Memorandum from World Disarmament Campaign
1. We would question certain aspects of the basic
terminology, which to some extent pre-empt the whole debate. In
particular, nuclear weapons are always referred to as the "Nuclear
Deterrent". We would challenge this. "Deterrence"
may be a function of a weapon, but it cannot logically define
the weapon itself. Any weapon may be a deterrent in particular
circumstances, but to assume that it will always be so by virtue
of its mere existence, as is implied by the conventional terminology,
depends on many assumptions that in our view cannot be justified.
2. The Committee is to consider "the threats
which the strategic nuclear deterrent is currently intended to
combat". But the government has always refused to spell out
these alleged threats when asked, relying on vague statements
about the unpredictability of the future, and therefore the need
to prepare for a worst case scenario. Although there is much turmoil
and conflict in the world, we see no evidence that there is any
direct threat to the security of the realm that could conceivably
be deterred by nuclear weapons. We believe it is recognised even
among the supporters of nuclear weapons that since the "end
of the cold war" there is no threat from Russia, and it has
been stated that the Trident nuclear missiles are not targeted
on Russia, although what they are targeted on is never disclosed.
While proliferation, both that which has already happened and
possible future, is a serious concern for the whole world, it
still does not constitute a direct threat to this country. And,
again, we cannot see that our possession of nuclear weapons in
any way influences the countries which have or wish to have nuclear
weapons. The nearest to a nuclear conflict that has occurred since
the end of the cold war is the stand-off between India and Pakistan
over Kashmir. Outright war has been avoided so far, and relations
have improved to some extent, but it remains a potential flash-point.
Similarly, the Middle East is a powder keg. Israel's nuclear weapons,
although not explicitly admitted by the Israeli government, are
universally believed to exist and constitute a major destabilising
factor in the region. Should Iran or any Arab countries obtain
nuclear weapons, that would be a recipe for disaster, but none
of these would be targeted on the UK. It is difficult to see in
what way Britain's nuclear weapons contribute to preventing this
development. The same argument applies to North Korea. While it
is deplorable that North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT and
developed its own nuclear weapons, it has never been suggested
that these are—or indeed could possibly be—aimed at
the UK.
3. The question of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty and nuclear disarmament as such appears to be outside the
terms of reference of this particular stage of the Defence Committee
inquiries, but the real answer to proliferation and the resulting
dangers is to pursue the "negotiations in good faith"
called for in Article VI of that treaty, towards the total elimination
of nuclear weapons. There are no such negotiations taking place
at present. Indeed, in all the 36 years since the NPT came into
force, there have never been serious negotiations aimed at achieving
this end. Some achievements have been made in limiting and reducing
the numbers of weapons, but total elimination has never been on
the agenda. The Draft Nuclear Weapons Convention, which already
exists and is recognised as an official UN document, would provide
a sound basis for those negotiations if the recognised nuclear
weapon powers took their obligations under Article VI seriously.
However, the UK government claims that it is meeting its obligations
because it has reduced its nuclear capability to a "minimum
deterrent", represented by a single nuclear weapon system,
with a nuclear explosive power reduced by 70% since the end of
the Cold War. That 70% itself is questionable, given technological
developments such as increased accuracy and "efficiency"
of current weapons compared with their predecessors. But quibbling
about precise numbers is irrelevant to the main issue. Some 200
warheads each with an explosive power 8-10 times that of the Hiroshima
and Nagasaki bombs can hardly be described as being significantly
near to the goal of zero. If these wider issues are to be considered
by the Committee at a later stage, we should wish to contribute
further evidence on this.
4. The real threat, not to the security of the
realm, but to human security everywhere, is terrorism. That nuclear
weapons are no defence against terrorism has been argued so many
times by so many authorities and so cogently that there is no
need to repeat the arguments here. It should be self-evident that
"deterrence", whatever merit it may have in relation
to potential conflict between states, is totally irrelevant to
this particular threat by non-state actors. How to respond to
terrorism, and in particular the alternatives to the current "war
on terror", are outside the scope of this inquiry, but certainly
we believe that nuclear weapons have no useful part to play in
protecting the people of the world from terrorist attacks.
5. The final question for this stage of the inquiry
is the timing of the decisions on Trident replacement. If, as
we believe, the only defensible decision is not to replace any
part of the Trident nuclear weapon system, then the decision could
be made almost immediately. Indeed, the sooner that decision is
made the better. Then there would be the maximum time to plan
for the future of any workers, communities and facilities affected
by the decision. This would apply especially to the shipyards
in Barrow and their workers, who currently have valid concerns
about their future. However, we believe that those concerns cannot
in any way justify the ordering a new generation of nuclear weapon
submarines, or even be a supplementary argument for a more general
case for Trident renewal (which we reject, of course, in any case).
6. However, if the Committee and the government
do not accept the argument presented here the decision must be
put off as long as possible in order to have the fullest possible
debate and consultation about this vital issue. That debate must
be based on the fullest information about all aspects of the decision.
This would include, inter alia, the UK's obligations under
international law, full details of perceived threats and the envisaged
response, total costs, implications for security, for example
of nuclear materials in transit and the relation between any new
nuclear weapon programme and the civil nuclear energy industry.
(e.g., How much would a new nuclear weapon programme contribute
to the intractable problem of nuclear waste disposal?) We do not
believe that the general public is currently sufficiently aware
of all these aspects to engage meaningfully in the debate, and
they must be able to if the government's professed desire for
a full and open decision-making process is to be achieved.
6 March 2006
|
