necessary." [2]
5. This appraisal has now been completed
and the Written Ministerial Statement made by the Secretary of
State for Defence on 19 July 2005 marked the end of the process
to agree contract amendments with AWE ML to deliver the new programme.
THE FUTURE
PROGRAMME AT
THE ATOMIC
WEAPONS ESTABLISHMENT
6. Under the revised contract the Ministry
of Defence intends investing on average an additional sum of some
£350 million per annum at AWE over each of the next three
years. The objective of this investment will be to sustain the
core capabilities required to meet the MOD's requirements. The
programme falls into three broad categories: upgrading of a range
of research facilities to underpin the science programme that
enables AWE to underwrite the safety and performance of the warhead;
the refurbishment of some of the key infrastructure on the sites;
and investment in sustaining core skills within the Establishment.
SCIENCE FACILITIES
7. The programme at AWE is focussed on providing
assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the UK's stockpile
of operational warheads for use on the Trident D5 missile. To
provide assurance of warhead safety and reliability without undertaking
full-scale testing, scientists must be able to demonstrate their
understanding of the physical and chemical processes that occur
within the warhead. In addition, age-related changes must be investigated
and the implications understood. Computer simulations are used
to predict the effect of future changes and warheads are routinely
withdrawn from the operational stockpile for forensic examination,
which further improves the accuracy of these simulations. The
specific capabilities required to undertake this assurance work
fall into three main areas—high performance computer simulation,
hydrodynamics and high energy density physics. Experiments and
models are used to test theoretical understanding of the scientific
principles and processes involved. This warhead assurance work
represents the core activity presently undertaken at AWE.
8. Particular projects to be taken forward
include concept and design studies for the replacement of major
facilities for hydrodynamics experiments; and the development
of a new high energy laser facility (Project Orion).
MANUFACTURING, ASSEMBLY
AND DISASSEMBLY
FACILITIES
9. Much of the basic infrastructure at AWE
(such as the heating and electrical systems and a considerable
percentage of the office accommodation) dates back to the 1950s
and is increasingly expensive and inefficient to operate. A great
deal of the additional investment will therefore focus on refurbishment
work in this area. In addition, AWE are required to ensure that
we can sustain the Trident warhead in-service throughout its operational
life, and also that the warhead can safely be taken out of service
at the end of its service life. It is possible that during the
in-service life of a warhead, faults can emerge in components
as they age. In extremis, this may require the remanufacture of
new replacement components in order to ensure the safety and performance
of the overall warhead. It is therefore necessary that AWE sustain
a basic capability to remanufacture key components of the Trident
warhead. Moreover, when the time comes to withdraw the Trident
stockpile, a range of skills and facilities will be required safely
to disassemble the warheads.
10. An additional focus of the programme
at AWE will therefore be to replace or refurbish some of the basic
assembly and disassembly facilities at Aldermaston and Burghfield.
These will include new facilities for handling high explosives
and highly enriched uranium, modernisation of the assembly/disassembly
facilities at Burghfield, and facilities for non-nuclear components
in the warhead.
INVESTMENT IN
SKILLS
11. The average age of the workforce at
AWE has been increasing, as the generation recruited to meet the
initial requirements of the Chevaline and Trident programmes near
the end of their careers. There is therefore a requirement to
recruit new members of staff to ensure that the core skills within
AWE are sustained. Other new staff will be required to assist
the infrastructure sustainment programme and also to operate the
new facilities as they come on stream. We have therefore started
a programme of recruitment and it is planned to increase the current
workforce by around 350 staff per annum until 2007-08, of whom
some 70% will be Non-Industrial staff and 30% Industrial staff.
SUMMARY
12. For as long as the UK remains committed
to retaining a nuclear deterrent, it is essential that we ensure
our stockpile of nuclear weapons remains safe and effective. This
programme of additional investment in skills and infrastructure
will ensure that this is achieved, against the background of the
additional demands placed on AWE by the current and future regulatory
regime, the introduction of the moratorium on underground nuclear
tests and the increasing age of the Trident warhead stockpile,
and of the scientists and engineers who support it.
13. This additional investment at AWE is
required to sustain the existing warhead stockpile in-service
irrespective of decisions on any successor warhead. The investment
will sustain core skills and facilities that could also be used
in future to develop a successor but no decisions have yet been
made either in principle or practice on this issue.
November 2005
1 O'Nions, Pitman and Marsh, Nature Volume 415 page
853 21 February 2002. Back
2
Supporting Essay 5, Strategic Defence Review: July 1998. Back
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