Examination of Witnesses (Questions 189-199)
DR ANDREW
DORMAN, DR
DOMINICK JENKINS,
MR MALCOLM
SAVIDGE AND
DR BRUNO
TERTRAIS
28 MARCH 2006
Q189 Chairman: I welcome all of the witnesses
to our discussion. We have a lot of ground to cover in the next
hour. You do not have to answer all of the questions just because
you are all there. I ask the Committee to keep questions short
and the witnesses to keep their answers short. Without cutting
out the meat, try to keep them as tight as possible. Dr Dorman,
I begin by asking you what you see as the nature of the threats
that we face, first from the existing established nuclear powers,
particularly Russia and China?
Dr Dorman: If I may go back slightly,
we adopted a nuclear deterrent basically for two reasons: one
was threat-based and the other was our status as a world power.
In terms of the threat-based reason, there are existing nuclear
powers including Russia, as you have articulated. Originally,
the goal of Trident replacement was to deter what was then the
Soviet Union, adopting the then Moscow criteria to destroy sufficient
Soviet cities to deter them from attacking the West. That threat
has now receded quite significantly. In the short to medium term
most analysts do not see a significant threat in that respect.
The question is the longer term: can we see a resurgent Soviet
Union in some form—Russia, China or some other big power
in that area? In terms of minor threats, we talk about rogue states,
to use American parlance. Would smaller powers potentially threaten
to use nuclear weapons against the UK? Both those threat bases
require potentially different types of nuclear response. If one
is talking of a minor rogue state, using American parlance, one
does not need assured second strike capability with the ability
to hit a wide range of targets at any time of the day. They are
likely to aim at only urban conurbations such as cities; they
are unlikely to try to destroy our existing capability. The ability
to destroy the British nuclear system as it exists now rests only
with the likes of Russia. The question arises: do we need to retain
that capability?
Q190 Chairman: I would like to move
on to what you may have described as minor threats, perhaps emerging
threats such as Iran or North Korea. Dr Jenkins, would you like
to comment on the threats we face from Iran and North Korea?
Dr Jenkins: Dealing specifically
with Iran and North Korea, it is important to put this in context.
American intelligence agencies say that any potential nuclear
threat from Iran will emerge only in a timeframe of 10 years.
The way Greenpeace views this, therefore, is that we have a window
of opportunity to improve the situation by acting in a certain
way, by which I mean not continuing to threaten Iran, for example.
Q191 Chairman: I am sure you are
right about that, but we will get to issues such as what we should
do. What I am trying to establish at the beginning is what the
threats are. What do you in Greenpeace see as the threats?
Dr Jenkins: Our view is that the
major threat is definitely the large existing nuclear powers which
are in a state of forbearance and peace. This is very much the
larger problem and, therefore, our action should be concerned
primarily with preventing a return to a cold war-type situation.
Q192 Chairman: Mr Savidge, welcome
back. What do you see as the threats from Russia, China, North
Korea, India, Pakistan or wherever?
Mr Savidge: Basically, the assessment
that the MoD has made in its most recent White Papers is that
at present we do not face any major threat. Obviously, one can
look at the question whether or not Russia at some point in future
may become hostile. We make a reference in our written submission[4]
to a suggestion made by Liam Fox in a publication that we shall
be bringing out this week, which I hope we can submit to you.[5]
It is a symposium of different views on this issue which I hope
would be of great interest to the Select Committee. Liam Fox asks
whether there could be a hostile power that conquered the whole
of the rest of Europe without provoking a nuclear war and then
was deterred by a British deterrent when it would not be deterred
by a US nuclear deterrent. I suspect that that scenario was drawn
up originally during the Cold War and has not moved on very much
since. If one looks at it, one must take account not only of the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact but the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and the expansion of NATO and the European Union. One has
a situation where there is a power imbalance. If one first takes
the proposal that Russia becomes hostile one then has an incredible
power imbalance between Russia as it is now and NATO as it is
now. I just cannot see that as a likely scenario. Why would Britain
on its own be likely to get into conflict with, say, China? It
is also important to say that very often in the popular media
there is a tendency to say that for some reason Iran or North
Korea would be an immense threat to us if it got nuclear weapons.
I cannot envisage the probability of this country, which does
not now have an empire, getting involved out of region without
being involved also either with the United Nations or NATO or
at least with the United States.
Chairman: Once again, you are moving
on to the response that we might make. I am trying to work out
the threat.
Q193 Mr Holloway: We are told that
China has a small and very out-dated nuclear arsenal. In what
sort of condition are the Chinese to accelerate and update their
arsenal?
Dr Dorman: The Chinese nuclear
deterrent forces are quite small compared with the other P5 members,
to use that language. They could put more money into their capability
and develop a more significant nuclear capability. That would
take them some time. From the point of view of the UK, it is probably
one of the countries least likely to be threatened by China given
our geographical position vis-a"-vis that country
and given that other countries, particularly the United States,
would be more of a threat presumably to China than ourselves.
Mr Savidge: My understanding is
that China has some plans to expand its forces primarily as a
response to its concern about missile defence, but again this
is very much an issue of the United States in relation to China.
I do not see that it has a particular effect on any potential
threat to the United Kingdom.
Q194 Chairman: I am asking for trouble
because I will expand the question slightly to the issue of the
threat of international terrorism. Clearly, we face a threat from
international terrorism. Dr Tertrais, is the issue of a nuclear
deterrent at all relevant to the threat of international terrorism?
Dr Tertrais: I believe that it
is only of partial relevance. Most of the defence and fight against
international terrorism has nothing to do with western nuclear
deterrence, British, French, American or otherwise. This would
be relevant only in the very extreme scenario where a state deliberately
sponsored a terrorist group and asked it to act on its behalf.
If one of our governments had incontrovertible evidence that a
terrorist act was being sponsored by another state's government
and that it would be of such magnitude that it could enter the
realm of our vital interests in such a case there would be a role
for nuclear deterrence. That was what the French President tried
to put forward in a speech on 19 January. That is an extreme scenario
and my understanding is that it is understood as such by the French
Government. Nevertheless, it is not excluded. If I may say a word
about China, I disagree that because of its distance it is of
no direct relevance to our nuclear deterrent. I believe that there
are scenarios in which our nuclear deterrent, British or French,
can be helpful in countering a possible blackmail by China. For
example, I believe that in a case where the Europeans are allied
with the Americans in a crisis in the Far East if the Chinese
wanted to deter us from supporting our allies and intervening
in the region there would be a role for our nuclear deterrence,
British or French. I do not accept the idea that there is no scenario
in which China is a relevant consideration.
Mr Savidge: If I may respond on
the issue of terrorism, Dr Tertrais has made a valiant attempt
to make Jacques Chirac's recent speech sound sensible, but in
the majority of cases where there has been any clear identification
between a state and terrorist organisations it is usual that such
organisations have a political objective. They are not likely
to be the sort of organisations which would be interested in obtaining
nuclear weapons. I would have thought that it would be the fanatical,
absolutist organisations like Aum Shinrikyo or al-Qaeda which
would have the objective of nuclear terrorism. It is, surely,
very unlikely that they would be sufficiently closely identified
with a particular state that it would be meaningful to try to
use nuclear deterrence. Even with the identification that one
had with, say, al-Qaeda and the state of Afghanistan, there was
never a thought of nuking Kabul or something like that. I find
that an improbable scenario. As to China, surely in any discussions
of this sort we would be part of NATO. There has been a suggestion
that China could blackmail us. One cannot rule out anything, but
to me that is a low probability.
Chairman: We move on to nuclear proliferation.
Q195 Mr Borrow: If the UK Government
has to make a decision essentially in the next couple of years
either to replace or end its nuclear deterrent in 15 or 20 years,
what effect will it have on the proliferation of nuclear weapons
in the rest of the world? Perhaps we can start with Dr Jenkins.
Dr Jenkins: We take serious note
of what has been said by the UN Secretary-General that there is
a possibility of a cascade of nuclear proliferation. That point
was also emphasised by a high-level panel at the UN. That has
been underscored, somewhat less strongly, by Jack Straw in statements
by him. There is a real problem but I think that it is a lesser
problem than a return to the nuclear arms race. We believe that
in a situation where all the major powers are not in a state of
enmity we should see it as an opportunity to strengthen the NPT
and so forth. This would be the worst possible time to go ahead
with a new nuclear programme. It would send the wrong signal.
Q196 Mr Borrow: I gained the impression
that Dr Tertrais wanted to respond to that.
Dr Tertrais: I would be willing
to. I do not think there is any evidence that unilateral disarmament
by the UK, or France for that matter, would have any positive
impact whatsoever on the dynamics of nuclear proliferation. I
remind the Committee that during the so-called decade of nuclear
disarmament, 1987 to 1996, tremendous efforts were made in arms
control, disarmament and non-proliferation. During the same time
the nuclear programmes of India, Pakistan and Israel, and Iran,
Libya, North Korea and Iraq for that matter, continued unabated,
at least until 1991 regarding Iraq. Although the argument has
some appeal on paper, the dynamics of nuclear proliferation are
not connected, or only very, very slightly, to what we do as established
nuclear powers with our own nuclear programmes. Perhaps the conventional
balance matters. For instance, there is a lot of evidence that
the nuclear programmes of proliferating countries seek to counter
our western conventional superiority. I argue that that probably
matters more than what we do with our nuclear programme. I have
never seen any convincing evidence to the effect that drastic
measures of unilateral nuclear disarmament, especially by small
nuclear powers like France and the UK, would have any meaningful
impact on the dynamics of nuclear proliferation.
Q197 Mr Borrow: Mr Savidge, if the
UK made the decision not to renew its strategic nuclear capability
in 15 or 20 years what impact would it have on the ability of
the UK to assume a leadership role in international arms control
negotiations?
Mr Savidge: If I may say so, that
puts the question extremely well. I agree with Dr Tertrais that
there is a tendency on both sides of the argument to take too
parochial a view and vastly overestimate the significance of the
British nuclear deterrent within the whole scheme. I think that
that applies to both sides of the argument. Dr Tertrais said that
if Britain simply said that it would give it up it would not necessarily
have an immediate effect. We ought to be looking at the whole
question of whether this is an issue on which we should try to
take a lead in a different sense. We have taken a lead in relation
to things like climate change, global poverty and a whole range
of other issues. By working together with other countries perhaps
we can discuss this issue and see if we can push it forward, even
against a very adverse international climate. We have had a degree
of success with the other issues. I think it very important to
try between now and at least the next nuclear non-proliferation
treaty revision conference to get the world community to look
at this issue. We all know that if nuclear proliferation goes
on and we continue to have wars at some point we are bound to
have a disaster.
Q198 Chairman: It is in the nature
of this debate that you are bound to disagree with one another
from time to time. You will not need to express your disagreement
in every case, particularly to come back on points. The discussion
is extremely valuable, but disagreement will be a fact of life
in this debate. We have had it before, and it is extremely helpful
to us. Dr Dorman, I move to a point that you raised; namely, that
possession of a strategic nuclear deterrent is partly threat-based
and partly status-based. Do you believe that it gives us status
and, therefore, we regard it as valuable to have nuclear weapons?
Dr Dorman: I think that when we
originally decided to acquire nuclear weapons one of the reasons
was status, and it was seen at the time—there is documentation
on it—that cutting-edge technology was a symbol of our being
then a world power, not a superpower, as we defined it; that is,
a power with interests beyond our region. It is now old technology;
it is not really a symbol of advanced technology. Most nuclear
weaponry is relatively old technology. The question is whether
it gives us any diplomatic leverage. One has a two-sided argument:
first, whether if we got rid of these weapons it might give us
a little more diplomatic leverage in some respects to nudge debates
in other ways. The other side of the argument is that it still
gives us a bit of diplomatic leverage. I think that the people
best qualified to answer that would be the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office in terms of how much they think it gives them the leverage
that they need. One area of discussion is: can we imagine getting
rid of nuclear weapons and leaving one other power in Europe with
them? We have seen a number of statements in that respect.
Q199 Chairman: And the answer?
Dr Dorman: I think that we could.
One of the matters that we have to think about in the field of
defence is that this is all about balancing risk. If we make a
decision to acquire a new generation of nuclear weapons it comes
at a financial cost probably in terms of other defence capabilities.
One of the big questions to be decided is: what level of capability
do you want to give up to retain the nuclear capability, because
it is unlikely that you will get more defence money?
4 Note: See Ev 42 Back
5
The Future of Britain's Nuclear Weapons, Oxford Research
Group, March 2006. Back
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