Conclusions and recommendations
1. We
welcome the Government's promise of a full and open debate in
Parliament, and in the country at large, on the future of the
UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. We are surprised and disappointed
that the Ministry of Defence has refused to participate in our
inquiry. We believe that a genuine and meaningful debate is only
possible with the active participation of the MoD. We call upon
the MoD to engage fully in our forthcoming inquiries into the
future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. We hope the MoD
will make a substantive response to this report and that it will
address openly the issues we have raised. (Paragraph 12)
2. The UK's strategic
nuclear arsenal is small in comparison with the other established
nuclear powers. (Paragraph 45)
3. In considering
the future of the strategic nuclear deterrent, the UK will need
to examine whether the concept of nuclear deterrence remains useful
in the current strategic environment and in the context of the
existing and emerging threats to the security of the country.
We will have to consider whether those states and non-state actors
posing such threats can, in reality, be deterred from instigating
acts of aggression by either existing or new approaches to nuclear
deterrence. We will also have to consider how the UK's nuclear
capability should be adjusted to meet new strategic realities.
Trident was developed during the final decade of the Cold War,
and was designed to counter the threat posed by the size and technical
capabilities of the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal: we need
to consider whether the form of the UK's current nuclear deterrent
is best suited to today's and tomorrow's strategic challenges.
(Paragraph 55)
4. We believe that
it is essential that, before making any decisions on the future
of the strategic nuclear deterrent, the MoD should explain its
understanding of the purpose and continuing relevance of nuclear
deterrence now and over the lifetime of any potential Trident
successor system. (Paragraph 56)
5. Before any decisions
on the future of the deterrent are made, it will be important
to consider whether the possession of nuclear weapons enhances
the UK's international influence and status and whether this contributes
to the justification for retention of a strategic nuclear capability.
(Paragraph 57)
6. It is clear that
there is a difference of views and no clear consensus that international
influence is, of itself, a reason to retain the strategic nuclear
deterrent. We recommend that the MoD make clear whether the Government
believes the possession of a nuclear deterrent is an important
contributor to the UK's international influence. (Paragraph 65)
7. The public debate
over the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent should
address:
- the independence of the
UK's current system; and
- the operational and diplomatic impact of any
potential dependency on the United States of any future UK nuclear
deterrent. (Paragraph 66)
8. It
is important to distinguish between two different types of independence:
independence of acquisition and independence of operation. We
heard that independence of acquisition is what the French have
opted for at a significantly higher cost to the defence budget.
Independence of operation is an alternative concept of independence
and it is this which the UK has opted for at a lower price.
(Paragraph 80)
9. We call upon the
MoD to clarify the technical dependencies of the UK's Trident
system upon the United States and to respond to the argument that
the UK's nuclear deterrent is not truly independent. In weighing
the importance of maintaining independence, attention needs to
be paid to the differing concepts of independence adopted by the
UK and France. (Paragraph 84)
10. The public debate
about the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent must
take into account:
- the nature of the threats
facing the UK;
- how those threats could evolve over the lifetime
of any potential Trident successor system; and
- in what ways retention of a strategic nuclear
deterrent might assist the UK in addressing those threats. (Paragraph
85)
11. The most pressing threat currently facing
the UK is that of international terrorism. Witnesses to our inquiry
overwhelmingly argued that the strategic nuclear deterrent could
serve no useful or practical purpose in countering this kind of
threat. (Paragraph
88)
12. Witnesses to our
inquiry did not believe that the UK currently faced a direct or
impending military threat from any of the established nuclear
weapons states, including Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel,
North Korea, or, of course, from France or the United States.
(Paragraph 95)
13. There are difficulties
inherent in anticipating future threats to the security of the
UK. It is not possible to predict accurately the nature of the
future strategic international environment and to identify with
any certainty the threats the UK is likely to face. (Paragraph
96)
14. We call upon the
MoD to consider publicly the threats the UK faces today and how
those threats may evolve in the future. Such a threat assessment
will shape any decision on the future of the UK's strategic nuclear
deterrent. We accept that future threats are unknowable, but,
clearly, a world in which nuclear proliferation had taken hold
would create deep uncertainties in international relations. For
this reason, the UK may wish to retain a strategic nuclear capability
as a guard against the unknown. If the MoD believes in the value
of the nuclear deterrent as an insurance policy, rather than in
response to any specific threat, we believe it is important to
say clearly that is the reason for needing the deterrent. (Paragraph
103)
15. The Government
has stated that decisions on the future of the UK's strategic
nuclear deterrent will be required during the course of the current
Parliament. To date, it has offered no explanation of the nature
of those decisions. If there is to be a meaningful debate on the
future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent, the public should
know what decisions will be required, when they must be taken
and implemented, and what factors are driving consideration of
the issue now. (Paragraph 104)
16. A fundamental
political decision needs to be made on whether or not the UK should
retain a strategic nuclear deterrent. There is no clear point
at which this decision has to be made and there is a risk that
- by taking a series of decisions to keep options open - we could
find that we have in practice taken the decision to keep the deterrent.
Conversely, if we do not keep those options open, we could find
we are left without a deterrent. In our view, the UK should make
a clear decision on whether to retain the strategic nuclear deterrent.
It is important that a decision of this magnitude is not taken
by default. It should be made only after a full public debate.
It must not be made by the Government in secret. (Paragraph 106)
17. A service life
extension programme would allow the UK to postpone decisions on
whether to replace Trident until around 2010, on the basis that
a service life extension programme would add an additional five
years to the existing system and that procurement of a Trident
replacement would take approximately 14 years. By this time, it
is possible that the strategic environment might be clearer. But
it is likely to be an expensive process. Such an expensive option
should not be used only as a means of deferring a decision on
the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. (Paragraph
110)
18. It is important that the Government continue
to invest in the UK infrastructure and skills base until a decision
on whether to retain or abolish the nuclear deterrent is made.
Unless this investment is forthcoming, the Government is likely
to find that its options will be constrained and that certain
choices for the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent will no longer
be available. (Paragraph 115)
19. Given the new
investment at Aldermaston, and the widespread expectation that
a new warhead will not be required until well into the 2020s,
the timelines for manufacturing a replacement warhead is not a
key driver of the current debate. (Paragraph 121)
20. Since the Trident
II D5 missile will be in service in the United States until 2042,
this component of the system is not a key driver of the current
debate. (Paragraph 124)
21. The platform is
generally regarded as the crucial factor driving the current debate
on the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. (Paragraph
126)
22. If the MoD believes
that the UK should retain the Continuous-at-Sea Deterrent cycle,
it must either extend the life of the Vanguard-class submarine
or procure a new platform to be in service by 2020. In the light
of the reduced threat we currently face, an alternative possibility
would be to retain a deterrent, but not continuously at sea.
(Paragraph 130)
23. We believe that
the maintenance of onshore infrastructure and the domestic UK
skills base is an issue of paramount importance in considering
the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent. We have decided that
this will be the focus of the next in our series of inquiries
into the future of the strategic nuclear deterrent. In that inquiry
we will also address the linkage between the Government's Defence
Industrial Strategy and the decision on retention, replacement,
or abolition of the UK's Trident system. (Paragraph 138)
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