Examination of Witnesses (Questions 100-119)
MR DAVID
BROUCHER, PROFESSOR
COLIN GRAY,
PROFESSOR SHAUN
GREGORY AND
PROFESSOR JOHN
SIMPSON
21 MARCH 2006
Q100 John Smith: Are there any grounds
to believe that the Americans did consider in the immediate aftermath
of 9/11 mounting a nuclear attack on Afghanistan?
Professor Gray: I do not believe
so.
Q101 John Smith: It was never considered?
Professor Gray: I do not believe
so.
Q102 John Smith: At any time?
Professor Gray: No.
Chairman: Now I would like to move on
to the seat at the table issue. Robert Key?
Q103 Robert Key: We have dealt at
some length with this argument but there are some aspects of it
that I would still like to explore. It is often said that possession
of nuclear weapons gives the UK a seat at the top table and I
was interested, Mr Broucher, that you said this was a "pernicious"
idea. Would you explain what you mean by that?
Mr Broucher: When I was in charge
of the UK delegation to the Non-Proliferation Conference I was
often approached by diplomats from developing countries whose
line would be: "The real reason you have nuclear weapons
is because it guarantees your seat on the Security Council."
If you accept the premise that you have got to have a nuclear
weapon to be a permanent member of the Security Council, does
not that, as it were, strengthen the argument for nuclear countries
like, I do not know, Brazil or Mexico or Japan or I could go on,
to develop this capability in order also to have a seat at the
top table, and is it not rather better for us to establish that
the reason we have a seat at the top table is because we are a
powerful industrial nation with a great trading history and a
great diplomatic history and we are a member of more international
organisations than anyone else, a whole range of reasons why we
can contribute. I do not think you need to be waving the big stick
in order to justify your seat at the top table.
Robert Key: Does anyone disagree with
that proposition? That is remarkable.
Q104 Chairman: — I am not sure
that Professor Gray in his memorandum[6]
entirely agrees with that proposition.
Professor Gray: It is an historical
fact that members of the Security Council have been nuclear armed
and the notion that we can change that unilaterally and the world
would accept the logic—The idea Mr Broucher has just outlined
is attractive but I think—and I would not use the word foolish—it
flies in the face of historical experience, which is to be a permanent
member on the Security Council you have to be a very great power
and very great powers are nuclear armed; at least they have been
thus far. To try and rewrite that would be very difficult and
not very persuasive. I think the diplomatic cost to Britain of
abandoning her nuclear weapons would be very considerable and
the case for Britain maintaining her position would become very
much more difficult if she does abandon her nuclear weapons.
Q105 Robert Key: I notice that Professor
Simpson said earlier that we would have to address these things
on a regional basis but of course if we looked at it from a European
point of view, in 10 to 20 years' time it is quite clear that
France under no circumstances, as far as I can see, will give
up the nuclear deterrent, but we could see that we might do so,
which would leave only France with a nuclear deterrent. Do you
think the United States would ever allow that to happen? That
they would sit back and see Britain giving up the nuclear deterrent
knowing that France would be the only European country with one?
Professor Simpson: First of all,
at that stage you get into a discussion over what is a nuclear
deterrent and what it is that we would have if we gave up Trident
(or not have), but I think a great deal is going to depend on
how the European Union, NATO, the whole European body politic
evolves and our relationship with it, and in those circumstances
I think you are into the set of questions which I posed in the
memorandum[7]
of at what point in the proceedings might the United Kingdom and
France link themselves militarily to Europe with the nuclear deterrent
and would Europe in fact want a nuclear deterrent, as again we
pointed out in the memorandum. If you have been in NPT forums
you will realise that one of the problems the European Union has
in getting a common position is that you have got two nuclear
weapons states plus at least three states which were former neutrals
and to try to get a common position from that group of states
is not easy. It has been done but it is not easy. I think under
those circumstances, let us put it this way, the United States
would be very unwise to put pressure upon the United Kingdom to
keep a nuclear deterrent which it decided it did not want to have.
The real issue would be what would be the quid pro quo
because if you go back to the UN Security Council issue, in many
ways our real strength now is our ability to provide intervention
forces, peace-keeping force under the UN umbrella. That is what
we bring to the table. And again I think in an American context
one of the questions that they might well look at is whether it
is better for the United Kingdom—this harks back to the
late 1960s—to spend a lot of its defence resource on the
nuclear deterrent, which does not appear really to have much relevance
to global problems or to regional security problems, or to spend
its money on forces which are useable and which do appear to be
very relevant to the current and possibly future security problems
of the United Kingdom and globally?
Chairman: Can we move on to the issue
of independence now please. David Hamilton?
Q106 Mr Hamilton: I am still trying
to work out Professor Gray's previous answer to the other question
and that is that we nuke the terrorists because I am just thinking
of how the Russians would deal with the Chechnyans in relation
to that. It has far more ramifications than just the answer that
was given. It is a real problem that we have got to deal with.
Professor Gray, the Committee heard in its evidence session last
week different perspectives on the independence of the UK's nuclear
deterrent and in particular about whether Trident or any successor
system could be operated and maintained independently of the United
States. In your judgment, is the UK's nuclear deterrent genuinely
independent? What are the implications of any potential dependency
we would have on the United States?
Professor Gray: Britain's nuclear
deterrent since the early 1960s obviously has been thoroughly
dependent upon the co-operation and indeed the willingness of
the United States to sell us or loan us the most vital equipment,
in other words the vehicles for delivery. So, yes, the independence
of the deterrent is obviously highly questionable. Under what
circumstances, grave national emergency and such like phrases,
one can imagine an independent British decision, aside from American
wishes, I have difficulty envisaging. From my own point of view,
I think the Anglo-American connection regardless of what happens
in Europe in a sense is our security environment. We learnt that
three times in the 20th century, so as the holder of two passports—British
and American—I am not the least troubled by the American
connection, but for anyone who wishes to question the true independence
of the British nuclear deterrent I would concede that it is, if
you like, a hostage to American goodwill; I think that is true.
Q107 Mr Hamilton: But could the United
Kingdom be totally independent of the United States in relation
to Trident or is it too dependent on the United States satellites,
guidance systems, software, and so on?
Professor Gray: It is my understanding
that the dependency is critical and will continue. We certainly
could develop a genuinely technically independent deterrent, but
Trident I think could not be.
Q108 Chairman: Professor Simpson
has something to add.
Professor Simpson: I think you
have to be very careful in answering these questions to focus
down on the components of the question, and in a sense there are
three components. One is acquisition, one is use, and the third
is decision making. It is true that the Trident missiles are held
in a common stock at King's Bay with the United States missiles.
It is equally true though that when on patrol it is possible for
them to be used as a result of a United Kingdom decision. So to
that extent use is something where the UK is independent in its
ability to use and even though the missiles submarines are committed
to NATO, in fact the decision system is such and the command and
control system is such that it has to come through the UK naval
system in order for the decision to be conveyed that they are
to be used. So to that extent you have got independence. As to
whether or not the United Kingdom would ever be in a situation
where it felt it had to use them independently, I have grave doubts,
that is on its own and not in association with the United States
or not in association with France. As I say, I have grave doubts
about that because it seems to me that all conceivable situations
where this might arise would be situations where the rest of the
Europeans, either in the EU or NATO, were involved and therefore
the threat would be a generalised threat to Europe.
Q109 Mr Hamilton: Professor Simpson,
what would be the costs and benefits of limiting future dependence
on the United States in our nuclear operations?
Professor Simpson: I think the
benefits are likely to be benefits which would be only, as it
were, felt in the longer term in acquisition, and in any event
I suspect that unless you went for a totally different system
from Trident, the only alternative is to actually look to the
French or to look to a totally different system to give you greater
independence. But, as I say, I think you are talking here about
a situation where there is going to be quite a lot of lead time.
You are not talking about a situation where submarines are on
patrol and someone in America then says, "We do not want
you to use them." Under those circumstances I think the UK
could still use them so you are talking very largely in non-independence
independence terms about acquisition and, of course, acquisition
cycles which, if you go for Trident, are liable to be very long,
a decade/decade and a half, which is one of the reasons why our
feeling is that in fact one of the issues you need to explore
is whether the existing system's life can be extended.
Q110 Mr Holloway: To follow on from
what Mr Hamilton was saying, can I ask Professor Gray could Britain
independently detonate a nuclear weapon? Could we decide here
is a spot that we would like to put one and we would like it to
go off; can we do that on our own?
Professor Gray: Yes.
Q111 Mr Holloway: I thought you were
implying earlier that we would not be able to do that.
Professor Gray: Yes we could.
Q112 Chairman: So the satellite guidance,
weather information, all of that is independently held by the
UK, is it, or is available to us independently?
Professor Gray: I can think of
no technical reason why we would be prevented from detonating
a weapon if we so chose is my answer to that.
Q113 Chairman: But if you are so
content with the dependence of the UK on the United States, what
is the point of our having it?
Professor Gray: Well, I believe
that the alliance with the United States has been proven by history,
and common sense tells me as well that it is the prudent course
for Britain for the future. I do not know what may happen. One
can imagine all sorts of things. I do not know what the 21st century
will bring. We may sail on happily with the American alliance
and all will be well. If we are going to be in the expeditionary
force business, as has been mentioned here in the discussion already
this morning, British forces on a UN mandate or a NATO mandate
will be around the world doing good, and I think it is important
that behind the British element of the forces (which may be substantial
in some cases) that there should be British weapons of mass destruction.
No-one is going to care as much for the security and safety and,
if need be, rapid evacuation of British forces as does the British
Government.
Chairman: I see. Thank you. Let us move
on to the timetable of the decision making whatever it might be.
Dai Havard?
Q114 Mr Havard: We have done the
preamble. The Government has said that decisions need to be made
of certain types in this Parliament hence our inquiry. What I
need to really try and get from you is a view about what sort
of decisions you think we need to make in this Parliament, both
in terms of political decisions and capability decisions, and
why we need to make those decisions now. Can I start with you,
Professor Gregory perhaps, as you were nodding at me.
Professor Gregory: I start from
a point of view that I think we have got an historic opportunity
to walk away from these weapons and that we should do that and
therefore I do not think I am the right person to ask about the
timetable for carrying them forward. Chairman: But there
is a timetable involved.
Q115 Mr Havard: Exactly, there is
a timetable involved in what you suggest as well, is there not?
Professor Gregory: Yes there is.
Q116 Mr Havard: There is a certain
political timetable for that.
Professor Gregory: I understand.
The Trident system, as far as I know, can run on until 2025. The
Americans are talking about possibly extending the system as late
as 2040 but you have 15 to 20 year cycles, which means we have
to take a decision one way or another on this, as I understand
it, by around 2010. I know there has been debate about whether
that is not slightly premature and, to be honest, I do not know
what the exact physical timetable of these weapons is.
Q117 Mr Havard: Right, do you have
a view, Professor Simpson?
Professor Simpson: First of all,
I think there is one driver in terms of the missiles (and it is
not my knowledge but my impression) and that is that there was
an agreement with the United States which was of a specific duration
over the storage and maintenance of the missiles at King's Bay.
I have no knowledge as to what the end date of that was but I
presume it was probably somewhere in the range of 2020 to 2025,
and therefore there is a question of whether if you want to extend
the life of the system you would have to make an extension to
that agreement. I think that is in a sense the key decision as
far as the United States is concerned in terms of having to make
additional agreements with the United States to extend the life
of the existing system and it may well be, I do not know, that
the current Government and the current Prime Minister feels that
such an extension is better negotiated whilst it is in office
and he is in office rather than anyone else, and while the current
American President is in office. I am speculating here but that
seems to me a possibility. In terms of the warhead, as I think
the Ministry of Defence memo indicated,[8]
there the question really is maintaining the technical credibility
of the warhead into the indefinite future in a situation where
we are not able to test because of the testing moratorium, and
that is a possibility both for the United States and the United
Kingdom, and France for that matter, who have this problem of
sustaining the technical credibility of the warhead under a non-explosive
nuclear testing regime, and that seems to be the driver for the
current collaboration between them. Insofar as there is a core
driver to the current schedule, it appears to be the question
of the submarines and there the issue appears to be a belief that
the submarines have a limited life to the 2020 through about 2027
period, depending on which of the submarines you are talking about,
and quite why that limited life exists is again not clear to me.
Whether it is on hull fatigue, whether it is a consequence of
the reactor life and refuelling the reactor, or whether it is
a problem over the capabilities at Barrow and what the nuclear
submarine building programme looks like at Barrow, and whether
there is a large gap after the Astute class finish building there,
and whether therefore in a sense the decision is about whether
we should sustain a nuclear submarine capability in the United
Kingdom (because if one did not build a new set of nuclear submarines
to take Trident then that capability would be lost). I do not
know, but those seem to me to be the issues that are out there
driving us.
Q118 Mr Havard: I do not think you are
a million miles away from all of them together actually. Perhaps
I could look at it in a slightly different way and look at where
the United States are now because there is this relationship and
it is so inter-linked. I have been watching with interest the
Quadrennial Review they have just been having and statements within
that. It seems as though to some degree they are looking at whether
or not they need to upgrade and replace their own nuclear deterrent
capability extending the new D5(A) missile so they can go to 2042
and the Mk4 re-entry vehicle, and those sorts of things (the technicalities
of the process) and also their own submarine fleet in order to
continue to carry them so we know all of those things. What I
really want to know is what you think is coming out of all that
decision making that is happening in the United States, what the
implications are for all of that about where it leaves us in making
this decision that we have to make.
Professor Simpson: If I am honest
I do not know the answer to that. All I would say is that the
lesson of Chevaline for the Navy and the Ministry of Defence is
never to be left out of step with the United States Navy, never
to be placed in a position where we have to effectively support
an American system which is not in current service in the United
States.
Q119 Mr Havard: What do you think,
Professor Gregory? Do you see any implications from the current
thinking in America that alters any of the timing of the decisions
or the type of decisions we need to make?
Professor Gregory: I would agree
with what John has just said. I think if we go, as is most likely,
down the path of the continuation of existing policy (because
that is in a sense the least risky option for the Government to
take) then the experience of Trident the D5, for example, is we
like to have the best system, the current system, the most up-to-date
system, the system we know the Americans are going to support
for the longest period of time because that gives us the "Rolls
Royce" of nuclear weapons and so on and so on. I do not see
us deviating from that policy. We are not going to replace Trident
(if we do) with an aging system which, as John says, is going
to be out of the American arsenal in a few years' time. We will
not do that.
6 Note: See Ev 30 Back
7
Note: See Ev 24 Back
8
Note: See The Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent,
HC (2005-06) 835. Back
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