Memorandum from the Keep Our Future Afloat
Campaign (KOFAC)
PART A: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
(i) The "Keep Our Future Afloat Campaign",
(KOFAC), is a trade union-led lobby Campaign". The CSEU,
Amicus and GMB are the lead unions involved.
(ii) KOFAC was launched in April 2004 in
response to a further round of large scale job losses associated
with completion of HMS Bulwark in June 2004 at the BAE SYSTEMS
owned Barrow shipyard in north west England.
(iii) KOFAC focuses on:
"sustaining and growing jobs in naval shipbuilding
in NW England".
(iv) In the context of the Defence Industrial
Strategy, design work on a submarine based system needs to commence
at Barrow in advance of the decision on whether to replace the
existing deterrent. This requirement is driven by the long duration
of the concept through detail design process and in order to help
sustain the design skills base at Barrow.
(v) The Trident submarine/deterrent programme
was the largest ever UK defence procurement project of the 20th
Century, it was delivered on time and within budget, with a major
component, the submarine delivery system designed and built at
Barrow-in-Furness shipyard.
PART B: CONCLUSIONS
(i) In developing the evidence, KOFAC has
taken account of the role of the Barrow shipyard and the trade
unions role in developing the Vanguard class, submarine based,
deterrent in the period 1980 to 2001, recent research in USA,
and the Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) of December 2005.
(ii) The UK possesses the minimum effective
deterrent in the present circumstances deployed in the most stable
configuration: continuous at sea deference. (1)
(iii) The British strategic nuclear deterrent
consists of four Vanguard class "Trident" submarines,
each able to carry 16, Trident D4 missiles. They are deployed
with up to 48 warheads. One boat is normally at sea at any one
time. The designed operational life of the British built submarines
is 30 years. (2) It might be possible to extend their design life.
The submarines became operational between 1994 and 2001. Replacement
boats will therefore be needed from 2024, based on a similar design
and build period required for Vanguard.
(iv) A significant number of nations have
either acquired or wish to acquire a nuclear capability, the UK
needs a strategic deterrent to counter potential threats from
a range of sources. As strategic submarines are largely invulnerable
to detection/attack and probably offer the best operational means
of carrying a strategic deterrent we favour a submarine based
system.
(v) Budget availability, affordability will
be major factors influencing procurement options for a submarine
based strategic deterrent.
(1) Paul Schulte, Director of Proliferation
and Arms Control, Ministry of Defence speech at 50th Pugwash Conference,
Queens College, 5 August 2000, in "Britain and Nuclear
Disarmament: Record Realities and Opportunities", Ministry
of Defence (2000).
(2) Strategic Defence Review, Ministry of Defence
(1998). "We need to ensure that it (Trident) can remain
an effective deterrent for up to 30 years".
PART C: DISCUSSION
The Keep Our Future Afloat Campaign (KOFAC)
1. The "Keep Our Future Afloat Campaign"
(KOFAC), launched in April 2004, has the support of the CSEU,
Barrow Borough and Cumbria County Councils, Furness Enterprise
and Northwest Development Agency. In September 2004 the then Secretary
of State for Defence the Rt Hon Geoff Hoon MP described the lobby
as "one of the most effective defence lobbies he had come
across." More recently the Rt Hon Alun Michael MP, Minister
for Industry and the Regions on 13 December 2005 said "this
(KOFAC) type of approach by management, trade unions and the local
authority is very powerful". (3)
2. KOFAC aims (4) to:
— Sustain and grow jobs in naval
shipbuilding in north west England.
— Secure full utilization of the
unique assets found in the Northwest region's naval shipbuilding
industrial base—the shipyard at Barrow and a supply chain
of 1,700 companies.
— Sustain the 60% of UK naval
ship/submarine design capability, which is located, in Barrow.
3. Barrow was a focal point for the current
strategic deterrent's development, having designed and built the
four Vanguard class submarines that make up the delivery system
between the announcement of the order for the lead ship Vanguard
on 4 April 1986 and 2001 when the fourth boat was completed.
Outline of the KOFAC Submission
4. KOFAC offers views on:
— "The strategic context
and timetable for decision making".
— "Threats which the strategic
deterrent is currently intended to combat, how this might change
over the next two decades (by 2025) and how this might affect
the strategic context in which decisions on the UK deterrent will
be made". (5)
— "The timetable in which
decisions will have to be taken and implemented" (5)
if the capability to design the required submarine is to be retained.
— Recent work by Rand Europe (6)
for the Ministry of Defence on timing of the start of design work
for a replacement submarine.
(3) Note of meeting with DTI Minister
for the Regions, Keep Our Future Afloat Campaign Secretariat,
December 2005.
(4) Keep Our Future Afloat Campaign pamphlet,
September 2005.
(5) Select Committee terms of reference, 20
January 2006, House of Commons, Operational Note.
(6) The United Kingdom"s Nuclear Submarine
Industrial Base, Volumes 1-3, 2005, Rand Europe, ISBN 0-8330-3979-8.
The Current Strategic Deterrent System
5. The current deterrent was authorised
in 1980. (7) It was designed and built to counter perceived "cold
war" threats at that time from Russia and other nations.
At the time the Minister said "Government regard the maintenance
of such a capability as an essential element in the defence effort
that we undertake for our own and western security".
(6)
6. Britain"s Trident deterrent which
entered service in 1994 is based on three components of the Trident
weapon system.
— Four "Vanguard" class
nuclear powered submarines "designed solely as a nuclear
powered ballistic missile carrier", (see Table 1 below).
— The Trident II D5 delivery system.
7. From Parliamentary decision in 1980 to
deployment of the first boat, HMS Vanguard with Trident took 14
years (1980-94). 21 years elapsed to completion of the fourth
boat.
8. The Vanguard class submarines were all
designed and built at Barrow-in-Furness. The design life of each
boat is assumed to be 30 years. (9) Refits include installation
of a reactor core designed for the submarine"s expected life.
Table 1
THE VANGUARD CLASS SUBMARINE FLEET
9. The fleet of four submarines or "boats"
was designed to carry 192 warheads (12 per missile). Each submarine
has 16 independently controlled missile tubes. The Strategic Defence
Review, White Paper (July 1998) Cmnd 3999, paragraph 66-67 reduced
the UK's reserve of warheads to 200. It was also announced each
submarine would carry a maximum of 48 warheads whilst on patrol.
(8) One submarine is understood to be on patrol at any one time.
(7) Statement to House of Commons, 15 July 1980 by Secretary
of State for Defence.
(8) "Trident and the Future of the British Nuclear
Deterrent", pages 6 and 8, Standard Note SN/1A 3706,
page 4, House of Commons debate, 15 July 1980, Column 1235, 5
July 2005.
(9) "Delivering Security in a Changing World",
White Paper, Cm 6041, December 2003.
Government Policy
10. Britain's current nuclear policy is set out in the
"Strategic Defence Review White Paper", Cm3999
(July 1998) and "Delivering Security in a Changing World"
(Cmnd 6041 of December 2003). Government justify the UK"s
deterrent capabilty based on:
"The continuing risk from the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and the certainty that a number of other countries will
retain substantial nuclear arsenals, mean that our minimum nuclear
deterrent . . . is likely to remain a necessary element of our
security", adding, "We will . . . continue to
take appropriate steps to ensure the range of options for maintaining
a nuclear deterrent capability is kept open until that decision
point". (10)
11. Defence Industrial Policy (2002) identified nuclear
technology as a key strategic capability in the domestic manufacturing
base of the UK.
12. The Government in its May 2005 Labour Party Manifesto
of May 2005, stated, "We are committed to retaining the
independent nuclear deterrent". (11)
13. Subsequently the Secretary of State for Defence on
4 July 2005 added, "Decisions on any replacement of the
UK's nuclear deterrent are likely to be necessary in the lifetime
of the current Parliament". (12)
14. The Defence Industrial Strategy of December 2005
makes specific reference to a possible "successor to the
current Vanguard class" in paragraph B2.63 (see Appendix
B).
(10) Paragraph 3.11, Delivering Security in a Changing World,
Cmnd 6041, December 2003.
(11) The Labour Party Manifesto 2005, www.labour.org.uk/fileadmin/manifesto_B042005
(12) House of Commons debate, 4 July 2005, C5.
The Threats Which The Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Is Intended
To Combat And How They May Change
"The world in 2030 will not be more predictable than
today". (13)
15. KOFAC considers that a strategic deterrent is still
needed and is still likely to be needed from the second decade
of this century and beyond. We also consider that a submarine
based delivery system holds advantage over land or air based systems.
16. KOFAC agrees with the Royal United Services Institute
paper "Questions for the Debate of the Future UK Strategic
Deterrent" which provides an excellent summary of the
issues associated with replacing the current UK deterrent for
the Committee"s consideration. (14)
17. A significant number of nations now have or are seeking
to have a nuclear capability. They include Russia, China, (sometimes
referred to aspiring peer group nations to USA), Iran, and what
have been described as "rogue states" or "terrorists".
(13) The Committee's attention is drawn to several recent studies
which have highlighted where nuclear threats could emerge from,
these are summarised below.
Russia—in "Russian Nuclear Forces 2006,
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists NRDC Nuclear Notebook",
pages 64-67 (March to April 2006), by R S Norris and H M Kristensen
and "Russian Nuclear Forces 2005", pages 70-72
(Marchto April 2005), by R S Norris and H M Kristensen. Also in
"The Eurasian Security Environment Testimony" by
Fiona Hill of the Brookings Institution, House Armed Services
Committee Threat Panel, 22 September 2005.
China—in "CRS Report for Congress RL33153
Chinese Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy Capabilities—Background
and Issues for Congress", 18 November 2005, and statement
by R Kamphausen, Director, National Security Affairs National
Bureau of Asian Research USA & House Armed Services Committee
on China as Military Modernization.
Rogue States and Terrorism—in "The Eurasian
Security Environment Testimony" of Fiona Hill of the
Brookings Institution, House Armed Services Committee Threat Panel,
22 September 2005 and Ambassador Lindon F Brooks, Under Secretary
of State for Nuclear Security, US Department of Energy evidence
to House Armed Services Sub-Committee inquiry on Strategic Forces,
March 2006.
18. We also note that on 1 March 2006 the Under Secretary
for Nuclear Security at the United States Department of Energy
said: "Acquisition of nuclear weapons, WMD capabilities,
technologies and expertise by rogue states or terrorists poses
a grave threat to the United States and International Security".
(15)
(13) Ambassador Lindon F Brooks, Under Secretary of
State for Nuclear Security, US Department of Energy evidence to
House Armed Services Sub-Committee inquiry on strategic forces,
March 2006.
(14) Focus on British Defence Policy and Doctrine: Questions
for the Depate on the Future of the UK Strategic Deterrent, pages
50-57, L Willet, Royal United Services Institute, December 2005.
(15) Russian Nuclear Forces 2006, Bulletin of Atomic
Scientists NRDC Nuclear Notebook, pages 64-67, March to April
2006, R S Norris and H M Kristensen. Russian Nuclear Forces 2005,
pages 70-72, March to April 2005, R S Norris and H M Kristensen.
19. Other possible threat scenarios identified range
from large scale terrorist acts to potential tensions between
Russia and China in the Russian Far East, emergence of extremist
terrorist groups in central Asia (see note 12).
Iran—in "Deter and Contain—Dealing
with a Nuclear Iran", Testimony of Michael Eisenstadt,
House Armed Services Committee, 1 February 2006.
Budgets
20. All aspects of a successor deterrent system has to
be considered in the context of UK defence budgets which have
remained relatively static at around £6 billion/year (16)
(summarized in Table 2 below). "Between 2008-15 the
current forward equipment plan is already expected to create a
`bow wave' when procurement programmes far exceed available funding".
(17)
21. The Government's 2004 Spending Review, set the Defence
Budget until 2007-08. The Defence budget will increase from £29.7
billion in 2004-05 to £33.4 billion in 2007-08. In real terms
(ie after inflation) it represents average annual growth of 1.4%.
It will amount to longest period of sustained real terms growth
in planned Defence spending (see Table 2 below).
Table 2
THE DEFENCE BUDGET 2004-08
£ million
| 2004-05
| 2005-06 | 2006-07
| 2007-08 |
| Resource Budget | 31,370 |
32,449 | 32,698 | 33,018
|
| Capital Budget | 6,327 |
6,880 | 6,970 | 7,600
|
| Total Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL) |
29,710 | 30,888 | 32,067
| 33,447 |
| | |
| |
Source: MoD website www.mod.uk (16).
MoD state that, "The settlement for defence allows
us to invest in new capabilities to increase our agility, flexibility
and deployability. Providing world-class equipment to our Armed
Forces requires major investment, so as well as using these increased
resources we are also driving a major efficiency programme to
maximise every penny spent on defence."
22. The Select Committee may wish to invite MoD to indicate
what timelines it has in mind for design work on a submarine-based
delivery system given current budgetary pressures and planned
naval shipbuilding commitments.
(16) HM Treasury Spending Review 2004, Cmnd 5237,
July 2004, Page 129.
(17) Trident and the future of the British Nuclear Deterrent:
House of Commons Standard Note SN/1A/3706, 5 July 2005, page
11.
Procurement Options—Defence Industrial Strategy—Submarine
Based Delivery System
23. Timelines for strategic deterrent procurement will
depend on budget availability and on which procurement option
is chosen. Three options are reported as being under consideration:
(18)
— Extend in-service life of "Vanguard"
class submarine—we would not favour this as it would "only
keep the Trident capability in service for a further 10 years".
(18)
— Procure a direct replacement system—the
decision for this would come later than UK is likely to require.
— Procure a brand new capability.
24. KOFAC's preference is therefore to see MoD procure
a brand new capability - this new capability could involve a purpose
build submarine or a new multi-role submarine with vertical launch
tubes in terms of affordability and delivery of "capability
and effect".
25. In USA a new Trident variant will probably be developed
in 2020-42 timeframe. The US replacement procurement decision
is likely in 2016, UK needs one by 2010.
(18) Trident and the future of the British Nuclear Deterrent:
House of Commons Standard Note SN/1A/3706, 5 July 2005, pages
11-14.
Defence Industrial Strategy Policy—Submarine Based Delivery
System
26. KOFAC considers a submarine-based delivery system
gives UK a strategic advantage over other potential delivery systems.
With this assumption, we now turn to the issues of timing being
addressed by the Select Committee and set our views in the context
of:
— The time needed to develop a submarine-based
delivery system,
— the timing of work so as to sustain the necessary
design skills base, and
— the UK's recently adopted Defence Industrial
Strategy (1) (see Appendix B).
27. The Defence Industrial Strategy (19) (DIS) (paragraph
B2.63) specifically states that Government wishes to "ensure
options for a successor to the current Vanguard class deterrent
are kept open in advance of eventual decisions likely to be necessary
in this Parliament".
28. The last strategic deterrent submarine build commenced
in 1986. Detailed design began earlier soon after the 1980 decision
to invest in the system. Initial concept design work commenced
at least four years prior to 1986 in order to prepare for a decision
being made. It took 14 years to develop and the programme lasted
until 2001, 21 years. Three "Astute" class attack submarines
are now being constructed at Barrow-in-Furness. The Defence Industrial
Strategy states that future submarine orders depend on affordability
and on being able to keep design team domaine expertise together.
(20) (see Appendix B, paragraphs B2.62 & B2.63).
29. KOFAC agrees that it will be necessary for "MoD
and industry to demonstrate an ability to drive down and control
the costs of nuclear submarine programmes" (para B2.63).
(19) Significant progress has been made by BAE SYSTEMS at Barrow
in driving down overhead costs, (27% have been achieved since
2003) and work is underway to encourage firms who act as suppliers
to follow BAE"s example.
30. DIS (paragraph 2.62) observes "submarine
design capability is at risk if long gaps emerge between first
of class design efforts" (21) (see Appendix B).
The well documented example of the gap between build of the "Vanguard"
and "Astute" classes demonstrates the potential for
cost increases and programme delays. Rand Europe emphasise that
the UK submarine design base is rapidly eroding. (4) "Demand
for the design and engineering resources is declining as the design
of the first of class nears completion. To sustain the UK"s
nuclear submarine design expertise, some minimum core of professionals
must continuously work in that area". (19)(20) DISs proposal
for an eight year update of a submarine class design will not
employ all the core skills required to sustain a submarine design
capability in the UK.
(19) Defence Industrial Strategy, Defence White Paper,
Cmnd 6697, December 2005.
(20) The UK's Nuclear Submarine Industrial Base, Volume
1, Sustaining Design and Production Resources, Rand Europe 2005.
(21) Submarine designers can undertake surface ship design
work, but the same is not true in reverse. Design for the tight
space constraints of a submarine is a unique skill that needs
to be sustained. One way to do this is to allow the skilled submarine
design teams to have a core workload of ships and submarine design
work, to bridge any workload gaps between submarine design orders.
31. Rand (see Appendix A), in advising MoD, indicated
if the UK wishes to retain a submarine-based strategic nuclear
deterrent, design of a follow-on SSBN class would have to start
approximately 15 years prior to the desired in-service date for
the replacement submarines. They concluded, "With retirement
of the `Vanguard' class starting around 2018, the design for a
follow-on class would have to begin immediately". (21)
KOFAC agrees with this conclusion.
32. Rand came to this view after reviewing options for
the "Vanguard" class to have a design life of 25 years
and 40 years. They concluded "From a design base standpoint,
the most desirable retirement age for the `Vanguard' class would
be 30 to 35 years" ie 2023-28, adding that, "Even
if the Vanguard class is retired at 30 to 35 years of age, there
may still be a period of time when the design core is inadequate.
A retirement date that is not optimal for sustaining the design
base may have to be chosen for some other reason. How might the
design core be sustained through periods of slack demand?
— Spiral development of the Astute class.
— Continuous work on conceptual designs
for new submarine classes, whether or not those classes are ever
built.
— Design of unmanned undersea vehicles."
(20)
33. The DIS proposes a Maritime Industrial Strategy (MIS)
by mid summer 2006 (see Appendix B). MIS will set out in
detail programming of warship and submarine programmes. KOFAC
considers the MIS needs to programme concept design work for replacement
options to "Vanguard" to be introduced by 2007 in order
to help sustain the design capability to develop a submarine based
system and achieve the DIS policy quoted above in paragraph 39.
We also advocate the MIS should define the specification, capability,
and effect it wishes to see delivered and the likely budget available
so that industry can assess what is required and present suitable
options for "team navy" (MoD and industry) to
examine, evaluate and approve.
(21) The UK's Nuclear Submarine Industrial Base, Volume
1, Sustaining Design and Production Resources, Rand Europe 2005.
Conclusions
34. The Trident submarine/deterrent programme was the
largest ever UK defence procurement project of the 20th Century,
it was delivered on time and within budget, with a major component,
the submarine delivery system designed and built at Barrow-in-Furness
shipyard. The domaine expertise remains at Barrow to enable MoD
to aim for a similar outcome of delivering a follow-on submarine-based
deterrent carrying system.
35. Given the number of nuclear capable states, risks
of proliferation, and terrorism there is likely to be a continuing
need for UK to sustain a strategic nuclear deterrent and invest
in a successor delivery system. To maximise its operational effectiveness
it should be submarine-based.
36. Timing is a key issue from the point of view of sustaining
the capability to design a replacement system, there is strong
evidence that design work should commence on submarine-based concept
solutions now and in advance of any decision on whether to proceed
with a new system "to keep options open" and in order
to sustain critical design skills in the UK, especially at Barrow.
We note that the cost of undertaking concept design work is likely
to be modest in relation to total project cost. Rand indicate,
"Annual investments to sustain a core of submarine-specific
design resources involving a core of 200 designers, engineers,
and draughtsmen would require annual funding of perhaps £15
million".
37. MoD should, "Decide as soon as possible whether
there will be a next-generation SSBN class and when it will be
designed and built. This decision is needed to inform any further
actions to sustain the design base and schedule remaining Astute
production to maximise efficiency". (22)
38. Ministers have recently said: "We need to
sustain high-end skills to design and integrate complex warships
and maintain them through-life. We need to retain, too, the ability
to design, manufacture and support all aspects of submarine capability".
The approach KOFAC advocates will help achieve this objective.
(22) The UK's Nuclear Submarine Industrial Base, Volume 1,
Sustaining Design and Production Resources, Rand Europe 2005.
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