Memorandum from the Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament
SUMMARY
The decision on whether or not to replace Britain's
nuclear weapons system must be taken on the basis of what will
most contribute to the security of the British people. This paper
suggests that non-replacement would best meet that requirement
and would also make a significant contribution to international
security by strengthening and advancing the disarmament and non-proliferation
regime that is widely supported by states and civil society organisations
globally. The requirements of the international treaty framework
are outlined, together with the links between the failure of the
nuclear weapons states to disarm and the dangers of nuclear proliferation.
Legal opinion that a Trident replacement would be a material breach
of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is noted. The strategic
context in which Trident was bought is analysed, together with
the factors that brought that period to a close, including the
substantial nuclear disarmament that took place towards the end
of the Cold War. It is noted that rather than disarming in the
post-Cold War period, Britain adapted some of its weapons for
sub-strategic use and in part restated the function of Britain's
nuclear weapons as the defence of vital interests. In the current
context it is noted that there is widespread opposition to a Trident
Replacement, partly because it is generally thought to be irrelevant
against the threat of terrorism. Britain's links with the United
States (US) are considered, including nuclear sharing via the
Mutual Defence Agreement, and policy similarities that include
the abandoning of negative security assurances and the considering
of nuclear weapons as part of a useable arsenal. The possible
emergence of China as a nuclear threat is considered. The paper
concludes that moves towards NPT compliance, exemplified by non-replacement
of Trident, can help reverse the dangers of nuclear proliferation
and prevent a new nuclear arms race. The current policy orientation
of the British Government is exacerbating these dangers and an
urgent reversal is required to ensure Britain's security.
The requirements of the international treaty framework:
understanding the relationship between nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation
1. Concerns about the possession and proliferation
of nuclear weapons are not new. Indeed, the international desire
for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation has been manifested
strongly—at both state and civil society levels—for
many decades. The most significant legal expression of this is
the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), of 1968. The NPT was
the result, in particular, of widespread international concerns
about the dangers of proliferation and the spiralling weapons
stocks of the nuclear weapons states. Prior to 1968, both Sweden
and India had led attempts in the United Nations (UN) General
Assembly to bring both of these under control. Whilst in 1965
the US and Soviet Union had put forward their own proposals for
a treaty, these were rejected by the non-nuclear weapons states
because the disarmament component was insufficient, only really
limiting the nuclear club to its existing members. The perspective
of much of the international community at that time can be summed
up in the words of the former German Chancellor Willy Brandt:
"The moral and political justification of a non-proliferation
treaty follows only if the nuclear states regard it as a step
towards restriction of their own armaments and toward disarmament
and clearly state they are willing to act accordingly." The
resulting treaty inextricably linked disarmament and non-proliferation
and provided a framework for the achievement of both. Article
VI states: "each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes
to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating
to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control." It can
be argued that the non-proliferation pillar of the NPT has been
relatively successful. Only three, possibly four, states possess
nuclear weapons outside of the NPT framework despite fears in
the early years that many nuclear weapons states would emerge.
Rights under Article IV of the NPT, to the development of nuclear
power for civilian purposes—which has been taken up by over
forty countries—have not been used as a jumping off point
for nuclear weapons proliferation. But the disarmament pillar
of the NPT has not met with success. The five declared nuclear
weapons states of the NPT still retain massive nuclear arsenals
and are currently making no progress towards their NPT commitments.
Indeed, there have been recent attempts to suggest that the nuclear
weapons states are somehow legally entitled by the NPT to possess
nuclear weapons. In November 2003, Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon
stated: "Under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, China and
Russia are legally entitled to possess nuclear weapons".
In fact, what that the nuclear weapons states are actually legally
obliged to do, under the NPT, is work towards the elimination
of their nuclear weapons.
2. The twin requirements of the Treaty—disarmament
and non-proliferation—are fundamental to the security of
the world today. The understanding of the inter-relationship between
the two—and the need for compliance in both areas is a perspective
that continues to predominate within the international community.
It is very clearly and regularly conveyed through, for example,
speeches by numerous state representatives at UN meetings, such
as the NPT Review Conference of 2005. This position was recently
expressed by Kofi Annan, who linked the failure to disarm with
the danger of nuclear proliferation, at the 60th anniversary of
the UN: `the more that those states that already have [nuclear
weapons] increase their arsenals, or insist that such weapons
are essential to their national security, the more other states
feel that they too must have them for their security'. The failure
of the nuclear weapons states to comply with their obligations
under the NPT—taken together with an apparent orientation
towards nuclear use by some of these states—has real potential
to create a tendency towards proliferation. The logic of the "deterrent"
notion is that all states need nuclear weapons to protect themselves.
This point has also been made by Nobel Laureate Professor Sir
Joseph Rotblat, "If some nations—including the most
powerful militarily—say that they need nuclear weapons for
their security, then such security cannot be denied to other countries
which really feel insecure. Proliferation of nuclear weapons is
the logical consequence of this nuclear policy."
3. Concern about the failure to make progress
on disarmament led to a further strengthening of the NPT's requirements.
In 1998, Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia,
South Africa and Sweden issued a declaration entitled: "Towards
a Nuclear-Weapons Free World". Working together as the New
Agenda Coalition (NAC) these countries demanded that the nuclear
weapons states commit themselves to the elimination of their nuclear
weapons and work on practical steps towards this goal. In the
face of major opposition from the nuclear weapons states, the
NAC received very strong support within the UN General Assembly,
and their work resulted in the adoption of the "13 practical
steps" by the NPT Review Conference in 2000. This included
the commitment by the nuclear weapons states to `an unequivocal
undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear
arsenals'. The Review Conference of 2005 confirmed that the achievements
of the 2000 Conference remained part of the NPT framework.
Trident Replacement and the international treaty
framework
4. Given the clarity of the NPT requirements
on disarmament there is concern, not only that Britain is not
making progress towards disarmament, but also that it may be seeking
to engage in vertical proliferation through the replacement of
Trident. Recent investments in, and building work at, AWE Aldermaston
only serve to strengthen this fear. At a time when our government
pursues the notion of "counter-proliferation" against
those thought to be pursuing horizontal proliferation, this would
be a hypocritical step. Defence Secretary Dr John Reid has stated
that "anything we do in future will be fully consistent with
our obligations under the NPT". However, recent legal opinion
makes it clear that a replacement of Trident would not be acceptable
under the NPT. In 2005, Peacerights sought a legal opinion from
Rabinder Singh QC and Professor Christine Chinkin on "The
Maintenance and Possible Replacement of the Trident Nuclear Missile
System". In their opinion, the replacement of Trident is
likely to constitute a breach of Article VI of the NPT:
"74. Enhancing nuclear weapons systems,
possibly without going through parliamentary processes, is, in
our view, not conducive to entering into negotiations for disarmament
as required by the NPT, article VI and evinces no intention to
`bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament
in all its aspects'. It is difficult to see how unilateral (or
bilateral) action that pre-empts any possibility of an outcome
of disarmament can be defined as pursuing negotiations in good
faith and to bring them to a conclusion and is, in our view, thereby
in violation of the NPT, article VI obligation".
Singh and Chinkin further hold the opinion that
such a breach would be a material breach of the treaty:
"80. The linkage between the principles
of non-proliferation and the obligation to negotiate towards disarmament
shown by the negotiation history . . . indicate that Article VI
is a provision `essential to the accomplishment of the object
or purpose of the treaty.' The non-nuclear weapon states required
commitments from the nuclear weapon states as part of their willingness
to accept non-nuclear status under the NPT and failure to comply
with article VI thus, in our view, constitutes material breach."
The final sentence quoted further indicates
the significance of compliance with the disarmament requirements
of the NPT. For the nuclear weapons states to do otherwise will
have a negative impact on the compliance of non-nuclear weapons
states with the non-proliferation requirements of the NPT.
The strategic context in which Britain bought
Trident
5. In July 1980, the British government
announced the decision to buy the US C4 Trident missile system,
as a replacement for the Polaris system, which was due to reach
the end of its service life in the early 1990s. In March 1982,
the order was changed to the Trident D5, a new development announced
by the US in October 1981. Trident was not merely a replacement
for Polaris, it was actually an expansion of Britain's nuclear
force, in contravention of our stated commitment to disarmament.
Polaris had three 200-kiloton warheads on each missile and had
been modernised to have a number of dummy or decoy warheads on
each missile as well, but each missile could only be used against
one target. The advance of the Trident system was that the warheads
were multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, which
could be independently aimed to achieve the destruction of a much
greater range of targets. The range of delivery was also increased
from the 2,500 miles of Polaris to 6,000 miles. In other words,
Trident has a longer range, greater accuracy, and can reach more
targets than Polaris could and, in addition, can carry almost
200 warheads, each of which has around eight times the power of
the Hiroshima bomb.
6. Trident was a system devised specifically
for the Cold War context in which it was initially planned. It
was part of the US shift towards "counterforce" weapons,
which would give it nuclear war-winning capabilities. The D5 system
provided the US with the capability to destroy almost all Soviet
land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. Britain's move
from the C4 order to the D5 order was explained by the need to
retain commonality with the US. But in the years between the decision
to buy the D5 system and its arrival in the early 1990s, a change
in the strategic context—of monumental proportions—occurred.
Changes in the Soviet leadership in the mid-1980s led to substantial
disarmament initiatives on the part of the Soviet Union, which
received a positive response from the US leadership. The Intermediate
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) Treaty was signed by Reagan
and Gorbachev in 1987, eliminating a whole class of medium and
shorter range nuclear weapons. The INF Treaty was the first nuclear
arms control agreement to actually reduce nuclear weapons.
7. In July 1991, the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty I (START I) was signed by the US and Soviet Union, reducing
their deployed strategic arsenals to 1,600 delivery vehicles carrying
no more than 6,000 warheads. Towards the end of 1991, Bush and
Gorbachev each pledged to make further significant reductions
in their nuclear weaponry. In December 1991, the Soviet Union
was dissolved and the bipolar world of the Cold War ended. The
Warsaw Pact was also dissolved and the western alliance no longer
faced a hostile superpower and its bloc.
8. Despite this monumental change in the
strategic context, the pace of disarmament faltered during the
1990s. START II, which sought to reduce deployed strategic arsenals
to between 3,000 and 3,500 warheads and banned the deployment
of multiple-warhead land-based missiles, was signed in 1993, but
abandoned in 2002. In 1997, Clinton and Yeltsin agreed a framework
for START III negotiations that included a reduction in deployed
strategic warheads to between 2,000 and 2,500. Negotiations were
supposed to begin after START II entered into force, but that
didn't happen. In May 2002, Russia and the US signed the Strategic
Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), limiting their operationally
deployed warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 each. But this Treaty
has yet to be approved by the Senate or Duma.
9. Despite the demise of its superpower
opponent, Britain pursued the procurement and deployment of the
Trident nuclear weapons system—a system designed to confront
a massive, enormously armed, hostile state actor. The first Trident
submarine entered into service in 1994, and the other three joined
it at regular intervals over the next few years. In the post-Cold
War period, Britain had achieved a more formidable nuclear arsenal
than at any previous point. Whilst weapons like Polaris and the
WE 177 freefall bombs have been decommissioned it would be wrong
to suggest that this constitutes a measure of disarmament, as
these were aging weapons that have been replaced by an enhanced
system. Furthermore, whilst Britain's tactical nuclear weapons
were withdrawn, at the same time the number of warheads on some
of the Trident missiles were reduced, thus becoming sub-strategic
missiles. In this way Britain maintained a strategic and sub-strategic
nuclear force, keeping its options open about where it wished
to target its nuclear weapons. Indeed, in November 1993, Defence
Secretary Malcolm Rifkind explained the need for Trident in the
post-Soviet era in terms of securing Britain's "vital interests".
This was a significant shift from—and perhaps more accurate
than—the previously stated position that Trident was necessary
to deter nuclear attack. The role of Britain's nuclear weapons
in defence of Britain's "vital interests"—defined
in part as economic interests—was subsequently restated
in the British government's Strategic Defence Review of 1998.
Thus Britain pursued new roles for its nuclear weapons in the
post-Cold War period, meeting neither the letter nor the spirit
of its commitments under the NPT. This was particularly disappointing
given the historic political changes and real disarmament achievements
that could have been built upon to move towards the complete elimination
of nuclear weapons. Four countries—South Africa, Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine—did, however, give up their nuclear
weapons. These countries, together with the path-breaking disarmament
moves of the end of the Cold War, show that nuclear disarmament
is not a utopian fantasy, but a realisable policy. The impetus
towards nuclear disarmament must be recovered.
Today's strategic context
10. Britain's greatest current security
threat is generally accepted to be terrorism, perpetrated by non-state
actors. It is very widely agreed that nuclear weapons are no use
against such threats, and this point has certainly been made by
the Prime Minister, who stated in October 2005: "I do not
think that anyone pretends that the independent nuclear deterrent
is a defence against terrorism." Trident Replacement is also
opposed by the former Conservative Defence Secretary Michael Portillo
who has concluded that Trident should be scrapped, as did the
late former Labour Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, and many others
across a range of parties and civil society organisations. Indeed,
a recent Greenpeace/MORI poll also indicated that 54% of those
polled opposed a Trident replacement when they realised the likely
cost. However, the Prime Minister has also made it clear that
he believes, as was outlined in the Labour Party Manifesto before
the last general election, that Britain should maintain its "independent
nuclear deterrent". It is this position that presumably determines
government thinking on the question of the Trident Replacement.
The thinking behind this was made clear by Dr John Reid in September
2005, who, on opening the public debate on the matter, appeared
to suggest that Britain needed to replace Trident in case we face
a nuclear enemy in the future. This position is a matter for serious
concern. It would seem irresponsible to begin preparations now
for a rerun of the edge of the abyss nightmare of the Cold War,
where we genuinely feared nuclear annihilation, and terms like
"mutual assured destruction" and "the balance of
terror" were used to describe the military and political
policies that shaped our world.
11. The fact that we currently face no nuclear
threat, and there is no imminent danger of such a threat emerging,
presents us with the opportunity to begin the process of negotiations
towards disarmament as required under the NPT. A decision by Britain
not to proceed with a replacement for Trident, together with a
commitment to working for multilateral disarmament, could help
break through the logjam that currently exists around this issue.
Of course, Britain does not exist or act in isolation, and there
are also treaties that tie us in to a nuclear framework, and the
implications of these would have to be considered. Britain's membership
of the nuclear-armed NATO is one such example. Another is the
1958 Mutual Defence Agreement between Britain and the US, most
recently renewed for ten years in 2004, and believed to be the
world's most extensive nuclear sharing agreement. We are dependent
on the US for all three aspects of Britain's nuclear weapons—platform,
delivery system and warheads—and the collaboration on these
takes place under the MDA. In fact, there has been concern over
many years from a number of states about the legality of this
Agreement in the context of Article I of the NPT. In this regard,
we note that a legal opinion sought from Rabinder Singh QC and
Professor Christine Chinkin in July 2004 found it to be "strongly
arguable that the renewal of the Mutual Defence Agreement is in
breach of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." This Agreement
seems to be a significant component within the "special relationship"
between Britain and the US, and it is thought that it may underpin
foreign policy cooperation as well as nuclear cooperation.
12. In this context, changing US policy
on nuclear weapons and nuclear use is of considerable concern.
The 2001 US Nuclear Posture Review spoke of nuclear weapons as
part of a "usable arsenal", and of the development of
nuclear weapons for battlefield use. A draft revised Doctrine
for Joint Nuclear Operations, which was revealed in Arms Control
Today and The Washington Post in September 2005, described
pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons in conventional wars and discussed
battlefield scenarios, post-nuclear weapon use. Whilst this draft
revision has been formally withdrawn by the Pentagon, other public
documents from the Department of Defense and other sources say
many of the same things. Furthermore, the "negative security
assurances" framework appears to have been abandoned; this
was an addendum to the NPT agreed in 1978 by a number of the nuclear
weapons states, which agreed not to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear weapons states. This shift in policy could also contribute
to a possible tendency towards proliferation among non-nuclear
weapons states. It is also apparent that British policy has turned
in the same direction. Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon, prior to
the war on Iraq, on 24 March 2002, stated that the British government
"reserved the right" to use nuclear weapons in the event
of Britain, or British troops, being threatened by chemical or
biological weapons. Under international law, the use, or threat
of use, of nuclear weapons, is illegal under virtually all conceivable
circumstances. In 1996, the International Court of Justice ruled
that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be generally
contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed
conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian
law." The circumstances under which currently the US and
UK—and recently France also—have suggested they may
be willing to use nuclear weapons, are not legal.
13. Given this policy orientation, it is
of some concern that when Dr John Reid opened the public debate
on Trident Replacement, he referred only to Britain's nuclear
weapons as a "deterrent", necessary against potential
nuclear threats. This avoids the issue of nuclear use and the
abandoning of negative security assurances. But it should be noted
that public opinion is overwhelmingly against this turn in British
policy. The Greenpeace/MORI poll of September 2005 found that
when asked the question: "Would you approve of using the
nuclear bomb . . . against an enemy that does not possess it themselves?"
87% disapproved. However, it is necessary to consider what type
of future nuclear threats may be envisaged by those who perceive
it as necessary to retain a nuclear "deterrent". Light
may be shed on this by looking at the recently published US Quadrennial
Defense Review Report. The Report describes the Pentagon's new
perception of the "long war" in which the US is engaged.
It will be a war "unlimited in time and space" against
global Islamist extremism, fought in dozens of countries simultaneously
and for years to come. But the Report also, in its section "Shaping
the Choices of Countries at Strategic Crossroads", identifies
China as the one of the major and emerging powers that has "the
greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States
and field disruptive technologies that could over time offset
traditional US military advantages absent US counter strategies."
14. China is a rapidly growing economy.
Starting from a very low level of output per head, it has enjoyed
the fastest economic growth in the world for more than 25 years,
and if it continues to grow at this rate at some point the size
of its economy will exceed that of the US. For this reason, the
rise of China is a primary strategic concern of Washington. It
is quite possible to see US moves to put weapons in space, to
continue to develop a limited national missile defence system
and to develop a similar system with Japan, Taiwan and Korea,
as the beginning of a nuclear arms race against China. The presumed
goal would be to maximise US military superiority and simultaneously
force China to stall its economic growth by devoting more and
more resources to arms. China is of course a declared nuclear
weapons state, but of a very limited capacity and, whilst modernising
its arsenal, is certainly at present incapable of destroying the
US. China is estimated to have about 400 strategic and tactical
nuclear weapons—50 more than France, and almost 10,000 less
than the United States. It seems extremely unlikely that China
would want to invest huge amounts of money in a nuclear arms race,
especially when it is aware that the Cold War arms race bankrupted
the Soviet Union. We note, for example, that China has always
supported—and actively tried to progress—discussions
for a Treaty on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.
In October 2004, at the UN First Committee in New York, China
submitted a draft treaty to prevent the placing of weapons in
space. This attitude by China is to be welcomed and serious steps
should be taken to prevent the development of an arms racing leading
to a new nuclear superpower confrontation in years to come. But
US policy does not seem to be orientated towards avoiding such
a development—rather its actions may provoke it. Over the
last few years, large numbers of US nuclear forces have been redeployed
from the Atlantic to the Pacific; over two thirds of US nuclear
missile carrying submarines are now located there, enabling accurate
nuclear strike capabilities against Asia-Pacific targets. It is
possible that John Reid sees China as the potential nuclear armed
superpower threat that we may face in the future, but there are
many ways to avoid such a fear becoming a reality. Prevailing
upon our ally the US to pull back from provoking a nuclear arms
race with China would be a very constructive route.
Conclusion
15. Britain currently faces no nuclear threat,
and no other security threat that can be resolved through the
possession or use of nuclear weapons. Possession of nuclear weapons
does not deter terrorist attacks and the continued possession
of them, in spite of NPT obligations, is more likely to lead to
nuclear proliferation than to counter it. The current selective
approach of the US and Britain towards nuclear weapons proliferation
and treaty compliance—condoning and even encouraging states
like Israel and India in their illegal possession—and attacking
Iraq on unfounded suspicion of possession of weapons of mass destruction,
can only turn countries away from NPT compliance. The orientation
towards illegal pre-emptive war by both the US and Britain contributes
to an increase in global tension and instability and can lead
countries to think they need their own nuclear "deterrent".
16. As new economic powers emerge, so there
is the possibility that they may choose to develop large nuclear
arsenals, capable of threatening or destroying other states. They
are more likely to do so under political or military pressure
from other nuclear-armed states, in response to a perceived threat
to their own security. It is by no means a foregone conclusion
that any emerging economic power would wish to invest large sums
of money in arms, which could be profitably invested in other
economic sectors, or in advancing the well-being of their populations.
17. A significant move to generate multilateral
negotiations on disarmament could begin to resolve both the current
danger of proliferation and global instability, which is exacerbated
by the current policies of Britain and the US, and the possible
longer term threat of the rise of a nuclear-armed superpower enemy.
We have seen in the past how courageous initiatives can lead to
substantial disarmament, and the international situation cries
out for another such initiative. A decision by Britain not to
replace Trident would be such a move. It would help to restore
confidence in the possibility of NPT compliance and would demonstrate
that relations between nations, and resolution of their security
concerns, can be built in the framework of international law.
In addition, Britain's commitment to support and help bring into
force the draft Nuclear Weapons Convention currently lodged with
the UN would be a positive way of advancing towards multilateral
disarmament. Noting the global tensions that exist currently,
it is an urgent matter to embark on this process.
7 March 2006
|
