Examination of Witnesses (Questions 220-232)
DR ANDREW
DORMAN, DR
DOMINICK JENKINS,
MR MALCOLM
SAVIDGE AND
DR BRUNO
TERTRAIS
28 MARCH 2006
Q220 Robert Key: Can you explain
a little the post-nuclear testing generation warhead, the TNA?
Dr Tertrais: When France decided
to commit itself to the CTBT in the early to mid-1990s there was
a decision to develop a new formula for new generation warheads.
The warheads could not be tested any more after the entry into
force of the CTBT. Several nuclear tests in 1995 in the final
French campaign were specifically devoted to validating this new
formula. As has been said, this formula will be used on weapons
which will begin service two years from now. The formula was tested
in 1995/1996 but the warheads are coming into service by 2008.
We call them robust warheads which means that they are bigger,
heavier and less modern, but they have the great advantage of
not needing to be tested any more. To give you an idea, the way
that the Americans speak about "Reliable Replacement Warheads"
these days sounds a lot like the sort of things that we have done.
Q221 Robert Key: The President has
recently said something about the targeting policy of France.
Can you expand on that?
Dr Tertrais: One can say that
in public discourse at least there are two different forms of
targeting, one of which is targeting vis-a"-vis major
powers. The French define major powers as those that can threaten
the very survival of France as an organised state or entity, such
as Russia, China or perhaps others in future. As to these, France
exerts deterrence through the threat of unacceptable damage of
any kind. The French consider that there is another class of potential
adversaries whom they call regional powers. For this class the
deterrence would be exerted through the targeting of centres of
power, that is, political, economic or military—the things
that the leaders of such countries would hold dear. Therefore,
it is assumed generally in public literature that the planning
of options would be more limited and targeted for regional powers
than for major powers.
Q222 Robert Key: The policy of the
French Government is that the second type of targeting policy
would cope with the issue of international terrorism?
Dr Tertrais: No, it would not,
certainly not in such general terms. It would have a relationship
with the issue of international terrorism only in the extremely
hypothetical case where the head of state or government of such
regional power decided to try to bypass our nuclear deterrence
by trying to hide himself or itself behind a terrorist group that
would make a major attack, or threaten to make a major attack,
on French interests.
Q223 Robert Key: It seems to me that
in France there is very little debate or disagreement about the
nuclear deterrent, certainly much less than in this country. Can
you explain that to me?
Dr Tertrais: I think that is true.
The consensus, maybe not so much in terms of public opinion as
in political parties, is much stronger in France than in the UK.
I have a feeling—I have never made any detailed study of
it—that there are two factors involved. One is the fact
that nuclear weapons today are still associated with Gaullism
(de Gaulle—of course, not de Gaulle himself) and independence.
Q224 Robert Key: Le force de frappe?
Dr Tertrais: Yes, although that
expression lasted for only two or three years, I believe. In 1967
we took the strategic decision to be fully independent for our
survival and that required an independent nuclear deterrent. That
has remained very firmly in the French strategic culture. The
second reason which is linked to the first is that basically the
sensitivity of the debate in this country, as I understand it,
and your relationship with the United States is by its nature
very different from what we have; in other words, your nuclear
debate is linked to the debate about your relationship with the
United States. Ours is in a very different position. Perhaps I
may add that traditionally while there has been a fairly strong
consensus on the virtues of nuclear power, military and civilian,
we do not have a strong green or environmentalist movement in
our country. This is a statement of fact.
Q225 Robert Key: I can certainly
confirm that from my observations. Suppose that the United Kingdom
decided not to replace Trident and phased out nuclear weapons.
Would France then regard itself as the nuclear power for the whole
of Europe? Would you see France taking over the role of providing
a European nuclear shield?
Dr Tertrais: That is a very big
question. I think that there would be two different reactions
to that hypothetical decision. One would be, "Oh, we are
now the only nuclear power left in Europe, which means that potentially
we have a more important role in the future protection of Europe".
But I must add immediately that I think there would also be a
second reaction, that it would increase pressure on the French
to do the same thing. The argument sometimes used is that each
would be glad to be the only nuclear power in Europe. I do not
think that that is a real world argument. In the real world responsible
French leaders would think, "Well, if the UK is beginning
this trend there will be more pressure on us to follow suit and
that is a problem for us." I believe that the French are
happy with a situation where there is more than one nuclear power
in Europe.
Q226 Robert Key: I have spent the
past quarter of a century regretting the fact that France has
not been a member of the Nuclear Planning Group, for example.
Do you think there is any prospect that France would begin to
co-operate more closely with Britain in a nuclear programme?
Dr Tertrais: Like you, I regret
that France does not participate as an observer at the NPG. I
think that it could and should do so at zero political cost. That
being said, is France ready to co-operate more with the UK? My
assumption is that it is, but my understanding of the way French
political leaders take stock of 10 years or so of nuclear dialogue
is that they have the impression that there is a kind of glass
ceiling beyond which it is very difficult to go in terms of French/British
nuclear co-operation. That glass ceiling arises partly from the
existence of strong technical co-operation with the United States
in the nuclear military field but also perhaps from how far the
British are willing or able to go in greater Europeanisation of
the nuclear deterrence programme. My understanding is that French
leaders are willing and able but are not so sure that the Brits
are.
Q227 Robert Key: I have also spent
25 years trying to understand the nature of the French state and
how French citizens perceive their state. That is inconceivable
to a Brit. We cannot begin to imagine how the French can be as
attached to something called the state of France, and you on the
other hand cannot imagine how we can be so friendly with the Americans.
But I find this hard to believe when we have so many defence procurement
programmes in common France, with the involvement of big companies
like Thales. We know that the French and British Governments are
talking to each other about aircraft carriers. The French must
be rubbing their hands as they see the joint strike fighter arguments
rage. You envisage buying a British-designed carrier from which
Rafale aircraft will deliver French nuclear missiles. Is this
my wild imagination?
Dr Tertrais: Not at all. I think
that for the French in terms of future European or British co-operation
many things are open as long as it does not encroach on their
very specific concept of independence vis-a"-vis the
United States. Beyond that, those things are possible. I certainly
concur with your characterisation of the French attachment to
the state. I think that the French attachment to nuclear weapons
is also part of the same cultural background. I add that such
hearings as this could not take place in France.
Q228 Robert Key: Why not?
Dr Tertrais: First, because our
Parliament's role in foreign and defence policy is much less important
in our system than in yours. Secondly, the executive branch is
extremely touchy about any debate in Parliament on nuclear deterrence,
and there is a lot of frustration among your French counterparts
on that. Nuclear deterrence is really an issue for the President.
It is a kind of joke to say that in terms of pure nuclear strategy
and policy the real monarchy is in France, not the UK.
Q229 Chairman: Dr Tertrais, you have
won our hearts. Dr Jenkins, does Greenpeace have a view as to
whether France has a strong green movement?
Dr Jenkins: We have an active
campaign in France directed against the M51 programme. We think
that the way forward is a European approach, and certainly part
of that would be a freeze on that new development as well as our
own potential new Trident system. That would be helpful as part
of the development of an alternative European approach to that
put forward by the United States.
Q230 Mr Jenkins: Dr Jenkins, you
said earlier that Russia was no longer a threat. What inside information
do you have? According to my information, at the present time
the Russian state is fragile and, looking forward, it will become
more fragile. What guarantee do you have that we will not see
a backward lurch from democracy to a totalitarian state in Russia
which has the second largest arsenal of nuclear weapons? Why do
you feel that you have the right to put our country's future defence
on hold because you have the inside track on Russia in future?
Would you like to inform me about how you have obtained that information?
Dr Jenkins: Perhaps I may clarify
what I said. I think I was quite direct in saying that the major
threats that we might face in future and should be most concerned
about were from the existing major nuclear powers. Contrary to
what you said, I took the realist's view that Russia could again
be a threat. I very much agree with Mr Savidge's specific reasons
why at the moment it is not a threat. It is for that reason that
I think it most important to use this time when we have good relations
with Russia to take forward multilateral disarmament, playing
very much a leadership role in conjunction with other major states.
I think there was a bit of a misunderstanding in that respect.
Mr Jenkins: I am glad you have clarified
that.
Q231 Chairman: Dr Dorman, you gave
the impression that you wanted to add something.
Dr Dorman: I should like to add
something to the debate. If I may go back in history, in the early
to mid-1990s when we were considering replacement of the sub-strategic
deterrent at one point we looked quite closely with the French
at a new cruise missile. We subsequently decided to go for the
sub-strategic Trident option instead but we looked at an air-launched
cruise missile with the French. We have had quite significant
links with them.
Q232 Linda Gilroy: Dr Tertrais, the
French programme takes up a much bigger slice of the defence budget
and is much more expensive. Although I hear what you say about
it being the President's decision, what sorts of pressures emerge
from that, and is it a growing problem?
Dr Tertrais: It is certainly a
growing problem. There are lots of pressures from those inside
the defence establishment, including of course the military circle,
who are not concerned with nuclear deterrence issues and are persuaded,
I think wrongly, that if they took money out of the nuclear budget
it would automatically go to the conventional defence budget.
I am not sure that that exactly captures the way that our defence
budgets are constructed. That idea, nevertheless, exists. More
generally, among the up and coming generation of politicians and
military and civilian leaders nuclear deterrence is something
less obvious, and certainly less than a given, than it was to
the previous generation. I am fond of saying that the next president
in 2007, whoever he or she might be, will be the first president
of the post-World War II generation. He or she will see the world
through very different eyes from those of the previous one. There
will be strong pressures on the next president, whoever he or
she might be, to reduce the nuclear budget, and I believe that
it will be a very interesting moment for the future of nuclear
deterrence.
Chairman: You will not have been able
or had time to say all that you could have said, but that is because
you are experts. I am grateful to all of you for coming to give
very important evidence to this inquiry.
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