Examination of Witnesses (Questions 120-139)
MR DAVID
BROUCHER, PROFESSOR
COLIN GRAY,
PROFESSOR SHAUN
GREGORY AND
PROFESSOR JOHN
SIMPSON
21 MARCH 2006
Q120 Mr Havard: Professor Simpson,
you said a lot of this is clearly driven by the capability decision.
We have to make decisions about procurement and acquisition of
new submarines and all of that. We know the potential dates for
the capability gap if we do not extend the life of the current
boats and buy new ones and so on. The whole thing seems to be
driven partly by that but also partly by the fact we are talking
about strategic nuclear weapons. What I find interesting about
the United States' position is that they now say that they want
to change from "threats from large institutional forces"
to "irregular, disruptive and catastrophic threats".
That is the conceptual change. It says it is "defeating violent
extremists; defending the homeland; helping countries at a strategic
crossroads; and preventing terrorists and dangerous regimes from
obtaining weapons of mass destruction". That is what their
policy is going to be based on. We have partly discussed about
where do nuclear inter-ballistic missiles fit into that particular
policy, and not into most of it it would appear. What I really
want to get at is if there is going to be this change of debate
in the United States, are we going to see a different form of
nuclear deterrent? Is the nuclear deterrent not simply going to
be strategic, is it also going to be thought to be sub-strategic,
whatever that might mean, or is it going to move partly to tactical?
Mr Broucher: I think you had better
stop there because that is quite a long question.
Mr Havard: That seems to me to be important
in the sense that that all the decisions have been predicated
on strategic inter-ballistic missiles being nuclear? Does it mean
that it is going to morph into something different?
Q121 Chairman: Let us have some answers
please. Professor Gregory?
Professor Gregory: I would look
to the French for an answer to that. The French have kept two
systems. They have kept their submarine-launched ballistic missile
system for this basic strategic deterrence but they have also
kept a stand-off, an accurate, aircraft-delivered missile system
which is the system that they are adapting for striking these
precision targets and articulating arguments in relation to holding
at threat the various parts of a dictator's regime or taking out
perhaps underground weapons of mass destruction centres, or whatever
it is, and you are right to put this finger on this absolute conundrum.
If Britain goes down the path of replacing Trident, ie a submarine-based
launch, for all the arguments that one makes for that which really
centre on the vulnerability argument (essentially, as long as
we have something out there we always have this capability in
a way that we do not have otherwise) I think that is always going
to be in tension with the issue of flexibility. We have tried
to fudge this over the last few years in the new context by articulating
sub-strategic roles for Trident but those are pretty unconvincing,
I have to say, and certainly the French and the Americans, as
they face up to this new threat agenda as they see it, are doing
that not on the basis of configuring their strategic systems but
on the basis of developing these smaller high precision, more
accurate and (many fear) more useable nuclear weapons.
Chairman: Linda Gilroy, do you have anything
to ask here or shall we move on to Robert Key?
Linda Gilroy: I am happy to move on.
Q122 Robert Key: In broad terms how
is the United States' nuclear relationship with Europe going to
develop over the future decades? Could you get out your crystal
ball and help us?
Professor Simpson: I am very tempted
to make a response to you by saying I have got no idea at all!
I think what is clear is that the relationship is evolving in
so far as it has moved from one where Europe was heavily dependent
upon the United States from a security perspective to one where
Europe appears an increasingly important base or staging post
for the United States if it is going to operate extensively in
the Gulf, or if it is going to operate extensively in the stands
in Central Asia. I think in turn that is going to generate a rather
different relationship of costs and benefits from the perspective
of the Europeans because it almost reverses the situation that
we had before 1991 where the United States was committed to defending
Europe and to that extent it was placing its homeland at risk
from an attack from the USSR. Now in some ways we are in a situation
where arguably Europe is going to be at risk from the areas in
which the US wishes to operate in the next 10 or 20 years because
it is providing staging areas. For example, if missile defence
were to develop a number of the key facilities for missile defence
of the United States are going to be in Europe, and that missile
defence is not necessarily going to defend Europe itself, so you
are going to move into a rather different relationship. Quite
how that relationship is going to play out, especially given that
a number of the European states in the EU were not in NATO and
have not been in NATO and have taken a very different view of
the United States to the view we take of the United States, I
think is just very unclear.
Professor Gregory: I think again
it is helpful to look at this from the French point of view. We
are probably at the moment as close with the French in terms of
nuclear co-operation as we have ever been. We set up this Joint
Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine under the Major Government,
you will remember, in 1992-93 where we started to talk quite seriously
in the post-Cold War context with the French about a whole raft
of nuclear questions, largely staying away from the operational
but co-ordinating arms control policy, talking about all sorts
of things, co-ordination of nuclear policy in all sorts of fields.
The French have this idea that Europe in the end will become a
centre of power of some kind and if it is going to be a power,
for the French, it needs to be a nuclear power, and that means
in the end the co-ordination of Britain's and France's nuclear
weapons. The question concerns these European states within Europe
who are neutral or anti-nuclear and do not buy into this kind
of thing. The French have a wonderful way round this. They have
this idea of dissuasion par consteil. It means "by
the fact they possess nuclear weapons", and the logic is
this: any state that thinks about taking on the Europeans has
to factor in somewhere deep in its recesses the fact that two
of the European members are nuclear powers, therefore it does
not matter whether these other European states accept this, want
this, feel protected by France's extended deterrence or whatever,
none of that matters; what matters is this fact. And the French
will say that what that means is that sooner or later the other
Europeans are going to have to talk to them about the European
question and the best way I have heard it encapsulated is if European
defence goes forward over the next 20 or 30 years so that we do
eventually have some kind of European army, in whatever form it
is going to be, that army will need a nuclear dimension. We cannot
therefore sit and reach that end point and not have done any thinking
about nuclear forces, so this co-ordination is going on. It is
highly secretive. I have done research in Paris and here in London
and found it almost impossible—no-one will talk about the
Joint Nuclear Commission. The best way I heard it encapsulated
is it is like a mole. It is going on underground quietly and then
20 or 30 years down the road, when need be, it will pop up. That
is a nice little way of conceptualising it.
Q123 Robert Key: Can I be absolutely
sure that I understand where France's deterrent rests. It is three
components, is it not?
Professor Gregory: Two.
Q124 Robert Key: Four SSBN, three
squadrons of Mirage-2000 equipped with air-launched missiles—
Professor Gregory: Yes.
Q125 Robert Key: Does it not also
have a flotilla of Super-Etendard on the aircraft carrier?
Professor Gregory: Yes it does
but they all deploy one weapon, they all deploy the ASMP.
Q126 Robert Key: I want to come back
to something you said earlier, but just for one moment is it conceivable
that if the French buy into the British aircraft carrier programme
and we find ourselves without our Joint Strike Fighter project,
the Rafale will fly off both British and French carriers deploying
French nuclear weapons?
Professor Gregory: It is an interesting
thought.
Q127 Robert Key: It is interesting
but could you comment on it, please?
Professor Gregory: In a sense
this debate that we are having is being conducted with one of
the big pieces of the jigsaw missing. We are thinking about either
continuing our relationship with the United States or we are thinking
about, as I would prefer, giving it up. The big hole here is the
possibility of moving with the French down the path of a European
deterrent and uncoupling ourselves from the United States, in
which case these things you are talking about, like flying French
missiles from British aircraft carriers, suddenly become less
fanciful, let us put it that way. Yes, the French have a degree
of technical collaboration and co-operation with the United States
but have largely independent nuclear forces in all three realms
of their submarines, their missiles (which Britain left decades
ago) and their warheads. In essence—and I would not make
this case—you could make a case for Britain moving towards
the French as a way of actually empowering themselves paradoxically
because they would be given by the French and would necessarily
have as part of Europe a much bigger say in the development of
the co-ordination of nuclear forces in Europe, allowing us to
come technically on board in areas like computing and all these
other things that we are working on, in a way that we will never
have that kind of equality with the United States because they
are simply too large, too powerful, and too dominant.
Q128 Robert Key: We have been told
in the Committee that the French nuclear deterrent costs maybe
three or four times as much as the British one because they do
the whole thing from building the ships to the weapons themselves,
whereas we of course procure and do not build our own system entirely.
Why is it that there is such a difference in public opinion in
France where they are prepared to see 20% of their defence budget
taken up on a nuclear deterrent? French public opinion is robustly
behind the nuclear deterrent whereas in this country we are timid,
we are doubting whether we should continue, we are talking about
not doing it. What is the difference between the French democracy
and the British democracy in this respect?
Professor Gregory: I think the
two nuclear programmes have very different histories. The underlying
thing for the French is that we need to remember that the French
developed and started to go down their nuclear path in the 1950s.
They had just passed through 70 years of history in which they
had been invaded three times, in 1817,[9]
1914 and 1940. For them, and it is still the case with Mr Chirac's
statement in January 2006, the number one reason for the retention
of nuclear weapons for the French is to guarantee the survival
of the state. I think there is a direct connection between that
and the national humiliation of occupation. That is why.
Q129 Chairman: Do you think they are
wrong?
Professor Gregory: In the modern
context, yes, I do. They are wrong because hopefully what I have
been saying all morning has been consistent with the basic parameters
of my thinking that nuclear weapons are not relevant to the main
security threats we face now and most likely in the future.
Q130 Robert Key: I certainly can
understand this idea that the French have a very different concept
of something they call "the state" to which they are
implacably wedded and emotionally involved at every level which
we simply do not have in this country, we have a rather more practical
approach. We touched on this question of Anglo-French nuclear
co-operation which is apparently so secretive. I wonder if any
of our other witnesses would like to comment on this secrecy.
Professor Simpson: Can I just
make a comment of a more general nature. I think there is a difference
between British and French defence planning in that the British
defence planning is much more systemic, much more management technique-led,
in that if you look at the 2004 Defence White Paper it is laid
out there at the back just what are the contexts in which British
forces will be engaged, what are the forces that are going to
be needed for those contexts, and in a sense what it is that we
are incapable of doing beyond those contexts by default, whereas
the French have not arrived at that very almost clinical way of
deciding what their forces are going to look like. Of course,
in the UK case, the one element of the forces which really does
not fit into this framework at all is the nuclear force. I think
that is another reason why you have a rather different relationship.
In terms of discussions with the French, clearly one element that
makes life difficult is the commitments the United Kingdom has
dating from 1958 that effectively they cannot talk to the French
about nuclear weapon issues unless the United States agrees to
it on specifics because that is part of the nature of that agreement.
Professor Gray: I think the French
nuclear weapon programme is not only about survival in the context
of the three invasions. It is also about the French sense of glory,
of status and French self-regard, which also of course one can
relate to French history over the last 150 years of course. I
would like to throw a rock in the pool here by saying that I can
imagine without too much of a stretch a continuing, shall we say,
drift apart of the Atlantic between Europe and the United States.
I believe that if Europe does indeed become a genuine defence
entity, then that is incompatible with NATO, and in some ways
the stronger Europe becomes, if one can imagine that, the less
likely it is that NATO will survive. NATO has been an American
guarantee organisation essentially. If Europe, almost unimaginably
from today, were to become a genuine potential partner in a defence
and foreign policy sense, NATO as we know and love it could not
exist. In fact, I think the relationship across the Atlantic is
very dubious for its future anyway given the differences of outlook
between the United States and Britain on one side and Europe by
and large on the other. It came to a head, as we know, in 2002-03
over Iraq and I think we should not take for granted the fact
that Britain can happily co-operate in the "European project"
whatever that becomes and all the while remain happily part of
the great family of American defence. I see a need for a choice.
Personally I have no difficulty if I have to choose between being
in bed with Washington or being in bed with Paris. I know what
I would choose, and it would not be Paris!
Q131 Robert Key: Come off the fence,
Professor!
Professor Gray: This is a serious
point. As Europe comes together, if it does, and acquires, shall
we say, a unified place in international politics, I think the
existing structure and the existing relationship to the United
States would alter and become much more distant. I think NATO
would be very, very fortunate indeed to survive, bearing in mind
that NATO is the only organisation that actively involves the
United States in European security and the fact of course that
the European project is sharing a continent with a heavy nuclear
armed and nuclear focused irredentist Russia, and there may yet
be lively times in Europe that do not appear in very much of today's
commentaries.
Q132 Robert Key: I believe it would
be a mistake to look at this issue entirely from the Atlantic
end of Europe. This might be one for Mr Broucher. I am very conscious
of the role of Turkey in the future of NATO and the future of
European defence. I wonder if you have any knowledge on the perspective
of how Turkey views this issue given the determination of the
French and Germans that Turkey will never be part of the European
Union and at the same time Turkey's determination that they will,
and the fact that the Turks are determined to be good NATO partners?
Do the Turks say anything about their role in the nuclear world?
Do they have nuclear ambitions? Where would they see their preference?
Would they prefer to see a French-dominated nuclear scene in Europe
or an American and British one? Mr Broucher first, please.
Mr Broucher: I am not an expert
on Turkey but I think it is true to say that the further east
you go, the closer you get to the areas of instability around
the former Soviet Union, around Russia, and the more you find
that countries in that region look to the United States as the
ultimate guarantor of their security. It would be my expectation
that they value the US connection and ultimately the US nuclear
umbrella and that you would not find them being particularly enthusiastic
about developing an alternative strategy.
Q133 Mr Holloway: Can I just rewind
about 10 minutes. Professor Gray and Professor Gregory have been
quite straightforward and clear about where they are coming from
on this. Do either of the other of you favour Britain having an
independent nuclear deterrent in the future?
Mr Broucher: I have never been
in favour of unilateral disarmament. I do not think we should
go out of the nuclear business unilaterally if we determine that
our national security requires us to retain a weapon. I think
there are questions now about whether that requirement still exists.
I have always been in favour of multilateral nuclear disarmament
and I think we have ceased to pursue that with the vigour that
we used to give it and that we ought to revive that area. It may
not work, but I think it is something that has not been explored
properly for a number of years and could be explored. I think
the moves that we made to reduce our capability, in contrast to
the opinions of my colleagues, did help to strengthen the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and I believe that there have been negotiations in good
faith in the past: on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, on banning
nuclear weapon from outer space, on banning nuclear weapons from
Antarctica, and agreements among the nuclear powers to respect
the non-nuclear status of South America, Africa and South East
Asia. So there have been negotiations in good faith, and there
have been successful negotiations to outlaw biological and chemical
weapons, so I do not think we should give up on arms control.
If the decisions that we are going to take allow the timetable
for us to approach this in slightly slower time then there would
be a case for Britain taking a diplomatic lead in trying to restart
multi-lateral negotiations.
Q134 Chairman: Before we move on
to you, Mr Broucher, can I go into that a little bit more. I am
going to go into contingencies here so you might not want to answer.
If there were nothing on the table from somebody else that would
make it worthwhile giving up our nuclear weapons, would you wish
to see the nuclear strategic deterrent modernised in order to
retain its usefulness?
Mr Broucher: I think the simple
answer to that is yes. If we cannot make progress with disarmament
and there are going to be at least one, possibly two, nuclear
armed countries that might be hostile to the United Kingdom, then
you could make a strong case for us retaining the deterrent.
Q135 Chairman: Thank you, that is
very helpful.
Professor Simpson: First of all,
I think the issue of independence is a bit of a red herring in
all this. It seems to me that if you have independence of use
then the issue of where you acquire it from is not awfully significant.
As long as you can acquire it the system will function, if it
is to be used. In terms of the question you directly asked about
the future, it seems to me that the issue is what sort of nuclear
weapon capability are the British going to have in future, because
just saying that you are going to abandon Trident does not mean
that you do not have a capability. The real question is what sort
of capability. To that extent it seems to me that the real issue
here is how much of our military resources, how much of our national
resources are we going to commit in the nuclear area as against
in other areas? I am struck by this 49-page document which the
Americans have produced because I think you would find it difficult
to get what is said here about nuclear weapons and nuclear capabilities
into two pages of it and it seems to me that the real judgemental
issue that we face is what salience do we think nuclear weapons
are going to have in the world of the future and in terms of our
defence capabilities.
Q136 Mr Holloway: Sure.
Professor Simpson: All the evidence
points to that evidence being very limited indeed.
Q137 Mr Holloway: So what is your
opinion then?
Professor Simpson: I am inclined
to go down the same road as David Broucher in that it seems to
me the key question is what can you actually get from this decision-making
process by way of reducing the capabilities of others, and therefore
if it takes more time, if it is useful to extend the current capabilities
to try to move multilateral negotiations on, let us do that.
Chairman: Then we will move on to the
final area which we have covered to a certain extent already and
that is the relationship with civil nuclear issues. Linda Gilroy?
Q138 Linda Gilroy: How relevant is
the public debate over the future of the civil nuclear power to
decision-making on the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent, in
the sense that there are issues perhaps connected with the stockpiling,
reprocessing and storage of weapons-related nuclear material and
waste that would be affected by a decision to abandon civilian
nuclear power? I am not sure who might be most—
Professor Simpson: Sorry, I am
a bit lost, you mean a decision to abandon civil nuclear power?
Q139 Linda Gilroy: We have an on-going
energy review at the moment in which there is a big debate about
the future role or non-role of nuclear energy. If we were to continue
going down the path of gradually letting go of our nuclear energy
what would be the implications in relation to any decision about
the nuclear deterrent? Does that pre-empt the decision about the
nuclear deterrent or have additional costs for the nuclear deterrent?
Professor Simpson: I do not think
the two are connected in any obvious way. The military sector
is completely insulated from the civil sector now. I do not see
any obvious need to acquire additional fissile material for any
decision, at least I do not at the moment see any need to acquire
additional fissile material for military purposes. In fact, we
have already transferred some plutonium from the military to the
civil sector. There is an issue over nuclear submarine fuel which
is a slightly complex area.
9 Note by Witness: The first invasion was in
1870, not 1817. Back
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