Memorandum from the Royal United Services
Institute
1. THE STRATEGIC
CONTEXT: WHY
THE UK NEEDS
A STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR DETERRENT
1.1 Currently, the wrong debate being had,
which is why many will welcome the HCDC debate—especially
structured, focused, balanced and transparent as it is. There
has been too much focus on the what, when and how much: these
are very valid questions, but valid only after addressing the
questions of "what is deterrence, what is it for, how do
you do it, why do we need it, and what is its value to the UK?"
In sum, the first question is why, not what.
1.2 Deterrence is a political, and not a
military, matter.
1.3 Key value of strategic nuclear deterrence
to the UK:
1.3.1 Grand strategic deterrence
— Political tool to deter other nuclear-capable
powers, especially at a time of growing proliferation.
— The history of armed conflict is
a history of wars taking people by surprise. From UK perspective,
Falklands, Gulf War and 9/11 were all surprises. Cannot predict
what threats will emerge in the next 50 years.[1]
— Threat is the sum of capability plus
intent. Capability takes a while to develop. Intent can change
much more suddenly.
— Common view that the UK does not
face a threat today that can be offset by nuclear weapons. Nuclear
materials, technologies, weapons and delivery systems are proliferating.
— While effective deterrence requires
a range of options other than just nuclear weapons to deter a
wider range of threats, strategic nuclear deterrence is designed
to deter high-end threats to the survivability of the nation,
only nuclear weapons can deter a nuclear weapon, and no other
nuclear power is considering giving up its capability while many
other nations—not to mention non-state actors—are
looking to acquire the capability.[2]
— As long as other potential enemies
possess nuclear weapons, the UK must retain its strategic nuclear
deterrent. The challenges are to make the capability more relevant
to new challenges with a more flexible—and perhaps smaller—inventory.
1.3.2 International status
1.3.2.1 It is an implied tenet of British
security policy that being a nuclear power is fundamental to the
UK's international status. A nuclear deterrent could be argued
to provide the UK with:
— considerable authority in international
political structures;
— status in Europe and in the world
as a whole;
— a political balance in Europe;
— a safeguard against US dis-engagement
in Europe;
— a balance against global instability.
1.4 Nuclear Disarmament
1.4.1 Just because the UK may reduce or
abolish its capability does not mean that others will follow suit.
Each declared nuclear power—never mind those wishing to
and trying to develop such a capability—has its own reasons
for keeping theirs that are wholly unrelated to the implications
of any UK decision to abolish its own capability and, even, to
pressures for multi-lateral global nuclear disarmament.
1.4.2 However, the UK could make a contribution
to disarmament, for example through reducing warhead or missile
inventories, while retaining sufficient capability to provide
a flexible deterrent.
2. DECISIONS
2.1 Once you have addressed the question
of why, if the answer to that question is that the UK does require
a nuclear deterrent capability, there are a variety of capability
choices available—each with their own performance, time
and cost implications.
2.2 What must the UK Government decide in
this Parliament? There are, perhaps, three levels of decision,
at the top end one major political decisions down to a series
of capability decisions that can inform, shape or influence the
major decision. The question is what decisions are required, and
when.
— Level One—Retain or abolish
the nuclear deterrent. There is a decision in principle to be
made before any investment in retention is decided. A final conclusive
decision could wait until there is commitment to major investment.
This could be at: the Initial Gate, when the UK takes the decision
to move into the investment phase; or conceivably not until the
Main Gate stage of commitment by government to the programme,
when the major investment decision for development and manufacture
is taken.
— Level Two—upgrade or extend
the existing system, buy a direct replacement, or develop a new
capability. This decision could be based initially on a Level
One decision in principle. Final commitment to an answer would
be at Main Gate stage although many options would be dispensed
with at Initial Gate.
— Level Three—current capability
decisions, including the investment of funds at the Atomic Weapons
Establishment (AWE), Aldermaston, or funding designs for the next
generation of submarine. Some of these decisions are already being
taken. Others may be taken depending on any decision to invest
in "Concept Phase" work on refining capability options
or in moving to Initial Gate. Even if the decision taken in this
Parliament is only to move the main decision right as much as
possible by extending the life of the current boats by five years,
these decisions are critical to ensure that, when the decision
eventually does have to be made once and for all, the Government
still has all options open.
3. CAPABILITIES
3.1 The capability issues have to be discussed
in broad terms at this early stage because they relate to strategy,
timelines and cost issues. These issues cannot be addressed independently
of technology. What we need to replace and when is crucial.
3.1.1 The capability requirement should
be established on the basis of an assessment of the likely effect
required back to the delivery system needed to deliver that effect
and to the affordability of those options.
3.2 Platform options
3.2.1 Land-based system.
3.2.1.2 A ballistic missile deployed on
UK soil.
3.2.1.3 The system would give the UK global
reach.
3.2.1.4 The UK would need to develop—indigenously
or in partnership—an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
(ICBM), a new warhead, a new launch site, and supporting infrastructures.
Perhaps some of these costs could be offset with a joint programme
with the US, especially if the offensive capability could be put
in place under the umbrella of a US ballistic missile defence
(BMD) system on UK soil.
3.2.1.5 However, the lack of a US programme
would mean that the UK would need to bear a large proportion of
the costs for this option. This option also would represent a
huge political cost, and would turn part of mainland UK into a
potential target. Lastly, a land-based system would be liable
to pre-emption, therefore undermining deterrent.
3.2.2 Air-based system.
3.2.2.1 Aircraft-deployed options: a nuclear-armed
cruise missile; or a free-fall nuclear bomb.[3]
3.2.2.2 An air-launched system would provide
a degree of flexibility.
3.2.2.3 However, this option would require:
a new aircraft; a new warhead; a base on mainland UK; and other
infrastructure support.
3.2.2.4 Aircraft options
— The UK does not have a strategic
bomber (as announced in the Quadrennial Defense Review, the US
is looking to develop a future strategic bomber programme: however,
the emphasis for this programme is on conventional munitions).
— The UK could consider basing the
weapon on existing transport and surveillance aircraft, but this
option risks these assets being required for other tasks at other
times.
— A shorter-range aircraft might need
to be based overseas for some operations, and this risks denial
of basing rights.
3.2.2.5 Aircraft and any missile would need
overflight rights for most missions. Air-based options also are
liable to pre-emptive attack, thus undermining deterrent.
3.2.3 Sea-based (surface system)
3.2.3.1 Nuclear-armed cruise missile fitted
to UK escort flotilla (UK surface ships do not have the capacity
to carry a ballistic missile). A neat fit with any potential sea-based
BMD capability.
3.2.3.2 However, a surface ship is visible
and thus can be targeted. The UK escort flotilla is also tasked
with many other roles.
3.2.4 Sea-based (sub-surface system)
3.2.4.1 Unique benefit of the sub-surface
option is the invulnerability required to guarantee the survivability
of the deterrent. If a system can be seen, it can be hit and will
not deter.
3.2.4.2 The UK already has a submarine platform
and missile system programme, and the infrastructure support already
is in place.
3.2.4.3 Options:
— Nuclear-armed cruise missiles on
UK SSNs. UK SSNs already fitted for Tomahawk cruise missiles,
and submarine support infrastructure exists already. However,
the SSNs are tasked with other missions.
— Hybrid submarine, capable of conducting
both SSN and SSBN operations and carrying a variety of payloads.
Main driver here would be affordability of two classes of nuclear-powered
submarine.[4]
The UK's Astute class submarine would need to be re-designed before
it could carry such a payload, however.
— Continue with a dedicated SSBN. By
threatening to exert the most catastrophic use of force from an
independent, autonomous, invulnerable platform deployed in a Continuous
At-Sea Deterrent cycle, SSBNs are the most effective form of deterrence.
SSBNs have the flexibility to carry a variety of nuclear and conventional
systems—SLBMs, Tomahawk cruise missiles, Intermediate Range
Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs), each of which with either nuclear
or conventional warheads. A deterrent system deployed in a continuous
cycle also underlines commitment to the deterrent, reduces risk
of escalation (if a boat is seen to sail during a period of tension)
and also—most critically—guarantees the survivability
so fundamental to effective deterrence.
3.3 Weapon System options
3.3.1 Cruise Missiles
3.3.1.1 Much debate focused on cruise missiles
on the grounds that their capabilities are more credible in light
of today's threats, but—perhaps most importantly—under
the perception that they are cheaper.
3.3.1.2 Host of problems associated with
total reliance on cruise missiles.
— Cost: design and test of new warhead
(thus violating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty).
— Cost: only single warhead weapons,
a much larger number of missiles would be needed to carry the
current inventory of warheads.
— Capability: slow speed means that
they can be shot down, so deterrent impact not credible.[5]
— De-stabilising: dual nature of weapon
risks escalation as adversary will not be able to tell if missile
is nuclear or conventional until it hits.[6]
— UK does not have an indigenous capability.
Tomahawk is a US-made weapon. UK Storm Shadow conventional only,
air-based only and short-range. France is developing a longer-range,
sea-based version.
— Nuclear cruise missile: US has no
Block V Tomahawk funding, nor is it looking at a nuclear warhead
option. All R&D would be down to the UK.
3.3.2 Ballistic Missiles
3.3.2.1 Ballistic missiles are only system
that deliver the global effect at place and time of choice, with
autonomy through national and international air space.
3.3.2.2 Current D5 missiles have planned
life of 25 years. In service 1994.
3.3.2.3 US developing a new version of the
D5 missile, the D5 LE, which includes upgrading existing missiles.[7]
These missiles will remain in service until 2040s. UK has not
yet determined whether to opt for this improved version.
3.3.2.4 US plans for conventional warheads
for ballistic missiles carry same dual nature/escalation risks
that cruise missiles carry (see above).
3.2.3.5 However, UK extending current capability
may also mean buying into the programme to ensure UK has missiles
available for an extra five years.
3.2.3.6 No evidence to suggest US is looking
at the D5 as a land-based option.
3.3.3 Nuclear Weapons
3.3.3.1 Current UK Warhead Issues
— UK looking at research, capability
and stockpile issues.
— An upgraded warhead would not need
to be re-tested.
— Critical step: the investments in
the AWE at Aldermaston to ensure sufficient support for the current
deterrent system and to retain the capability to develop an upgraded
warhead if the Government requires it.[8]
The current warhead design can be maintained in service at least
into the 2020s, with some relatively minor upgrading and refurbishment
during the first half of the next decade.[9]
3.3.3.2 Reports suggest UK discussing with
US options for more accurate, smaller and cheaper nuclear weapons:
— Part of logic here appears to be
that smaller weapons are potentially more useable, and are therefore
more effective as a deterrent against some of the new threats.
— These should be seen as one component
in a deterrent package.
3.3.4 Conventional Weapons Options
3.3.4.1 As well as the conventional options
noted above, UK could look at other options such as kinetic energy
warheads.
4. TIMELINES
4.1 The UK national strategic deterrent
is a system of systems, including the missile, warhead, the submarine,
and the supporting infrastructure. Extending, upgrading or replacing
these components represent the timeline challenges which are driving
the UK debate.
4.2 Critical decision element: lead time
to design and build a new submarine
4.2.1 The key timeline in this debate relates
to the submarine. Warhead exists already. Missile/s exist already.
Infrastructure support largely in place. No decision yet taken
on the out of service dates for current deterrent platforms.
4.2.2 Can service life of current boats
be extended?
— The key timeline is when HMS Victorious
comes out of service around 2019-20. Victorious is the second
boat in the class, and when she withdraws from service the UK
will no longer be able to carry out Continuous At Sea Deterrence
unless a replacement boat is in service.
— This time period can be extended
if the decision is taken to extend the life of the submarines.
However, extending the life expectancy of current boats by five
years does nothing more than defer the decision.
— If service life of SSBNs is extended
by five years from the current service life of 25 years, whole
system has a life-cycle of up to 30 years.
— Beyond this, meeting UK's safety
requirements for the hulls may require an investment that no longer
delivers value for money given the age of the hulls themselves,
with costs of running the boats increasing and availability likely
to reduce. At that point, building a new boat simply delivers
better value for money.
4.3 Some argue a new submarine design is
needed: others argue that the Astute SSN design could be developed
for an SSBN programme. Key here is what the capability requirement
will be: speed, what weapons/how many, number of tubes. Also,
even though new nuclear reactor cores have been developed (meaning
that cores do not replacing during the life of the submarine),
the propulsion system design may need to be refreshed to ensure
it will still be sufficiently current in the 2050 timeframe.
5. COSTS
5.1 Costs of a replacement (whether by renewal
or refurbishment) cannot be known until a decision is taken and
when programme requirements and parameters are known. Also highly
relevant to cost is the chosen deterrent strategy which will define
among other things the number of warheads and the nature and readiness
of delivery systems.
5.2 Like Polaris before it, Trident came
into service on time and under budget. Trident absorbs around
3-4% of the UK's defence budget for each year.[10]
5.3 Who will foot the bill for any new system?
One the one hand, the UK strategic deterrent is a political tool
that should be paid for by the Government. On the other hand,
allocating the replacement system to the defence budget might
put at risk other key programmes.
5.4 Timelines and costs—potentially
could be reduced by increasing co-operation with the US. However,
significant political issues on both sides here.
6. CONCLUSIONS
6.1 The three key capabilities for a credible
independent deterrent are: a survivable platform; a survivable
weapon system; and the autonomous ability—from a sovereign
platform in international waters, through international airspace
to a point in the sky and on to a latitude/longtitude point on
the Earth's surface—to deliver effect at place and time
of choice.
6.2 Assuming the Government decides that
the UK continues to require a strategic deterrent, a submarine-based
option is the only one which guarantees the survivability which
is fundamental to effective deterrence.
6.3 Dan Plesch argues that "it is unrealistic
to consider that the world can continue indefinitely with uncontrolled
armaments and not see a nuclear war."[11]
However, given the changing nature of the threat, the logical
solution for the UK Government would be to retain a minimum strategic
nuclear deterrent and to deliver a more flexible range of capability
options in the submarine package, while perhaps making a contribution
to disarmament by reducing warhead and missile levels, and while
delivering this capability for the same or less cost than the
original Trident programme.
6.4 Until the decision is no, the UK must
continue to plan as if it is a yes. This includes taking key capability
decisions to ensure system remains current and to ensure all options
are available to Government. If the decision is no, could take
boats out of service today. However, in Government statements
there has been no mention of abolishing capability—only
to "modify, replace, update or diminish", or "reduce".
6.5 Delay in making decision/s also risks
a potential increase in costs. Risk of losing skill base in Barrow.
Hard point of 2019 for when replacement system needs to be in
service, and development and manufacture phase will take a set
amount of time: thus, delay in making decision/s means that assessment
phase may need to be truncated; doing this increases risk and,
possibly too, costs. Any gap in programme also, arguably, denies
UK ability to re-constitute programme in time.
6.6 Defence Industrial Strategy underlines
UK need to retain sufficient—and independent—understanding
of all the elements of a nuclear deterrent, including the complex
weapon systems and platforms (notably submarines) that form a
core part of this capability.
6.7 Given the length of time required to
bring a new system into service, the Government should currently
be at the stage where it is looking to fund concept phase studies,
such as capability and user requirement studies, to define capability
and cost issues for all options, and—if required—developing
a submarine design for a new SSBN.
13 March 2006
1 Any successor system to Trident will be in service
for 30 years from 2020 or so. Back
2
In 2002, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) declared that as
many as 35 states had the knowledge to build nuclear weapons.
In 2005, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to International Atomic
Energy for their work in halting those trying to convert civil
nuclear programmes into military capabilities. Back
3
Under the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the UK withdrew the
air-based WE177 freefall bomb. Back
4
The US has developed four of its Ohio-class submarines for a
conventional role, and is considering adapting its Virginia-class
SSNs to carry SLBMs as well as fitting conventional warheads to
Trident D5 ballistic missiles. Back
5
In combat, several US Tomahawk cruise missiles have been shot
down using surface-to-air missile systems. In test firings, Tomahawks
are regularly tailed by a chase plane, indicating that they can
be tailed and shot down by aircraft. Back
6
This risk, with the implication that the adversary might push
the nuclear button just in case, was precisely the reason why
the US and the Russian Federation gave up their sea-based nuclear
cruise missile programmes under the START negotiations. Back
7
This process includes replacing some specific missile components,
including the re-entry vehicle, or "bus" (see: Youngs,
T & Taylor, C "Trident and the Future of the British
Nuclear Deterrent." House of Commons Standard Note SN/IA/3706.
5 July 2005. pp 11-12; "US Navy to Extend Life of Trident
Force", in Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 1 September
2000). For additional reference, see: House of Commons Select
Committee on Defence. Memorandum Submitted by the Ministry of
Defence. 20 January 2006. Available on-line: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmdfence/835/835m04.htm Back
8
In 2005, the MoD announced a £2 billion upgrade (see: MoD,
Press Notice. "Facilities Upgrade for Atomic Weapons Establishment."
Press notice 146/2005. 19 July 2005; Ingram, Rt Hon Adam, MP.
Response to Written Questions, 7 June 2005, column 464W. Available
on-line: http://www.acronym.org.uk/uk/written.htm). An investment
of a further £5.3 billion had been announced in 2003 (see:
Reid, Rt Hon John, MP. House of Commons Hansard Written
Answers, 3 November 2005, part 7. Available on-line: http://www.publications.parliament.uk).
For further reference, see also: House of Commons Select Committee
on Defence. Memorandum Submitted by the Ministry of Defence. 20
January 2006. Available on-line: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmdfence/835/835m04.htm Back
9
House of Commons Select Committee on Defence. Ibid. Back
10
Trident's acquisition cost reached just under £15 billion,
it has through life costs of around £280 million per year,
and has occasional additional expenditure at Aldermaston and elsewhere.
This gives a total cost of under £25 billion over its potential
30 year life-expectancy. For reference on Trident's acquisition
costs, see: Hansard, 18 Jan 2005-Written Ministerial Statements,
column 27WS. Back
11
Plesch, D (2006). "The Future of Britain's WMD". London:
The Foreign Policy Centre. pi. Back
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