Memorandum from Professor William Walker
1. The reasons behind the UK's decisions to acquire
and maintain nuclear weapons have never been straightforward.
They have included the desires to maintain the "special relationship"
with the US, influence its strategic decisions and act as its
bridge into Europe and NATO; to buttress the UK's international
prestige and its position in the club of great powers inside and
outside the UN Security Council; to influence arms control processes
and outcomes; and to avoid a French monopoly in nuclear weapons
in Europe. Taken together, these concerns have been more influential,
in my view, than the perceived need for nuclear capabilities to
deter threats from other states.
2. This is likely to remain the case. Indeed,
it would be hard to justify the retention of a nuclear force on
strategic military grounds alone. Among the eight or nine nuclear
armed states, with the possible exception of France, the UK arguably
has least cause for concern about future military attack from
a well armed foe. This situation seems likely to continue, given
the UK's geographical position on the safe fringe of a relatively
stable region, unless there is some fundamental breakdown of order
on the European continent. Although UK forces stationed abroad
might face chemical or biological threats, it is doubtful whether
nuclear weapons could or should play much part in deterring an
attack using them.
This said, there are obvious questions to be asked
over the future strategic relations between the UK and its allies
and Russia and, at a greater distance, China and India. There
are also questions, of a rather different sort, over strategic
relations with states in the Middle East. It is always possible
to construct worst-case scenarios. Equally, it is possible (and
easier in my view) to construct scenarios in which nuclear weapons
will be irrelevant to the UK's political and security relations.
3. UK nuclear forces have long been "committed
to NATO", whatever that may mean. Consideration of their
future utility therefore depends on NATO's future, the contexts
in which NATO operates, and its military strategies and nuclear
doctrines. Their utility also depends on the direct or indirect
role of nuclear weapons in the protection of members states of
the European Union, and on the degree to which the United States
or possibly France might be willing and trusted to provide extended
deterrence. Decisions on the UK's defence are therefore inescapably
decisions on the defence of Europe.
4. There has been much comment recently on the
non-proliferation regime reaching a "tipping point"
beyond which controls over the spread of nuclear weapons will
be all but lost. Anxieties are currently being fuelled by difficulties
over Iran and North Korea, the evident ease with which actors
have gained access to enrichment technology and nuclear weapon
designs, the inability to make any progress in multilateral arms
control, and the damage being inflicted on the NPT by the US-Indian
rapprochement among other things. There is talk of the NPT collapsing
or becoming irrelevant. Although the situation is unquestionably
serious, it is not yet calamitous. The non-proliferation norm
is proving remarkably durable, and only a small number of states
appear interested in dabbling with nuclear weapons. The outlook
would be improved, above all, by a shift in the US away from policies
which, in recent years, have placed undue emphasis on coercion
and have been profoundly disrespectful of international law and
institutions. The NPT-centred international nuclear order has
rested upon notions of reciprocal obligation and mutual restraint
which appear to mean little to the current US administration.
5. In consequence, predictions that the UK may
be faced by 20 or 30 nuclear armed states in coming decades seem
unduly alarmist, even if it is not possible to dismiss them out
of hand. My expectation is that a change of US administration,
the combined interests of great powers (in particular) in preventing
further weapon proliferation and in moderating their rivalries,
the continuing resilience of treaties and other institutions despite
recent setbacks, and the need to establish a more stable political
and regulatory environment for civil nuclear trade, will bring
about a strengthening rather than weakening of the international
nuclear order over the next decade or so. It is of course possible
that further deterioration will occur, but fear of it may encourage
still greater efforts to buttress the security order.
6. My assumption is that the UK's obligations
under the NPT and other international treaties and agreements
will be addressed in another Inquiry. Suffice to say that replacement
of Trident will not be easy to justify internationally under the
NPT's Article VI and the agreements reached at the 1995 and 2000
NPT Review Conferences. In addition, the UK would not be sending
welcome signals if, as is widely observed internationally, the
threats to its security are not exceptional. If the UK needs nuclear
weapons, does not every state need nuclear weapons?
7. Since the conclusion of the US-UK Mutual Defence
Agreement in 1957-58, the UK's acquisition and deployment of nuclear
weapons have depended substantially on transatlantic exchanges
of materials, equipment and know-how. Although the costs of maintaining
the deterrent have been reduced as a result, the political and
strategic advantages have long been questionable. There is little
evidence, certainly in the public domain, of UK influence over
US policy and strategy, especially in recent years. US constraints
on the freedom of action of successive UK governments and political
leaders seem more tangible, despite little again being revealed
in public. Concerns that the US might withhold future nuclear
assistance, or become more grudging in its provision, have naturally
discouraged governments from taking independent lines on foreign
policy and arms control. It should worry us that the US government's
hold over UK policy could increase if Trident replacement brings
fresh reliance on US supplies of nuclear material. The US-UK Mutual
Defence Agreement has also acted as a barrier to technical and
strategic cooperation with France, closing off another possibility
for cooperation.
8. The opportunity costs for British armed forces
of allocating substantial resources to a new strategic nuclear
system will have to be considered. The full cost of sustaining
an operational nuclear deterrent is often underestimated. My impression
is that the nuclear Navy is regarded in several military quarters
as an indulgence. It is also rather forlorn and detached in Scotland
from the main centres of influence and activity in southern England.
Might resources that are currently locked up in sustaining the
nuclear deterrent, and that will be required for its replacement,
be put to better purposes by the Navy and the other armed forces,
given the changed security environment and the missions that they
are now called upon to perform?
9. The technologies of nuclear warheads and delivery
systems are comparatively mature. The most important advances
in warfare, on land and sea and in the air and space, are coming
from developments in conventional military technologies and associated
civil systems. Again, might resources be better deployed supporting
R&D in these areas?
10. The threats from nuclear terrorism have to
be taken seriously. Yet they are often exaggerated. It is still
very difficult and expensive for a non-state actor to assemble
a workable nuclear device without detection, and the advantages
to all but a very few terrorist groups of resorting to nuclear
weapons are questionable. There are other easier and less costly
means of creating a "weapon of mass effect", as 9/11
has shown. Radiological weapons are a more plausible threat, but
they are not easily controlled and the consequences of their usage
are likely to be much less serious than explosive devices. How
the UK's nuclear weapons might be used to deter attacks from terrorist
groups, or to deter attacks by such groups on behalf of disaffected
states, is hard to imagine. For one thing, the threats of death
and injury to civilians from the use of nuclear weapons for such
purposes would probably be unconscionable.
11. The future terrorist threat to nuclear bases
and deployed forces is slight if appropriate measures are taken
to protect them. There is vulnerability, however, in the transfer
of warheads from Aldermaston/Burghfield to and from Coulport/Faslane
along public highways which pass through or near to urban areas
(most prominently Glasgow). A well aimed car or truck bomb could
deliver quite a political shock. In general, public support for
the nuclear deterrent depends heavily, especially in Scotland,
on the absence of any serious accidents or other events that would
lay bare the risks to public safety associated with nuclear weapons.
12. All told, I remain sceptical of the benefits
that will accrue to the UK from the continued possession of a
nuclear deterrent. I recognize, however, that it is a complicated
decision involving the weighing of many advantages and disadvantages,
only some of which have been discussed here, in conditions of
uncertainty over the future security environment. Abandoning the
deterrent would also take considerable political courage and statesmanship.
16 March 2006
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