CURRENT PURPOSE
51. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the
Soviet Union has radically altered the international political
and strategic environment within which the UK's nuclear deterrent
operates and has changed the nature of, and requirements for,
strategic deterrence.
52. This raises the issue of what deterrence means,
in practice, in the post-Cold War era. The Oxford English Dictionary
defines the term deterrence as "discouragement by fear".
This is arguably what the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent does:
Trident is intended to discourage aggression by the fear of retaliation.
53. But Trident is not the UK's only means of deterrence.
Deterrence is "an extremely broad concept" and refers
to "a whole range of instruments for the prevention of war,
or the discouragement of aggression, some of which may not even
be military".[45]
Deterrence can be exercised by a spectrum of options ranging from
economic sanctions and robust diplomatic pressure to conventional
military options and the threat of strategic nuclear retaliation.
54. Strategic nuclear deterrence is not intended
as a means of countering all threats to the security of the UK.
Rather, it is "on the right hand of the deterrence equation
to be used in extremis when the survival of the nation state is
at stake".[46]
55. In considering the future of the strategic
nuclear deterrent, the UK will need to examine whether the concept
of nuclear deterrence remains useful in the current strategic
environment and in the context of the existing and emerging threats
to the security of the country. We will have to consider whether
those states and non-state actors posing such threats can, in
reality, be deterred from instigating acts of aggression by either
existing or new approaches to nuclear deterrence. We will also
have to consider how the UK's nuclear capability should be adjusted
to meet new strategic realities. Trident was developed during
the final decade of the Cold War, and was designed to counter
the threat posed by the size and technical capabilities of the
Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal: we need to consider whether
the form of the UK's current nuclear deterrent is best suited
to today's and tomorrow's strategic challenges.
56. We believe that it is essential that, before
making any decisions on the future of the strategic nuclear deterrent,
the MoD should explain its understanding of the purpose and continuing
relevance of nuclear deterrence now and over the lifetime of any
potential Trident successor system.
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