Examination of Witnesses (Questions 200-219)
DR ANDREW
DORMAN, DR
DOMINICK JENKINS,
MR MALCOLM
SAVIDGE AND
DR BRUNO
TERTRAIS
28 MARCH 2006
Q200 Chairman: Dr Jenkins, as to
status does it give us a seat at the top table?
Dr Jenkins: My short answer is
that at this stage in terms of the Security Council we have that
seat anyway and we would not lose it by not having nuclear weapons.
Q201 Chairman: Dr Tertrais, if the
French were to give up their strategic nuclear deterrent would
it be an enormous blow to French pride?
Dr Tertrais: I am tempted to comment
on some of the undertones of your question but I will not. Certainly,
it would be a blow to the French conception of independence. I
argue that if the French did develop their own independent nuclear
deterrent force partly for reasons of status, influence and prestige,
as I believe was also the case with the UK, in today's world that
dimension is of much less importance than during the cold war.
If the French took the step that you mention I believe that it
would definitely mean a clean break with the traditional French
concept of independence. The French nuclear programme was, and
still is, intimately linked with its concept of independence and,
I add, its independence vis-a"-vis the United States,
because that is what it is all about. Michael Codner[6],
whom I believe you heard, said that there were two concepts of
independence: the British one and the French one. These are two
concepts of nuclear independence. The British and French do not
have the same concept of nuclear independence, although in both
cases the intimate link between nuclear status and the relationship
with the United States is very important.
Q202 Chairman: We will come back to the
French stance towards the end. Mr Savidge, would you like to add
anything to the issue of top table status?
Mr Savidge: Our membership of
the Permanent Five is based on our position in World War II. It
is really coincidental that those became the nuclear powers. If
we look at it now, when talking about expanding the Permanent
Five there is no particular suggestion that because India has
nuclear weapons it would be favoured before, say, Japan or Germany.
Looking at our status within G8 and the EU, there is no particular
indication that the nuclear powers are favoured as against the
non-nuclear powers. In general, most of the major disarmament
talks were either bilaterals between the United States and the
then Soviet Union, now Russia, and the multilateral ones have
tended to involve nuclear and non-nuclear powers. I do not think
that there is now a great status argument.
Chairman: Let us move to the issue of
the independence of the UK's strategic deterrent.
Q203 Mr Holloway: Dr Jenkins, in
your written submission to the Committee[7]
you cast doubts on the independence of our weapons. In what ways
do you consider them not to be independent of the US?
Dr Jenkins: Often the debate continues
to be framed in terms of deterrence, whereas the Soviet Union
is no longer there and in a sense the purpose of nuclear weapons
is being reinvented both here and in the United States and perhaps
elsewhere. I think that it is in that context that we should consider
the question of independence. First, Trident is very much a trans-national
enterprise. I have given some of the technical details of that.
The way I put it is that, first, we now have the doctrine most
strongly articulated in Washington of the pre-emption of conventional
war fighting with usable nuclear weapons. There is an interrelationship.
In technical terms, because Trident has been made trans-national
we may be inheriting parts of that doctrine so that, talking specifically
about rapid retargeting, it appears that we have already acquired
that new capability. What would be the purpose of having that
rapid retargeting capability? Clearly, we already have the capacity
to hit Moscow.
Q204 Mr Holloway: The question was
about our operational independence. What do you consider to be
the factors in relation to that question?
Dr Jenkins: In a previous session
the question was raised whether in the final analysis if we were
attacked with a nuclear strike we would be capable of responding
to, say, a Russian attack.
Q205 Mr Holloway: Independently of
the Americans?
Dr Jenkins: I think that is correct.
However, the real life scenario today is not that because we will
not be attacked by Russia. In that situation the only real circumstance
in which I can conceive we would ever use it would be to assist
an American attack, because for any other purpose Washington has
so many means to come back at us, ranging from the kind of economic
coercion that it exercised after Suez to much simpler things such
as degrading the technical capability of the system.
Q206 Mr Holloway: Dr Tertrais, if
we tried to have a system which was not reliant on American technology,
Kings Bay et cetera, what would be the factors involved in that,
and what would be the cost of developing our own system?
Dr Tertrais: I believe that it
would be more costly for the United Kingdom to pursue other options,
such as building its own system or even buying a French system.
That would certainly be more costly than an American option. Are
you asking me to give you some specific cost figures?
Q207 Mr Holloway: No. I just want
your general impression.
Dr Tertrais: My general impression
is that given what I know about the very close defence relationship
between the UK and the US any US option will always be cheaper
in strict cost terms than any other option.
Q208 Mr Holloway: We took evidence
from someone a couple of weeks ago. He suggested that talks were
taking place at the moment between the British and French on the
subject of their nuclear weapons and some sort of mid to long-term
co-operation between them. Have you any idea of those talks and
the nature of the matters being discussed?
Dr Tertrais: I certainly have
a good idea of the general nature of French/British nuclear co-operation.
In a previous capacity I participated in it. My understanding
is that today, as a few years ago, there are two kinds of co-operation:
political/strategic co-operation, with a close strategic dialogue
on nuclear issues, including nuclear deterrence, and also staff
talks, that is, a dialogue between your nuclear military staff
and ours. That has been going on for years. I am not aware of
their current agenda. I would be very surprised if at this point
in time there were in-depth discussions about the long-term future
of practical, technical co-operation between France and the UK.
I would be very surprised if in parallel with government thinking
here some options were being seriously discussed at this point
in time.
Chairman: Once again, we will come back
to that issue towards the end. I would like to move on to the
timetable for decisions to be made.
Q209 Mr Jenkins: If you do not have
an answer to my question please say so. I want to try to get some
evidence and facts on the table. There may be different opinions,
but within the public arena I want to give everyone a chance of
putting their view on the table rather than debate it during the
present session. Dr Dorman, it is said that we need to take a
decision in this Parliament with regard to the future of our system.
What exactly are the decisions that need to be taken, and why
do they need to be taken now?
Dr Dorman: I think that some decisions
need to be taken in this Parliament, for example whether we want
to replace the nuclear deterrent and what type of capability we
want. We need to make some significant decisions about where we
go in the long term. As alluded to in the session earlier this
morning, there is an industrial dimension. If you want to go for
the submarine-based replacement programme there is a potential
gap or window in terms of the production of submarines between
the Astute-class and the replacement of the Trident fleet, if
the Government says that the Trident fleet needs to be replaced.
We have seen problems with the Astute-class. We had a downturn
in submarine orders and there was a loss of skill sets which they
had to rebuild. If you want to delay your Trident replacement
or try to replace it with the same system you will have to continue
to build additional SSNs or nuclear-powered attack submarines
to keep the production line going, or you will have to acquire
the ballistic missile submarines earlier. If you decide to go
for a different system, whether it be land or air-based, you will
start to run down the potential nuclear build capability.
Q210 Mr Jenkins: You are doing the
one thing that I did not want you to do. I asked a specific question.
I can ask a lot of questions and give you the opportunity to pick
which answers to give, but I do not want to do that. That was
why I asked what decisions needed to be taken, and when.
Dr Dorman: I think that we need
to decide by the end of this Parliament whether we want to replace
the nuclear deterrent and what type of capability we want. That
will then allow one to start making decisions early in the next
Parliament in terms of acquiring those capabilities.
Q211 Mr Jenkins: I have asked you
twice now and I will leave it at that. Mr Savidge, do you have
any idea what decisions have to be made in this Parliament and
when?
Mr Savidge: One hears very diverse
advice on this matter. Today, we heard Mr Whitehouse make a clear
case for why the industry would find it optimum to have the longest
possible time and the earliest possible decision to keep the industrial
base and skills going. Obviously, that is one aspect of the case.
Having listened to various experts at conferences and read some
of the literature, it seems that a lot of others suggest that
the boats might be kept going longer and that in an emergency
rather than the optimum for the industry one might be able to
have a shorter lead time to produce a replacement, particularly
if it was to be a submarine.
Q212 Mr Jenkins: I was hoping for
a date, for example that by 2009 or 2010 we have to make a decision,
because if we do not there will be consequences. The consequences,
quite simply, will be that once we lose our skill base the decision
is made for us. Maybe I am asking the wrong people; maybe you
do not have the knowledge and experience to give me those dates?
Mr Savidge: Certainly, I would
be happy to talk to my co-authors who obviously would have more
expertise on matters such as nuclear reactors. I could provide
the Committee with a written submission later. I have to say that
the general view is that we do not have to make that decision
before the end of this decade. That was the view expressed by
Commodore Hare and a number of others. When Mr Whitehouse went
for an earlier date he was talking about when the decision about
concept had to be made. That could still mean that one would not
have to make the actual decision whether or not to go ahead until
after 2010.
Mr Jenkins: We have already made
a decision about Aldermaston. Because of the aging workforce we
need to put more people into the establishment to maintain the
capability. All these things play an important role. Chairman,
I do not think that the witnesses have the necessary back up and
experience to deal with the timetable.
Chairman: That is probably so.
Mr Jenkins: It will be a waste of our
time to continue. To shorten the timetable perhaps I can forgo
that section.
Chairman: Let us turn to what other possibilities
there might be in regard to the service life extension of Trident.
Q213 Linda Gilroy: Dr Dorman, the
United States is in the process of extending the service life
of its Trident submarines in order to keep them in service until
2042. What is the US doing to extend the life of its force, and
should the UK embark on a similar programme of service life extension
for the Vanguard-class?
Dr Dorman: I declare that I am
not a scientist and cannot give you the exact figures. I understand
that, for example, we have a different reactor system on our boats
from the American boats, which means, as alluded to in earlier
submissions, that if we want to extend the life of the boats we
can make that decision but we start to run into some risks about
how long those platforms will run. To go back to the Polaris system,
you may remember that in the early 1990s we extended the life
of those boats and started to run into difficulty in keeping them
at sea while the Trident system came on board. The danger of service
life extension is that that might happen again. You start to get
into the "what ifs". What happens if something goes
wrong with the system?
Q214 Linda Gilroy: In your paper
you say that the decision faced by the UK is what effect it wants
to achieve and at what price. You refer to Trident as the deluxe
system and say that it may not be necessary given the threats
that the UK faces after the Cold War. What are the alternative
procurement possibilities?
Dr Dorman: You have the full range.
You can have no nuclear capability whatever. You can have what
the Japanese have which is a virtual nuclear deterrent. They have
nuclear expertise and a nuclear industry. They could design a
warhead relatively quickly. They have their own space programme
and so could design a ballistic missile relatively quickly. Within
the space of a couple of years they could constitute a nuclear
capability if they so wished.
Q215 Linda Gilroy: I will come back
to that in a moment. I think that in your paper you also mention
cruise missiles with nuclear warheads?[8]
Dr Dorman: I was going to move
to that. Trident is deluxe in that it gives you, under the then
Moscow criteria, the ability to level a number of cities at any
moment of the day and assured second strike. This was a system
that could not be destroyed on the ground or, in this case, at
sea; it was impervious. If one wants to start taking further risks
to minimise costs one can go for an air-based system, whether
it be free-fall bombs, which you will remember we had up until
1998, or cruise missiles. The simplest way would be to take the
existing Storm Shadow which has come into service as a cruise
missile and put a nuclear warhead on it. One could have a land-based
system. If one did it very crudely, one could take the existing
Trident missiles and put them on land. That would probably be
the least popular solution. Generally, we have moved away from
that and gone towards either air or sea-based systems. But they
will give options that will keep one in the nuclear game at lower
cost.
Q216 Linda Gilroy: To return to the
idea of the virtual nuclear state, you have explained a little
what you mean as far as Japan is concerned. Is that really likely
to be taken seriously as a deterrent?
Dr Dorman: One suggestion that
some of the panel have made is that if we cannot see nuclear weapons
being used against terrorist organisations and potential proliferating
states, our main concern is a resurgent Russia or China-type scenario.
One has a lead time in which one thinks that that threat will
emerge and become significant, in which case the virtual nuclear
arsenal solution gives one the ability to redevelop and rebuild
the nuclear capability, if one so wishes, over that timeframe.
Q217 Linda Gilroy: Provided that
the states that you are talking about do not have their own?
Dr Dorman: It assumes that if
Russia suddenly becomes a big nuclear threat to the United Kingdom
it will be over a number of years; it will take them some years
to reconstitute its nuclear capability, but again it is about
what risks one wants to take.
Q218 Chairman: Dr Dorman, you heard
Commodore Hare and Mr Whitehouse earlier talking about the alternatives
to nuclear-based missiles. I got the impression they believed
that a cruise missile-based system would not necessarily be any
cheaper than a submarine-based system. Did you disagree with that
while they gave that evidence? If you did, on what would you base
your disagreement?
Dr Dorman: It can be cheaper depending
on how one runs it. If one wants to run a cruise missile system
based either in the air or on submarines that is always available
to be used it becomes very expensive. That is an ongoing commitment.
If one bases it on the same systems being used for alternative
operations where one can then use the nuclear programme it becomes
far cheaper because one is not keeping people constantly on alert.
If you remember, we had the WE 177 with free-fall bombs on Tornados.
Those Tornados in the post-Cold War period would generally make
conventional training sorties but could then be used in a nuclear
role. All one needed to do was keep Aldermaston going and keep
those bombs in service and maintained and keep the armaments people
on station. It is not that big an infrastructure. If one wants
to keep a permanent air alert it becomes far more significant.
Chairman: Dr Tertrais, we said that we
would return to the relationship with France.
Q219 Robert Key: Dr Tertrais, I start
with some technical questions about the French deterrent. Can
you tell us the nature of that deterrent, technically? One has
missiles and submarines. Can you please expand?
Dr Tertrais: The French have two
components, one of which is nearly identical to the British one:
a force of four submarines with long range ballistic missiles
with one on patrol at all times. I would, however, argue that
the current missile in terms of technical preferences is inferior
to the Trident II D5. There is an additional air-based component
which is some form of cruise missile. The vast majority of French
nuclear warheads are in the submarine force. Nevertheless, the
French consider that they are really two different legs and each
is necessary to ensure a credible deterrent.
6 Note by Witness: It was in fact, Mr Michael
Quinlan, not Mr Michael Codner. Back
7
Note: See Ev 34 Back
8
Note: See Ev 39 Back
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