House of Commons - Defence - Written Evidence

Select Committee on Defence Written Evidence

Memorandum from Professor John Baylis

1. INTRODUCTION1.1 This paper focuses on a number of key questions and issues relating to the future of the British nuclear deterrent. In line with the issues to be discussed in the first inquiry to be held by the House of Commons Defence Committee the paper considers the timing of the decision on a possible replacement for Trident, the kinds of threats the deterrent is designed to deal with, how these threats might change in the period up to 2025, and the range of states and non-state actors that might acquire nuclear weapons in the same time period. There is no discussion of the alternative options that might be considered. It is assumed that this will be the subject of a separate inquiry.

2. THE TIMING OF THE DECISION

2.1 The Defence Secretary, John Reid, made it clear in his statement to the House of Commons on 4 July 2005 that: "Decisions on any replacement of the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent are likely to be necessary in the lifetime of the current parliament." [31]This statement appears to emerge from the fact that the first Trident submarine (Vanguard) entered service in late 1994 and has a projected lifespan of 30 years. If this is assumed to be correct, Vanguard will be due for de-commissioning in 2024. At this point the force as a whole will lose significant credibility as a deterrent because it will no longer be possible to guarantee one submarine on permanent patrol. Given that the timescale for decision to deployment for Trident was 14 years, it is likely that a decision on a replacement will have to be taken by 2010 at the latest. [32]

2.2 It could be, however, that the decision is more imminent than that. In his statement on 4 July 2005 John Reid said, not only that it was the government's intention to retain the minimum nuclear deterrent, but that the present force would last between "10 and 20 years".[33] If the lowest of these estimates turned out to be true Trident submarines might need to be de-commissioned from 2015. If this were so, it would probably already be too late to develop a wholly new force. Under circumstances such as these, the government's options would be constrained significantly, and might have to involve extending the life of the Trident system.

2.3 If however, as seems more likely, Vanguard can be kept in service until at least 2024, the government has two to three years to consider the various options available in detail before coming to a decision. Given that the next election could be in 2010, it would seem prudent that a decision should be made sometime in 2008 or 2009. [34]In part this might be dictated not only by domestic political circumstances in Britain, but also the next American election. If it is assumed that the present Bush administration might be favourably disposed towards providing Britain with a follow-on to Trident, it might make sense for the government to secure a deal before a new President takes office. Given that the US Presidential election is in November 2008, this might suggest the need for a decision by 2007 or early 2008.

3. THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT AND THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

3.1 Public statements about the role of nuclear weapons in countering threats to British national security tend to be unspecific. The Defence White Paper of 2003, Delivering Security in a Changing World argues that:

"the continuing risk from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the certainty that a number of other countries will retain substantial nuclear arsenals mean that our minimum nuclear deterrent, currently represented by Trident, is likely to remain a necessary element of our security."

The White Paper also argues that nuclear weapons remain the ultimate guarantor of the UK's national security. What this suggests is a government belief that nuclear weapons continue to have significant utility, both in security and political terms. Although the Trident force is no longer targeted against any particular state, there appears to be a belief in the value of "existential deterrence". Despite the end of the Cold War and the progress made in establishing a new relationship with Russia, this may well reflect a judgement, in some quarters, that Russia remains a major nuclear power whose future direction is uncertain. For those whose responsibility it is to think in terms of worst-case scenarios, concerns about Chinese nuclear weapons and the possibility of changes in regime in other nuclear powers no doubt also justifies the need for "a just-in-case" deterrent capability.

3.2 The emergence of terrorist groups, who appear to be quite prepared to inflict maximum damage and kill thousands of people in the name of their cause, also raises the question of whether nuclear weapons have any role to play in countering such threats to national security. In January 2006 President Chirac announced that French nuclear forces had already been reconfigured to allow them to destroy the "power centres" of any state which sponsored a major terrorist attack on France. [36]The clear message was that nuclear deterrence had a role to play in the "war against terrorism". States that sponsored and directly supported terrorist groups were warned that they risked a nuclear attack. The British government has not made a similar declaration but it would be surprising if debates about the need for nuclear weapons in such an anti-terrorist role had not taken place amongst defence officials.

3.3 There has been some speculation in the press that new facilities have been built at Aldermaston in order to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons that could be used in a tactical role. [37]This follows speculation that the United States is developing "smaller and more specialised nuclear warheads that could be used against hardened or underground targets, perhaps to destroy chemical or biological weapons agents in the possession of so-called rogue states", that might be linked to organisations like Al Qaeda. The government, however, has dismissed these rumours, arguing that the work being undertaken was designed to ensure the reliability and safety of British nuclear weapons. [38]It remains clear, however, that the continuing close nuclear partnership with the United States and on-going discussions on nuclear matters with France, means that the government intends, at least, to keep its options open on the question of developing nuclear weapons which could, under certain circumstances have a role to play in the "war on terrorism". Its approach, however, may well be more ambiguous than either that of the US or France. [39]

3.4 It is, of course, also clear that the notion that a new generation of either strategic or tactical nuclear weapons is necessary because of an uncertain future, will be opposed by various sections of society. Many nuclear opponents will agree with the sentiments expressed by the back bench Labour MP, Paul Flynn, when he argued that:

"To have a nuclear deterrent now—where these Trident submarines wander the oceans with missiles aimed at nothing—is a meaningless proposition . . . . I cannot think of any conceivable use that (British) nuclear weapons could have . . . .

There are also those who argue that "nuclear weapons are of no help when it comes to responding to terrorism" and there is concern that a new generation of nuclear weapons will undermine Article 6 of the Non Proliferation Treaty. [41]What this suggests is that in the run-up to the decision, as in the past, there is likely to be a lively public debate and a rejection in some quarters of the argument that there are conceivable threats that require a continuation of a British nuclear deterrent.

4. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN THE PERIOD UP TO 2025

4.1 The outcome of the public debates about future threats depends, in part at least, on the perception of likely nuclear proliferation over the next 20 years. The problem is that past projections of nuclear proliferation, particularly those in the 1960s, have often proved to be somewhat inaccurate. That difficulty, however, should not prevent an informed debate about the most likely patterns of nuclear (as well as chemical and biological) weapons proliferation.

4.2 One useful source for this debate is The Lugar Survey On Proliferation: Threats and Responses published in June 2005. [42]This report is based on 85 responses to a Survey on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The responses came from a wide range of international experts from a variety of fields, including scholars, policy makers, diplomats and technicians. In particular, they were asked about nations that would be added to the nuclear club in the next five, 10 and 20 years and the risks of nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological attack during the same time periods. The final Report was produced by Senator Richard Lugar, the Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Lugar has a respected reputation on matters relating to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

4.3 What follows highlights some of the findings of this poll of experts.

— The average estimate of a nuclear attack occurring "somewhere in the world" in the next five years was 16.4%, rising to 29% in the next 10 years.

— The estimates of the risks of a biological or chemical attack during the same periods was judged to be comparable to, or slightly higher than, the risk of a nuclear attack. The risk of a radiological attack, however, was seen as significantly higher. The average risk was 27% over the next five years and as high as 40% over the 10 year period.

— The survey responses suggested that the estimated combined risk of a WMD attack over five years is 50% and over a 10 year period it was as high as 70%.

— It was argued that there was also, "strong though not universal, agreement that a nuclear attack is more likely to be carried out by a terrorist than by a government in the next 10 years."

— "There was a split 45% to 55% on whether terrorists were more likely to obtain an intact working nuclear weapon or manufacture one after obtaining weapons grade nuclear material."

— Perhaps not surprisingly one of the most immediate concerns amongst those polled was the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran. One participant noted that Iran's programme "will have a highly destabilising impact on the region, and accelerate similar efforts by Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and other regimes."

— Senator Lugar himself argues that the findings of this Survey reinforce the need to "strengthen non-proliferation efforts, improve safeguards around existing weapons and materials, bolster intelligence gathering and interdiction capabilities, and expand international co-operation in dealing with a threat that should deeply concern all governments and peoples." The implication of this is that if these measures can be introduced the scale of the threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can be reduced. To what extent this might be possible is not discussed. It should be noted, however, that the utility of the Non-proliferation treaty appears to be in significant decline.

5. CONCLUSION

5.1 These estimates no doubt can, and will, be questioned given the uncertainties and assumptions surrounding any attempt to predict the future. What is clear, however, is that although UK policies will have some impact on the process of proliferation, that impact will be very limited indeed. This is not to say that the government should not play a significant role in trying to stem the tide of proliferation. Clearly it should. No doubt, a decision to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons or to extend the life of the Trident force, will be seen by some states and non-state actors (as well as domestic opponents of nuclear weapons) as hypocritical. It has to be accepted that such a decision may in itself in some ways contribute to proliferation (although the reasons why states acquire weapons of mass destruction are complex and mostly unrelated to what a British government might decide. Such unintended outcomes, however, must themselves be set against a broader understanding of what is in the national security interest.

5.2 Given that it is likely that a decision on the future of Trident is likely to be made sometime in the next three years, it is important that there is a comprehensive public debate about how national and international security interests are enhanced or undermined by a decision to maintain the British minimum nuclear deterrent, as well as by the more technical issue of what form that deterrent force might take.

8 February 2006