Memorandum from Scottish Campaign for
Nuclear Disarmament
1. The nuclear weapons deployed on Vanguard Class
submarines today are not in service because of specific or generic
threats to the United Kingdom. Britain has nuclear weapons not
because of a conscious decision that they are needed, but because
there has been no thorough review of nuclear policy since the
end of the Cold War. Scrapping Trident was not an option in the
Strategic Defence Review of 1998.
2. The Trident system was purchased because of
concern about a threat from the Soviet Union. The main danger
was seen as an assault by Soviet conventional forces. The US sold
Trident on the understanding that Britain would substantially
upgrade its conventional forces. [57]The
agreement was also linked to approval of plans to expand the American
base in Diego Garcia.
3. The focus of Defence policy today is on "terrorism".
Al Qaeda are more likely to provoke a nuclear attack than to be
deterred by the threat of one. The claim that nuclear weapons
might be used against a country supplying nuclear weapons to terrorists
is also flawed. Such an assault would be based on the judgement
of the same intelligence agencies which missed Iraq's destruction
of all its chemical and biological weapons.
4. There is a real danger of proliferation. But
it is wrong to claim that this is a new problem that has replaced
the threats perceived during the Cold War. Nuclear proliferation,
as it has been seen in the past, was almost entirely a by-product
of East-West tension. The idea that American, NATO and British
nuclear weapons have a role to play in countering proliferation
is a myth created in the early 1990s to rationalise the continued
retention of substantial nuclear arsenals.
5. Most of the member countries of the United
Nations have concluded that there are no substantive benefits
from the possession of nuclear weapons, certainly none that justify
their enormous cost. For most nations the taboo on nuclear use
has been strengthened over time. If a British government were
to order the use of nuclear weapons against a country that had
recently acquired or sought to develop the bomb the domestic and
international political repercussions would be immense. The radiological
and political fallout would be catastrophic. Consequently any
threat to launch such an attack would not be credible. This is
most clearly seen in the pretence that Britain might make a nuclear
response to a chemical or biological attack. Because nuclear weapons
are so much more destructive this would be an unacceptable escalation.
6. The Foreign Office has described its effort
to tackle Weapons of Mass Destruction in the following terms—"Our
work over the year has focused on implementing existing multilateral
treaties, which are the cornerstone of international counter-proliferation
efforts".[58]
This should remain the focus of efforts to tackle proliferation
in future decades. A key part of this is Britain's commitment
to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date
and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective control." [59]This
legal undertaking should form the bedrock of the review of the
future of British nuclear weapons.
7. During the Cold War Britain was presented
as a second centre of nuclear decision-making, so the potential
to use nuclear weapons independently was deliberately exaggerated.
Today the Ministry of Defence conceals the extent to which Trident
is operationally dependent on the United States. This has distorted
political debate, which is often based on a false premise of independence.
8. The Mutual Defence Agreement and the Polaris
Sales Agreement severely constrain the circumstances in which
British nuclear weapons can be used. The dependence on American
hardware and software is a further restriction. It is conceivable
that British nuclear weapons could play a small role in an American
nuclear assault. They could also be used as a proxy, in place
of US weapons. But a genuinely independent nuclear attack is not
a real option.
9. It is extremely unlikely that the world will
return to a situation resembling that of the 1970s. Even if it
did, Britain's possession of nuclear arms would only contribute
to the dangers of nuclear Armageddon. America and Russia are expected
to substantially reduce their nuclear arsenals. American forces
are likely to be much more capable than their Russian counterparts.
There is no significant prospect that Russian conventional forces
will be a major threat.
10. The nuclear triangle of India, Pakistan and
China is a cause of concern. Israel's possession of nuclear weapons
is a danger and encourages proliferation. But none of these countries
has nuclear weapons in order to threaten Britain.
11. It is possible, but by no means inevitable,
that in 2025 there will be nuclear-armed nations in the world.
It is extremely unlikely that any of these countries will retain
or acquire nuclear arms in order to attack or threaten Britain.
British nuclear weapons do not and will not make a positive contribution
to tackling the issues arising from the nuclear arsenals of India-Pakistan-China
or the Middle East. These countries use Britain's possession of
nuclear weapons to counter the international community's attempts
to persuade them to disarm. They echo the language that we use—India
talks of its "minimum deterrent". The current debate
on British nuclear weapons is reported in Asia and the Middle
East. Britain's nuclear capability is a factor in the retention
of these arsenals—but it plays no role in countering them.
12. In 1996 the International Court of Justice
came close to saying that it would be illegal to threaten to use
nuclear weapons in all circumstance. Replacing Trident cannot
be logically consistent with the Advisory Opinion. If the Opinion
is followed then a threat to use nuclear weapons could only be
considered when the survival of Britain as a state was at risk,
not in other circumstances when vital or supreme national interests
were at stake. Even then the threat might well be contrary to
the rules of international law. [60]There
is only the possibility of legality in a narrow set of circumstances
that are very unlikely to arise. The use of British weapons to
bolster an American nuclear strike would almost certainly not
comply with these restrictions.
13. Behind the gloss of "deterrence"
is a threat to use indiscriminate Weapons of Mass Destruction.
An essential element of deterrence is that we are prepared to
create the impression that a Prime Minister might irrationally
and vindictively launch nuclear missiles, knowing that this would
result in the deaths of very large numbers of civilians. [61]
14. In assessing the future strategic situation
consideration should be given to the Scottish factor. A recent
opinion poll indicated that 78% of Scots were opposed to buying
new nuclear missiles to replace Trident. [62]There
are substantial pressures for independence. Whether or not this
is achieved it is likely that the Scottish Parliament will acquire
more power in future decades.
15. On 26 April 1974 Henry Kissinger discussed
plans for Chevaline with the British Cabinet Secretary, Sir John
Hunt. They agreed that the £1 billion upgrade to Polaris
would be kept secret. Sir John said "We will say nothing.
If there are leaks or gossip that Ministers have to answer, we
will say something banal about taking all steps necessary to maintain
the credibility of an independent nuclear deterrent".[63]
There is a need to challenge the banal language which today conceals
both the modernisation of Trident and the irrationality of British
nuclear policy.
16. Britain should not replace or upgrade Trident.
We should discourage proliferation and enhance the nuclear taboo
by dismantling the nuclear weapons currently in service.
6 March 2006
57 Memorandum from Jim Thomson for Zbigniew Brzezinski
on US and French Nuclear Programs with attached drafts of letters
to be exchanged, National Security Council 29 May 1980. Declassified
12 February 1999. Back
58
Strategic Priorities, Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Back
59
Non Proliferation Treaty Article VI. Back
60
The President of the Court made it clear that the lack of a clear
decision in the case where the very survival of the state was
at stake should not be interpreted as a "half-open door to
recognition of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear armaments"
President Bedaoui, Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat
or use of Nuclear Weapons, International Court of Justice, 8 July
1996. Back
61
The need to present irrational and vindictive impression was
revealed in The Essentials of Post War Deterrence, US Strategic
Advisory Group, 1995. Back
62
System Three poll April 2005. Back
63
White House Memorandum of Conversation 1.25-2.45 pm, 26 April
1974, Eighth Floor Dining Room, Department of State. Declassified
1 August 2000. Back
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