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UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 1241-i

House of COMMONS

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE

DEFENCE COMMITTEE

 

 

UK OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

 

 

Tuesday 20 June 2006

RT HON ADAM INGRAM MP, LT GENERAL NICK HOUGHTON CBE

and DR ROGER HUTTON

Evidence heard in Public Questions 1 - 69

 

 

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Oral Evidence

Taken before the Defence Committee

on Tuesday 20 June 2006

Members present

Mr James Arbuthnot, in the Chair

Mr David Crausby

Linda Gilroy

Mr Dai Havard

Mr Adam Holloway

Mr Brian Jenkins

Mr Kevan Jones

Robert Key

Willie Rennie

John Smith

________________

Witnesses: Rt Hon Adam Ingram, a Member of the House, Minister of State for the Armed Forces; Lt General Nick Houghton, CBE, Chief of Joint Operations, and Dr Roger Hutton, Director, Joint Commitments Policy, Ministry of Defence, gave evidence.

Q1 Chairman: Minister and gentlemen, welcome to the Defence Committee and the evidence we are taking on Iraq. There are a number of questions that we would like to ask you. We would be most grateful for short questions and for short answers. Towards the end of the meeting we will wish to go into private session to ask you things that we feel should be dealt with only in private session. So we will conduct the meeting in two parts - first public, second private - and we will not go back into public session at the end. Minister, if I may, I would like to ask you, first, if you would introduce your colleagues and then I will start asking the questions.

Mr Ingram: Thank you very much, Mr Chairman. On my left is General Nick Houghton, who is Chief of Joint Operations, and on my right is Dr Roger Hutton, who is Director of Joint Commitments. I will do my best to give you short answers, but it depends on how detailed the questions are.

Q2 Chairman: Indeed. Yesterday we heard that the Muthana Province was going to be handed over to Iraqi control. When is that going to happen?

Mr Ingram: That is happening now, so to speak, in the sense that that is a process which is now under way. The specific date of the handover I do not have off the top of my head; I do not know whether the General has or not.

Lt General Houghton: The process involved allows for 45 days for the formal handover to take place with a ceremony at the end attendant on that, but we do not know when within that 45 days the firm date is going to be yet.

Q3 Chairman: Thank you. There are four provinces in which the British are particularly concerned and Muthana Province is the first. Do you have any suggestions as to which the next province is likely to be?

Mr Ingram: The plan would be Maysan, but what we have said consistently, as indeed with Muthana, is that it is all about the conditions that apply, the capability, obviously, of the Iraqi security forces, the determination of the Iraqi Government itself and the conditions on the ground. So all of these matters have to be considered as to when it is then appropriate to do so. So it is about the capacity and the confidence of the Iraqi security forces to do what they are now seeking to do in al-Amarah and, from our point of view, our confidence in their capacity and capability to do that as well. So that will be a progressive process. As we have said, this is one event as part of a sequence of events, all part of the greater process.

Q4 Chairman: When we were in Iraq we visited the 10th Division and, clearly, your confidence in the ability of the 10th Division of the Iraqi Army to carry out its function is increasing. Would the handing over of control of Muthana to the Iraqi Army imply that you are confident that they will be able to do the patrolling work that the British have been able to do until now?

Mr Ingram: Maybe that is better addressed from a military perspective, but the answer to that would be yes. However, there is still the obligation on us to continue to ensure that we are working with them in terms of the monitoring of it and, also, in terms of support if required if it suddenly turns poisonous in a way which we have not expected or predicted. We have to be able to make sure that we do not have a reverse, so there would be a joint approach in all of that, but we will put the delivery by the Iraqi security forces on the ground. It is not just, of course, the Army, it is also the police as well; this is a more rounded approach than just an Army response.

Lt General Houghton: I absolutely endorse your point about the increased confidence we have in the 10th Division of the Iraqi Army. As the Minister has said, the conditions which are attendant on provincial transfer relate to a number of different fields: local governments, local security, the competence of Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police and, also, the position of coalition forces to re-engage if there was a sudden deterioration in the security situation. The Iraqi Army themselves will not be on the front edge of providing the security in al-Amarah; that will be a police task with the Iraqi Army in support of the police, but we have every confidence in the competence of the Iraqi Army to do the task that is expected of it. Hence, the conditions have been met in Muthana.

Q5 Chairman: The Italian Government has suggested that it intends to withdraw troops from Iraq over the coming months, and today we heard that the Japanese are intending to withdraw their troops. What will be the consequences of those withdrawals?

Mr Ingram: The consequences of those withdrawals will be part of what has been envisaged and planned. This is part of the process of change which is under way. Probably the best judgment would be that the Japanese have completed their task and they have made the decision that they have completed their reconstruction task, which is the prime purpose they are there. Of course, they will retain a strategic presence anyway in Iraq; they are not pulling out everything; they have said they will commit strategic airlift to the Americans in the North, and that is helpful, so it is not a complete withdrawal by the Japanese. The Italians are due to be out by 21 December (I think that is the date they have given), so there is time to plan all of that process. That then means what we will have to do with our other coalition partners is look to see what is then required to be done on the ground when they are no longer there. So we have time to plan all of that. I think it is a bit early to be 100 per cent specific but, again, the CJO may want to comment on some of the evolving thoughts on that.

Lt General Houghton: There is absolutely no surprise at all about the Japanese withdrawal; it is more, actually, the conclusion of their redevelopment and reconstruction mission, and this was part of the planning and is naturally vested with the transfer of provincial control in Muthana. From the Italian perspective, clearly there is both a political dynamic behind that (on which I cannot comment) but, also, we would anticipate that within the drawdown period of the Italians that Dhi Qar would also meet the necessary conditions for transfer. Therefore, from a military perspective, we would be left purely with a requirement to provide what we are terming "Operation Overwatch" which just is, as it were, an enduring insurance policy against something unforeseen going badly wrong there. The actual withdrawal of the Italian forces themselves should not present us with a security problem.

Q6 Robert Key: Chairman, we should not forget that the Royal Navy is also involved here. Given the porous nature of the Iraqi border and the work that the Royal Navy is doing very crucially, can you give us some idea of the assessment made by the Royal Navy of the competence of the Iraqi Navy and exactly how they are encouraging the Iraqis to take over that part of the security scene?

Mr Ingram: Again, the CJO is perhaps best placed to answer that.

Lt General Houghton: I think the most important thing about the Iraqi Navy will be in its competence to defend the strategic oil export infrastructure in the northern Arabian Gulf in the area of control that we call CTF58. Up until a couple of months ago the UK commanded this particular operation, and a subset of that command working with a training element of the Royal Navy ashore, is to bring the indigenous Iraqi Navy up to a level of competence where they can secure that infrastructure. I think that it makes sense, although there have been significant advancements in the competence and quality of the Iraqi Navy, not to take risk over that particular security task. So although we have increasing confidence in the Iraqi Navy, in terms of their overall equipment and competences to perform what is a vital task in terms of protection of that key infrastructure, I think it will be some time before we hand over to the Iraqis the sole responsibility for that.

Q7 Chairman: How would you describe the consent of the Iraqi population, in the area of operations in which the British are particularly interested, to our continued presence in the area?

Mr Ingram: How do you measure that? You can do opinion polls, you can do assessment, you can measure, I suppose, in terms of public reaction on the street. I think it is very difficult to get the best assessment and the best feel for that unless you are there on a constant basis, which of course our troops would be. There is ebb and flow in all of this, and there is no question at all it is a difficult environment at the moment. I am conscious of the fact that the first time I visited Iraq I was on the streets with our soldiers who wore soft hats and no body armour. I do not think that could happen now. So, if that is the indication of a change of threat level, unquestionably that is a very key measure. The people of Iraq are no different from any other country: they want security, they do not want troops on the street; they do not want people being blown up, they want jobs, they want employment and they want a future for their children - all of which we are seeking to deliver. It is difficult to deliver that, either through the agency of the Iraqi Government or through what we are seeking to do through the developing PRTs or any other reconstruction efforts, because of the nature of the security environment. That is why we have to get that security environment stabilised and why we then, at the same time, have to try and grow all that necessary infrastructure and social environment and political environment, but it is difficult. I do not know if it is a percentage you are looking for - I do not think that is the basis of the question - but it is a difficult environment we are in at present, and we have to ensure that we succeed against that. That is how we will win this. This is, as we keep saying, about hearts and minds, and you do not win hearts and minds by military presence; you win it by all the other key ingredients. The hearts and minds are won by what we can do to ensure security, but the continuation of troops on the street is an indication that you are not winning in the other areas.

Q8 Chairman: They also want sovereignty over their own land and they want their own local elections. We were told that there might be a delay to the provincial elections which were expected to be held roughly this summer. Do you expect the provincial elections to take place this summer or do you expect them to be delayed?

Mr Ingram: My understanding is that there was not a drop-dead timescale in all of that. As I understand it, the elections are scheduled for later in the year in Basra. There was not a specific time set for all of that, but clearly the security environment is important to be able to deliver in all of this. Let us remember what has been achieved in elections. We have gone through that; that was delivered on the back of the Iraqi security forces providing a secure environment for those elections to take place, and is a case of trying to achieve that type of more stable environment so these elections can then occur. When you say you were told there was a delay, who said there was a delay? Who has given an indication there was a delay?

Q9 Chairman: The military people we spoke to in the British forces said that there might be a delay.

Lt General Houghton: It has been a hot topic, as it were - the timing of the provincial elections. There was a time when, for security reasons, it was felt it would be a good idea to have allied two different electoral events; one the provincial elections and, secondly, the referendum on the constitution. Since that time it has been thought better that the election on the constitution should slip off further into the future, as that was more a matter of still strong internal political debate. Therefore, the provincial elections, it is deemed, will be held sometime during this year. It is probably felt better to hold them in the autumn rather than rush to hold them too quickly, but this is a wholly political decision to be made by the new Iraqi Government.

Q10 Mr Havard: The questions come from the fact that what we were told was that there had previously been a general acceptance that there was consent from the Iraqi people; it was now more tolerance, that there had been a shift in relation to perceptions of the Iraqi people's attitude and, also, their expectation. The whole point about the timing of elections was that there were various watersheds in their expectations about how quickly they could gain control of their own processes as opposed to deliberately, somehow, avoiding giving them control and, therefore, stimulating discontent. That is, essentially, where the questions come from. I do not think there are right or wrong answers to any of these things, I know there just are not, but that is why we asked the question.

Mr Ingram: This is a process, and if you do it too soon and it does not succeed then you have a problem. So there is a political judgment to be made in all of this. That is why we are saying there were general expectations rather than a firm timescale. So when you say "delay" it was not a case of that was the date on which it was set, and that is why I was answering in the way in which I was. I can see where the word "delay" comes in, but if it is delay it is delay for a purpose - to get the right conditions. We have to ensure total buy-in to all of this, and you will know from your own visits that there are issues that have to be addressed with the Governor in Basra; it is only recently that he has re-engaged in communications with us. So these are all the key ingredients that have to be worked at to get to that environment where we can then move forward. That is why later in the year is the more likely timescale for those local elections. Important though they are, they should be done in the right conditions. If we get the right ingredients then it is another indication of community buy-in to all of this, but there is not a simple equation or a simple set of answers for this.

Q11 Mr Crausby: I have an overall question on the state of emergency in Basra and its effect on our forces. What is the significance of the Iraqi Prime Minister's declaration of a state of emergency in Basra in May, what impact has this had on relations between the multinational forces and local government and how would you characterise the current security situation in both the Basra Province and MND South-East as a whole?

Mr Ingram: It is an undesirable step when you have to declare a state of emergency, but there is an important element to this because it does show that the new Prime Minister and his government are now focusing Iraq-wide and, indeed, on the important city of Basra and the surrounding provinces. One of the issues is that it has been too Baghdad-centric. Now there is a greater engagement and a greater focus on looking at where all the attendant problems are, where there are some really big issues in the north, but that of itself means that we should not ignore what is happening elsewhere. So I think it is very significant that Prime Minister al-Maliki has turned his attention to all of this. That is a very positive engagement and one that unquestionably shows a greater roundness to what is happening in Iraq from Baghdad. In terms of the immediate impact and how that has evolved, I think it is better that the CJO addresses that and gives you a clear indication of the various aspects of that, and the way it is impacting upon our personnel.

Lt General Houghton: I think, in respect of the security situation in Basra, there is no doubt that it has got worse of late due to the protracted period of time it took to form the government - upwards of five months. That allowed a period of time when, if you like, politics that should have been conducted more appropriately actually were conducted through violent means on the streets - some of this through rival militia gangs. What we have in the south of the country, quite different to elsewhere in the north, particularly in the Baghdad region, is we do not there have an active Sunni insurgency; we do not there have active signs of the Jihadist terrorist movements such as AQI (al-Qaeda in Iraq) and al-Sarna (?) and those sorts of things. So the nature of the security dimension is difficult and it is one in which, as it were, there has been inter-faction rivalry, much of it then reflecting in non-judicial murder (?) between rival Shia factions struggling for political and economic power. In relative terms, vis-à-vis elsewhere in Iraq, the security situation there is still relatively low or modest. There is always a statement given that four Iraqi provinces attract over 85 per cent of the incidents, and Basra is not one of those, but there nevertheless is a worrying amount of violence and murder carried out between rival Shia factions. It is in this context of an upturn in the level of local violence between Shia factions, in the aftermath of the period, as it were, of political instability whilst the government was being formed that the Prime Minister has now stepped forward and wishes to establish his own mark and his own political involvement and identification with the improvement of the security situation down there. The most immediate thing that it has actually seen, as well as that political involvement, is an increased use of the Iraqi Army on the streets of Basra because Prime Minister al-Maliki himself recognises the requirement that the security situation down there must carry an Iraqi face and is actually against our own plans because the transition, ultimately, of security responsibility to the Iraqis is a wholly good thing

Mr Ingram: If I can supplement that briefly, in terms of the way in which the Iraqi security forces did respond at the tragic loss of the Lynx helicopter and our five personnel, we do know how very quickly (this was all said, of course, in the media) the Iraqi security forces took ownership of that issue. More recently there was the major suicide bombing in Basra where they took total ownership. That shows: one, a willingness to engage and, two, a capability to actually deliver and, I would guess, community buy-in as well, because if there was not community buy-in to it there would have been hostility towards the security forces. So those are very good, solid indicators of change of a substantial nature which is beginning to take place.

Dr Hutton: If I may just add, the basic problem in Basra is, as General Houghton and the Minister have indicated, one of poor governance, and the only way you are going to fix that in the medium term is to have a stake in Baghdad, in the governor's right (?), and that is the real significance of Prime Minister Maliki's intervention. This is Baghdad saying: "We want to put governance in Basra right". That is its real significance.

Q12 Chairman: Provided he maintains attention on it

Mr Ingram: That could be a throwaway remark as if somehow or other he is not maintaining attention ----

Q13 Chairman: He is.

Mr Ingram: That is the point.

Q14 Linda Gilroy: Minister, we met a range of senior politicians in Baghdad when we were seeking those reassurances, which I think we got, but we were also told in Baghdad that the Iranian influence in Basra was endemic. How would you characterise the extent of the Iranian influence in the region, and to what extent do you think Iran is supporting the IED and other attacks against UK and coalition forces?

Mr Ingram: There is no question at all that there is an indication of Iranian presence. Now, whether that is Iranian Government-inspired or directed is a moot point - not provable at this point. The Iranian presence is there and it is clear in terms of transfer technology in terms of some of the devices that we are having to deal with. The question is: it is there and it has to be factored into what we are doing, and we also have to make it very clear, as we do, to the Iranian Government that this is not something that they should be so engaging in, remembering this: that what we are doing there is supported by UN mandate and resolution. So we do make our views very clearly known through the FCO to the Iranian Government, and the presence of an Iranian influence is unquestionably there. Just how extensive that is is something that has to be tested over time. It is very easy for some to say: "It is total; it would not happen without them", remembering that in any political environment, and Iraq is a very good example where you have a lot of competing factions, some who owe allegiance to Iran for the support they gave them at the time of Saddam and others who take a different point of view, people will say things because there is a lot of assessment from their history, from their perspective of what they are trying to achieve in terms of the political objectives. There is nothing unique about Iraq in that sense. You could say the same applied in Northern Ireland, where people were saying there was a whole lot of influence coming into play. It depends who you talk to amongst particular politicians how they will come to their conclusion about the influence of external forces.

Q15 Linda Gilroy: In relation to IEDs, however, have you got an assessment on what the Iranian involvement maybe?

Mr Ingram: This is, perhaps, something we are going to discuss in private session. We do know about the technology; we know where that technology has been developed and we do know it is extant in Iraq, so the technological capabilities are there. It is not something which has grown organically, it has been transferred in and it has come from people who have been trained in that technology. So it is quite clear that that is happening. There is nothing unusual about this. That is part of the global terrorism network - the transfer of knowledge base - and they will transfer it to anyone who is taking on, in this case, the coalition forces in Iraq, and they will seek to do it elsewhere where they can have a threat against us.

Chairman: We may well come back to that.

Q16 John Smith: Following on from that, Mr Chairman, when the Committee was in Iraq, particular and deep concern was expressed about the porous nature of the border between Iran and Iraq, which may not be influencing the Shia rivalry or the smuggling of arms explosives and technology. What is being done to try to improve that border security, and what more needs to be done?

Lt General Houghton: I think the first thing we have got to do is keep our feet on the ground about the scale of the problem. I, off the top of my head, forget how many hundred kilometres this border is long; much of it is marshland and waterway and, historically, the locals astride that border have not recognised it and it is impossible to police it in any way that one might consider an absolute guarantee of control of all border movement. That is quite impossible. Nevertheless, there are a whole range of different techniques, physical and technical, that you can bring to bear to improve one's monitoring, surveillance and physical presence on the border. The primary one is through the Department of Border Enforcement, which is an Iraqi institution, which the coalition has trained and has built a whole string of border forts which they man and patrol from. There are a number of technical devices that we use to give technical surveillance over the border, most of these aerial surveillance, and then there are a number of what we would call border "surge" operations to both act as a mentoring force to the Department of Border Enforcement, to their forts, as it were, but also to provide, on an opportunity basis and on a surge basis, physical presence to interdict likely smuggling routes along the border. So quite a lot is being done and quite a lot of this is being done with a view to handing it over to the Iraqis, but I would put it in the context of a task which will never generate 100 per cent security of a controlled border.

Q17 John Smith: We know from a previous report of this Committee that it is recognised that there are a significant number of small arms in the Iraqi community in our area of influence. Have we any idea what proportion of those come from Iran, and is that significant?

Lt General Houghton: My view is that we could not conceivably police such a statistic. This is a nation that has always held arms domestically as of right, and quite where they have come from there is no such statistic, I am pretty certain, in existence.

Mr Ingram: Nor ever likely to be. It is impossible to assess that.

Q18 John Smith: On the relative security situation, it has been argued that 80 per cent of the attacks in Iraq are against coalition forces but 80 per cent of the casualties are suffered by civilians. Do you recognise that figure and do you recognise that figure in the MND South-East area?

Mr Ingram: What is the source of the figure?

Q19 John Smith: It is military, but do you recognise it?

Mr Ingram: Which military? Is it something you have been given when you were there?

Q20 John Smith: No, but it is something that I have been given.

Mr Ingram: It is useful to know source. It may well be I have said, in the past, that is the figure and then I am going to try and dissemble a wee bit. I make this plea: let us not deal with anecdotes; where we can establish facts let us give the facts. Is that measurable? If 80 per cent of the attacks are against security forces, you said, and 80 per cent of the casualties are civilians, I do not know whether, off the top of my head, I could confirm or otherwise. I know I do not have anything in my briefing.

Q21 Chairman: Minister, the answer to the question is you do not recognise the figures.

Mr Ingram: I am trying, as I am talking, to think if there is anything in my memory bank that tells me that is accurate. If we can get best assessment then, again, we will do that, and we may do that in a letter.

Lt General Houghton: What I would broadly offer is that that sort of statistic is probably supported when you aggregate up all the incidents across the whole theatre of Iraq, but it differs from place to place. For instance, within Baghdad itself there is little doubt that the vast majority of the casualties are civilian ones as opposed to security force ones, but that is not the same across the piece. There is no doubt that certainly the Jihadist terrorists, as a policy, are going towards incidents that try to trigger mass civilian causalities as an attempt to ferment inter-sectarian strife. So I do not know what the authority for that figure is but I can recognise the broad statistic.

Q22 Mr Holloway: Minister, to what extent do patrols in Basra have an Iraqi face to them?

Mr Ingram: What is the mixture between us on the streets with Iraqi ----?

Q23 Mr Holloway: Exactly.

Mr Ingram: I could not give you precise figures but, again, the CJO may be best placed to give you an assessment of that.

Lt General Houghton: The reason I am hesitating is that that figure will have changed significantly over the last week or two. Since the introduction of a Prime Minister Maliki-endorsed security plan for Basra, the requirement for a security force presence to wear an Iraqi face has changed significantly and there has been the introduction of a significant number of Iraqi Army troops on to the streets of Basra. So it is certainly nothing like 100 per cent but the move in that direction is significantly under way.

Q24 Mr Holloway: Do all of our patrols have an Iraqi with them, for example, if not even an interpreter?

Lt General Houghton: They will carry our own interpreter capability with some of them, not all of them. It depends: foot patrols into certain areas will be joined and will have interpreters; other patrols which might be mobile ones going outside the city might not.

Q25 Mr Holloway: If we are patrolling in someone else's country without a single Iraqi, does that not look very bad?

Lt General Houghton: The aim is, normally, to always attempt to accompany Iraqi police within Basra, so that there is a police presence with them. What I am not saying is an increasingly Army presence as well to give the whole of the patrol a more Iraqi flavour. What I am not saying is that given patrols which relate to convoy escort towards the administrative, and all that, there are many patrols which go out without an Iraqi presence within them.

Mr Ingram: The comment was: "Doesn't it look bad?" I think (and you will know from your experience as well) you have got to do what is realistic as well. The basis of your question is, without doubt, desirable, but then we have to deal with the real and evolving situation. So who knows where that profile could end up, and unquestionably that would be the desired objective. So, increasingly, you have that close engagement, and that is what we will do no matter where we are; we will work to seek to achieve that objective, but it may not always be practical, and there may be different purposes being served by our patrols. Therefore, we have to deal with the real environment we are in and not against some notion of whether there is an ultimate set of relationships, desirable though they may be. I do not think it is bad, I think it is a reflection of reality.

Chairman: We are just about to come to the capacity of the 10th Division, but before we do, Dai Havard.

Q26 Mr Havard: Can I just return to this question of the Iranian border? Is the truth not, really, that for Maysan province to be given control (which, really, ought to come fairly soon) the one thing that needs to be done is confidence has to be given to the United States and to General Casey, in particular, and to the Iraqi Government, that this question about border security in relation to Maysan is sufficient enough for them to make that political jump and allow that to have its own control? I think, personally, and I have talked to various people about it, that is a doable thing, but is it not really the fact that it is less to do with perceptions on the street and it is more to do with questions about confidence, if you like, that the process of control being handed over can be sufficiently maintained, particularly given that Maysan is a border province?

Mr Ingram: Everyone who has a share in the developing situation in Iraq, and it is positive, will have a view as to what should happen next. That then is part of the discussions that take place, and that is why I spoke, at the beginning, about the confidence of the Iraqi security forces in their own capabilities (our confidence that they can deliver), and increasingly we are seeing that the other international partners, not just the US but others who are working alongside us, also have a right to say: "Well, if this happens what are the implications?" if they are in a particular location. That is the nature of those rounded discussions. Yes, everyone has to have confidence in what we are seeking to do before you move forward, and some people may have 110 per cent confidence and some people may have less than that. You do not make progress unless people are buying into that process. So if someone is holding up a red card and saying: "This is just not going to work" then that has to be talked through: why is that being argued in that particular way? What can we do to show that this is the desired way forward? That, clearly, will happen in terms of the border issue and in terms of Maysan. Everyone has to be assured that if that is the next step, and we have said it should be (and I would agree with you, the sooner the better because that is another indication of good progress, but the sooner based upon best assessment and best confidence), they will actually deliver and you do not have a reverse. So that is the nature of the discussions that have gone on at senior military level so that everyone has a full appreciation, full understanding and full acceptance of the next step in the process.

Q27 Linda Gilroy: In those positive moves towards Iraqi control, what assessment have you made of the availability of equipment, firepower and transport to the 10th Division? We had some remarks made to us about some significant shortages and we did raise that with people we met in Baghdad, but I wonder what is your assessment of that as a barrier to moving more towards Iraqi control.

Mr Ingram: That, in a sense, may be another technical question about what is happening specifically on the ground. It depends who says this. Again, we are into if someone says something you will get contacts ----

Q28 Linda Gilroy: Can I clarify? We met the 10th Division.

Mr Ingram: And they were saying what? They were under-resourced?

Q29 Linda Gilroy: Particularly on transport there were issues about getting transport made available to them that would enable them to continue along the path of taking control.

Mr Ingram: Before General Houghton replies, this goes back ----

Q30 Linda Gilroy: Adam is reminding me it was Polish armoured vehicles, particularly, that they were expecting and they had not been able to take.

Mr Ingram: And they had not been given them?

Linda Gilroy: They had not arrived.

Q31 Chairman: They had not been bought.

Mr Ingram: They had not been bought? That is the information you have got. This goes back to the point, in general terms, I was making about the confidence of the Iraqi forces themselves to be able to deliver on the ground. I suppose, like any military force, they always want the best and they always want a sufficiency. Therefore, we have an objective to try and deliver on all of that because then that makes sure that we then have the confidence in their capabilities. It would seem to me instinctively, as a civilian and not a military person, that what you do not do is build in problems where they then cannot effectively deliver on the ground, whether it is ground mobility or whether it is air cover or whatever else. Part of Operation Overwatch is about ensuring that if they do experience any difficulty they then have a combination of forces as back-up to them. That is an important aspect of all this. On the specific, I do not know whether there is more detail to give you on this.

Lt General Houghton: In very general terms, the assessment on the condition and the state of the Iraqi Army and the police is done on a monthly basis. As a result of the assessment they fall into one of four criteria, from four to one, with one being the very best and four being the very worst, and it is across personnel, training, logistics, equipment, firepower and all those sorts of things. TRA, as it is called (Transitional Readiness Assessment), number two is the one they need to achieve in order to be ready for transfer. There is a level of capability beyond that which is one, which allows them an increased level of capabilities, but over and above that which is specifically required to deal with an internal security issue. Many of the commanders, and General Latif of the 10th Division is no different, want a lot of what I might crudely say are the "goodies" associated with transition level one, even though they are not actually required to meet the basic transitional requirement. Such things as the Polish armoured vehicles are in that level one basket. However, I can confirm, I was there last week, and I know the first few vehicles have arrived and the crew, driver and maintenance training on them is ongoing, and I have no reason to believe why a reasonably steady deployment of those vehicles should not ensue from now on in. There are, I accept, and you will have come across this in your various briefings, various levels of capability particularly to do with enhanced levels of firepower, with logistic sustainability and with protective mobility vehicles which are not the requirements of the transition criteria at level two; they come on stream later.

Q32 Linda Gilroy: Can I ask a brief, follow-on question to that? What assessment have you made of the capacity of the administration in the Iraqi Department of Defence to be responsible for procurement issues? Certain things that we (learned is maybe too strong a way of putting it) picked up - and we greatly welcomed the appointment of the Minister for Defence while we were there; I think that is very important to the leadership - caused me, certainly, to wonder about the capacity of the administration to deal with these matters.

Mr Ingram: Can I say you make the same criticism of our MoD as well about procurement matters, so it seems to be the iron law of MoD procurement that we can never satisfy select committees. One of the issues, of course, has been the question of governance in the administration departments. Clearly, one of the key developments in that is getting a minister in place. We now have that. I have not met the minister so I cannot speak from any personal experience but it would be down, again, to how powerful he is and how he then relates to the Prime Minister. It would seem to be that these are probably early days in all of this. How does he then - not unlike what happens here - get his share of the budget and then how he disburses that budget? Part of the process of good governance is making sure that they get best advice, if they so seek it, in the way in which they approach all of this. However, at the end of the day, they are the Government of their country; I do not think it is for us - and I am walking very carefully here - to comment one way or the other. On the competences, we will do what we can to ensure that their competences are raised, but they are a sovereign government and I am not going to criticise their capacity in that sense. Roger may want to give you some detailed information on the way we approach this in Baghdad.

Chairman: Do you want a quick follow-up on that Linda?

Q33 Linda Gilroy: I am very happy to listen to what Dr Hutton has got to say. I was just going to ask a more general question about other obstacles, which, perhaps, we have not raised and that the Minister may be aware of, to achieving the transition.

Dr Hutton: We recognise that procurement within the Iraqi MoD has been a problem in the past, and we have been working very hard to try and put that and other structures, processes and procedures within the Iraqi MoD right. We have people in the Iraqi MoD sitting alongside both ministers and officials introducing those new procedures and structures. So I am not going to claim that we have solved all of that, but we are at least on the starting blocks and the Iraqi MoD is starting to look like a functioning body now, which we think will start to deliver the goods, including in the region of procurement.

Q34 Linda Gilroy: Are there other obstacles - we have discussed a number about confidence, about the right timing, etc - to moving sooner rather than later on the transition to Iraqi control in the four southern provinces? We have discussed, obviously, the security situation in Basra.

Mr Ingram: Are there other obstacles? I suppose the security environment on the ground would be one of the major obstacles. That is one of the key conditions; we have to ensure that the conditions on the ground are right for all of this. This is an iterative process; it is progressive. We have one big step, I suppose, in terms of what has been announced over the last 24 hours or so, but it is only one part of the ongoing process. Will it all work smoothly into the future? We hope so, and we will throw all our effort into achieving that. Do we have to plan for it not happening that way? Yes, we do, and we have to identify as best we can what those obstacles are. Overall, it is about the competency of the security forces, it is about the competency of the governance of the country itself and about the relationship between the provincial governments and central government. This is only a young country in that sense, in terms of its democratic overwatch and relationships.

Q35 Mr Havard: Can I ask about one of those areas? We are now going to see the setting up of provincial reconstruction teams. This is an idea that we have seen partly working in Afghanistan under one sort of model, but really the question in relation to Iraq is whether or not this is the right construct to introduce into Iraq. Part of the reason I ask that is that whilst it is quite clearly necessary that all the organisations come together as efficiently as they possibly can (and if it is a vehicle for bringing them together that is a good thing), on the other hand, those are all of the organisations that are separate from the Iraqi Government. The Iraqis have their own national development plan and there are provincial development plans. Is a PRT going to be an enabler of that process or is it going to actually be competing with Iraqis in setting up their own processes of distribution to do the things that you rightly agreed, which are not necessarily all military tasks? They are the people appearing at the barricade to do their bit.

Mr Ingram: The PRTs have proven successful in Afghanistan, and I think increasingly we will see greater success for them there. The concept is fundamentally sound (I will talk about the relationship with the Iraqi Government in a moment), and that is to try and bring as much non-military expertise into play, and it is about reconstruction, it is about economics, it is about social, it is about political - all of those key aspects - and, also, importantly, to try to make it multinational and multi-agency. So the concept, as I say, has proven itself. You cannot, of itself, say that because it has worked in one part of Afghanistan it is going to work throughout Afghanistan, and, therefore, the same argument and logic applies: it will not necessarily work with certainty with Iraqi. However, it is a very sound concept and it does ensure, from a UK Government point of view, other departmental buy-in. It forces us, as a government, to make sure that we have got our act together; that we are co-ordinated in all that we are seeking to do. Then you have got to work in a relationship with what else is happening on the ground. In terms of what the Iraqi Government is seeking to do, it is not to be in competition but to be complementary. So we may be getting to parts that they are not touching and they certainly, hopefully, are getting to the bigger parts that we cannot touch, because at the end of the day it is the responsibility of the Iraqi Government to make the country whole again; all we can do is assist as best we can. A key ingredient of all of that is having a stable environment so you can deliver those programmes. Let us remember the history of the early days of Iraq when the UN had a very bad experience of some sad loss of life and, therefore, disengaged. The key to this, as I say, is to get other agencies involved, NGOs, all those international donors, to be supportive ----

Q36 Mr Havard: That is part of why I asked the question.

Mr Ingram: That is why I am answering in the way I am.

Q37 Mr Havard: Is there a mechanism that does that, because quite clearly what we have seen in previous visits there is this basic sort of stuff about water and infrastructure and all the rest of it? The message that came to us very strongly was that the Basra province is quite clearly the economic engine of the country of Iraq and more attention needed to be put to it from elsewhere, namely Baghdad or the USA or wherever, and its relative importance in being able to generate the money for all the other things as being something, if you like, that had not been given sufficient consideration, and there needs to be sufficient spend there. That is what we see. We see a frustration there, and frustration amongst some of our military, I think, which is that, frankly, they are being asked to do tasks that are not theirs to do with money that they have not got. So where are all the other agencies coming together to actually provide to do these other things? Is the PRT mechanism the efficient way to do that, or does it actually, in some way or another, stop the Iraqi processes? You now have a new interior minister and you have a new minister for the MoD. So that is the fear: is it another talking shop or is it actually an enabler?

Mr Ingram: You said: "Is it the way forward?" It is not the way forward, it is a way forward, and it is a component part. It is actually delivering and it has the potential to deliver on some of those areas where we can actually make a difference. Is it the total solution to the problem? No, it is not. We are not offering it up in that way. This is part of the process of engaging with the wider community, because the way in which the military can be accepted in carrying on the security role is if people can see there is some benefit accruing on the other side of all of this, in terms of economic infrastructure development, political development or social development. That is what we are specifically trying to tackle. Is it perfectly formed? Not yet. Will it ever deliver on every objective 110 per cent? Probably not because of the very nature of the environment in which it is trying to operate. Will it fail because of a lack of effort? No, it will not. Will it fail because of a lack of funding? That depends on what the funding demands are. There are significant tranches of money being put in both by the US and the way in which we will operate our central allocation, mainly through DFID money, but it will be small by comparison to what is required and what the Iraqi Government itself has to do. Clearly, in terms of the underlying aspect of your question about the vitality of Basra and the region as an economic engine room, that is the case, and the more that can be stabilised the more it generates wealth and the more that wealth can then be reinvested back into Iraq overall and into Basra and surrounding provinces.

Q38 Mr Havard: The success of the PRT is also in direct relationship to the success of our drawback plan, the rebating strategy and our ability to actually have overwatch as opposed to current engagement.

Mr Ingram: They work together. It goes back to this point of creating the stable environment. You cannot put civilian agencies out into a very hostile environment. It does not matter how much money you have got or how solid your plans are if your people are being threatened and, probably, even being killed. You will not be able to deliver on those mechanisms. So they are a part of the whole, and the more we can create that stable environment the more the agencies can then go out and deliver.

Q39 Linda Gilroy: Minister, if I understood correctly, that PRT is only part of the reconstruction. Where can we look at what the whole strategy for reconstruction in those provinces is to make an assessment of what the relative value of the PRT is in contributing towards that?

Dr Hutton: DFID has its own strategy for reconstruction in Iraq which I do not have with me today, but it is publicly available and readily available to the Committee. Getting back to the point made by the Minister, the PRT is not a panacea here; it is about oiling wheels, brokering solutions and establishing relationships, but above all acting as a conduit for international engagement in Basra and, also, international engagement in Baghdad being directed towards Basra.

Linda Gilroy: Exactly, and I think that is what Dai was saying. We experienced some frustration that that was not being directed in a focused way. I am still not certain of the extent to which the PRT is the means of focusing that, or if there is another means of focusing the overall reconstruction.

Q40 Chairman: I think the Minister said it was a means of ----

Mr Ingram: I said it was a means; I did not say it was the means.

Q41 Linda Gilroy: That is why I am trying to get a handle on where should we be looking. We did make strong representations, when we met the senior politicians in Baghdad, that they needed to pay more attention to the economic powerhouse of their country. I am just trying to get a picture. You say these are publicly available sources that we should be able to look at. Perhaps you could let us have a note on precisely what those are.

Mr Ingram: From DFID it is publicly available what we are doing. Whether we have access to information, public or otherwise, in terms of the overall commitment of the Iraqi Government, we will see if you can give you more information of that. If you raised the question with politicians, what did they say to you? It is their country, not ours.

Linda Gilroy: I was reassured but then people have to "walk the walk", and there is a difference between people saying: "Yes, we recognise that Basra is very important to our economic future" and then actually having a strategy which recognises it. I am trying to get a grasp on where that strategy lies, because we all ought to be able to understand whether there is enough focus on Basra. Goodness knows, they have got enough challenges in other parts of Iraq as well.

Q42 Chairman: Minister, you will let us have a note?

Mr Ingram: We will let you have what we have, certainly from DFID. Whether we have anything beyond that, I am not conscious of it, again, off the top of my head.

Q43 Chairman: You said the money for the PRT was coming partly from the US and mostly from DFID. Is the Ministry of Defence putting any money into the PRTs?

Mr Ingram: Again, it is all about how we bring together the overall funding. We will give you details on how that is put together.

Chairman: Moving on to John Smith, we have a question about the Hercules replacement.

Q44 John Smith: This might appear to jump a little bit, and the reason for that is that we are going to take other questions in private session a little later. What is the MoD's current estimate of the Hercules replacement coming into service, the A400M, and will it be fitted at the beginning of its service life with Explosive Suppressant Foam?

Mr Ingram: I do not have an answer off the top of my head on the A400M. I have not got stuff on all the different procurement streams. I can see a year coming in my head but I do not want to give it, but, again, we will give you details of how that is developing, when it will come into play and what the fit on that will be, because some of that may not yet have been determined, as to what is required on the aircraft, because it depends on what it is going to be used for. So the whole fleet may not be kitted out; only some may be kitted out, and I do not know whether that has been finally determined yet. Again, we will give that to you in writing.

Chairman: We will write you a letter expressing exactly the question.

Q45 John Smith: And with that letter, if a reply cannot be given now, whether the extended life of the C-130K is capable of filling any capability gap that might result in a delay of the in-service date for the A400M.

Mr Ingram: I know it is part of that because the in-service date for the A400M clearly sets one deadline down and, therefore, what is to fill that gap in between and how we are dealing with all of that, and of course with the C17, we are in the process, as you know, where we have leased four C17s and we are now going to purchase them and we are looking at the funding for an additional C17. As you will understand, it is not my area of procurement, so I do not want to start talking as if I have a detailed knowledge.

Q46 John Smith: But it is related.

Mr Ingram: The C17 has a very significant capacity and that is part of the decision thinking to fill that gap while we await the A-400M.

Chairman: We are now moving on to another area which may be more within your area, airbridge reliability.

Q47 Linda Gilroy: The mid-tour leave is always important and particularly so when you are working in 50 degrees, as our troops are out there at the moment. We experienced the unreliability of the airbridge ourselves and it took us nearly 30 hours to get home, and that causes great irritation to troops because it erodes their leave. Are you satisfied with the reliability of the service provided by Excel Airways? We heard that it may be replaced soon by RAF flights direct from Basra to the UK, but is that right and, if so, when will it happen?

Mr Ingram: I am sorry that you had, I think, a burst tyre and engine failure, but that happens with aircraft, but it was not deliberate, let us put it that way. It was not to give you a lesson in the frustrations or even to frustrate you because you had been asking tough questions in the past. This happens in terms of aircraft and aircraft can become unreliable. We have in terms of the airbridge an ageing fleet and that is why we are trying to replace that ageing fleet. We are putting in place a lot of mitigating measures to make sure that we have that capacity to satisfy the needs of troops transferring in and out of theatre because I recognise that, certainly for those coming home, they should not be unduly held up and clearly, if they are going in to theatre to replace people, they should not be unduly held up either. What I am saying is that we recognise there is fragility in that process. We went through quite a bad period when it was not functioning very well because of unreliability of the aircraft. We have put those mitigating processes in place in terms of putting aircraft to our need and commercial to our need and then military thereafter. We are looking at ways in which we can deliver a more effective process than this. This all comes down to the number of aircraft we have and the number of aircraft with the appropriate DAS fit on them, so all of those issues have been looked at. We have put in place a major procurement process to upgrade the Hercules maintenance process ----

Q48 Chairman: We will come on to that in the private session.

Mr Ingram: ---- which will give us greater availability of those aircraft. Have we had problems? Yes. Have the problems been mitigated? I think so significantly. You had a bad experience. Can I give a guarantee that it will not happen again? No, I cannot. Are we putting our best into finding solutions to it? Yes, we are.

Chairman: Moving on to another equipment issue, Bowman.

Q49 Mr Havard: I took the time to go and have a look at the Bowman radio system which has been operated out of Shaiba and so on. It is obviously made in Wales and it is good stuff, but I would like your assessment of what is actually happening with it. We had reports about it. It is the 'Light' system, as they call it, the Bowman Light, not of data, but speech transmission. Can I ask how you are evaluating all of that and whether or not there will be plans, as the deployments continue and new ones go in, to extend the use of it to its full facilities?

Mr Ingram: Bowman, I think, is proving very successful, but with any major procurement there are issues associated with it and certainly communication kit is something which, because of the very nature of it, has to be effectively tested and then, once you hit fatal relationships or environments, you find out more about the capability of the equipment. The current deployment of 20th Armoured Brigade of course do not have the full fit and that is maybe who you meant there over there ----

Q50 Mr Havard: That is right.

Mr Ingram: ---- but that was because of their readiness cycle and they had not been through the training process. If they had been through the full training process on Bowman, then they would have had full Bowman capability in theatre, but they had not been trained and then when it came to the point when they were due to be deployed, from memory, 7th Brigade were fully 'Bowmanised'. I met some brigades recently when they came back to their base in Germany and I did not pick up any criticism of Bowman at all and I can give you an assurance that, if people want to make a complaint, they complain to me, so, from the practical experience of our personnel, it is not coming back as a major issue. That is not to say that there are not still some technical issues which have to be resolved somewhere within the overall full capability of that procurement programme, but I do not have the details of that.

Q51 Mr Havard: What they say is that, because they were not fully trained, they were using two and three pieces of communication kit at the same time which did cause some sort of problem.

Mr Ingram: If I meet 20th Brigade, and I will either meet them out there or when they come back, I will get that in stereo, I know that, but this is about getting our troops trained up in the use of that equipment and the next time they are deployed, wherever that is, they will be fully Bowmanised. I do not know where they are in their training cycle, but they were partially Bowmanised, I think, when they went there.

Q52 Mr Havard: Do you know anything about the next people going and whether they will have this equipment?

Lt General Houghton: My instructions are that 20th Brigade were the last Brigade which were not to be deployed fully Bowmanised. You will appreciate the difficulties, that, if you are a force generating formations in order to go on operations and at the same time you are fielding new equipment and going through a complicated retraining programme, you will not always be able to achieve, because of the dynamic nature of these things, an absolute perfect match. No genuine operational risk was taken on the deployment of 20th Brigade given its level of training on both the new Bowman and the legacy Clansman system. Ideally of course we would like to just have them on the single system and from here on in that should be the case.

Q53 Chairman: The Osprey body armour we saw when we were there. Is it planned to provide all British Forces in Iraq with that new armour and, if so, when do you expect that to happen?

Mr Ingram: The answer is yes and the figures, if I can find them on this, there are some very precise figures on the numbers that we have or the number that we have available and the numbers which will become available by the turn of the year, and I think it is 5,000 more. No, I do not have the figures. The figures and the way in which that is progressively being delivered through theatre I do not have in front of me, but the answer to your original question as to whether they would have them, yes, but of course what we need is a greater sufficiency of supply and we are now looking at the ways in which it will become a personal piece of kit. At the moment it is not that, but, when troops are being deployed who require it, they will have that piece of body armour, that piece of equipment.

Q54 Chairman: Medical facilities - we visited Shaiba Hospital which we thought was quite outstanding, but clearly there is a lot of pressure on the medical personnel in Iraq and perhaps generally. What are you doing to address the shortfall of medical personnel and are you concerned about the reliance on medical reservists?

Mr Ingram: No, I am not because that is part of our availability of resource. People are in the reserves for utilisation. They are not just in the reserves to sit around and not be deployed. In fact we find a very high level of keenness amongst the reserves to be deployed. Now, in terms of what can be seen as the pressure on our medical personnel overall, reserves and regulars, we recognise that as a pinch area. It is one of those areas where there are shortfalls and there is pressure on the personnel. What we are seeking to do of course is to increase the numbers of medical personnel and regulars. We have also, through TA rebalancing, dedicated an increased amount of resource to medical support in terms of the reserves, so we are aware of the problem, but there is no easy and quick solution overnight in this. Part of the rebalancing in terms of the future Army structure, again it is not just in medicals, it is in other key enablers, engineers and other specialisms, 3,000 posts are being reinvested back in to the Army specifically to meet those shortfalls. That does take time. We have got to train people up. We have got to find the people, we have got to recruit them and we have got to train them up and make them deployable.

Q55 Chairman: One doctor told me that, if he were to work in the UK in the NHS instead of working in Iraq, he could immediately double the amount of money that he was earning. Do you recognise that?

Mr Ingram: It would not surprise me.

Q56 Chairman: Well, it would not surprise you then that there are pressures on medical personnel?

Mr Ingram: It would not surprise me, but again you will know, Chairman, and your Committee will know that I do not negotiate in that sense for the individual terms and conditions. We have the Armed Forces Pay Review Body which is an independent body to which we give evidence to say, "Here are areas that are of concern", and it is then up to them to determine what would be the best solution to that. Again you will be aware that we have in the past given golden handshakes and golden handcuffs as part of the inducements to retain personnel or to encourage personnel in. This is done through a wholly independent process and, although I say I am not surprised that that comment has been made, I pay tribute to our people who are continuing to deliver a very high-grade, high-quality and a highly professional service because they have a dedication to duty and they do not just chase money, and that is the point I think they would make. I think we could find that across a whole range of the Armed Forces where people could say, "I could earn a lot more money outside in the private sector", and they could become a Member of Parliament and earn more money, I suppose, as some of them do, but our people have got purposes in life other than the pursuit of income.

Chairman: Moving on to the issue of detainees and the detention facilities in Shaiba.

Q57 Mr Havard: The divisional temporary detention facility - we had some discussions with the Prime Minister and his five-man team he had sent to Basra. One of the things that they were particularly excited about was the question of a number of people in that facility who, they were pleading, should be let out and this was becoming politically contentious as to whether or not it would help with the situation in Basra. I do not want to comment on the detail of any of that, I am not qualified to do it, but what we do know, however, is that, in order for people to be released from the facility, there is a review process and what I would like to do is to ask you a question about that really. We understand that, the way the review works at the moment, it does not involve any Iraqis in that process and I wonder whether you could make a comment about whether the processes involved with the continuation of the facility are in future going to involve them in some fashion. Also what is its future going to be in the discussions about the renewal of the UN mandate under which it operates as we move towards the end of the calendar year?

Mr Ingram: Just as a point on detention, clearly everything we do is fully consistent, and in full compliance, with the relevant UNSCR1637. All the detention facilities are inspected by the ICRC and we receive no, although these are matters between the State and the ICRC and the ICRC never publish the reports, as we know, because that is the way they operate, but we do not receive adverse comments. If there are things which need to be attended to, then we immediately attend to them. Any person who is detained, usually within 24 hours both their family and the ICRC will be duly notified of all of that, so in terms of the governance of the facility, it is to a very high and professional level. In terms of the review of those who are held and the engagement of Iraqis in that, I am conscious of the fact that the Secretary of State is currently in Iraq and I know that is likely to be part of his discussions, and our intention is to achieve that end result, and it may already have happened in terms of a set of relationships where I have not yet had feedback from any of those discussions, but that is our objective so that the Iraqis are part of that review process.

Q58 Mr Havard: One specific thing, however, about its governance or, rather more importantly, its operation, I have visited it twice in the past, not because I was caught and put in there, but I was actually allowed in and out. The point I would like to make though is that at that time when I visited it, it was being run by the provost marshals and there were professional prison officers conducting the exercise. We learned from the Grenadier Guards that they were now providing prison officers essentially and they were being trained in order to undertake the task on a rotation basis, but it now seems as though there has been a change in terms of who is actually operating or working with the people who operate the facility. Is that also going to be part of the review process?

Mr Ingram: Again I do not have the detail of the change you are talking about. Remember, the nature of those prisoners that are being held is that they are pretty dangerous people and we are holding them on the basis of good intelligence and perhaps even actions they have taken and the threats they pose to us and, therefore, to the overall security within our area of operation. We do not do this lightly, we do this on best judgment and we also have to be conscious of the need to ensure a secure environment in which they are held as well as being an appropriate and proper environment which has to be secure so that, if anything happens in that facility, we have the capabilities to be able to attend to it immediately. This is not an open prison in the UK and you have got to remember who is being held there. In terms of the overall management of it, usually there are changes taking place, but I have no immediate knowledge of that, so again we will write to you and let you know the precise arrangements which are currently applied and, if there is going to be a change, whether there is going to be a change to that as well.

Q59 Chairman: Minister, I find that a rather odd answer, I am afraid.

Mr Ingram: There may be some more information on that.

Q60 Chairman: Could I just pick you up on something you said, that the people who are being held are very dangerous people. That would generally be the case in most British prisons, that there are a lot of very dangerous people in there. This is a detention facility that is in the centre of the Shaiba camp, so there are a lot of soldiers around about to cope with any military activity that was needed. The idea that it should be the Grenadier Guards looking after these detainees as opposed to the Military Provost Staff does not seem to me to have achieved an answer, from what you said just now.

Mr Ingram: I do not have the precise management arrangements as to who is doing that and as to why.

Lt General Houghton: Currently the Grenadier Guards are used there in a supervisory and close security role working alongside formally trained military prisoner officers, as it were, so it is a combination of the two. I am not quite certain what the origin of the change has been because, as far as I am aware, this has been the case for some time.

Q61 Chairman: Anyway there are formally trained military prison officers?

Mr Ingram: Can I again give another good example. At the Maze Prison we had military personnel, when required, doing perimeter guarding. I appreciate that was a much more open environment, but, by the very nature of the prisoners themselves, if there was a prison break-out or violence, then who has to attend to them because of other troops around unnecessarily focused on that incident, so you need people who are aware of what the potential may be and in a position then to immediately and professionally react to that, so again, if there is a proposed change, we will give it to you and I do not know of any changes being muted.

Q62 Chairman: Dr Hutton, is there anything you would like to add?

Dr Hutton: First of all, we are talking about small numbers of people here. It varies between seven and 140 and at the moment it is 78 people held in that centre. There is some Iraqi involvement in the review in that there is a committee chaired by the Iraqi Prime Minister and the multinational forces which reviews cases at the 18-month point. It could be that we might be able to build a bit more review in lower down the chain, but I would point out that, as most of these detainees are held on intelligence grounds, that could be complicated.

Q63 Mr Holloway: It was very interesting when we met the Prime Minister, that we were all trying to talk about what you do about the Governor and he wanted to talk about 15 detainees, and it was kind of a big issue to him. I think we found it quite bizarre.

Mr Ingram: What is he focusing on? Is he saying that it is something that could give more political buy-in in the region, something that could help him in his objectives? Are those people known to him? Does he have a view about them? Generally, I do not think that is being bizarre, I think that is focusing in on the political equations he has to deal with and we then have to satisfy him as to why we cannot comply with that if we cannot comply with it.

Lt General Houghton: In the specific instance of your visit, I am led to believe that Prime Minister al-Maliki had been slightly misled to the point that a number of the detainees in the UK facility were being held without any evidence and he got very emotive about that because it seemed to be completely in contravention of Iraqi national sovereignty. The fact is that there may not be specific evidence, but they are allowed to be held against an intelligence portfolio and that was not very clear to him, so the substantive grounds for their detention exist, but they are based on an intelligence case, not an evidential case, if you see the difference. I am told that he was not made aware at the time of your meeting of that specific difference.

Q64 Chairman: But there is a substantial difference, I think, between the way the United States handle their review process and the way that the British handle the review process and the United States involve Iraqis at a much lower level than the Prime Minister whereas the British do not. I would have thought that it might well be helpful to local buy-in to have more Iraqi involvement at the review process.

Mr Ingram: We are looking at getting compatibility in the handling arrangements. Again I am conscious of the fact that the Secretary of State is out there and that might have been part of his discussions, but I have not seen the read-out from that yet.

Q65 Mr Havard: Perhaps at some point you could tell us how it is going to be dealt with in relation to the renewal of the UN mandate or the replacement of the UN mandate at the end of the year. Last time it was catered for in an exchange of letters which went alongside the Resolution and, if you could give us some detail about that as that becomes known, that would be very helpful.

Dr Hutton: I think we would want the renewed UN mandate to roll over the ability to ----

Q66 Mr Havard: So would there be another exchange of letters, for example?

Dr Hutton: I do not think there would necessarily need to be an exchange of letters. We would have to look at the detail at the time, but the basic rollover would probably ----

Q67 Mr Havard: The reason I ask is partly because I want to be very clear that the people who are actually being asked to engage in this activity and do it are also individually protected in relation to the law as well as the general question being dealt with in the proper way.

Mr Ingram: I can give you that absolute assurance, that one of the issues which we will always attend to is our compliance with international law.

Chairman: We are just about to go into private session, but, before we do, I would like to make one comment which is that I think the overall impression that we got while we were in Iraq was of British troops performing in comparatively small numbers under extremely difficult conditions, heat that I had certainly never experienced before, and performing to a standard that was perhaps as expected, but nevertheless utterly outstanding, and I think we all came away feeling what a huge debt we owe to them.

Linda Gilroy: Hear! Hear!

Q68 Chairman: My colleagues clearly agree with that.

Mr Ingram: I would echo that. That is my experience too, and not only that, but when I visited 7th Armoured Brigade it was very significant how much all of those soldiers, experienced, young and old, all of them felt they were making a difference and had a purpose to what they were seeking to do in Iraq. They were not just saying this, but they realised the enormity of the task they faced and will continue to face for some time, but they were making a difference and that is important, and it shows the professionalism of our people.

Mr Havard: I think the other thing which struck me, Chairman, was the clarity of understanding about how they could draw back, rather than immediately withdraw, and support and consolidate the process as it moved forward.

Linda Gilroy: I think morale was very high. When you read the briefings going out, you wondered what to expect, but it is certainly one of the abiding recollections I will have just on an individual level of how they were meeting that challenge.

Q69 Robert Key: Could I just add on behalf of hundreds of my constituents in the Salisbury Plain Garrison area that there is a stark contrast between the acknowledged professionalism of the task our Forces are performing in theatre and the pressure on wives and families and the need for the Army Families Federation and for the welfare services of the Army because every day every one of their families switches on the television and radio and there is a constant drip, drip, drip of criticism, contrasting with the excellence which is really happening on the ground, and that is very, very corrosive to Army families. I simply ask you, Minister, to bear that in mind and do all you can to support the families.

Mr Ingram: Chairman, again just to comment, and I agree entirely with all of that, those who make critical comments are not making a difference in Iraq. They are not actually making it better. The people who are making it better are those who are delivering on the international missions their task. When I visited 7th Armoured Brigade, they had put in place a very effective family wrap-around system, called 'Home Rat'. They are the Desert Rats, as you know, and they had this system, called 'Home Rat', and everything was focused on making sure the families, mainly in Germany, had a whole range of support mechanisms so that no one should feel, if they had a problem, that they could not go and talk to someone. Talking to the families as well about the way in which they put their own wrap around people was truly significant and it really was immense to see this, it was very satisfying to see this, and I know that happens in different brigades in different deployments. The families are very important and those who make the critical comments should realise that there are worried mothers and wives and others back home and they should just condition their remarks in remembering what we are asking our people to do and balance that against the point I made about the soldiers themselves believing they are making a difference, and we can see the difference in Iraq and that is with some of the things we have discussed today.

Linda Gilroy: I would just add to what Robert said that, although I say morale is high out there, there were many expressions of puzzlement as to why more positive stories are not written about what is going on out there because they are just doing an amazing job.

Chairman: On that note, we will now go into private session.