Memorandum from Dr Eric Grove
1. The reason that the future of the British
nuclear deterrent is now an issue is a direct result of the expected
service lives of the "Vanguard" class nuclear powered
ballistic missile firing submarines (SSBNs). On current plans
these are expected to be in need of replacement after 25 years,
in other words between 2019 and 2024. Given the snail-like pace
of current defence programmes, decisions thus have to be taken
soon if a replacement platform and/or system are required to take
over by then. This paper questions this assumption and argues
that a decision to replace the basic architecture of the current
nuclear force may not be required for another two decades or so.
2. Currently the United Kingdom leases a portion
of the US stockpile of D-5 missiles. It might be questioned whether
this arrangement will continue for the next two decades, but,
given the current very close strategic partnership between the
USA and the UK and the assumption of a semi-permanent close transatlantic
relationship that underpins the entire defence programme, this
can probably be taken as a given. D-5 missiles will be available
until 2042, thanks to the Life Extension(LE) programme being undertaken.
New financial arrangements would be required. In 2002 the Government
said it had no plans at that time to purchase the new missiles,
but such a programme would not be too financially onerous compared
with other replacement options. The provision of missiles is thus
not a serious problem. Commonality with the Americans would be
maintained and the key argument for Britain going for D-5 in the
first place vindicated.
3. The controlling factor is the life span of
the submarines to carry the missiles. The key point on this issue
is whether this is governed by safety standards or by practical
safety. British nuclear submarines are part of a very rigorous
safety regime that is more integrated with civilian standards
than the system that governs the more autonomous United States
Navy. The latter seems not to be as conservative as the Ministry
of Defence in considering the life-span of its SSBNs.
4. The US Navy is now planning on a service life
of 45 years for its "Ohio" class SSBNs, almost twice
that of the British "Vanguards". The American boats
are having their reactors re-cored as part of an impressive "service
life extension programme" (SLEP). This would seem to be an
attractive option for the United Kingdom also; it is at least
worthy of detailed investigation. SSBNs have relatively easy lives
compared to SSNs and their hulls should not have suffered too
much strain. Work to strengthen them to extend their life span
on the American pattern should not be too expensive. Similarly
the more modern British reactor designs have a longer expected
life; the latest cores are expected to last 25 years.
5. The combination of "SLEP-ed" Vanguards
carrying D-5LE missiles would keep the highly credible and flexible
Trident force operational until about 2040. Reports that somehow
submarines will be more detectable in the 2020s and 2030s should
be treated with considerable reserve. The SSBN remains relatively
the least vulnerable platform and the ballistic missile relatively
the most effective nuclear delivery means in all foreseeable technological
circumstances. The blurring of nuclear with other platforms and
systems should be avoided for strategic and crisis management
reasons.
6. Aldermaston could continue its current work
on "Reliable Replacement Warheads" for British Trident
with perhaps further new developments (eg more yield options)
to exploit improvements in D-5LE's guidance. The SLEP work would
also help maintain Britain's nuclear submarine infrastructure.
7. Conclusion. Given American plans to keep the
Trident D-5 force operational until the 2040s there is no pressing
need to abandon or replace Trident D-5 as Britain's nuclear force.
A British service life extension programme (SLEP) for the "Vanguards"
should be as practical as it is for the American "Ohios"
and there is no reason to believe that access to life extended
D-5s would be denied. This would mean that decisions on any "replacement
for Trident" can be delayed until about 2025.
6 March 2006
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