House of Commons - Defence - Written Evidence

Select Committee on Defence Written Evidence

Memorandum from British American Security Information Council (BASIC)

THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

1.1 The nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and the possibility of access to such weapons through failed states or "rogue" regimes, is the dominant strategic context or world-view. Maintaining overwhelming superior military capabilities against any potential opponent remains the dominant US-led Western response.

1.2 There are important transatlantic differences between perceptions of future threats and how to respond to them.

1.3 It is universally acknowledged that nuclear weapons provide no security against independent non-state actors, such as terrorist organisations, threatening strategic attacks.

1.4 The recognition of the non-military nature of many future threats is not yet adequately matched by the response, which remains reactive and dominated by military instruments. Nuclear weapons provide no contribution to the necessary international actions to address these issues.

1.5 The crux of the present debate is between those who have faith in collective security provided by international organisations (NATO, EU, OSCE and the United Nations) combined with conventional national military and policing resources, and those who consider that, ultimately, Britain's security can only be guaranteed at the national level, including retention of a nuclear insurance policy against possible and undefined future threats.

1.6 A key underlying assumption of the British government is that the multilateral global non-proliferation regime is unable to deter hostile states or terrorists from acquiring WMD. But while today's proliferation challenges are real and acute, the track record in uncovering, confronting and reversing proliferation with established tools is actually quite strong.

1.7 Nuclear weapons remain the gravest danger and our most urgent task is to head off this danger by strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and expanding and accelerating implementation of Cooperative Threat Reduction Programmes.

1.8 Replacing Trident effectively entails permanent possession and therefore an abrogation of our treaty responsibilities and sends a clear message to aspirant nuclear powers that the UK continued to attach strategic and political importance to nuclear weapons. It would encourage states with far greater and immediate strategic threats to their vital interests and territorial integrity than the UK to go down the nuclear route.

1.9 The extent to which Britain becomes vulnerable to future shocks in the international system, or from terrorists armed with unconventional weapons, depends less on the possession of nuclear weapons, than on the reliability of our collective security arrangements: the US-UK bilateral relationship and our membership of regional security organisations (NATO and OSCE), the EU, United Nations and other global frameworks (such as the Commonwealth). These arrangements are robust and provide a formidable non-nuclear insurance policy.

TIMETABLE FOR DECISION-MAKING

1.10 The timing of any decision over replacement will be determined by the expected life of the current system and the lead-time for deploying any new system. The current system involves a number of components, but the determining factors are the submarine hulls and the missiles.

1.11 We assume that the favoured option will be a replacement like-for-like. That is to say, that it will be based upon a US submarine-launched ballistic missile delivery system, requiring similar features to the existing system, although components would use state-of-the-art technology. There are very good reasons for this assumption.

1.12 Past experience shows that many of the irrevocable steps towards new nuclear weapons are taken well before any formal decision is put before Parliament. We recommend that before any decision is taken the Government undertake a comprehensive Strategic Security and Defence Review.

1.13 The decision as to whether to replace Trident could be delayed for at least a further 10 years until 2019.

BASIC

The British American Security Information Council (BASIC) is an independent research organisation that analyses government policies and promotes public awareness of defence, disarmament, military strategy and nuclear policies in order to foster informed debate. BASIC has offices in London and in Washington and its governing Council includes former US ambassadors, academics and politicians. Further information is available on our website: http://www.basicint.org

1. THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

Terrorism is a dominant factor in current strategic calculations

2.1 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War left the United States as the sole hegemonic power, and smaller regional powers and non-state actors competing for influence in a diverse and fluid security environment. This competition for power has thrown up a range of "new" and "asymmetric" military threats. Of these threats, as the 2003 Defence White Paper recognises, "international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD represent the most direct threats to our peace and security".[64]

2.2 It is also important to recognise that there is a clear link between how we deal with today's threats and the type of strategic environment we will face in the future. For example, if we plan and prepare for a "Long War" against international terrorism, using policies that inflame the very root causes of terrorism, then the future strategic environment is likely to be dominated by "catastrophic terrorism".

2.3 Strategic circumstances and political goals have changed markedly since the end of the Cold War, largely as a result of US security leadership. The US National Security Strategy released in September 2002 redefined the threat to US security as the nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and the possibility of access to such weapons through failed states or "rogue" regimes. Other parties to the transatlantic alliance have also begun to endorse this emerging world-view. For example, in the foreword to the 2003 UK Defence White Paper, the former Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, states that "the threats posed by international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are starker, as are the risks to wider security posed by failed or failing states".

2.4 Looking back at the last four years, has the link between terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and failed states been established with undue haste? The attacks of 9/11 involved no "WMD" and the use of "WMD" by terrorists (eg sporadic attacks using anthrax and sarin) has had a limited effect. One of the most controversial issues during the Cold War was the deliberate and continuous inflation of the Soviet threat by the US military that allowed for the emergence of a US "war economy", with wide sections of the community directly dependent on a high rate of defence spending, playing upon the ongoing atmosphere of fear; fear of the Soviets and of universal nuclear immolation. There continues an obsession with maintaining overwhelming superior capabilities against any potential opponent, a posture that inevitably drives arms races and consequent insecurity.

2.5 Fast-forward 25 years, and the now seemingly "permanent war economy" of the United States has spawned a defence budget of $522 billion in 2006 (48% of global military expenditure, and alongside spending by the UK, France and Germany amounting to 60%).[65] Fear of terrorism has supplanted fear of communism in the American heartlands; and nuclear mutual assured destruction (MAD) has morphed into the chilling threat of biological, chemical and even nuclear weapons, the trinity of so-called WMD, in the hands of "rogue states" or non-state actors (terrorist groups). This, in turn, has given rise, under the rubric of counter-proliferation, to a doctrine of waging preventive war (often mistakenly referred to as "pre-emptive war"), striking emerging threats before they emerge. The UN High Level Panel Group points out that this is a doctrine indistinguishable from outright aggression and has no legal justification.

2.6 There are important transatlantic differences between perceptions of future threats and how to respond to them. The EU Security Strategy, formally adopted by the member states in December 2003, asserts that, "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history". In contrast, the introduction to the US National Security Strategy states that:

"Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government. Today, that task has changed dramatically . . . shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organised to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us".

2.7 Nonetheless, threat perceptions are converging, evidenced by the EU document identifying terrorism, proliferation of WMD and failed states and organised crime as "three key threats", which are "more diverse, less visible and less predictable" than the "now improbable threat of large scale aggression against any member state".[66]

2.8 It is universally acknowledged that nuclear weapons provide no security against independent non-state actors, such as terrorist organisations, threatening strategic attacks. Tony Blair has himself highlighted this: "I do not think that anyone pretends that the independent nuclear deterrent is a defence against terrorism".[67] Nuclear deterrent postures are also problematic even against those asymmetric threats strongly linked to states. This is because, to be credible, threats of retaliation require clear proof of guilt by association, and a willingness to inflict large-scale casualties against populations that may not themselves be aware of any such links.

2.9 Alongside these new and asymmetric military threats the post-Cold War era has also seen the emergence of a range of non-military challenges that further threaten the stability and security of the international community. It is a welcome development that the UK government is beginning to place more importance on "soft" security issues, such as population pressure, environmental stress, energy supplies, and weak or failed states. However, this recognition of the non-military nature of many future threats is not yet adequately matched by the response, which remains reactive and dominated by military instruments. [68]

2.10 Nuclear weapons provide no contribution to the necessary international actions to address these issues. Indeed, a strong case can be made that British possession weakens our ability to respond, because our capability to launch a nuclear attack on anyone without warning undermines trust in both directions.

2.11 The end of the Cold War has also brought opportunities for countries to operate collectively to overcome conflict and to promote democracy and freedom. This is an approach clearly acknowledged in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's (FCO) 2003 Strategy White Paper, which noted that the UK's "security and prosperity depend on the willingness of other states to cooperate in an international system based on the rule of law and shared principles." [69]If the British government is to play a leadership role in a global project building stability, peace, sustainability and a world order based upon the universal observance of international law a review of all its policies to ensure consistency with such a project is required.

2.12 It is with these strategic and non-military challenges in mind; and the UK government's ability to successfully meet these challenges in line with published policy objectives and strategies, that the future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent must be evaluated and assessed.

Nuclear proliferation—what does the future hold?

2.13 As the 2003 Defence White Paper notes "There are currently no major military threats to the UK or NATO"[70] and ". . . it is now clear that we no longer need to retain a capability against the re-emergence of a direct conventional strategic threat to the United Kingdom or our allies." [71]However, in Trident the UK continues to retain a "defensive" nuclear deterrent. This deterrent is not targeted and as such is retained as a political rather than military tool in the immediate term. This is confirmed by Tim Hare, the former MoD Director for Nuclear Policy thus: ". . . nuclear weapons . . . have no function as war fighting weapons or to achieve lesser military objectives." [72]

2.14 Thus, with the demise of the Soviet Union it is widely accepted that Trident has no military or deterrence role today. The argument for Britain's continued possession of nuclear weapons lies in future uncertainty. The crux of the present debate is between those who have faith in collective security provided by international organisations (NATO, EU, OSCE and the United Nations) combined with conventional national military and policing resources, and those who consider that, ultimately, Britain's security can only be guaranteed at the national level, including retention of a nuclear insurance policy against possible and undefined future threats. Unpredictable future shocks to the international system are a certainty. However, it is important that strategic planners are not over-influenced by highly unlikely and bizarre future threat scenarios, particularly if the insurance policy itself is expensive and presents its own dangers.

2.15 So what are the threats? Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are constantly in the news these days. The war against Iraq was premised largely on the concern that Iraq already had a large and growing stockpile of unconventional weapons and would not be easily deterred from using them. Efforts to stop North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons have made little progress. Concerns are mounting about the nature of Iran's nuclear programme. And recent revelations that Pakistani scientists were illicitly selling nuclear weapons technology within a far-reaching black market has reduced confidence in existing efforts to contain proliferation.

2.16 A key underlying assumption, especially among the current US administration and some of its allies (including the British government), is that the multilateral global non-proliferation regime is unable to deter hostile states or terrorists from acquiring these weapons. [73]This alleged failure is said to be partly due to the unwillingness of the international community to take action against treaty violations and non-compliance, and partly due to the changed nature of the threat, post 9/11. Critics also argue that developments in technology and globalisation trends exacerbate these defects and threaten to render current treaties unenforceable and/or unverifiable.

2.17 But for all their faults, the existing arms control treaties are vital to stopping the most dangerous states and groups from acquiring the most dangerous weapons. Moreover, the critics often downplay the many non-proliferation successes, and avoid the Bush administration's role in undermining international attempts to strengthen some of these treaties. Nonetheless, there is general acceptance that the Cold War international arms control treaty-based system has its shortcomings, and a number of new counter-proliferation measures (such as the IAEA's Additional Protocol and the Proliferation Security Initiative) to address the new challenges have been added to the existing non-proliferation toolbox.

2.18 The threats posed by nuclear weapons, especially non-deployed nuclear warheads, and their fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) are well documented. The nuclear stockpile continues to grow dramatically: in 1982, the amount of nuclear material under IAEA safeguards was 18,578 (measured in units of "significant quantity")[74] by 2002 this had arisen to 123,320 (an increase of 564%). During the same period, the number of IAEA Inspectors in the Department of Safeguards rose from 358 in 1982 to 542 in 2002 (an increase of 51%). Thus, the need to control and reduce the global stockpile of warheads and fissile material, which terrorist groups could steal or acquire on the black market, and to increase the resources available to those tasked with international control should be a core priority for the UK government.

2.19 Nuclear weapons remain the gravest danger and our most urgent task is to head off this danger. Strengthening the NPT and expanding and accelerating implementation of Cooperative Threat Reduction Programmes offer the best route to this end. Since its inception in 1968, the NPT has been the main legal framework for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states. There are only five recognised nuclear weapons states, and four states with the non-recognized nuclear weapons capability outside the NPT. Without the NPT, there could have been at least 28 additional states with nuclear weapons. This alone is a significant achievement. Several states, including South Africa, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Brazil, and Argentina have voluntarily given up their nuclear weapons programmes. Libya has recently become another convert.

2.20 There are now four regional nuclear weapon-free zones, which cover virtually the entire southern hemisphere, not to mention treaty regimes that prohibit the stationing of nuclear weapons on the seabed, in Antarctica, in orbit or on the moon and other celestial bodies, or the testing of such weapons at sea, in the atmosphere, or in space. Thus, while today's proliferation challenges are real and acute, the track record in uncovering, confronting and reversing proliferation with established tools is actually quite strong.

2.21 Safeguarding the weapons complex of the former Soviet Union to prevent proliferation of nuclear, as well as chemical and biological materials, has been a neglected priority. Russia is thought to have enough surplus nuclear weapons material to make at least 60,000 nuclear warheads (in addition to an estimated arsenal of approximately 5,000 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and an even more dangerous an unknown number of tactical nuclear weapons, estimated at approximately 3,400). In the absence of reliable systems to safeguard and account for this huge stockpile, much of this material is highly vulnerable to theft or diversion to terrorist and "rogue" states.

2.22 A pessimistic future scenario would see continued and possibly accelerated nuclear and other WMD proliferation and an increase in the number of "countries of proliferation concern" (ie countries with an active overt or covert WMD programme and a recent history of supporting international terrorism, or the potential to do so in the future as a result of state failure or regime change). Such a list of countries might include North Korea, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Somalia, West Africa, Malaysia, Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

2.23 But an optimistic scenario would see a strengthening of the non-proliferation, compliance and disarmament functions of the NPT[75] and in turn, clear and unambiguous progress on implementing nuclear disarmament, measures to "roll back" nascent nuclear weapons capabilities (as in North Korea and Iran) and to engage the three non-NPT nuclear weapon states (India, Pakistan and Israel) in the process of non-proliferation. Such a scenario will only be possible if those governments with power in the international system choose to use apply their political will to promoting positive outcomes.

2.24 Britain's nuclear insurance policy is premised upon Cold War deterrence theory. This theory may be a poor guide to future hostilities with new nuclear powers or "rogue states". It would represent seriously flawed thinking, therefore, for the UK to adopt a new nuclear weapon system based upon old paradigms of deterrence since there would be no guarantee that it was fulfilling the strategic role that it had been commissioned for.

The likely impact of Trident replacement on nuclear non-proliferation

2.25 The UK government continues to state its unequivocal support for the NPT and "the total elimination of nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament." [76]Any replacement system for Trident based upon the belief that the UK needed to maintain an insurance policy against possible future threats would logically entail permanent possession and therefore an abrogation of our treaty responsibilities. Replacing Trident would send a clear message to aspirant nuclear powers that the UK continued to attach strategic and political importance to nuclear weapons. It would not only legitimise nuclear weapon possession but it would encourage states with far greater and immediate strategic threats to their vital interests and territorial integrity than the UK to go down the nuclear route. The message is simple: if we continue to attach a strategic rational to nuclear weapons then others will do so too and will continue to covet them.

2.26 It is frequently stated confidently that the UK's nuclear arsenal has no impact upon other countries' calculations, that the UK is generally perceived positively and is no threat. It is important to test such assumptions with target audiences outside the UK, rather than simply assert them. In a recent PIPA World Public Opinion poll it emerged that Britain is not universally perceived as a positive influence upon the world, and appears low down in the European list. [77]These views are particularly negative in the Middle East amongst states of proliferation concern. A combination of current British military involvement in the region and a legacy of intervention, often in support of authoritative regimes, undermines Britain's reputation; it would not be surprising if British nuclear weapons do have very real influence over local attitudes to the legitimacy and saliency of nuclear weapons acquisition by local governments, even if those governments have little immediate fear of a British nuclear strike. Such fears can be created by Defence Secretaries pointing to the possible use of British nuclear weapons to prevent the use of chemical or biological weapons against British forces in the region.

The long-term stability of Britain's collective security arrangements

2.27 The extent to which Britain becomes vulnerable to future shocks in the international system, or from terrorists armed with unconventional weapons, depends less on the possession of nuclear weapons, than on the reliability of our collective security arrangements. The principle elements of these are:

— The US-UK bilateral relationship;

— Regional security organisations: NATO, EU and OSCE; and

— The United Nations and other global frameworks (such as the Commonwealth).

The US-UK Special Relationship

2.28 A dramatic deterioration in the relationship with the United States to the point where a future US President would cease to have any interest in threats to UK security is highly unlikely. Even with dramatic and unpredictable changes in the political make-up on one or both sides of the Atlantic it is difficult to see a major change in the relationship given the scope and depth of US-UK interdependence (at economic, political, military and cultural levels).

2.29 It is also important not to make the mistake of seeing the nuclear alliance as a foundation stone of the relationship, but rather the result of it. If Britain were to withdraw from the nuclear weapons business but remain a close ally in other respects, the impact within Washington would be minimal. Indeed, there has not always been strong support within previous US administrations for an independent UK deterrent, and some in Washington may welcome such a move.

2.30 Indeed, if the relationship were to deteriorate it could have a severe impact upon the UK's ability to deploy a deterrent. As described in greater detail later in this evidence, the UK's Trident system, and in all likelihood any follow-on system, is greatly dependent on the US not only for its acquisition but also maintenance, in particular in the use of the joint missile pool. This dependency is itself reliant upon a strong bond between the two countries.

NATO, EU and OSCE

2.31 Under current NATO rules any serious military threat that materialised against the UK would undoubtedly be considered as a threat against NATO as whole and as such would invite a collective military response from NATO. As part of NATO it is difficult, even in 30 years time, to see a scenario that required a unilateral UK nuclear response, as opposed to a collective NATO conventional military response. It is also difficult to envisage a peer competitor to NATO that will come even close to challenging NATO's conventional military supremacy in the next 30 years.

2.32 Similarly, the EU and OSCE are uniquely placed to deal with the conditions that breed terrorism in Europe, and for preventing the emergence of other "soft" security threats (including organised crime, the illegal arms trade, political repression, refugee flows and the denial of human rights). By advocating a comprehensive approach to security and by seeking to defuse conflicts before they erupt, the EU and OSCE are enhancing Britain's security in a more agile and far less expensive way than nuclear weapons ever could. An expanded OSCE role in Central Asia and the Caucasus in particular would be an effective means of dealing with both the threats of radical Islam and political and economic instability.

United Nations and The Commonwealth

2.33 In the wake of the Iraq war and the bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad, the legitimacy and relevance of the United Nations as a forum for handling matters of international peace and security is being increasingly questioned. However, the United Nations remains essential to securing a world order that respects both human rights and international law. The Report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change is an almost ideal vision for a flawed system.

2.34 It can be argued that the reforms suggested in the document are based on an assumption of how responsible states ought to be acting, not how they are acting in the modern era. The United Nations is at a critical juncture. The commitment of individual member states to an optimism and multilateralism that many think lost is the only way to ensure the future of the UN in the 21st Century and enhance the security of medium-sized powers like the UK.

2.35 The UK exerts considerable power and influence in the international political, economic and military arena through its permanent membership of the UN Security Council and membership of other important international organisations, such as the G8, the OSCE and NATO. Britain also has highly developed and distinct global partnerships and cooperation agreements, largely through the EU and the Commonwealth.

2.36 Britain is well placed to take a strong leadership role on the issue of UN reform and should use its privileged position as a permanent member of the Security Council to carry forward a progressive agenda. If it were to do so from a position of having been the first of the P5 to relinquish nuclear weapons, its moral authority and political capital within the UN would present enormous opportunities.

2.37 The distribution of power and states' capabilities would need a major revolutionary upheaval for the emergence of a nuclear threat directed against the UK independently of other European or transatlantic allies. If the UK is to take such a possibility seriously it would be better to delay a decision on replacement until it were necessary (see section on timing below).

2.38 Since the end of the Cold War, arms races have generally occurred within a regional context and in response to a specific regional threat or a general build up in regional tensions. The UK faces no regional conventional or nuclear threat that would suggest the need for a new strategic deterrent, nuclear or otherwise. The strategic partnership that is developing between NATO, the EU and Russia, along with NATO's expansion to include former Warsaw Pact countries, combined with the conflict prevention work of the OSCE and EU, further diminishes the likelihood of a major military conflict within Europe or a major military threat from outside of Europe. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by states such as India, Pakistan and North Korea, and the nuclear designs of states such as Iran, is taking place first and foremost, in a regional context. Such developments are undoubtedly a major international security concern, in part because of their implications on international non-proliferation regimes, but they are unlikely to represent a direct military threat to UK security.

3. TIMETABLE FOR DECISION-MAKING

3.1 The British nuclear deterrent is currently made up of four elements:

(iii) Four Vanguard-class submarines (the "platform"); and(iv) The support infrastructure mainly consisting of:

— Burfield,where the warheads are assembled and taken apart;

— Faslane, where the submarines are based;

— Coulport (near to Faslane), where warheads and associated materials are maintained and stored;

— Devonport, where the submarines are refitted;

— Derby, Rolls Royce, where the reactors and fuel rods are constructed; and

— Principal command and control facilities: MoD Main Building in Whitehall; Chief of Joint Operations, the Permanent Joint Headquarters in Northwood; and Commander in Chief Fleet, Portsmouth.

3.2 We assume that the favoured option will be a replacement like-for-like. That is to say, it will be based upon a US submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) delivery system, requiring similar features to the existing system, although components would use state-of-the-art technology. The SLBM system offers a solution that is stealthy, has maximum range (up to 11,000 km depending upon payload), delivers the warhead extremely rapidly (in less than an hour depending on the range) and reliably, and with minimal opportunities for interception. It is difficult to see any other system delivering similar capabilities.

Warheads and infrastructure

3.3 The warheads undergo regular maintenance within the UK in a system that could continue for several decades with confidence. There may be relatively minor requirements to renew certain components, and it may be necessary in future, for example, to start purchasing our tritium from the United States. The support infrastructure, and the command and control facilities also require regular maintenance, and occasional renewal, but the current facilities are adequate for the task of maintaining the sea-based deterrent for some decades. It is still openly debated whether the decision announced in the summer of 2005 of major investment in Aldermaston was motivated by safety and stockpile stewardship, or rather to develop the capability for research into new or modified warheads for any future system. That investment has been committed in any case, irrespective of any future decisions.

Missiles

3.4 The US Navy has been acquiring critical components for some 15 years at a minimum level sufficient to maintain production lines and build up its spare parts stock. Production started in 2002 for an additional 115 missiles as part of the Life Extension Programme (LEP). The US Department of Defence (DoD) plans to continue purchasing new D5 missiles until 2013. Some 300 of the missiles within the US pool will soon undergo an upgrade, or LEP, to replace the guidance system and some of the critical missile electronics and rocket motors. The main elements of the LEP are:— New arming and fusing subsystem for some of the W76 warheads for more accurate ground-burst capability. The subsystem used by the UK is based upon a US design, and is almost certainly purchased from the US. However, there is no link to the common missile pool, and the UK's current subsystems could be maintained without replacement, as the UK policy of minimum deterrence should not require a ground-burst capability.— Equipping guidance systems with GPS and "three-axis flat system" for steering the re-entry vehicles. This is a significant upgrade designed to increase accuracy, but would also not be needed for a UK minimum deterrent.— Upgrade and life extension to guidance system. Production for the D5's Mark 6 guidance system, which uses technology that is now outdated, ended in 2001. The US Navy intends to include a new guidance system using updated technologies as part of the LEP. It is currently unclear when a British decision would be needed on whether to cooperate in such an upgrade, and indeed how much it would cost.— Refurbishing of the solid-fuel propulsion motors. The US DoD contract with Alliant Techsystems for the production of new solid propulsion systems, the only critical upgrade that would require UK involvement to continue its participation in the pool system, is worth $71.5 million.

3.5 The UK may soon need to make a decision as to whether it chooses to be involved in the US LEP. Given the paucity of publicly available information, providing an independent assessment on this point presents a challenge. In the past, however, when the UK was procuring the original Trident D5 missiles, there was a subsidy provided to the British government in return for flexibility over the timing so that missile production lines were optimised. It could be that in the case of this current life-extension proposal an early decision is required to be taken by the British government in order that there is no ambiguity and production lines can be planned with maximum efficiency. However, the LEP is not a complex production line in quite the same way as the original procurement was.

3.6 If the UK were to engage in a minimum life extension programme for the missiles (within the strategic system's existing budget) to extend our current arrangement with the US Navy beyond 2040, and to replace critical components that required updating for redundancy reasons, this would leave the submarines as the element of the system determining the life expectancy of the whole.

Boats are the weakest link

3.7 The submarines are complex pieces of kit requiring regular maintenance and occasional overhaul. The first UK Vanguard-class submarine, HMS Vanguard, commissioned in 1994, underwent its first refit between 2002 and 2005. The two essential and primary components affecting longevity are the hull and the reactors. But it is the hulls that will determine the life expectancy of the submarines, and by extension, the current Trident system as a whole. When they were constructed the hulls were designed to last 30 years.

3.8 The original procurement of the submarines took 14 years from the then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's decision to acquire Trident in 1980 and the commissioning of the first boat (HMS Vanguard) in 1994. The working assumption is therefore a lead-time for any replacement of 15 years. With the 30-year life expectancy outlined in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, HMS Vanguard is due to leave service in 2024, so a decision is said to be required by 2009 or before the end of this Parliament. It is difficult to be more specific as we are unclear exactly what form a replacement will take.

3.9 This timetable was first alluded to in the 2003 Defence White Paper (that referred to a decision needed in the next Parliament), and has been confirmed by government officials since. The most recent statement (and equally the most equivocal) was made by the Defence Secretary to the House of Commons Defence Committee on 1 November 2005, when he said: "It is not absolutely essential the decision is taken during this Parliament but it would be highly desirable in my view." (uncorrected evidence) This confirmed the UK government's view that it intended to make a decision in this Parliament, but also holds out the possibility of delay.

Delaying the decision

3.10 If there were a chance to extend the lifetime of the boats and therefore the current system and delay the decision there are good reasons to do so.

Meshing in with the US

3.10.1 Thanks to the US Navy's Service Life Extension Programme (SLEP), the oldest US Ohio-class submarine is not now due to retire until 2029, and it would be safe to assume that any replacement system will not be deployed much before this. If the British government were to maintain its current course of looking to deploy a replacement to Trident by 2024, using American missile technology, that replacement would likely need to rely upon D5 missile technology, or some variant, that may be phased out by the Americans in the early 2040s.

Strategic flexibility

3.10.2 A delay would allow the MoD to maintain greater flexibility in future choices without commitment, while having a better idea of future strategic requirements. The Committee will already be grappling with the problem of predicting uncertain future threats in 20-30 years time to Britain's vital interests; such an exercise is fraught with dangers of over- or under-estimating—such threats; dangers that multiply by several factors the longer we look into the future. A delay would give the MoD (and other government ministries) more options for realistically assessing and thus combating and preventing future threats without being tied into a particular system. It could also give a future government the chance to encourage further progress towards disarmament by downsizing or not replacing the deterrent should the international security environment allow it.

Financial savings

3.10.3 With the MoD under budgetary pressures which the Committee has already noted with concern elsewhere, it can ill afford to be planning additional spend on a replacement system, that has no military function, at this time.

Impact upon proliferation and the global security system

3.10.4 As stated above, the NPT has been up until now extraordinarily successful in slowing the proliferation of nuclear weapons when commentators in the 1960s believed it was doomed to failure. In 1995 and 2000 the Review Conferences agreed important principles that led to optimism and international cohesion. The future today, however, looks bleak again. Warnings before last year's NPT Review conference that the system was in danger of unravelling came from NGOs, the High Level Panel Group, and from the UN Secretary General. Those warnings went unheeded and we are witnessing increased dangers of breakout. If a second-tier nuclear weapon state such as Britain, without immediate threat, reversed its previously positive moves towards disarmament and gave clear saliency to indefinitely continuing its nuclear deterrent by making an early decision to replace Trident—before the 2010 RevCon—it could have a disastrous and irrevocable impact.

Encouraging debate

3.10.5 A delay would enable the full official debate that this issue deserves and has never until now received. Defence Secretary John Reid has called for a national debate on what system should replace Trident; but the MoD is refusing to answer any requests for information on the subject. The House of Commons' Library briefing on the future of British nuclear weapons in July 2005 neglected to consider one important option ie not to replace Trident. This reflects a belief that this government will not consider this option, despite Britain's clearly stated aim to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and the government's international legal obligation to make progress towards this objective.

However, when questioned by the Defence Committee on 1 November 2005 the Defence Secretary stated that the government's manifesto commitment to retain the deterrent was for the lifetime of the current system, and that all assumptions would be questioned in considering its replacement. Members of Parliament have an important role to play in ensuring that the decision-making process is open, informed, transparent and accountable. We recommend that before any decision is taken the Government undertake a comprehensive Strategic Security and Defence Review. This review would be foreign policy led and would assess UK security objectives, priorities, policy and planning and explain how nuclear weapons might fit into the broader strategy. The Defence Select Committee could also recognise that this is an issue that needs to consider the foreign policy context and invite the Foreign Affairs Committee to join it in future inquiries into the decision.

Reasons to be optimistic on life expectancy

3.11 The 30-year life expectancy was predicated on Cold War operations. These envisaged two boats being out to sea at any one moment, underwater for months on end, thus placing significant strain on the hulls. With the end of the Cold War the 1998 Strategic Defence Review relaxed the readiness of the submarines, and the UK now has only one boat on patrol at any given time. This alone halves the time at sea for each submarine and must significantly increase the life expectancy of each of the hulls. It also means that towards the end of the life of the submarines, assuming Britain maintains a minimum deterrent posture with only one boat out at a time, there will be greater redundancy built in to the system and there will be less dependency upon the reliability of all submarines.

3.12 Additionally, without any current imminent threat to the submarines, other operational adjustments could be made (for example the boats spending more time above water) that would further extend their lives.

Strategies to reduce lead times

3.13 In the Trident system we have a gold-standard system, which, with modifications and upgrades, could easily fulfil the deterrent task determined by the government for the indefinite future. Although other options inevitably need to be considered, if it is to be replaced, a like-for-like replacement with modifications remains by far the most serious option open to the MoD. This would not require a 15-year lead-time. Each copy replacement for the Vanguard-class submarines are estimated to cost around £2 billion, and take five years to construct.4. CONCLUSIONS

4.1 It is our assessment that the strategic environment, both current and in the foreseeable future, does not warrant a decision to replace Trident. British nuclear weapons are simply not a credible deterrent against the mainly non-military threats that we are faced with, or indeed from the nuclear forces of any countries or non-state actors likely to seek nuclear weapons in coming years. It would be extraordinarily damaging for a British Prime Minister to use or even contemplate using a nuclear weapon. Beyond the immediate casualties and radioactive fallout, it would destroy the invaluable international nuclear taboo and place Britain at grave risk (not least of immediate retaliation—including from terrorists). And yet for a deterrent to be credible Britain needs to be ready and willing to be an agent of such an outcome.

4.2 Britain's energies need to focus upon ensuring countries like Iran do not acquire nuclear weapons, and our most effective way of doing that is to lock all countries into their existing commitments under the international non-proliferation regime. There are 183 other countries that manage to exist without nuclear weapons, many of which face much greater military threats to their territory than Britain. They understand that it is in everyone's interests to halt proliferation and promote disarmament.

4.3 The weakest link of Britain's Trident nuclear weapon system is the 30 year expected lifetime of the hulls of the submarines. The oldest, HMS Vanguard, can therefore last until 2024. Last time it took 14 years from an initial decision to first launch. The suggestion that a lead time of 15 years will be needed this time, thereby requiring a decision to replace by 2009, does not survive detailed examination and makes a mockery of the undoubted level of military-industrial expertise that the UK enjoys.

4.4 The submarines' expected lifetimes are based upon regular deep dives and long periods under sea evading Soviet detection. UK submarines are now off hair-trigger alert and as a result spend longer periods on the surface or on shallow dives. This can be expected to extend the life expectancy of the hulls significantly. In any case, if the UK is simply to build more replacement submarines it will not need the same lead-time as the original Trident purchase. Modified submarines could be built in the space of five or six years from any initial decision to replace.

4.5 The decision as to whether to replace Trident could be delayed for at least a further 10 years until 2019.

7 March 2006

64 "Delivering Security in a Changing World", Ministry of Defence, Cm 6041-1, December 2003, p 4. Back

65 US defence spending amounts to 48.2% of global spend, when it includes budgeted military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and DoE nuclear weapons development. Reference: Centre for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, US Military Spending vs the World, website accessed March 2006: http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/archives/002244.php Back

66 "A Secure Europe in a Better World-The European Security Strategy", drafted under the responsibilities of the EU High Representative Javier Solana and approved by the European Council held in Brussels on 12 December 2003, available at: http://europa.eu.int/index_en.htm Back

67 Prime Minister's Questions, 19 October 2005, Column 841, Q3 [Responding to Paul Flynn, MP]. Back

68 These challenges by no means went unrecognised during the latter half of the 20th century but they were invariably forced to take a back seat to traditional perspectives that viewed security as being directly proportional to military capability. The genesis of a more comprehensive approach to security was reflected in the 1980 Brandt Report which drew the unequivocal conclusion that "while hunger rules peace cannot prevail. He who wants to ban war must also ban mass poverty." North-South: A Programme for Survival, Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1980, p 6. Back

69 "UK International Priorities", Foreign and Commonwealth Office Strategy White Paper, Cm 6052, December 2003, p 34. Back

70 "Delivering Security in a Changing World", Ministry of Defence, Cm 6041-1, December 2003, p 7. Back

71 "Delivering Security in a Changing World", Ministry of Defence, Cm 6041-1, December 2003, p 11. Back

72 Hare, T, "What next for Trident?", RUSI Journal, April 2005, p 30. Also see the statement made by Ambassador John Freeman, Head of UK Delegation, to the Seventh Review of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 2005 in which he stated that the UK's nuclear weapons "have a political role-not a military one." Available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/ukdis Back

73 The regime consists of: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), their international secretariats and governing bodies, a number of other treaties, and various other international arrangements designed to limit the spread of critical materials for the production of WMD. Back