Memorandum from Dr Andrew Dorman
In publishing "Delivering Security in a
Changing World: Defence White Paper" in 2003[24]
Geoff Hoon, the then Secretary of State for Defence, confirmed
that the decision surrounding the replacement of Trident would
have to be addressed in the next parliament. In the meantime a
contract to update and maintain the relevant infrastructure at
the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston was approved.
[25]
Outside the official domain Professor Michael
Clarke published a piece in International Affairs[26]
in which he outlined the likely issues before policy-makers. More
provocatively Michael Portillo, the last Conservative Defence
Secretary, queried the continuing relevance of the nuclear deterrent
in a piece published in The Sunday Times. [27]Apart
from these relatively little has emerged about the current state
of British nuclear thinking and there has been virtually no wider
debate.
Once the debate begins there is a danger that
it will solely focus on the traditional argument about the morality
of nuclear weapons and whether the possession and potential use
of such weapons is legal. Some of those who have spoken in favour
of retention of such a system have spoken of replacing the existing
Trident system with a similar deluxe version again based on submarines.
Whilst the costs of such a system are not known, figures between
£20-40 billion have been quoted. This is not an insignificant
sum and this paper argues that in reviewing the issue of replacing
the existing Trident force the impact on defence, wider government
and the country also needs to be considered. Such a decision is
not cost neutral, a price will have to be pad elsewhere. Put another
way, as the defence debate has moved towards aiming towards effects
based operations and effects based warfare what effect does the
United Kingdom want to achieve and where does a nuclear capability
fit in. In other words are there now better alternatives to achieving
the foreign policy aims of the United Kingdom? And will the cost
associated with acquiring such a system have such an adverse impact
in terms of our other capabilities that it is worth changing the
parameters that currently surround the deterrent?
The original thinking behind the creation and
maintenance of the British deterrent was twofold. Firstly, it
was seen as the only way to counter-balance the threat posed by
the Soviet Union. Indeed, when in 1980 the decision was taken
to replace the previous strategic nuclear system the rationale
used to acquire the Trident system was based on the need to satisfy
the "Moscow Criteria"[28]—the
ability to threatened to inflict sufficient damage on Moscow and
a number of other Soviet cities at any time of the day, 365 days
of the year, and thus deter the Soviet Union from any act of aggression
against the United Kingdom. This was the main reason for the then
government rejecting the idea of the then SDP who argued in favour
of a force of SSNs equipped with nuclear armed cruise missiles.
Such a force would have had to be distinct from the existing SSN
force to remain constantly available and there were fears that
improvements in Soviet air defences might make such a capability
redundant.
Critics who argued that the United Kingdom could
rely on extended deterrence provided by the United States and
did not need its own deterrent were countered with the argument
that the United Kingdom provided a second centre of decision-making
and thus complicated Soviet decision-making in this area.
Now the Soviet Union is no more and whilst Russia
retains a significant nuclear arsenal few envisage its use against
the United Kingdom. Moreover, even Russia's conventional capability
no longer threatens Britain's interests as those of the Soviet
Union once did. In fact the more likely threat comes through trans-national
crime and the use of energy supplies as a bargaining tool.
The requirement therefore to maintain the "Moscow
Criteria" has gone in the short to medium term and this partially
explains why those who favour the replacement of the existing
Trident force with a similar unnamed system have also suggested
that such a force could also be equipped to carry Tomahawk cruise
missiles and even special forces to provide additional value for
money. The danger of this route is that the different roles might
not be conducive. For example, in the Special Forces role how
close inshore would we be prepared to let a ballistic missile
submarine go? To what degree would we be prepared to run risks
of it being detected to support this role?
In place of the Soviet Union the two principal
threats to the United Kingdom have been identified as the rise
of international terrorism, represented by the likes of al Qaeda,
and the acquisition by so-called "Rogue States", to
use American parlance, of weapons of mass destruction. [29]
Both these scenarios present problems for those
in Britain committed to the retention of a nuclear capability.
The likes of al Qaeda are unlikely to be deterred by a nuclear
deterrent. For a start the frequent absence of a geographical
base means that such a deterrent has nothing to be targeted at.
Moreover, the relative indiscriminate nature of the current deterrent
means even if such a target were to appear the use of nuclear
as opposed to conventional munitions would seem unlikely. Moreover,
it is hard to imagine a situation where a British government opts
to use nuclear weapons and an American administration does not.
If a nuclear weapons were to be used then a smaller more precise
system-so called "mini-nukes" would be far more relevant.
The Rogue States argument appears to have greater
salience and has therefore received greater support. Whilst the
United Kingdom has not named any particular states the traditional
argument goes that such a state might threaten to use a weapon
of mass destruction against Britain or its forces. Britain therefore
needs to be able to deter such a regime and that it is therefore
sensible to continue to maintain a nuclear capability. Again the
idea of dependence on the United States is again rejected and
the assumption is made that whilst the regime may be rogue it
does accept the concept of deterrence and thus act in a rational
manner. If this argument is accepted the need for a Trident type
system is also questionable. These "Rogue States" will
at best threaten our large urban conurbations via relatively crude
devices. They will not be looking to or have the capability to
conduct pre-emptive first strikes against our nuclear capabilities.
In other words the requirements to have an assured second strike
by the United Kingdom are far less than they previously were.
This means levels of alert and dispersal procedures can actually
be scaled down and alternative platforms to submarines could be
considered.
If the requirement is only to have the capacity
to reconstitute the "Moscow Criteria" in the long term
whilst retaining a capability to deal with Rogue States then there
are a range of cheaper alternatives. For example, arming cruise
missiles with nuclear warheads would provide a far cheaper solution
and allow for the retention of key nuclear skills. Platforms for
such weapons could include submarines, surface ships or indeed
aircraft. Here it is worth noting that the RAF has recently accepted
the Storm Shadow missile into service in the conventional role.
Such a force would not necessarily have to be retained on constant
patrol but could, in the long term, be developed into such a role
if the international situation deteriorated. More far-reaching
would be to maintain a virtual nuclear arsenal similar to the
Japanese capability. There have been a number of estimates ranging
from 6-24 months about how long it would take Japan to build a
nuclear capability if it so wished. Japan has a civil nuclear
programme and advanced rocket technology. Likewise the United
Kingdom would retain its design teams and invest in maintain the
capacity to build and reconstitute its nuclear force but not actually
have one day to day. This would clearly be quite radical; it would
also send a significant diplomatic signal to those contemplating
acquiring their own system.
This leads onto the second reason why the Attlee
Government decided to develop a nuclear capability in the late
1940s. At the time such weapons also brought with them a degree
of prestige. Nuclear weapons represented cutting edge technology
and, as 1948 Defence White Paper stated "the United Kingdom,
as a member of the British Commonwealth and a Great Power, must
be prepared at all times to fulfil her responsibility not only
to the United Nations but also to herself." [30]Indeed
the Iranian argument about its "civil" programme follows
similar lines of argument. The irony for the United Kingdom is
that this argument still remains at the heart of the deterrent
debate. Although the technology is now very dated, there is a
clear disconnect in government policy. On the one hand it wants
to discourage proliferation of nuclear weaponry to further states
and on the other is not prepared to relinquish its own capability.
When pushed and off the record policy-makers and indeed by implication
some ministers indicate that ultimately nationalism and the traditional
rivalry with France that prevents the relinquishing of such a
capability. Put another way whilst France retains such a capability
so must the United Kingdom and it must also be a Rolls Royce one
at that.
Such arguments not only commits successive British
Government to the maintenance of the relevant nuclear infrastructure
but it also means that the defence budget over the next decade
or so will consequently have less resources available for the
conventional side of defence. The reality for Britain's defence
planners is that financial resources are finite and any investment
in a replacement for the Trident force will mean that there will
be fewer resources available for other conventional capabilities
which may actually be pertinent for dealing with these threats.
In other words, does a Trident replacement provide more political
effect for its investment than other elements such as additional
infantry battalions, new aircraft carriers or more combat aircraft?
For many within defence today it is this resource issue that is
beginning to raise queries about the utility of the nuclear deterrent
and not the moral argument.
Yet few within government seem prepared to openly
challenge the existing orthodoxy. Today the world has changed
fundamentally and it would seem appropriate to really debate what
role such a deterrent plays. Within the increasingly diminishing
defence field there is comparatively little thought given to the
nuclear issue as attention has focused on other areas. In Ministry
of Defence the issue of corporate memory is growing as an issue
as military and civil service fast-streamers compete to see who
can move jobs more often. As a result, the nuclear submariners
tend to dominate nuclear thinking and institutionally they are
the least likely to suggest change.
Within the Labour government memories of the
wilderness years of the 1980s remain strong. Unilateralism is
a scar that remains sore within the party and no Labour leader
is likely to want to open that wound. It would seem that only
with a cross-party consensus could such a change be made and that
does not look favourable at present.
Outside government CND stick to their moral
opposition to nuclear weapons and remain marginalised. Within
the wider academic arena the defence community has shrunk with
the end of the Cold War. In a sense as the debate became less
and less relevant those engaged in it slowly vanished.
It therefore looks as though we will blindly
head towards replacing the existing Trident system with a similar
model, if the Americans will sell us one without really considering
why we are doing so.
In a Department of State that regularly refers
to the need to engage in effects based operations we may well
be wise to consider what effect we are seeking to achieve and
at what price. Does the retention of such a capability confirm
greatness or merely reflect a desire to dwell in the past?
8 March 2006
24 "Delivering Security in a Changing World:
Defence White Paper", Cm 6,041-I, (London: TSO, 2003), p
9. Back
25
Geoff Hoon, House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, Statement
on "Delivering Security in a Changing World: Future Capabilities",
21 July 2004, col 348. Back
26
Michael Clarke, "Does my bomb look big in this? Britain's
nuclear choices after Trident", International Affairs,
vol 80, no 1, January 2004, pp 49.62. Back
27
Michael Portillo, "Does Britain need nuclear missiles? No.
Scrap them", Sunday Times, 19 June 2005. Back
28
John Baylis, "British Nuclear Doctrine: the `Moscow Criteria'
and the Polaris Improvement Programme" Contemporary British
History, vol 19, no 1, Spring 2005, pp 53-65. Back
29
"Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White
Paper", Cm 6,041-I, (London: TSO, 2003), p 4. Back
30
"Statement Relating to Defence, 1948," Cm 7,327, (London:
HMSO, 1948), reprinted in Brassey's Naval Annual, edited by Rear
Admiral H G Thursfield, (London: William Clowes and Sons Ltd,
1948), p 528. Back
| 
