|
UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 556-i House of COMMONS MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE DEFENCE COMMITTEE
GENERAL Evidence SESSION with the secretary of state for Defence
Tuesday 1 November 2005 RT HON JOHN REID MP, LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR ROB FRY KCB CBE, MR DESMOND BOWEN CMG and MR IAN ANDREWS Evidence heard in Public Questions 1 - 45
USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT
Oral Evidence Taken before the Defence Committee on Tuesday 1 November 2005 Members present Mr James Arbuthnot, in the Chair Mr David S Borrow Mr Colin Breed Derek Conway Mr David Crausby Linda Gilroy Mr Mike Hancock Mr Dai Havard Mr Brian Jenkins Mr Kevan Jones Robert Key John Smith Mr Desmond Swayne ________________
Witnesses: Rt Hon John Reid, MP, Secretary of State for Defence, Mr Desmond Bowen CMG, Policy Director, and Mr Ian Andrews, Second Permanent Under-Secretary, Lieutenant General Sir Rob Fry KCB CBE, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Commitments), Ministry of Defence, gave evidence.
Q1 Chairman: I would like to welcome everyone to the Committee. This is our first briefing with you, Secretary of State, and it is a general evidence taking session in which I hope we will be able to cover a lot of ground. This means, if I can address particularly the members of the Committee, short, snappy questions and, if I could address particularly the witnesses, short, snappy answers would be much appreciated. Perhaps I may begin, Secretary of State, by saying that by all accounts this is the job you wanted. This is an area in which you have had a lot of previous experience. Can you tell us what your major aims have been to cover during your period as Secretary of State for Defence, which we very much hope will be a long one? John Reid: Thank you very much. May I just place on record my condolences to the families of all those servicemen and women who have lost their life or been injured in service to their country since you were first established and I became Secretary of State and, also, to remind us of the threats and dangers which they face which have been exhibited in the last 48 hours by an action to deprive this country of the poison of masses of drugs. I am delighted that the Navy has succeeded in that. It is the latest illustration of just how the servicemen and women in our Armed Forces serve this country. That is precisely one of the reasons I wanted this job. I cannot think of any group of people for whom public service is more serious, more dangerous and more comprehensive than the men and women who serve our country. To have a contract that says I will serve my country even until death is a very exceptional and rare thing and I am honoured to be able to play some part with them in defence. That is why I wanted to come back and why today I am working with my colleagues: the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, General Sir Robert Fry who covers operations, Desmond Bowen who is my Policy Director and, on my right, Ian Andrews is my Second PUS who covers finance and other issues. The Ministry of Defence exists to produce fighting power. It does many other things, but essentially the main product of the Ministry of Defence ought to be fighting power. My job is to make sure that that is relevant to today's threats, it is capable of meeting those threats and it is sufficient in terms of all of the elements of fighting power to so do. The first element, as you will know, Chairman, is the intellectual element, which is doctrine, training and so on. The second element of fighting power is the physical, that is equipment, tanks, ships, planes, and the third element is morale and it is probably the most important element, which means a bonding together, a feeling of trust in each other and in the leadership, a sense of history and family as well as a sense of country and a sense of belonging together as a fighting unit. It is my job to make sure that all of those elements, the intellectual, the physical and the morale element, are sufficient for today's tasks. Chairman: Thank you. There are a lot of issues we are going to have to cover this morning and the first one that we would like to go into is the nuclear deterrent. Q2 Robert Key: Secretary of State, you say in your Department's report published last week, paragraph 171, that in a recent poll undertaken by Ipsos 81 per cent of people said that the UK needs strong Armed Forces. That is no surprise. When it comes to the nuclear deterrent and the fact that you are going to have to make decisions with the Government during the lifetime of this Parliament and given the answer yesterday in the House of Lords from Lord Drayson about nuclear weapons in which he laid out what I can only describe as a very large number of nuclear weapons still around in the world, do you think it is going to be very difficult to persuade the British people that we need to renew our nuclear deterrent? John Reid: Let us be absolutely clear on what the present position of the Government is and then I will turn to a replacement because the question you are asking me is very relevant but it concerns events 15 years away and up to 50 years away. I think what the public is most interested in is what the present position is and the present position has been laid out quite clearly by the Government, ie we will retain Britain's minimum nuclear deterrent. That is a pledge that we made in the last manifesto nearly six months ago and one that we will keep. You may ask how long that manifesto pledge lasts. Technically it is for the life of a Parliament, but I think all reasonable people would assume it to apply for the life of the Trident system. That is where we are. We intend, at the same time as minimising our deterrent, which we have done, and keeping our obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to maintain the nuclear deterrent. The question to which we must now turn is about what we might do in 15 years' time in terms of addressing the situation when the present warheads or missile system or nuclear submarines from which they are launched come to the end of their useful life. That is precisely the discussion on which we are now embarking. There are a great many questions to be asked about the nature of the threats we might face then, about the assumptions on which we work at present and being willing to take part in multilateral negotiations at the right time. We have always maintained that as long as some other nuclear state which is a potential threat has nuclear weapons we will retain ours. That is the assumption from which we start but it has to be tested in discussions with others and it will be. Even if we decide that we want to keep the nuclear deterrent, we then have to ask whether we want to keep it in the same form, submarine launched, sea launched, air launched or land-based nuclear weapons, and then we have to ask ourselves about the cost, and we will work through those points. For the foreseeable future we will be maintaining the nuclear deterrent. We are now entering a discussion about whether that foreseeable future will extend beyond the 15 to the 50-year point. Q3 Robert Key: The Prime Minister has said that decisions are likely to have to be taken in the life of this Parliament, although we are looking a long time into the future. I understand why you have to be very discreet about the information that can be made public. Do you agree that if we are to have a proper debate, and it must be an informed debate, it will be necessary to come clean with people and to give a certain amount of information about the basis for the discussion that you have said already that you wish to have? How far can we go? John Reid: I have tried to do that not only in Defence Questions and defence debate in the House and I am sure that will continue but, also, last night with my colleagues in the Parliamentary Labour Party, today in front of this Committee and I am sure this is something that will continue to be discussed and debated. In a sense the decision is really quite simple and that is whether we stand by the assumptions that we have used so far, which are that we should minimise the nature of our deterrent, that we should be prepared at a given stage, if the Russians and the Americans get down to a certain level of nuclear capacity, to hand our nuclear weapon in, but that throughout this process of complying with the NPT and along with those assumptions also to have the other assumption, which is as long as another potential enemy has nuclear weapons we will retain ours. That is the decision in principle. That has to be taken in practical terms against what we think will be the threats in 15, 25, 30 years' time and then we have to decide, if we want to go ahead and if we can afford it, what the nature of our deterrent would be. I would merely make one point. I have heard it said that because there are new threats from terrorism that in itself makes the nuclear deterrent redundant because, of course, it is said you cannot use the nuclear weapon against terrorists. It is equally true that you cannot use Special Forces to deter a nuclear attack. That does not mean to say that Special Forces are redundant. The truth of the matter is we face a range of threats at this moment running from individual acts of terrorism to nuclear threats. We need a range of responses that include Special Forces, individual acts of dynamic heroism if you like, right through to nuclear deterrent. Not all of those responses are responses to every threat but the range of them is necessary in order to meet the range of threats. That is the assumption we have at the moment and it is that assumption that we will test against our analysis of what might be future threats. Q4 Robert Key: Secretary of State, I wonder if you would agree with me that maybe for the last decade there have been discussions about battlefield nuclear weapons, a little nuclear weapon that would somehow do much less damage, but that that actually is a trap and that if you have a very small nuclear weapon it would be just as dangerous and much less effective than a big one. Is it not a good idea to start educating us, the general public, 81 per cent of whom want to see a strong defence? How are you going to do that? How do you see this process evolving over the next two or three years, up to the time when you are going to have to take a decision during the lifetime of this Parliament? John Reid: You are right to say that there has been a discussion about the types and nature of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrent. You are also right to imply that among our major colleagues in the Security Council they retain multiple systems of nuclear deterrence. The French have got two, the Russian have got three and the Americans have got a range of nuclear deterrents as well. We have reduced ours to the absolute minimum. Under this Government we have reduced our fire power by 70 per cent, we have reduced the number of warheads to less than 200, we have reduced the number of warheads per boat to no more than 48, we have reduced the number of boats at sea and we have reduced the state of readiness and targeting and so on. We are the only country in the world which has actually got rid of a complete system of nuclear deterrents[1] because up until this Government came in we had two systems, one of them was the WE177 airborne free-fall bomb and the other one was the submarine launched Trident D5. We got rid of the former. We have reduced ours to a minimum. Unfortunately over recent years, despite the fact that we have contained the number of new states that have developed nuclear weapons and therefore we have got less than, say, John F Kennedy would have expected 30 or 40 years ago when he predicted that by the turn of the century we might have 40 states, as we have been reducing other states have been acquiring. We know that India has nuclear weapons, Pakistan has nuclear weapons, North Korea and so on. Probably more worrying is the fact that some countries have been trying to develop nuclear weapons by deceiving the world and not complying with their own obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, for instance Iran. Therefore, you are right to point to the need for an informed discussion on this because if we are looking at trends over the past ten or 20 years and looking forward 20 years, I think it would be naive to believe inevitably that there will be no further proliferation, however hard we are committed to that. Q5 Mr Borrow: It seems to me that this is a crucial decision which is for the medium to long term. If it has not to be made during this Parliament and by this Labour Government, it may well be a decision which comes in under a different government altogether and therefore any public debate needs to lead to a public consensus and ideally a cross-party consensus on what happens after Trident. Do you agree that that can only happen if there is the maximum amount of information in the public domain to allow the public to reach a public consensus which politicians can then use in making any decision? John Reid: It is not absolutely essential the decision is taken during this Parliament but it would be highly desirable in my view. It is not absolutely essential that you have a cross-party consensus but in my view that would be desirable. It is also desirable with any such important issues that there is the maximum information and consensus across the public as well as across Parliament. The history of these matters is, despite the raging controversies that have been going on for 25, 30 or 40 years, that there has been a fairly consistent two-thirds majority who believe in the simple proposition that as long as a potential enemy has a nuclear weapon we should retain one. That is not to say that is necessarily right or that it will not change, but that has been the traditional position in terms of what we can take out of the scientific evidence from opinion polls. Let me just comment on the timescale. If you leave aside any replacement in 15 or 20 years' time, whether that replacement is an update or a renewed type of system with new submarines or whatever or whether it is a completely new system, we still have to maintain the safety and reliability of our present deterrent. That means that the various elements of the deterrent have to be maintained, that is the warhead, the missile system and the boats in simple terms. That involves a degree of expenditure which any government that succeeds this one would have to pay anyway otherwise we would be losing the key obligation of Government, which is to keep safe, reliable and secure our means of security. There will be an ongoing need for governments to maintain our present deterrent until the end of its useful life while we have the discussion and decision about how and when we replace the present system. Chairman: This will lead us on to a long debate over the coming years and this Committee will play a part in that. Let us move on to the issue of European defence and NATO. Q6 Mr Hancock: How do you expect European Security and Defence Policy to develop over the course of this Parliament? What are the implications of a strengthened ESDP for our defence relationship with the United States and the future of NATO bearing in mind that we are under considerable criticism from the United States about Europe's lack of commitment to defence expenditure? Where countries currently are spending money on defence, much of that is simply going to pay long pension commitments and not much in the way of developing new technology or indeed bringing into place the sort of troops and equipment replacements that were required. John Reid: This is a very big question to which snappy answers carry a risk of their own. Let me try and answer the three things that I think you raised. The first one is what is a general, philosophical and practical approach to European defence? Secondly, what about the defence configurations inside the ESDP, and thirdly, what about equipment? On the first one, the cornerstone of our defence is NATO. It is well tried and tested and it is also developing in terms of the NATO Response Force, but it needs to transform itself even more and at a greater pace. It needs to do at the NATO level what we did in 1997/98 and that is a thorough transformation. We did it through a Strategic Defence Review. A transformed NATO is the cornerstone of our defence. The European Security and Defence Policy ought to develop in partnership as a complementary means of applying power or addressing some of the threats and challenges we face in NATO. Therefore, I do not see this as a zero-sum game whereby if NATO does well the European Union is diminished or if the European Union develops its particular prowess and attributes, that NATO has diminished. I have never seen it in that way. Therefore, as President of the European Defence Ministers at present I want to see the ESDP become more coherent, more capable and more active. I mean more capable in the sense of having forces we can use. It is no good having shop window forces. It is no good having forces on paper if they are not deployable. Therefore, we want to make it more capable by identifying what it is we need in Europe and then, through the Force catalogue, identifying where we are going to get those resources and developing issues like the battle group concept. By more coherent I mean that today's security threats are much more complex than the old defence threats. Today we have migrations, internal genocides, natural disasters, disputes between states and we also have states breaking up internally, we have ethnic tensions, we have failed states and that means that we need a complex response to those complex security challenges and that complex response runs from the political civil response, intervening between parties, helping them to come together, rehabilitation, building security forces, building the police, building the judicial systems, extending politics, right through to the heavy combat side. Given that range of responses necessary, I think Europe is particularly well placed because of the range of forces at its disposal, provided we can be coherent in the management of them and, taking the example of Bosnia, learn the lessons of that and apply them. The final area is activity. If we are more capable, more coherent and more active - for instance, we are making a contribution to Darfur in the Sudan, to the peace process in Indonesia, in Aceh - then even out-of-area we can make a contribution to today's threats. I think we can be more capable, more coherent, more active and complementary to NATO. On defence weaponry, there is obviously a problem in Europe with everybody doing their own thing and too many suppliers for too little demand. Despite the fact that we have been increasing our defence budget every year in this country above inflation since the Labour Government came in, the truth is that as a percentage of our GDP it has been decreasing. At one time it was 5.4 per cent of GDP; it is now about 2.4 per cent. That is similar in a lot of countries as you pointed out. To have a total demand in Europe for 10,000 armoured vehicles but to have 23 different projects trying to supply them shows a mismatch at the European level. That is one of the things the European Defence Agency ought to be able to help with as is the development of common approaches to technology. That is a very long answer, it was not snappy, but I hope it addresses all the points you raised. Q7 Mr Hancock: I think it is a fair reflection. You say the European Defence Agency "ought" to be able to work towards giving a common policy on procurement, but ought to against the reality of whether they could actually ever deliver is a different matter. NATO did a capability study which it promised would be published, it took three years or more to create and it still has not been put in the public domain. The capability that counts is that the number of countries prepared to put soldiers' lives on the line has not increased and the responsibility for doing the actual fighting in a crisis situation is once again heavily dependent on countries like the United Kingdom. Others have not rushed to join a commitment to put their soldiers in harm's way readily. The equipment issue is a classic example where natural restraint on countries to buy a capability which would be common across NATO would invariably mean buying from the United States or possibly from the United Kingdom and nobody is going to rush to sign up for that. How do you expect Europe to be able to deliver what you are seeking here in a realistic way? John Reid: I think you know that I am as proud as anyone could be of the contribution the British Armed Forces have made to all we have been doing. I will let that stand. I think people know where I come from on that position. I think it is a bit unfair to suggest that we are the only ones in Europe --- Q8 Mr Hancock: I did not say we are the only ones, I said there are the same consistent few. John Reid: I think that is unfair as well because there are others now who are contributing towards it from Europe, not just the French. Whatever the rivalries in politics, whatever the differences we have at present in Europe on the constitution and on the budget, actually on defence I think we probably have a closer relationship with the French than we have had for a long while and I want to see that develop. I think they have fine fighting forces and I think they contribute a great deal. The Dutch Minister Henk Kamp and I discuss these things regularly. I think the Dutch, and not just the Marines, have been prepared to contribute and are prepared to contribute in many ways and indeed are joining with us in one of the Marine-based battle groups in two or three years' time. Italy is playing a far bigger role than they did a few years ago. I was in Kosovo recently and it is an Italian General who is in charge there. At the moment in Afghanistan the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps is being taken over by an Italian General. It is an Italian General who is the Head of the Military Committee at present, Mosca Moschini. In terms of the European dimension, Italy is playing a great role. The Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland and Norway, where the outgoing minister was one of the major contributors to European defence, are also playing a great role. I do not think it is right to diminish the contribution they are making. However, I will concede this to you. In terms of their financial contribution, not every country is paying what is required nowadays. In terms of their forces, a lot of these countries who have come in from Eastern Europe in particular have very static forces. As it happens, they were on the other side of the Iron Curtain facing us, but they were like our forces, static, based on the plains of northern Germany, waiting for the war to come to them as we were to us. They need to reform and transform those forces into more mobile, flexible, high readiness forces that can take part in what we could call expeditionary warfare. That limits the amount they can contribute at the moment. I think the intention to transform is there. Q9 Mr Hancock: I want to ask about the changing situation in the Balkans generally. With the future of Kosovo as one of the big questions, whether Serbia and Montenegro will break up and the ramifications of what that will do for stability in the whole area and whether it is possible to hold Bosnia together and what sort of commitment that will have on our Armed Forces bearing in mind commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans, where do you see that going and what do you feel Europe's contribution has to be to that and possibly even the worsening situation in the Black Sea generally, in the Caucuses and Europe's role there? John Reid: That is another big question. Europe's role in Bosnia is very significant indeed because, of course, in Bosnia it is now the European Force that is in there. I discussed recently the situation with our leading officer there, General David Leakey, and the position is this. We have about 1,000 soldiers in EUFOR. We are there for deterrence and reassurance. I think in the immediate future, that is the course of next year, we will be staying at or about that level. I think deterrence and reassurance have worked. There is still a need there, but I think in the course of next year we should take stock of whether or not we ought to be handing over a little more, including the fight against organised crime, to the Bosnians themselves. Why do I think that the situation is getting a little more optimistic in Bosnia? It is because two of the very, very sensitive areas between the entities are shifting towards resolution. The first of these is a Bosnian Army. If you had said to me ten or 12 years ago that there would not only be a Bosnian Army at the Bosnian level, admittedly made up of regiments from the different entities, Serbs and Croats, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats and Bosniac themselves, but agreement that from the beginning of next year that will be the Army rather than the entity armies and that it would be pushed above all by a Bosnian Serb Defence Minister by the name of Radovanovic, who has either just arrived here or just about to , you and I would have found that difficult to believe, but it is true. So there has been a big advance in the Army and some advance in policing and I pay tribute to Paddy Ashdown for the job that he has done there because there is now a move in policing to move it down to the local level. That will not be resolved until next year, but they are moves in the right direction in Bosnia. On Kosovo, we have now had the standards report and we go on to the status. It will be difficult. It is very sensitive. It is potentially very controversial between the Albanian Kosovars on the one hand and the Serbs in the north and also Belgrade, but I do think that with goodwill all round it is possible to settle this politically. That is the final thing to say about the Balkans. Croatia is now entering discussions about Europe, I hope Serbia at some stage in the not too distant future will get there and Bosnia will become more stable. Kosovo is still sensitive but it is getting there. I think the solution to all of these problems lies in two things. One is a feeling of security, which comes ultimately with entry into the European Union, and the other one is an opportunity for personal and social advance which is enhanced by entry into the European Union. The break-up of the state there and its circumstances caused terrible problems. I think that the greater unity of the European Union offers an opportunity to give the stability and reduce the paranoia and give the opportunity for prosperity, both of which are essential elements at mitigating the worst excesses of nationalism. I think in the short, the medium and the longer term we do have a route map there, we are making progress on it and I trust that things continue in that direction. Q10 Mr Swayne: Secretary of State, it will cost us two and a half times more to equip a formation with the Future Rapid Defence System than it will for a corresponding formation to be equipped with the USFCS system and we will still be less well equipped. Is this the premium that we have to pay for Europeanization? John Reid: No. With great respect, Mr Swayne, I listen to the Chiefs of Staff and my military advisers on these matters. They do not take the same views as you. No final decision has been made as to where we are going to place these contracts or indeed to the final shape and configuration of the armoured vehicles or the technology with which we equip individual soldiers, but the decision will not be made on the basis of the political decision irrespective of the wishes of the military themselves, far less against the wishes of the military. Indeed the people who are looking at these things just now - I think General Mike Jackson was recently in Sweden looking at these things - are taking a deep and close interest in it and they will let me know their views. Anybody who thinks people like General Jackson will take second, far less third, best on these things because of my whim do not know Mike Jackson or Mike Walker or the Chief of the Naval Staff or the Chief of Air Staff. Chairman: Secretary of State, we are covering quite a lot of ground. I know you have to leave by 12.30 so we will try to finish by 12.25. We are now moving on to Iraq, another huge subject. Q11 Mr Breed: Secretary of State, could you share with us the MoD's planning assumptions in respect of the timetable for run-down of UK forces in Iraq? John Reid: Yes. I can tell you in precise terms what our objectives are and what our assumptions are. They are not based on a timetable, they are based on the achievement of certain conditions. Basically we are in Iraq now, whatever the original controversy was of the intervention, under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 and acting alongside the United Nations and the multinational forces who are there with three objectives. First of all, it is to assist the Iraqis in the building of their own democratic institutions and democratic control of their own country. Secondly, it is to build up the security forces necessary to protect that and, thirdly, to build an economic and civil infrastructure and civil society. The second one of those, which is really what you are asking me about, although the other two are relevant, the Iraqis are making big advances on in terms of building the democratic institutions in the process. They have just had a bigger turnout in a referendum despite threats from terrorists than we had in this country for our general election. The infrastructure is proceeding despite the terrorists, although very slowly. Water supplies, electricity and oil are under constant terror attacks in order to disrupt economic and social advance. Our objective is to help the Iraqis build security forces. To the extent that they can begin to participate in counter-terrorist and other operations then they can begin to take the lead in such operations and then they can act autonomously in such operations. How are we doing on that? At the moment we have over 200,000 security forces, from the Army through the Ministry of Interior to the police, who are trained and capable of taking part in operations. Secondly, they are increasingly taking part in operations although not in the lead on operations. Thirdly, they are not yet ready to act autonomously. They need better officer training, command and control, logistics back-up, intelligence support and so on. However, it is possible that in the course of next year they could begin to take the lead in different parts of Iraq at different times. In other words, the planning assumption would be that the handover to the Iraqis themselves will not be an event, it will be a process that will occur over time, starting in different areas at different times and that is a process of handover to the Iraqis which could occur in the course of next year in some places. As it does that then our handover will take place in stages as well. In other words, we will begin to participate alongside the Iraqis, then we will draw back to barracks or to central areas as a local or theatre reserve and then eventually we will withdraw. That is a process that I said in July of this year I thought could start next year and I see no reason to change that. There are nine Iraqi Brigades running operations with United States mentors at the moment. In our area, in the Multi-National Division South East, I visited the 10th Division Iraqi Army just outside of Basra. There are many, many more Iraqi security forces trained and capable than there were even 18 months ago but they are not yet able to act without some support. Q12 Mr Breed: You seemed to indicate that the timetable will not be influenced by the situation as a whole in Iraq but by particular parts. Is it conceivable that there could be a UK withdrawal or at least a run-down in the southern part of Iraq in advance of any US withdrawal? John Reid: Perhaps I have given the wrong impression. There will be a number of factors which will influence the decision as to the timing of handover in different areas. One of them will be the level of a terrorist threat locally as well as nationally and in that sense the terrorist activity that is taking place is not having the effect of pushing us out of Iraq quicker than would otherwise be the case. Its only effect is to keep us there longer than would be the case otherwise. That is one of the terrible tragic ironies of this position, that one of the elements that will help us to move from Iraq early is a diminution of acts of terrorism, but there are other elements, one is local government and one is the national government, the progress, the democracy and so on. So there will be a national element. You are right in the sense that there will be local features which will be involved in this as well and at the moment there are different configurations with different strengths and different force postures in different parts of Iraq. In some areas, particularly the heavy Sunni populated areas, the level of terrorist attacks is much higher than in others. I do not think people understand that the vast majority of attacks in Iraq are occurring in four provinces; over 80 per cent of terrorist attacks are in four provinces. Fourteen provinces are relatively peaceful compared to the rest. So in those areas things could move a little quicker than they would in other areas of Iraq, but we would want to do all of this with complete transparency and in consultation with the Iraqi Government themselves who have established a committee under the Prime Minister to look at the criteria for transition and with our allies, not least our major ally who have suffered such losses there and shown such fortitude and bravery, the United States Armed Forces under General Casey, but, of course, there are other colleagues there, the Australians, the Japanese and we will discuss these matters with them as well. Q13 Mr Breed: Whilst it might be conceivable that UK forces may be able, because the process has gone slightly better in our sector, to be brought home, it is equally as likely that they may be redeployed to other parts of Iraq rather than be withdrawn, is it not? John Reid: No, I do not think anybody is envisaging such redeployment out of our traditional area. I am certainly not considering such an option at present if that is what you are asking me. I would point out to you that even within MND South East there are different levels of threat and different levels of activity and different levels of progress. We have Maysan and Dhi Qar and I was discussing events there recently with Antonio Martino last Monday, the Italian Minister, where again the Italians are playing a tremendous role in police reform. In our own area there are different levels and there could be a degree of flexibility inside our own area, but I am not envisaging that we will be going in great numbers to other parts of Iraq. In the past we have gone through specific operations and I regard it as an important element of what we are doing there to maintain the solidarity of the coalition. We are a sovereign state, we can take our own decisions, as we always can do when we enter obligations, but we are a sovereign nation with honour and so when we enter obligations with colleagues and allies then that intervention and solidarity is very important to a nation like the United Kingdom. We do not go back on our word and, therefore, we will discuss all these matters with our international allies as well as have our opinions shaped by the opinions of the Iraqis themselves who have established a committee to look at the criteria and then decide which areas they think are ready for the handover. We want them to have confidence they can lead on these matters. Q14 Robert Key: Secretary of State, public opinion in this country and around the world is conditioned by the news that people hear on a daily basis coming out of Iraq. In this country no BBC news bulletin would be complete without the daily drip of bad news from Iraq. Representing a lot of military families as I do, I know the impact that has on military families and indeed military personnel in this country. I wonder if you could explain whether it is just that news editors decide only to report bad news or is it that they cannot report the good news that you and I know that our forces and the civilian contractors and the voluntary organisations are doing in Iraq because they are not allowed into those areas. Do you put any barriers in the way of news or do you, on the other hand, try and facilitate access to good news stories, or is it just that there is a sort of death wish about the way the news is reported coming out of Iraq? John Reid: You are tempting me in a very interesting direction. Q15 Robert Key: Good! John Reid: This is not an unimportant issue because, as I mentioned at the beginning and you know, this question of morale is an essential element of fighting power. When we face a world in which we are not fighting on equal terms with dictators or terrorists, because they are accountable to no one, they are answerable to no one, they have transparency with no one, they are not open to this type of questioning, it is very easy, if we do not try to get a balanced picture, to show only the deficiencies or downsides of one side in this and the casual observer might come to the conclusion that sometimes our media falls into that trap. Certainly soldiers say to me when I am there about the contrast between the sort of receptions they very often get and appreciation they get for what they are doing on operations and the sort of apparent "condemnation" for all of this in the press back home. All I try to do is to point out constantly the fact that in Afghanistan and in Iraq those who are elected by the people to speak on behalf of the people are hugely supportive of our presence in their countries because we are helping them to have the freedoms that we value so greatly in this country and I wish that a little more attention was paid to that than to those who would try to undermine our morale by presenting an unbalanced picture. I do not think it is useful to go down the road of who has got what agenda on what, but I did notice that in one weekend newspaper there was a front page story about some leaked anonymous report saying the Iraqis did not want us there, whereas an exclusive interview with the President of Iraq opening with the words "The President of Iraq today appealed to the United Kingdom's forces to stay in Iraq and help the Iraqi people" was relegated to page 29. I do not make these editorial decisions. You must make your own decisions about why they are being made in that fashion and whether there is a balanced picture. I am all in favour of a balanced picture. I do not want anybody to be complacent. Things are tough in Iraq, there is no question about that. The terrorists are going to huge lengths in the name of terrorism by the destruction of human life, women, mainly ordinary Muslims going to the mosque, not American or British and multi-national politicians or soldiers, children trying to take sweets being massacred, as they were last night in Basra, and the terrorists are trying to stop the majority of people in Iraq building their own future democratically, taking care of their own society in a civilised fashion, getting a better job and getting electricity. We are helping the people of Iraq to do that and every one of the democratically elected spokesmen says that whenever they get the opportunity, but when they say it they do not hit the headlines. When the terrorists say something they do hit the headlines. You must make your own judgment about why people choose which headline. Q16 Robert Key: I am sure that, like me, you believe it is a strength of our democracy that we have an independent, free press media, of course we do and I do not wish to see propaganda coming out of Iraq either. I want to press you on the point I made about what facilities you give to the national and international press and media in Iraq. Are you able to assist them, to take them to see projects or is everybody just confined to the green zone and not allowed to see what is going on as physically it is unsafe for them to do so? John Reid: No. We constantly take journalists out to Iraq and into other fields of operation. We try to be as open as possible in who they can speak to given the security implications. I have no doubt some people think this is just a brainwashing or propaganda exercise. Having listened to Mr Simon Jenkins who has been on such visits, if it is intending to do that then it is singularly failing, but that is not the intention. The intention is to try and place before people the reality on the ground, warts and all, and the reality on the ground is difficult, it is dangerous for our troops, it is dangerous for people to go there, including journalists and, occasionally, ministers. Despite all of the efforts of the terrorists progress is being made on democracy. We have gone from 8.5 million people taking part in elections on the constitution to 10.5 million people in the referendum and now the elections. Progress is being made on security. We now have over 200,000 trained and capable Iraqi security forces. They now participate in 80 per cent of the operations. Progress is being made on the social and civil side of society. We now have something like 230 hospitals, we have several thousand schools operating, we have an immunization programme going, but that is not represented in the press. You will have to address your questions, Mr Key, to the editors who choose not to illustrate that side of the equation. Q17 Mr Swayne: Secretary of State, in your recent statement you agreed that Iraq is now meeting engagement with terrorism and that as political progress is made so that battle will intensify, so if we are going to lick the terrorists we have to lick them here in Iraq. Can you just reassure us that we really have got the political will to do that? It is going to take more troops rather than fewer troops. If, for example, we need those troops to undertake the disarmament of militias, have we got the will to do it? John Reid: First of all, let me take your general question about the nature of the struggle in which we are engaged. I am under no illusions about that. There is a struggle going on, at the heart of which is an ideological one internationally between 21st Century values and 7th Century values. There are people who would seek to impose upon us and others a dictatorship of a nature that is counter to all our democratic freedoms and all our modern instincts. I will not go into the details of it, you will know them. You will know that in Afghanistan, for instance, it was not only not encouraged to educate a young girl, it was a criminal offence so to do. In terms of the ideological struggle which is going on, I am in no doubt that that is there and unfortunately it manifests itself on one side with the use of means of terrorism unconstrained by conscience or convention, on a scale that we have never seen before and it will require a great deal of resolution and endurance over a long period of time using every conceivable weapon in our armoury, military and non-military, diplomatic, financial and political, which is why aid, trade and the G8 process is a necessary concomitant of the preparedness to use military power. I think that will be necessary over a long period of time. It is a long, wide and deep struggle. It will be fought in many theatres, sometimes with attacks upon us in our home town, in London, Madrid, Egypt, Tanzania, Africa, New York, Bali and sometimes in theatres like Iraq. There is an international dimension to what is going on in Iraq. If the terrorists win and they stop a Muslim Arab nation developing democracy, they will have a huge strategic victory. If, on the other hand, the terrorists do not win and an Arab Muslim country like Iraq develops its own democracy, it will be a huge blow to those extremists who argue that democracy is incompatible with Islam or with the status of being Arab. Having said all that, we would be wrong not to recognise that there are specific internal issues in Iraq that have to be addressed as well. Not all terrorism is imported. There is an insurgency inside Iraq which consists of elements of the former Fascist regime that led Iraq under Saddam Hussein and elements of Sunnis who feel dispossessed, alienated -- they have lost power and jobs -- and we have to reach out to them. There is an unmitigated and unmitigating struggle against international terrorism to meet force with force when necessary, but there is also the need for us to look at the underlying political problems, whether in the Middle East, Kashmir or elsewhere, the poverty, the exploitation, the perceived injustice and a need to recognise that within each area like Iraq itself there are not just the imported terrorists like Zaqawi from Jordan, Al Quaeda and so on, but there are the former regime elements with whom we cannot talk. There are many ordinary Sunnis whom we should try to engage in the political process. I think that effort is a necessary concomitant of the preparedness to use force. Again, that is a complicated answer because it is a complex situation. You cannot just say this is a global war on terror any more than you can say it is just a little, local difficulty. It is not. There is both an Iraqi dimension and an international dimension to this. Q18 Linda Gilroy: I want to ask a question about recruitment and retention in the context of Iraq. Iraq, and the rather more simple version of Iraq that you have just been discussing with us in terms of how it is reported, tends to be the prism through which people see our armed services. Are you concerned that the controversial nature of the deployment, the sort of press coverage, the abuse, the scandals, the fatalities is having an impact on recruitment and retention? If so, what are we able to do about that? John Reid: I genuinely do not think they are the main issue. There is a deeper and longer problem in recruiting, particularly to the infantry or to what we call the pinch points of certain skills. That is the changed employment market. Q19 Chairman: We will come on to the broad issue of recruitment and retention a little later on. I wonder if you could concentrate on the question in relation to Iraq. John Reid: I do not think it is the main issue. Q20 Mr Jones: I have to concur with your view about the media's interpretation of events happening in Iraq. I have been there three times now and I was in a Basra police station with a journalist from a well known national newspaper. Having seen the report when we got back, it was completely different to the meeting that took place with myself and other colleagues, but that is an aside. Some of this Committee first went to Iraq in July 2003. The situation is complex in the south because there are provinces that have always had problems, even under Saddam's regime. The situation has deteriorated. To what extent is that holding up the work that you have outlined in terms of reconstruction? Is there any truth in the rumour that troops are now not to go by road or patrols but are moving around the south by air? John Reid: I do not think the situation in general is worse in Basra than it was. It has had peaks and troughs and one of them was 19 September. On the question of policing in Basra and elsewhere, policing is slower in terms of its training and capability than the Army is. There appears to be a greater problem among the police of split loyalties which would range from a natural affinity of support for your local ethnic or religious group through to, at the other extreme, some attempt to enter the policing from militias in order to get authority and arms. Although this reared its ugly head on 19 September, I do not think we should assume that all Iraqi police are like that. I would like to place on record my appreciation -- and hopefully yours -- for the courage of many Iraqis who, from the day they stand in a queue for recruitment through to the day that they put on the uniform and go out, are countenancing and facing death and mutilation by the terrorists. Many, many of them have died in the fighting both as soldiers and as police. In terms of the general situation there, I do not think it is generally worse. I am going to ask General Sir Rob Fry, if you will allow me, about the general situation in terms of transportation and travel down there. I know that on several occasions we have had lock down because it can get difficult. Anyone, like you or I, who has flown into Basra or Baghdad at night with the lights off, manoeuvring lest there be a welcome from the terrorists knows how the level of adrenaline and concern runs. I am not pretending for a moment that this is a normal day trip to Blackpool. It is not. This is pretty dangerous stuff. However, I do not think it is getting a lot worse in general. Lieutenant General Sir Rob Fry: If you went to Basra today -- and maybe if you went there a short while ago -- you would have seen British troops operating on their feet, operating from vehicles and also deploying by air. That is exactly the way it is now and it is the way we see it going into the immediate future. You would also have seen a lot of British troops operating with Iraqi counterparts, both in the Army and the police. We cannot give the collective protection that we might want, under certain circumstances, to give to British troops to an entire Iraqi division, so clearly recourse simply to travel by air is not part of our plan at all. You would also, had you visited Northern Ireland at any time over the last 20 years, have seen exactly the same mix of techniques there that you see in Basra at the present time. The answer to your question is that there are well worn, well worked procedures for this and the British Army is merely building on the experience it has had for a very long time. Q21 Mr Jones: It was very interesting. The last time we were there we went for a walk in downtown Basra and the journalist did not come with us. He preferred to stay in his armoured car. Can I ask about two specific issues around the threat that troops are facing? One is about the improvised explosive device and what measures are being taken to counteract that. In terms of protection for our troops travelling around, particularly for example the snatch Land Rovers and the Saxon armoured vehicles, is there a need for an upgrade or a new type of vehicle in terms of the threat they are now facing in the south, which was not there when we first went there in July 2003? John Reid: First of all, can I say how much I appreciate the efforts which are made by Members of your Committee like Mr Jones to go there, to meet with our troops? We want informed opinion to see things as they are. When people go there, it is not a burden. Our troops like the fact that somebody seems to be interested and supportive of them because what they read does not always suggest that. Can I exempt from that several of the newspapers in this country who have gone out of their way to try and show the other side, the bravery and fortitude, of our soldiers there. On IEDs, you are right. There is a particular worry about the development of IEDs. I will not stress here what I have said in other places but one of those worries is where they come from because they seem to be using a technology associated with Hezbollah or elements of Iranian background. That would be very worrying if that was being given any succour or comfort by the Iranian Government. Of course they say it is not and we certainly hope that is the case. There has been an increase of those types of IEDs, improvised explosive devices or bombs to the layman. Secondly, the nature of them is particularly sophisticated. We would need a particularly sophisticated response. I would ask for your understanding that we do not particularly want to get into any greater detail of that other than to say we are doing all that we can as quickly as we can. Very often these things are a race between us and the terrorists for us to employ our skills, expertise, different training routines, different ways of approaching not just the question of IEDs but how we patrol and so on. I do not want to go into excessive detail on that but it is among my very highest priorities to see that this issue is addressed and that we keep ahead of this rather terrible terrorist game. The other question you asked was about protection in vehicles. I think I am correct in saying that we upped the number of armoured vehicles in January of last year, around the time of the elections. We have retained them there and they will be handed over to the new roulement troops who are going in at present. Lieutenant General Sir Rob Fry: As the Secretary of State has said, this is a constant, technological race. There is nothing new in this. Look at the bomber offensive between 1942 and 1944. Exactly the same thing took place. The best protection we have against these sorts of attacks is the quality of our tactics, techniques and procedures. That is what really defends you rather than any technological, magical solution. John Reid: These have been developed alongside the technological and manufacturing side of things. Q22 Derek Conway: I have considerable sympathy with the Secretary of State's view on how the media reports things. For those of us who have not visited Iraq, what I find difficult to square with the comments we have just heard are the statements that we then read from the commanding officer serving in Iraq who had very different views on the sort of vehicles that were available to his infantrymen. I am sure the Secretary of State will understand that I completely share his scepticism about some of the media reports but they do seem at odds with the reported observations of a serving commanding officer of an infantry unit. I find it a bit confusing relating the two when it comes to the protection that infantrymen have on the ground. John Reid: It might be helpful if we identify who we are talking about. Q23 Derek Conway: It was the commanding officer of the Coldstream Guards. It was reported a fortnight ago. John Reid: Is this the report that said that the commanding officer had taken early retirement because he had made a request? It is a completely inaccurate report. It was some considerable time ago and certainly before the improvised explosive devices had been come across that the chance of early retirement had been extended to quite a large number of officers. That particular officer had accepted it then. That was then portrayed, unfortunately -- and it is part of the problem Mr Key was talking about -- in a newspaper wrongly, misleadingly, one hopes not maliciously, as a decision that had been taken at a later date to resign because he had had a request refused. The officer in question is on the record as denying that report so I hope that explains how you should read these things, I think with a degree of scepticism. Q24 Derek Conway: It is good to have that sorted out. The Secretary of State is assuring the Committee that those who are in operational command on the ground have no concerns about the protection vehicles available for our infantrymen? John Reid: I beg your pardon. I did not say that. I have concerns. I am sure every serving soldier and every officer has concerns. Certainly General Fry has concerns. We are concerned to make sure that the new threats as they develop are adequately countered. Sometimes that is by existing equipment, which is the point you make about armoured vehicles. Sometimes it is by developing new technology and responses. Sometimes the best method is different techniques which we do not particularly want to go into, but it just means you carry out your operations in a different fashion to minimise the chances. I would not want to say for a moment that we go home at night without giving this a huge deal of concern. I believe we are doing everything possible physically and humanly to meet those concerns which I share along with others. It is among my very highest priorities, with regard to anything that needs to be done to protect and safeguard the lives of our troops. Q25 Chairman: There were two issues in those newspaper reports. One was that the commanding officer might have taken early retirement as a result of this. I think you have told the Committee that, completely and satisfactorily, there is no question of that. The second issue was that he had asked for Warriors and had not been given them. That is the important issue that we need to look into. Was that the case? John Reid: Yes. I thought I had answered that. I thought that the additional Warriors which had been asked for had been deployed earlier in January of this year for the elections and, after the elections, had not been returned and had been maintained there. For instance, in the present roulement where the mechanised brigade is coming out and the armoured brigade is going in, the Warriors are not coming back with the soldiers. The Warriors are staying there and will be taken over by the incoming troops. That is my understanding of it. Because it is an important issue, I will ask General Fry to confirm my understanding of this position because I did ask about it at the time this story appeared. Lieutenant General Sir Rob Fry: What the Secretary of State has said is entirely correct. What we in the Ministry of Defence and also the chief of joint operations at Northwood do is constantly look at the mix of different capabilities that exists across all theatres but particularly in Iraq at the present time. There is a process which we title internally a force level review which looks at the level of troops and the equipment that they have. That is an infinitely variable mix. We did leave some Warriors in Iraq during one of our roulements. We have recently sent out some more Warriors and we have also sent out additional Warrior crews which allows the tempo of operations to be maintained at a greater level. None of this was in response to the views of a single commanding officer. It was as a result of the synthesis of all of the advice and views of both those on the grounds and those who regulate operations here in order to bring about the best tactical effects on the ground. John Reid: I can quite understand the concern that has been raised by Members. I read the day before yesterday in the papers, at the end of one story, there was another thing tucked in that said I had had a request for 2,000 extra troops and had turned it down for political reasons and General Casey and the Americans were upset. It was one sentence that contained three untruths. To the best of my knowledge -- and I checked in case I had had a request for 2,000 extra troops and forgotten about it -- it never happened. The Americans are not worried about something that did not happen. I did not turn it down for reasons political or otherwise. Constantly we read these things and I understand that people will be concerned. They are perfectly legitimate questions to ask. As far as I am aware, we have given what was asked for and will continue to do so. Q26 Mr Havard: Can I talk about Afghanistan and the ISAF move to the south? If we deal with the politics of it, one of the suggestions is that this move is coming about really as a trigger for a rundown of the Americans out of Afghanistan as opposed to its motivation being something else. John Reid: No, it is not. Q27 Mr Havard: I was there about 12 months ago and even at that point the suggestion was that there was going to be a change because the Americans wanted to come out of Afghanistan; and since that period there has been a process put in place in order to allow that. John Reid: It just is not true. Let us recall why we are in Afghanistan. We are in Afghanistan to deny the terrorists a Trojan horse, an empty state in which they can shelter for attacks on the west, potentially us. Secondly, if we are gong to do that in the longer term as well as in the short term, we have to do more than expel the terrorists which has been largely the job of the Americans. The Americans have been involved in counter-terrorism lead-up but we have to do more than that because, if that is all we do, we leave Afghanistan as an unviable state and the terrorists will come back. Therefore, alongside the American mission of counter-terrorism, we have had a reconstruction mission through NATO which has been building democracy, the Afghanistan security forces and the infrastructure. If we are going to do that, we have to do it for the whole of Afghanistan. At present we are in the north and the west and it was always envisaged that phase three would take us to the south. There are three things that are liable to happen next year, though I have not made final decisions on all of them. I have made final decisions on some of them. The first is we will go in, the British, as head of the ISAF forces there through the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps and take the role of the Italians. The second is that we will be part of phase three in the south if we can satisfy ourselves that we will have the resources, the social, economic and humanitarian back-up and the multinational allies. Subject to those caveats, we would like to extend phase three so that we are on three-quarters of the Afghanistan map. The Americans will still be countering terrorism which is mainly in the eastern province, the province which is bordering Pakistan next to their north-west provinces. The third thing that is liable to happen is that the two operations will come closer together. Q28 Mr Havard: Specifically in relation to that, one of the things said to me was that what was the one star NATO coordinator -- I think he was a Brit -- came back from that and it has not been continued. If the description is that the Americans will still be there operating together with NATO, how are the coordination arrangements going to happen? What is this relationship between the coalition and ISAF? Is the British commander of the ARRC, for example, going to become the commander of both of these operations? If not, how is the coordination going to work? John Reid: ISAF will expand geographically and in numbers. The American counter-terrorism effort will probably be concentrated more in a smaller area and they will probably reduce in numbers, but they will not be going away and us taking over. The operations will have a greater degree of synergy. We are still discussing exactly what the mechanisms for that might be but the supreme allied commander has put forward a proposition which would enable us to bring the operations, the American one and ISAF, closer together ultimately under a double hatted general at the top but two chains of command which would lead to him. You would still have technically two chains of command but you would have a double hatted deputy SAC for instance who would be at the head of both of those operations. That is the structural problem. Personally, I do not think the structural problem is the problem. The problem is the political problem and that is how do you bring together a counter-terrorist operation where the Americans do not have all the caveats, qualifications and restrictions on their rules of engagement and activity, with a reconstruction mission of ISAF where there are varying degrees of caveats, restrictions and some people would say handcuffs on what the various multinational contingents could do in a way that allows both to be comfortable. That is partly a job of politics for people like us to do, particularly if it starts at a time when we are leaving the headquarters. Op plan 10304 is now under discussion in NATO so that is all of the matters we are discussing but I think I am accurate in the description of the supreme allied commander's potential resolution of this. Chairman: As you know, we will be doing a full inquiry into Afghanistan starting in two weeks' time. Q29 Mr Havard: There is a lot of speculation in the press about who is going to go for the British as part of the ARRC. There is talk about the 16th Air Assault Brigade, the 19th Light Brigade and all the rest of it. Can you say anything today about what that formation is going to look like? John Reid: I do not think there is a great deal of speculation about the ARRC, the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps headquarters, that are going in. The speculation is about the second element of that and that is the move to the south. How many Brits will there be? What will be the configuration? What will be the tasks? Where will the Dutch and Australians be and so on? I am not in a position to say that today other than what I have said. That is that we would like to go in there but I am not committing us to going there until I am satisfied that we have our own configuration, the multinational allies, the capabilities and resources that we need and, very importantly, that we have the humanitarian aid and so on. DFID has plans which we are working with them on now. There is a very constructive relationship because it is no good going in, attempting to counter narcotics, for instance, in the south which is corrupting all the politics and commerce in Afghanistan and saying to the farmers, "We will either prohibit or dissuade you from producing poppies" unless there are some alternative, economic livelihoods for the farmers, some other source of income. That is an essential element of it. It will also need a political drive from the centre. I was in Kabul recently. I met with both Minister Wardak and President Karzai. They say it will be there. They are very keen for the British troops to be staying. They want us to play a greater role there. We will do it but only if the conditions are right and the configuration is right. Q30 Mr Havard: I agree with you. To stop narcotics, there is a lead on that. There is the military and all these different civil support activities. This narcotic, as you will know, is ending up in the veins of some of my constituents so I have a particular interest. The declared intention, as I understand it though, is by sending the ARRC in the way that it is going and doing what is being planned in some ways will make a step change. The move to the south and so on will make a step change in the process. As I understand it, that is only planned to be there for nine months. I agree with the general intention, which is to make that step change, to stop the narcotics and so on but is all of that achievable within the plan that is being set out here? The Brits are the lead for stopping narcotics but we have to do the stabilisation. Apparently there is a declared intention to move something in there for a nine month period. Is that going to work in that sort of time frame? John Reid: You are right about the heroin in this country. The reason we went in there was to counter terrorism and the threat to this country but it also raises almost incidentally but importantly this question of the production of opium. 90 per cent of the heroin taken in the streets of this country originates in Afghanistan. That is important for people as well. No one believes that this is going to be finished within the period of the British leadership of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. Q31 Mr Havard: Is it going to provide the stability for it to happen, for the criminal justice system to develop and do all the other things you describe? John Reid: Where we look upon this as a step change is that it is possible for three things to happen around the middle of next year, possibly. The first is that we take over from the Italians as leaders and therefore we are in a better position to shape the overall theatre, operations and politics. The second is that we may be going into the south which means that we cover three-quarters of the country. The Americans to the east mean all of the country is then getting covered because we are close up to the Americans on that. Thirdly, that might be the time to try and get closer synergy between the two operations which would give us a more effective drive throughout the country. The confluence of those three things allows the possibility of reinvigorating, I believe, the complementary assets to counter-terrorism, to counter narcotics, the judicial system, the training of the police and so on. I do not think any of us have ever suggested that that would be completed by the time we pass on the leadership of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. We are saying that that is a window of opportunity to start this thing again, reinvigorate it, but it is going to take a lot, lot longer than nine months before we get some of these here. We are dealing with a society there which is the third poorest country outside sub-Saharan Africa so the idea that in a very short period you are going to build democratic institutions out of what was essentially a pre-feudal society or that you are going to get massive economic growth out of a society that is as poor as that very quickly is not going to happen. Q32 Mr Crausby: In your opening remarks you said that the Ministry of Defence must produce a fighting power and yet UK forces are increasingly being asked to carry out very different roles from war fighting with an emphasis more on peacekeeping and peacemaking. I know we have lots of experience from Northern Ireland which is hopefully fading into the distance but what are we doing to ensure that our troops are properly trained in these roles and that we continue to retain the skills that we have so effectively gained with our experience in Northern Ireland? John Reid: In the post Cold War period the nature and range of the threats we faced to our security were far greater than when we had the old Cold War together. It is almost as if the two great glaciers have shifted apart, one of them has melted and there is a torrent of problems. You are right. We have to keep a range of attributes inside the military configuration and capabilities and also outside. I mentioned some of those and I have tried to say why encouraging free and fair trade, giving aid, diplomatic, financial and political elements are all part of addressing underlying security problems. You are right. Within defence, which is one of those elements, you have to have a range of attributes as well. The point I made is that the starting point for the British armed forces and the Ministry of Defence is the production of fighting power. That is what we do. Everything else comes out of that. The humanitarian interventions, the disarmament, the reconstruction, the training of Iraqi forces, all of that at what you would call the lighter end of the spectrum, is absolutely essential and we train for it but it cannot be a substitute for retaining the capacity to fight at the heavy end of the spectrum as well. That is why we need not only those trained skills but we also need, in my view, the best equipment on land, sea and air in order to retain us as combat forces. Q33 Mr Crausby: What about equipment? Do we need very different equipment from the point of view of our forces? Are we turning ourselves into a super police force? Is that advisable? I remember when we first went to America prior to the Iraq war the Americans said, "We do war fighting, not peacekeeping." They have learnt quite a serious lesson on that eventually, that peacekeeping is very important in the long run, as has been demonstrated. How prepared are we to maintain the peace? John Reid: We do both. We do war fighting. Touch wood, we do it well. Pound for pound, I happen to think we have the best, most capable forces in the world. We also do defence diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace promotion, disarmament, and just about everything else in between. In the combat role, do we need to change in terms of the strategy and the threat we face? Yes. That is what the Strategic Defence Review was about. Does that have implications for the type of equipment we get? Yes. We go from being a static Army which has massed tank regiments through to a high readiness, deployable, expeditionary force and a more great use of the traditional type of activity that General Fry did in the Marines; Reach in terms of sustainability; carriers, agility -- not only the air to ground attack precision -- hence Typhoons; the special forces against terrorism -- hence the new reconnaissance regiment. The answer is yes. In terms of deployment, configuration and our equipment, we need to change to keep ahead of the game. Did we get it right, the direction in the Strategic Defence Review? I declare an interest since I presided over it for George Robertson. Yes, I think we did get it right. I think the direction is right. Did we get the pace of the change right? No. I think it was even more dramatically shifting than we thought, which is why after I had done the Strategic Defence Review Geoff Hoon and the military carried out the new chapter. We did not envisage that terrorism would get to this scale and so on. Yes is the answer to the question do we need to keep changing equipment and do we need to have a range of skills that goes from war fighting through to peacekeeping. Lieutenant General Sir Rob Fry: Can I give Mr Crausby a reassurance on this? One of the things we spend a great deal of time doing is constantly trying to intellectually reduce the changes that are taking place. In the Joint Doctrine and Concept Centre, we probably have a world leader in this. Perhaps it would be of some assistance if I send the Committee some of the publications that it produces. In particular work on peace support operations is widely regarded as the best there is and widely emulated by most of our other allies. Having intellectually defined it, we then try and make all the necessary preparations in terms of the training and equipping of our people so there is an internal process that constantly looks at the shifting patterns of warfare and constantly tries to bring about an appropriate response. John Reid: Wherever possible, I try to commend our services. We often hear about their bravery, not often enough, their sacrifices, heroism and so on, physically and that is true but never underestimate the intellectual integrity and the intellectual rigour of the British armed forces. In terms of doctrine, analysis and so on I think they are absolutely superb. Part of this is a willingness to constantly have a permanent revision questioning the world and the posture we have at present. I spend a lot of time with the generals and my policy advisers like Desmond Bowen talking about these very things. Are we getting this right? Is the world changing faster than we are? That goes from IEDs right up to the biggest piece of equipment but including doctrine from war fighting right through to peacekeeping. Q34 Mr Crausby: What about our relationship with other government departments and NGOs? Are you satisfied that there is enough cooperation there? I was disappointed when we visited Afghanistan to hear some of our troops say that NGOs in particular were reluctant to completely cooperate with the military because they thought that was not a field that they wanted to get involved in. It seems to me that there needs to be absolute cooperation with some of the absolutely excellent work that our troops are doing in peacekeeping. John Reid: I agree with you. Complex threats need complex responses. A complex response runs from aid, trade, politics, diplomacy, finance, right through military capability, warfare and down to peacekeeping. If that is going to work, we have to work together inside government. Jack Straw and I and Hilary Benn work very closely together indeed. Kim Howells will be speaking to me this afternoon. He has just returned from discussions with some of our European colleagues. I spoke to Jack twice at the weekend before he went off to New York. That is because inside government we are trying to get that whole range of security responses working together. Sometimes it will need to be at the heavy end with combat. Sometimes it will depend on the diplomacy at the United Nations. Sometimes it will be aid. Sometimes different parties will take the lead, for instance, in Pakistan and the tragedy there. What you are saying is absolutely right. It is also true we have to get better cooperation with the NGOs outside of government. What ought to be very effective I think sometimes is less effective than it ought to be. Q35 Chairman: We still have the major issues of recruitment, retention and overstretch to cover. The answers you were giving before in relation to Iraq which suggested that we would be unlikely to have withdrawn from Iraq by 2006 -- possibly not even by 2007 -- and the deployment to Afghanistan suggest that there might be a degree of overstretch on the armed forces that might put pressures on that they would find it very difficult to sustain. What would be your answer to that? John Reid: The assumptions of the timescales are yours. You are entitled to make them. I have not indicated a timescale. I have been assured -- and I have asked several times -- that our deployment, if we were to go ahead with it in the way that we would like to, to Afghanistan does not require the drawing in of forces in Iraq. I have also been assured by those who advise me on these things, which includes the chiefs of staff, that the current running level, the foot on the accelerator, the capacity versus the commitments, is something that we can sustain. Thirdly, notwithstanding the assurance that it is within our planning assumptions and the present level of sustainability, it is very challenging and very taxing for the men and women who serve in our armed forces. In terms of where we are compared to trained strength requirements versus trained strength, we are at the moment at 99 per cent of our training requirements in terms of our trained strength. In the Army, for instance, if you compare the identified requirements for troop numbers against the trained strength of our Army as of 1 September this year, they are almost identical. There are about 80 short out of 101,720,so there are 101,650 or thereabouts. Q36 Chairman: Concentrating you on overstretch, do you think the harmony that is required within the intervals of service is acceptable at the moment? John Reid: Nothing less than perfection is ultimately acceptable. Do I think it is tolerable? The changes that have been brought about in the Army will ease the challenges which soldiers face at present and ease the question of harmony by making a more efficient and flexible system. That is large regiments of multi-battalions. I will stand corrected on this if it is incorrect but I think the position of harmony in the Navy is better now than it was when I was Armed Forces Minister some seven years ago. I think the position in the RAF is probably similar. I gave the figure for the training requirements against trained strength as an indication of manning and personnel, which is one indicator of overstretch. We are just about precisely matching requirements to trained strength. In the Navy it has eased harmony; in the RAF it is about the same. In the Army, we have gone through a difficult period. I think it is going to get less taxing over the next couple of years in terms of the tour intervals and certainly the reformation, reconstruction and reconfiguration of the Army in the future Army structure with the large regiments and battalions should ease that further. I think that is an accurate position. Q37 Chairman: What about airlift and rotary aircraft. If we have Iraq and Afghanistan at the same time, is that going to be sustainable? John Reid: I think it is. On heavy airlift we now have a greater range than ever before. One of the successes of the SDR incidentally was the purchase of the C17, the subject of great debate at the time. The C17 has turned out to be a large success. The C130J transport planes are fulfilling continually their role in a satisfactory fashion. In terms of fixed wing and in terms of air mobile attack, Apaches and so on, if you are asking me whether or not we would have the cover necessary if we went into the south in Afghanistan, the answer is I would not go in there unless we had it. The answer is yes. We have been discussing that recently. I do not want to go into further details at the moment about the configuration of rotary and fixed wing on the deployment to the south in Afghanistan because if I do I will give the impression that we have reached a final decision. We have not. One of my concerns has been to see that, if we were to do that, we would have both the air mobility for the troops and the air cover that was necessary in both rotary and fixed wing. Q38 Derek Conway: On the point about the harmony guidelines, the government's response to the previous Committee's report on future capabilities identified and accepted that there was a problem with the department's methodology for monitoring specialisms. I wonder if you have some advice for the Committee on overstretch so far as it relates to the individuals, people like the medics, the linguists and those sorts of sole traders who move within the units. Is that now resolved or is it still an issue? John Reid: There are certainly some skills in some pinch points. The overall figures which I gave earlier on would conceal some difficulties we have and some particular recruitment challenges we face. As regards your general question, perhaps I can ask Mr Andrews and General Fry from the military and the administrative perspective to give you as succinct an answer as we can. Lieutenant General Sir Rob Fry: To a certain extent I am in double jeopardy here. When the Secretary of State turns to advice, it is clearly me and others in the Ministry of Defence he turns to. I feel I have to answer a certain degree of parliamentary scrutiny but also, just as important, perhaps more important for me, is to answer to the constituency that I represent which is the soldiers, sailors and airmen who are currently serving. We look at the harmony guidelines. We also look at the assumptions which the department makes about the scales of its deployment. This is a complicated equation and in general terms what the Secretary of State has said is exactly correct. Your question on the specific issue of small population trades is not completely addressed but is on the way to being addressed. One of the reasons why it is not completely addressed is that, for example, to produce Pashtu linguists or a greater number of Arabists or to produce those who have the requisite skills in order to lead a field HUMIT team is not done overnight. Therefore, the capacity building that we have to create to go through that process is underway. Those measures are in place and my judgment is that we will be able to reach an equitable level of deployment and employment at home for particularly those areas over the next couple of years. Q39 Mr Hancock: You mentioned the Navy right at the beginning today. Congratulations to the ship's company in the Caribbean on the drug bust. As there is not a problem in the Navy relating to harmony, are the Ministry of Defence going to reconsider the decision of not having that ship available there for much longer periods of time? John Reid: In agreeing with you and joining with you in congratulating the Navy on that particular operation, it does illustrate that you do not have to be there all the time in order to score big hits. We keep these things under constant review but we have no intention at present of changing that. We constantly look at what is needed. For instance in helicopters, there is some £4 billion available over the next ten years. On pinch points, one of the reasons why we are reconfiguring the infantry is to free up manpower to address the pinch points and we will continue to look at the Navy as well. Q40 John Smith: Specifically on overstretch and the greater demands we are putting on our forces, expecting more fighting power from smaller forces, do you still hold the view that you used to hold that service personnel should not be engaged in non-military tasks, thereby freeing them up to focus on front line capability? John Reid: You are at an advantage, having been privy to my closest thoughts, in questioning my consistency. I can see exactly where this Exocet is heading. Yes, wherever possible -- and you can be sure that I have been asking that question in deliberations about the reconfiguration. For instance, to pick a hypothetical subject, aircraft repair. Not every example of what I applied has borne the fruits I thought it might bear. At least I am told that, but I am testing the evidence on that. I see exactly where you are coming from. Chairman: I am sure we shall have to ask something further about that at some stage. Q41 Linda Gilroy: Your answers have tended to suggest that training strength is much more positive than it has been and is addressing the issues under the PSA targets to do with the Army particularly. What about the reserves though? Are you concerned that the increasingly frequent requirement for them to serve overseas is affecting recruitment and retention or have you got that on track too? John Reid: This goes back to my own view on reserves which was that they were much more valuable than others were suggesting and that, during the Strategic Defence Review, we should have larger numbers than they were suggesting, though lower than they were at the time, but the quid pro quo was that they should be deployed more actively. Therefore you do not join the TA just to be a weekend soldier but to serve your country when it comes up. That has an upside and a downside. The upside for TA soldiers and the other reserves is they are actually engaged and given the respect now, I believe, by the regulars that they always ought to have had. The downside is it can get more wearing because you are perhaps being asked to deploy more regularly than previously. The short answer to your question is I think the morale in our reserve forces is good. The number is less than we ought to have. I think they are about 85 per cent of establishment. One of the ironies in the history, I am sure if we check, is that whatever level you have for reserve forces, particularly the TA, we always manage to maintain 85 per cent of the level we picked. No matter how much we reduce it, it has refused to come down. You asked me a straight question earlier and I will try and answer it here: is Iraq the reason for this? We do not think so because we ask people in the continuous attitude surveys and Iraq is not flagging up as one of these issues. I think it is probably more of an issue with recruitment of younger soldiers where the mums and dads, the gatekeepers, may be more concerned, but it does not seem to be an issue with the TA and the reserves. Q42 Linda Gilroy: What about employers? Are they proving to be a barrier in that respect more than they used to be or do you have particular programmes targeted at that? John Reid: Amazingly, I find employers are hugely supportive. Of course they are supporting people now. They are not just going and training. They are going to serve their country and in many cases they are suffering injury. All of us here would want to pay a tribute to the contribution that the reserve forces make because it truly is fantastic. The figure of their participation, for instance in Iraq, is now around 11,000. That is a lot of people, effort and contribution from our reserve forces so thanks to them and thanks to the employers, because this could not happen unless we had good hearted and public service minded employers in this country. They are not all in the public sector. Some of these are in the private sector as well. We want to encourage more of that, obviously. Chairman: I am conscious that we have not dealt with procurement issues. I do not know whether colleagues on the Committee would like to ask any questions about procurement. We dealt with some procurement issues at the last two evidence sessions that we held. Q43 Mr Borrow: We had your colleague in front of us last week. I wondered if you could give us a commitment that the industrial defence strategy will be published before Christmas? John Reid: Yes. This is what I have asked for. Not everything that ministers ask for arrives because as we all know no plan survives first contact with reality, far less the enemy. I think we have waited years for this. We have talked about it. It is one of these great policies like the integrated transport policy. We all love talking about it and we may even be able to define generally what it means but it never seems to arrive. I would just like it to arrive. The upside of that is that, having asked for 20 to 30 years for clarity, British industry will increasingly find that clarity perhaps is not all they wanted. They wanted clarity with the indication through that clarity that they would be able to get all the demand they wanted for their own products. It is not going to be possible in giving clarity to please everyone but I hope that it will give both the Ministry of Defence, the employers and producers in this country and elsewhere a far better transparency about the future that enables them to plan and to adapt to changing circumstances and demand. Q44 Mr Havard: If it is coming out in December and you want the clarity and the transparency, how do you see that debate going forward? How is this document going to be used to do that? John Reid: I asked for Paul Drayson as a minister incidentally, lest there be any controversy round that. I wanted to bring his skills as a negotiator and businessman for the benefit of the taxpayer and the armed forces by getting better value for money. I have asked him to apply his mind, in consultation with both industry and the various other stakeholders, including the employers, some of the workers in the industry and so on, to work out the bones and the outlines of our defence industrial strategy. In layman's terms what will it do? It will say look, here is the money that we have over the coming period to spend on defence equipment. Here is what we think we are going to need out of that. Here is what we think we would want to buy in Britain because either for immediate, intermediate or long term strategic reasons we want to retain that production capacity here. Here is what we would prefer to buy in Britain but are prepared to go outside and here is what we will buy off the shelf. That is a very snappy, 30 second summary. That will not please everyone but at least it will have a degree of honesty, clarity and assistance in managing future change which would be absent in the absence of that but we will not pretend there is going to be enough to suit everyone. Q45 Mr Havard: Have you seen the White Paper? How is the debate going to happen? John Reid: I have not decided that yet. Perhaps I can come back to you on that. Chairman: Secretary of State, this has been the very briefest canter round the course and it has been inevitably the first evidence session which has not been able to go exceedingly deep. Nevertheless, we are very grateful to you and your team for the answers you have given to us and we look forward to seeing you again. Thank you very much indeed. [1] France has dismantled her land-based ballistic missiles |