Examination of Witnesses (Questions 68-79)
MR DAVID
BROUCHER, PROFESSOR
COLIN GRAY,
PROFESSOR SHAUN
GREGORY AND
PROFESSOR JOHN
SIMPSON
21 MARCH 2006
Q68 Chairman: Good morning everybody.
May I say a particular welcome to our academic witnesses who are
giving evidence in this inquiry into the strategic nuclear deterrent.
You are most welcome and we are grateful to you for taking the
time and trouble to come along. The purpose of this inquiry, as
I said last week, is not to come to a decision—that decision
will be for others—but to inform the debate. We will be
conducting in the course of this Parliament a number of different
inquiries into different aspects of the strategic nuclear deterrent
and this first one is in relation to the strategic context and
the timetable that faces us. We have a lot of issues to cover,
and we have a lot of members of the Committee and we have a lot
of people who are giving evidence. Please do not feel that it
is essential for each of you to answer every question. Please
could I ask the members of the Committee to keep your questions
as short and succinct as possible—no pre-ambles, please—and
in answering questions to the panel please would you keep those
as short as possible as well. The questions that we have are divided
into distinct subject matters and if it is possible for you to
stay within those subject matters (for example, like, "Timetable";
or "Is it independent?" or "What is the attitude
of the Unites States or of Europe?") it would help us in
our inquiry. If I may, therefore, I would like to begin by asking
whether the nuclear deterrent that we have is still effective
as a deterrent now that the Cold War is over and in the post-9/11
world.
Professor Gray: My answer to that
is that, at this moment, in 2006, it is admittedly very difficult
to think of a scenario that is halfway plausible of the present
time wherein it would be relevant. The main argument for retaining
nuclear weapons, for Britain to remain a nuclear weapons state,
is that we do not know what the 21st Century will bring. In my
very short paper[1]—brevity
is not usually one of my strengths, but I made an exception for
the sake of the Committee—I made the point that I do not
think, in 1906, people looking out to the future would have got
much of the 20th Century. In 2006, to anyone who says, "I
don't think that Trident is relevant to the Britain's security
situation," Britain's security situation could change almost
overnight. I am in the process of writing a book about the strategic
history of the last 200 years and I am greatly impressed by the
ability of strategic history to effect great changes and to surprise
us. We do not know what the world of the 2010s and 2020s and 2030s
will be like. We do know, I think, that the world of interstate
conflict, as opposed to conflict against irregular enemies, is
very likely to return. Whether or not it does, it is prudent of
us to assume that it might, and the unique value of nuclear weapons
for the protection, if you like, of the ultimate values of the
country would be highly relevant in such a situation. Those who
say our security future is to do with trans-national terrorists
and other irregular forces are just guilty of the sin of presentism:
they look out on the world of 2006 and they see the future. I
think that is very foolish. The future brings all sorts of threats
to which this will be relevant.
Q69 Chairman: How is it possible objectively
to judge whether it is effective as a deterrent?
Professor Gray: If a weapons system
of a military posture is effective as a deterrent you have no
evidence for it. It is like the argument that we were good at
deterrence during the Cold War. How do you know? We do not know.
We may have succeeded in having a no war outcome despite our deterrent
policies. We do not know that. There are no footprints in the
sand.
Professor Gregory: I suppose I
plead guilty to presentism, in a sense, to the charge that is
made. You asked the question about now: Is it still effective
as a deterrent? If you look at the security horizon, even in the
medium term, the principle threats that we face—threats
of global warming, threats of terrorism, threats of collapsing
states and civil conflicts, even proliferation—I just do
not see the connectivity about deterrents in relation to these
kinds of threats. I think Colin is right, the strongest argument
is the longer term one. It is the issue of uncertainty. But, even
in that context—and I am assuming that is something we are
going to explore in the next couple of hours—I still think
that looking forward at realistic threats to this country from
other states which require us, given our allies, given the European
Union, given the United States, to have a deterrent of our own—which,
after all, I do not think is an independent deterrent. That is
my position.
Chairman: We will come on to that in
a second or so.
Q70 John Smith: The argument that
we are guilty of presentism and we do not know what the future
holds, is that not an argument for any military system and any
price-tag on the defence budget? It could be applied to any scenario.
Surely there must be some reference to intent and/or capability,
either present or indeed in the future. We need to identify what
these possible scenarios could be, otherwise we are justifying
any defensive mode.
Professor Gray: I think that line
of argument is unsound. You are right, in the sense that: anything
is possible but some things are more likely than others. The danger
of presentism is likely to dominate this particular debate, but
the value of a nuclear deterrent is so obvious, and, if you like,
the ultimate argument of Her Majesty's Government in a whole range
of possible scenarios that it is not a case of this as opposed
to other military capabilities. This is a quite unique capability.
This is the most potent weapon that mankind has ever devised.
As I say, it is, if you like, the ultimate argument. Objectively
speaking, of course, one does not say, "We have this because
the future is uncertain." It is a matter of judgment; but
the judgment, I think, would indicate that, given the bad things
that might happen in the future, the pay-off could be very, very
considerable. I was troubled by the word used by Professor Gregory
just now. The word was "given"—you know: "given
this alliance; given the Americans; given Europe". I do not
know what we should take as given for the 21st Century. Ten, 20,
30, 40 years from now, I do not know who is going to be allied
with whom. I know who I hope is going to be allied with whom,
but if we start saying, "Given the fact that we always operate
with allies; we will always have an American ally; we will always
be part of Europe; Russia will always be down and out; China will
always be looking for its own prosperity before anything else;
given the problems of climate change . . . "—with which,
I think, by the way, we can connect strategically to a nuclear
deterrent—be very careful of that word "given".
Q71 Chairman: Could I ask you, Professor
Gray, please, to keep your answers a little tighter, if I may
put it that way.
Professor Gray: Yes.
Chairman: If I may say to the rest of
the panel: you will, with each question, have things with which
you agree and disagree—that will be perfectly obvious because
this is your speciality—but would you mind if we move on
to the next issue, which is that of other powers.
Q72 Mr Crausby: First of all, specific
threats—and I direct this question to Professor Simpson.
What is the nature of the military threat that we currently face
from China? How might that threat evolve over the coming decades?
What level of investment is China putting into its nuclear programme,
and how is its nuclear capability likely to develop in the coming
years?
Professor Simpson: At the moment,
there does not appear to be a nuclear threat to the United Kingdom
mainland from China. They have some fairly ancient long-range
missiles which I think take about two days to fuel up. Their main
capability is in short-range missiles, short-range weapons which
appear to be focused on Taiwan. As to how China will develop,
well, one can argue the past is no guide to the future, but it
is interesting that the Chinese really have not engaged in a nuclear
arms race with anyone. They do not seem to have been driven, as
the US/USSR race was driven, by specific concerns about other
states. They seem to want a capability but do not want to go beyond
that, so their numbers of warheads are variously at the moment
put at 300 to 500. Looking to the future, I think we have to ask
ourselves what the world configuration is going to look like.
There are indications that the United States is taking the view
that China is going to be a competitor, but, at the same time,
if you look at the US National Security Strategy document that
came out very recently, they are also placing great emphasis on
the need to try to address themselves to a cooperative, as it
were, solution to their relationship with China. Therefore, as
things stand at the moment, we are in a situation where China
is a very major trading partner of ourselves. In the main, the
threats that we would confront from China will be threats to our
trading allies in the region, and will be threats, if you like,
to the cheap consumer goods that we are able to obtain from China,
from Japan, from South Korea. And it is not self-evident to me
that under these circumstances we would want to intervene vis-a"-vis
China and vis-a"-vis that region with our own nuclear weapons.
Q73 Mr Crausby: Turning now to Russia—and
I direct this question at Professor Gray. Russia's nuclear capability
remains vast. Despite the end of the Cold War, serious questions
remain about the security of its nuclear arsenal. What is the
likelihood that the UK might face a threat from Russia in the
coming decades? I accept, it is difficult to predict the future,
but we have to, do we not?
Professor Gray: It is very difficult,
certainly. The Russian Federation accords its highest investment
priority in defence to modernising its nuclear arsenal. It has
been boasting about it for recent years; it has the lowest threshold
for nuclear use of any country's nuclear doctrine and it boasts
of that. It has a strange theory that in the event of a conventional
conflict—where Russia, of course, would be at a great disadvantage
because its conventional forces, frankly, are a mess—it
would employ nuclear weapons very early and it would implement
nuclear escalation which it believes would produce a satisfactory
outcome from its point of view. If you look at Russia today, it
has, shall we say, unsatisfactory relations on most of its frontiers.
No, it is not satisfied with its current situation. There is a
whole plethora of quotations from senior Russians one can quote
about how it views NATO, basically, as an enemy—and of course
NATO is an enemy, in the sense that NATO stands between Russian
realising its return as a great power in the current situation.
You do not need to invent very imaginative scenarios to see Russia
embroiled on several of its frontiers with countries in which
we have a security stake or maybe to whom we have a legal obligation.
Russia, as I say, is almost totally nuclear dependent in its defence
positions. It has been emphasising a new generation of nuclear
warheads, very precise, very low yield, and I say it has a very,
very low threshold for nuclear use. It is not reconciled to the
loss of the Baltics; it is not reconciled to the loss of the Ukraine;
it is not reconciled to what has happened in the Caucasus; and
NATO is right up against its frontiers. Who knows what the future
of Russia will be—either under Putin, or who knows who will
succeed Putin? I am not making a prediction; I am just saying
that the notion that Russia was sort of yesterday's problem is,
I think, an unjustified and unjustifiably optimistic assumption.
Q74 Mr Borrow: Could we perhaps move
on to some of the emerging nuclear powers and a question for David
Broucher, looking specifically at the threats from North Korea
and Iran, and perhaps linking into that the possibility of Pakistan,
which is in a pro-Western position at the moment, perhaps becoming
rather more unfriendly in the future and how that could configure
if we are looking into the next 10 or 20 years.
Mr Broucher: Thank you. I think
it is quite difficult at the moment to foresee a situation where
the DPRK could directly threaten UK interests where the United
States would not also be involved. Much the same, I think, is
true of Iran. If Iran is, as we think, developing a nuclear weapon
and the means to deliver it, its target is not the UK. Its potential
target is likely to be a regional one rather than a UK strategic
target. That is not to say that things will not change in the
future, but, looking at the situation as it exists today, it is
very hard to foresee either of those countries threatening the
UK mainland. I think the same is true of Pakistan. I would perhaps
be slightly less confident about that, but I think you would have
to look a very long way into the future to see a situation where
the UK mainland would be threatened by any of those countries
and where the United States would not be standing with us.
Q75 Mr Borrow: Which other states
do you think are likely to develop nuclear programmes between
now and, say, 2030?
Mr Broucher: I think that depends
very much on the future of the non-proliferation regime. One of
my worries about this is the way in which the Non-Proliferation
Treaty has been eroded. Confidence in this treaty is flagging,
frankly, through the activities of the four countries that have
remained outside the treaty or that are now outside the treaty[2];
through the activities of those who have been cheating within
the treaty; and also, I think, through the failure of the existing
nuclear weapons states to live up to their obligation to pursue
negotiations on multi-lateral disarmament in good faith. If the
Non-Proliferation Treaty were to break down, and if Iran develops
a nuclear weapon, I think it is difficult at this stage to be
precise about which countries might follow suit but there is a
danger that you would see several countries considering the nuclear
option. I think there are at least 15, perhaps more, countries
in the world that could develop a nuclear weapon quite rapidly
if they were to take the decision to do so, and this is why I
think it is very important that any decision that we take takes
account of the fact that we are, as it were, an actor in this
play and that the actions of others are conditioned by the way
in which they perceive us.
Q76 Chairman: You said 15.
Mr Broucher: That was a figure
that I was aware of sometime ago, so it may not be current any
more.
Q77 Chairman: Would it be possible
for you to let us have a list of the 15 that you have in mind?[3]
Mr Broucher: I can do some research
into that, certainly.
Chairman: Thank you. I would be grateful.
Q78 Mr Borrow: Mr Broucher, I think
you mentioned in answer to an earlier question about Iran and
North Korea and Pakistan not being a direct threat to the UK.
If we are looking across the wider group of nations who could
develop nuclear weapons, how many of those do you think not only
have the capacity to develop nuclear weapons but also the delivery
mechanism to directly threaten the UK?
Mr Broucher: I think in fact very
few. Unless you are looking at a situation where there has been
a complete breakdown in the current security arrangements: the
end of NATO, the end of European Union, a series of situations
that we do not currently envisage, I do not think that is the
real risk. The risk is that nuclear weapons will be developed
by countries for regional purposes, particularly in the Middle
East and perhaps in South-East Asia. If the denuclearisation of
South America does not hold up, then there is a lot of potential
there for nuclear mischief. As you know, there is a treaty that
the South American nations have signed up to, keeping nuclear
weapons out of that area, and the same applies to Africa and to
South-East Asia. If that were to crumble, you could see a whole
set of regional confrontations and conflicts that might impel
countries in those regions to go for the nuclear option.
Q79 Chairman: Would any of you like
to add anything to that?
Professor Gray: Could I say that
I think David Broucher's assumption that the British denuclearisation
would have an influence on decision making elsewhere is a fallacy.
States which are thinking about going nuclear or having a nuclear
option for their own very good local reasons would be entirely
uninfluenced by the British example.
Chairman: We will come on to that in
just a second.
1 Note: See Ev 30 Back
2
Note by Witness: Three states, India, Pakistan and Israel,
always remained outside the treaty. A fourth, the DPRK (North
Korea), has renounced its membership. Back
3
Note: See Ev 95 Back
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