Examination of Witnesses (Questions 180-188)
MR PETER
WHITEHOUSE AND
COMMODORE (RTD)
TIM HARE
28 MARCH 2006
Q180 Chairman: If that was what it
wanted when would an initial gate investment decision be needed?
Mr Whitehouse: Given the affordability,
engineering obsolescence and related dimensions, I would not markedly
change my view that work would need to start on that immediately
once it had been selected as the option. One does not know when
one can downselect and say that is what one will do, but it would
probably be within 18 months to two years in order to be sure
that one has the first submarine available when needed and, looking
at it from the industrial dimension, to try to create continuity
in the build programme at Barrow.
Chairman: Let us now move on to the warheads.
Q181 Mr Havard: From what you have
just been saying, it seems to me that there are almost two timelines
running side by side. One is to do with platforms and one is to
do with the actual warhead. Can you say what decisions need to
be made and when about the actual warheads?
Commodore Hare: I have to say
from the outset that I am not a warhead expert. Questions on warhead
probably need to be addressed to AWE scientists. I will just give
my view. A warhead is like any other piece of technology; it consists
of a number of piece parts, some of which in time become obsolescent.
Rather like one's car, one carries on replacing the piece parts
until one day one either goes to a dealer or wakes up one morning
and decides it is time for a new model. One moves from one's Ford
Escort to a Ford Focus, to use that analogy. The UK warhead goes
through a continuous process of safety and reliability assessment
and pierce parts that become obsolescent are replaced, continuing
the process in accordance with AWE Aldermaston's remit. I suspect
that some time in the mid to late 2020s it will be time, if we
still have a Trident system, for a replacement warhead to be procured.
Q182 Mr Havard: In terms of decision-making
you seem to be suggesting that if there is to be the replacement
that you describe, as far as the platforms or boats are concerned
the decisions at the conceptual stage need to be made next year?
Commodore Hare: I think that some
study work needs to be started about the nature of the platform.
Q183 Mr Havard: When do decisions
need to be made about the weaponry?
Commodore Hare: The warhead is
related more to the Trident system. If we assume that we will
still have a submarine-based system the warhead decision can be
taken independently of the submarine. The warhead relates just
to the missile. My personal view—it is just that because
I do not know the answer to the question—is that one would
not need to have a replacement warhead until well into the mid
to late 2020s. One has, therefore, a little time on one's side
before one has to make any decisions or have a peak in expenditure
at Aldermaston.
Q184 Mr Havard: One set of decisions
has already been made about Aldermaston. What do you see as the
rationale for that?
Commodore Hare: In my limited
dealings with Aldermaston I have always been hugely impressed
by its dedication, skills and experience. I have always been hugely
confident that it is able to fulfil its dual remit which is to
maintain the stewardship of the current stockpile for safety and
reliability and to be in a position to design and procure a new
warhead should the government of the day decide that it wants
one. When I was in post with Aldermaston there were two problems.
First, its infrastructure was becoming very dated, by which I
mean that a lot of its buildings were crumbling. Secondly, the
workforce was following my age line, if you like; it was getting
to the end of its professional careers. One needed to inject some
young blood into AWE to perpetuate the skills base. My understanding
is that the recent expenditure by government is focused on those
two areas to ensure that the infrastructure is able to support
the twin remit of Aldermaston and that the demography of the workforce
remains sensible and there is an injection of new blood to replace
retiring people.
Q185 Mr Havard: The Government says
that the expenditure is to retain core skills, the safety of the
current stockpile and its effectiveness and the replacement of
facilities. As I understand it, the Trident missile system is
a combination of things. The D5 is to be upgraded by the Americans
to the D5(A), or whatever it is. It has on it a W76 warhead, or
something similar. There is also work being carried out on the
re-entry vehicle. We are putting £350 million a year into
Aldermaston between now and 2008 and 1,000 scientists are to be
recruited. There is the Orion project which is a new laser that
can simulate nuclear explosions, because we cannot test in the
way that we did in the past. That is one-third owned by Lockheed
Martin which is the company which produces the missiles. Are we
really retaining a capability to develop our own nuclear deterrent?
Is that what it is really all about?
Commodore Hare: I believe that
we are. I can only speculate because it is a long time since I
have been engaged with AWE. My information is the same as yours.
I must correct one point. AWE Aldermaston is government-owned
but contractor-operated. In the jargon it is called a GOCO (Government-owned
contractor operated) facility. You said that it was owned by Lockheed
Martin.
Q186 Mr Havard: As I understand it,
there is a contractual agreement and one-third of it is owned
by Lockheed Martin.
Commodore Hare: My understanding
is that the operation of Aldermaston is through a consortium of
Serco, British Nuclear Fuels and Lockheed Martin. You are quite
right that Lockheed Martin is American-owned.
Chairman: Let us move on to the defence
industrial strategy.
Q187 Linda Gilroy: Affordability
is a key issue. Mr Whitehouse, can you tell us what are the prospects
for the formation of Subco in addressing the issue of affordability
and the extent to which it is likely to be able to do that if
it comes about? What is your view on how we continue to obtain
value for money beyond 2016 in relation to the shipbuilding and
submarine requirements of the Government?
Mr Whitehouse: I think that the
cost issues associated with the submarine capability in the UK
are quite fundamental at this point, with a planned force level
moving down towards eight SSNs and four SSBNs and the requirement
to consider the procurement of further attack submarines as well
as the need to cope with the decision on the future SSBN. There
is a clear and absolute need to achieve consolidation and rationalisation
because the nuclear facilities bring with them a lot of skills
and very specialised and expensive infrastructure. The majority
of those costs are fixed. Therefore, to take the whole enterprise
forward and to keep it affordable, it is of paramount importance
to have cross-site consolidation and rationalisation. I focus
on Faslane, Devonport and Barrow. As far back as 1994 when I was
working on the initial tender document by Devonport to the Government
after the decision to privatise we went a long way towards bringing
the then VSEL, the owners and operators of Barrow, into the DML
consortium to try to start that. That was 12 years ago. The need
even then was quite obvious. Where we sit today it is very important.
The prospects for it are under debate at the moment. They have
been influenced by some of the press coverage of possible developments
last week, which I do not want to go into, but one way or another
cross-site consolidation is fundamental. It must happen in order
to save significant costs if a future SSBN is required and it
is to be affordable.
Q188 Linda Gilroy: On the skills
and knowledge base, if the decisions that we have talked about
this morning were delayed what would be the implications? If there
was a decision not to replace Trident and somebody wanted to take
a future decision to do so what would happen to the skills base
in the interim, and with what implications?
Mr Whitehouse: That is a very
interesting point. A decision not to do things within the required
timescale implies an intent at some time in the future not to
have a deterrent. That is a fundamental message to send 15 years
away from not having a deterrent through inaction. That is a very
important political and philosophical point. First, in terms of
the practicalities, in the event that work does not start within
the required timescale—there are slightly differing views
on that—an obvious point is that to keep the current deterrent
going as long as possible perhaps more rather than less work would
have to be done in the second refits. Secondly, near certain workload
gaps would appear in the design and build capability associated
with Barrow, unless it was possible to slow up the build rate
for the Astute-class submarines and produce them over a longer
period of time. But then it would be quite likely that the SSN
force level would begin to drop because one would not have submarines
coming into service quickly enough to replace the Trafalgars as
they go out of service. It is almost like a matrix of influences
and results, but there is no doubt that the key result would be
a major affordability issue within the industrial base. Capability
would be retained but would have nothing to do or one would have
to let that go. It is a bit like weapons capability; once it is
allowed to go it would be very difficult if not impossible to
recreate it.
Chairman: We are going to finish the
first part of the session here. On behalf of the Committee I would
like to thank both of you for coming along and giving clear evidence
and answering our questions so concisely.
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