UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 558-ii

House of COMMONS

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE

DEFENCE COMMITTEE

 

 

AFGHANISTAN

 

 

Tuesday 7 March 2006

RT HON ADAM INGRAM MP, AIR MARSHAL SIR GLENN TORPY KCB CBE,

DR ROGER HUTTON and MR PETER HOLLAND

Evidence heard in Public Questions 128 - 198

 

 

USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT

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Oral Evidence

Taken before the Defence Committee

on Tuesday 7 March 2006

Members present

Mr James Arbuthnot, in the Chair

Mr David S Borrow

Linda Gilroy

Mr David Hamilton

Mr Mike Hancock

Mr Dai Havard

Mr Adam Holloway

Mr Brian Jenkins

Robert Key

Mr Mark Lancaster

John Smith

________________

Memoranda submitted by the Ministry of Defence

 

Examination of Witnesses

 

Witnesses: Rt Hon Adam Ingram, a Member of the House, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy KCB CBE, Commander of Joint Operations PJHQ, and Dr Roger Hutton, Director Joint Commitments Policy, Ministry of Defence; and Mr Peter Holland, Head of the Afghan Drugs Inter-Departmental Unit (ADIDU), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gave evidence.

Q128 Chairman: Minister, good morning and welcome to this evidence session on Afghanistan. I wonder whether it might be helpful first for us to say that we know you have to leave at 12.00 and we will not be clinging on to everyone else once you have left but we will bring the whole evidence session to an end in time for you to leave then. Minister, I wonder whether you could possibly introduce your team, who are all very welcome.

Mr Ingram: I am grateful for that co-operation. As you appreciate, I have got an adjournment debate on another subject and that is the reason for my departure. I would be only too happy, of course, to stay here all day to get to the conclusion of your inquiry. In fact, I would even be able to assist you in writing report if you wanted that! Obviously we recognise the importance of this subject and that is why I have what we would call a very heavyweight team with me today because they are the subject experts. On my right is Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy, who is CJO. On his right is Dr Roger Hutton, who is Director Joint Commitments Policy, and on my left is Peter Holland who heads up the Afghan Drugs Inter-Departmental Unit. I understand that you may want to explore some of the subject matter on the counter-narcotics side of it. We are now here to assist as best we can.

Q129 Chairman: Thank you very much. When the deployment was agreed a year ago things in Afghanistan looked rather better than they do now. How would you describe the situation in relation to the security situation in Afghanistan at the moment?

Mr Ingram: I will answer your question specifically but you are right in saying when we looked at this initially that there was a different climate than that which exists now. It would seem to me that, no matter what the climate was, the imperative of us as part of an international force helping the Afghan Government to deal with that emerging country and the way in which it is developing would have continued nonetheless, but clearly circumstances which prevail on the ground then have to be taken into account in terms of force generation and in terms of other aspects. If anything, the climate overall could be defined as being much better, but we will deal with the threat level separately from that because now we have a better and well-established government, a better-focused government, one that has a large measure of very tangible buy-in from the international community as substance rather than words - and the London Conference was a very clear example of all of that - so the overall governance of Afghanistan is unquestionably better than it was a year ago, and all credit to President Karzai and those who work closely with him to help to deliver all of that. I think that is one parameter which in many ways makes our mission and our objectives easier to obtain because it is not Iraq, let us describe it that way. There are many more beneficial indicators in there, ie they have a government, they have been through that process, and probably in the overall commitment of the international community it has a better view of what is happening in Afghanistan than what is happening in Iraq. Some people try to compare them and I make this point; they are not comparable; no two areas of involvement are. In the Balkans, Bosnia is different from Kosovo. On the specifics on the threat level happening on the ground, I think it can be over-stated. There is no question at all that there have been some pretty serious incidents and tragically lives have been lost as a consequence of all of that. It would seem to me that that was always going to be the case, that the closer we got to focusing on the ground as we developed our presence in co-operation with the Afghan Government from the north and the west as we moved towards the south, that that was always going to stimulate that type of reaction from those who are hostile to us. While there are indicators of a Taliban presence on the ground, it is not an overwhelming presence, and it is not what it was. There is a threat level there. There are certainly risks involved in what we are going to be doing there and there are also indications that al-Qaeda will be looking at this as well, remembering that al-Qaeda is very much the focus, indeed terrorism is very much the focus of Operation Enduring Freedom. You will have witnessed the discussions which have taken place between President Karzai and President Musharraf and between President Bush and President Musharraf to try and ensure that we have that concerted pressure in the border regions, which we will not principally be involved in. Much progress has been made but, as ever, those who want to put pressure on us will continue to do the things which they are capable of doing. What we cannot do is allow them to succeed, and nor will we.

Q130 Chairman: Who is responsible for the upsurge in violence? Would you say that it was al-Qaeda, the Taliban, warlords, or would you equate all three or only two of those?

Mr Ingram: As someone said to me, sometimes it depends on when they get up in the morning they will put on a particular uniform. It depends who is paying them and so, as ever, our intelligence can never be 100 per cent perfect in all of this and it is a mixture of all of those. With increasing focus on and increasing success in the counter-narcotics area, we are taking the senior players out and there is the interdiction activity that goes on. However, given the nature of those who want to participate in such trade (which is very valuable to them so they may well be paying people to do things) they are prepared to do it themselves anyway, so it is a mixture, but the potency of it and the scale of it should not be over-reacted to in the sense that it can be managed and it will be managed in other ways, ie that is what the PRTs are for, that is what the central government approach is in terms of what President Karzai is trying to achieve, and it is managing the wider community so that those who may be purchasable, who may be committed to doing something can find an alternative for them not to do so. It is taking away that ground support, and that will not happen overnight.

Q131 Chairman: You are being very reassuring, Minister, but perhaps overly so. Some of the violence that was quelled recently was quelled by ISAF troops. What is the capacity of the Afghanistan security forces?

Mr Ingram: I do not want to sound reassuring or indeed complacent because the language we use - and I will restate that - is that this is not a risk-free environment and we do anticipate - and I made this point and I will make it again - that there will be attacks on us. In terms of the formation of that threat and where it comes from, we are still best understanding it, and clearly in times past and in recent times past they have been prepared to stand up in numbers, which has resulted in sometimes OEF forces and sometimes ISAF forces taking that on and also, importantly, Afghan forces taking them on, usually in concert with each other. Where there is a sizable presence, where they do stand up, then they now well understand the potency of our reaction. If I have to guess anything it will mean that they change their modus operandi. We have no complacency in there and we have certainly no reassurance that they have gone away. In fact they will be there. They are capable, intelligent people and they will continue to pose a very real threat to us. In terms of the Afghan capabilities, of course they have been growing measurably. There are a very significant number of Afghan trained and equipped personnel - I think the figure is in the region of 34,000 - and a significant number of trained police officers as well. In terms of what will happen in the south, already 1,000 Afghan troops have been committed, with more to follow, and clearly in terms of the training of those troops the intention is to get the capabilities up to make sure that they turn up on the day. That always remains an issue that has to be addressed. However, I have a lot of confidence in General Wardack whom I have met on a number of occasions and who is the Afghan Defence Minister. He is a very experienced military commander in his own right. He will know where the quality is and what can be done, and he will also know where improvements need to be made. So he is a driver for change as well in all of this and that works its way right through the Afghan senior administration.

Q132 Chairman: Colonel Worsley said to The Guardian: "They are our exit strategy - a well trained, well led Afghan Army", but we are nowhere close to that yet, are we?

Mr Ingram: No, we are not and in a sense the exit strategy in any area where there has been conflict is building the capacity of the host nation. That applies in the Balkans, that applies in Iraq, and it is clearly going to apply in Afghanistan. As we have indicated before, and I think it is the iron law of such situations, the civil police are usually the last to get full competency and yet they become the key ingredient because that is the key indicator of normalcy beginning to apply. That does take time. So we are not there yet but it is not by failure on the part of the international community to lift that capacity - and I know that is not the point that you are making - nor is it a lack of willingness on the part of the Afghan Government. I mention General Wardak again. Increasingly amongst the Afghan people they themselves are willing to engage. They want a different society. There is not an off-the-shelf solution that says do all these things and you will automatically you get it the day after tomorrow. It does not work that way. There will be many points along the road where we have to deal with those issues and maybe because of what is happening in the counter-narcotics sector it is creating a reaction within the community, and that is why we have to grow all of that capacity in terms of alternative livelihoods and, to use the word again, to create a condition of normalcy that people have confidence that if they go down our route and the route preferred by their own Government and that which they have voted for, then that will continue to grow, and the capacity of the country to deliver for them will continue to grow. It will not happen overnight, even with the massive resources being put in both in people and in projects through alternative livelihoods and so on.

Q133 Chairman: Mr Holland, I do not know whether you wanted to come in there. We will be coming on to the issue of narcotics towards the end. I do not know whether you have anything you want to add immediately to that very briefly?

Mr Holland: I know that you will be talking about it, as you say, in a bit more detail at the end, but I think that is absolutely right that in terms of the counter-narcotics programme it must fit as part of the whole wider reconstruction and stabilisation effort. It is part of that whole effort to build Afghan government capacity and Afghan institutions. As part of that we are also trying to build specific counter-narcotics institutions, so a specific counter-narcotics police force, a specific part of the justice system to try narcotics criminals within so there are specific activities on the counter-narcotics side as well as that wider institutional development.

Q134 Mr Havard: Am I right in what you are saying then, which is that essentially for none or one of these groups, either in combination or singularly, the assessment has not changed that they do not present a strategic threat, however they do possess potency in certain places at certain times, so the uncertainty is uneven as opposed to it being a strategic problem. Is that essentially the same because that is what I understand it to have been previously?

Mr Ingram: What I do not want to do is to minimise the threat in all of this because the way in which they can attack, they have shown, they can be very specific in what they do and they can bring imported new technology into it as well, and we have to monitor all of that. These are the most difficult forms of attack to compete against in many ways, but we recognise that is the sort of threat that is out there. However, to use the Iraq analogy, there is not that measurable level of insurgency, there is not a campaign at present but, who knows, there are, again, no certainties and no-one has got the wisdom to say with 100 per cent certainty how things will develop, but there is no evidence of subdivision or disaggregation of the communities such as in the form of important forces in large numbers. The ground conditions in terms of creating the right climate for that to happen have been well examined and well looked at, and in a sense has been significantly achieved both in the north and the west with the PRTs that are there. Mazar-e-Sharif is a good example of where we have contributed. In the early days of that there were trouble points which we had to deal with and had to quell. It never manifested itself into anything really substantial and I would expect those very same spikes to happen. We have to plan for all of those spikes to happen.

Q135 Mr Havard: Given this question about what the Afghan capability is, we are talking about the Afghan National Army and its capability, but the point was made just now really about the police. There is the counter-narcotics police force, there is a special narcotics force and so on. There is a sort of carabinieri-type activity to them. The last time I went there and saw the Afghan National Army they were very capable as individuals, and trained up to be so, but the question about how well they are equipped and how well they are able to manoeuvre and co-ordinate between one another, however, is a different question. I understand it is a question of development but is that developing to such an extent that it is becoming more capable and how much more capable?

Mr Ingram: I will ask the CJO to come in in a moment but the answer to that is that they are improving their capabilities all the time. They are not a modern army, they are not a modern fighting force, they do not have all the resources that we will have but they will have that in support of them. Increasingly, General Wardak is looking at how best to grow those capabilities. The debate obviously has to be within the Afghan Government. They have got to decide their priorities and what they are going to do, but there is a growing competency there. It will increase over time. The more success we have, the more we are able to measure that and to say here is what has effectively been delivered, the confidence will grow and therefore the more capable both the commanders and the troops on the ground will become. This must be an iterative, developing process. This is not something you can simply deliver in one big tranche no matter what the activity is. The CJO may wish to comment on that.

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: I think the Minister's comment that the environment in the south is going to be less benign than the north is something which the Committee accepts. That is no surprise. The security architectures down in the south are less well developed than in the north. It is the heartland of the Taliban and we obviously have porous borders. So we accept that the environment is going to be not as easy as in the north and we have configured our force robustly to be able to cater for the threat that we see. In terms of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police, the aim is to train approximately 70,000 in the Afghan National Army. That is the US's responsibility as the G8 lead and at the moment we have trained about 27,000 and in the country at the moment they amount to about 34,000. Of course, that is one of the main tasks that the UK force will be doing down in Helmand. It will be continuing the training that the Americans have started with the ANA. We will continue that by partnering and embedding our training teams with the ANA brigade which is earmarked to arrive in Helmand Province progressively over the course of the next 18 months. On the police side, the police are meant to be some 64,000 strong and at the moment between the Germans (who are the G8 lead for police training) and the Americans, they have trained about 46,000. So there is a gradual increase in capacity which we have accepted. This is exactly what we are doing in Iraq with the Iraqi-situated forces and whilst we are building their capacity we are providing the secure environment so that reconstruction and redevelopment can occur at the same time and working very much along the same principles as we have seen in Iraq.

Q136 Mr Jenkins: I do not want to go over the same ground, Minister, but I am still lacking a feel for it, to be honest. I do not want to put words into your mouth - I never would - but since we are comparing it with a capable army to take over and run Afghanistan, on a scale of naught to ten, given all the considerations we have got (and I am not talking about the total force number I am talking about its capability its effectiveness) where would you put it? Would you put it at three or above? If we have got an exit strategy, do we expect to hand a province over to the Afghans to see if they can actually contain it and run it as it rolls out as a protective national force which should be effectively controlling this country?

Mr Ingram: I do not think we measure forces in scales of nought to ten. I have nothing more to add. I am sorry I cannot reassure you on this and nor can the CJO reassure you on this. This is a very significant number of people who are trained and equipped for the tasks they will be asked to do. I have indicated there are problems with that. I have indicated that will increase over time on the basis of success, and I think there is too much talk about exit strategies because what does that mean? Does that mean that there will be then no presence at all in terms of the international presence? Does it mean there will be some? Does it mean on a scale of nought to ten something else? I think people have got hung up on this exit strategy. The strategy is to create the conditions where, effectively, we allow for good governance to take place, which is what the Afghans want and what the Afghan administration is seeking to achieve, and the security environment is absolutely fundamental to all of that. Who knows what the counter-terrorist activity may require in the years ahead. Will we still be there? We have got to make sure and well understand why we are there. We do not want - and it is enlightened self-interest - that threat that came and attacked New York and Washington and Pennsylvania, the terrible events that occurred in September those years ago, and we do not want the conditions to apply again. However, we are up against a range of attitudes and people who are not going to go away. They are determined to do what they are going to do so we have got to stop the conditions to allow them to foster and to grow. To give some definition of when that is going to happen timewise, I think is just simply not possible. However, the scale and the pace of change, if we get all of the things right that we are seeking to do, will be very marked and very noticeable and the buy-in will be very significant from the Afghan people themselves who, ultimately, will be the key ingredient in all of this. Government has a big part to play, the security presence on the ground can have a big part to play, but if there is no buy-in from the people themselves then it becomes much more difficult and therefore long-lasting. That is why all we are seeking to do is to achieve that at the ground level.

Dr Hutton: If I may just add something on the issue about the Afghan National Army. Where they have shortcomings at the moment is in terms of their logistics and self-sustainability, and some of their technical ability, for example calling in close air support, but what I would say is that the experience of British soldiers who have operated in close proximity to them in the north is that their tactics and procedures are progressing well. We have been very pleasantly surprised with how capable they have been. So the basic quality of the Afghan soldier is good. It is filling in all those gaps that make them self-sustaining in due course.

Q137 Mr Borrow: Minister, I want to pursue the point you made about the reason we are there in the first place. The Secretary of State has said that we have got a strong national interest in being involved in Afghanistan. I sometimes wonder what do I say to constituents as to why seven years after the Taliban regime fell we have still got troops there who have been put in harm's way. You seem to be saying that the reason that we are still there, the reason we are still involved is the feeling that if we were not the Taliban regime would come to power again and provide a haven for al-Qaeda. Is that the strategic reason that the UK has got involvement there rather than any other reason? Is that the key national interest?

Mr Ingram: We have a national and an international interest in all this because remembering it was the US that was attacked, and if we removed ourselves and it became a wholly ungovernable space again, it does not necessarily mean that the Taliban come back into power, but if it is an ungovernable space the bad elements can fill that vacuum and they can use it for training grounds and they can use it for a whole lot of other purposes. They can even use the narcotics trade and the large volumes of money that come from all of that to assist them in all of this. They are not going to do it for benign reasons. It is not because they want self-government. It is not because they want to be left alone. It is because they want to grow that capability to attack us. So the international community well understands this, as does President Karzai and his senior people, and increasingly there is a significant buy-in from the Afghan people. They do not want to be known as the pariahs of the international community. The road to renewal is unquestionably going to be difficult but we cannot allow it to go back to anything like it was or anything approximating to it because the threat to us is very significant. That does not even deal with the narcotics issue which is out there as well and, as we know, 90 per cent of what they produce there ends up on the streets of our country. So we have another area of interest in trying to deal with that as well because of the death and desolation that can bring to so many families and indeed micro communities within the UK.

Q138 Mr Borrow: You will be aware of the argument that has been made by many people that if you looked at the history of Afghanistan there has very rarely been a strong central state, that it has never been a country with a strong government apart from very short periods, usually periods that we would welcome the return of. So there is an argument that the task of trying to bring about a stable, democratic government in Afghanistan may not be worth the effort and in that perspective could I just bring you back ---

Mr Ingram: Sorry, worth the effort to whom?

Q139 Mr Borrow: Worth the effort to the international community in that we have got troops and we have got all of the effort that has been put in to reconstruct. Looking specifically at the work of ISAF in Afghanistan, what would you say was a realistic aim and objective over the next three years for them to achieve in Afghanistan because obviously we ought to be having some sort of target as to what our effort and expenditure and everything else will achieve while they are there? What would you say was realistic over the next three years to be achieved?

Mr Ingram: I think all the ingredients we have set out to achieve, and perhaps are best articulated and discussed in commitments arising from those discussions at the London Conference, are about creating that freedom for the Afghan people to determine their own future, to give them the security, working alongside them, to achieve all of that, to create the conditions where people have the buy-in to a normal type of society. It is not our type of society but what they would expect and want, and that would be the right to look after their families, to have some economic future, hopefully to move large numbers of them away from subsistence farming, and to give them the prospect of economic growth in the future. Remembering there was a time when Afghanistan was a major exporter, I am not an expert in this area but it was at one time a fairly successful economy. That does not mean to say there were not large areas of poverty - undoubtedly there were - but all of that was knocked off course because of the events of decades past. In terms of have they ever had central government: in many ways the United Kingdom at one time did not have strong central government but we grew it and now over recent time it has improved, and is a capable central government over even more recent times. The point is: do the people of Afghanistan want that? That is a matter for them so to decide. We cannot impose that. However, there are very clear indicators, and with the elections that took place and the way in which people committed themselves to those elections, they realise there is a better future; they want to part of it but cannot deliver it on their own. That is what the international community is seeking to achieve. If we create those conditions and it does develop in that way it then does not represent an area, a territory of one governable space, into which those evil elements would be able to grow. I cannot speak for the Afghan people, only they can speak for themselves in this, but they do not want those people on their doorstep. They do not want them doing what they are doing, and that is what they have indicated in terms of what they are seeking to achieve. Whether it means a completely, wholly united country - let them develop that themselves. We have only in recent decades got into devolution in this country. We have gone from one construct and we are evolving still, both as an economy and as a governed entity. I will not go into a debate on devolution right now.

Q140 Mr Borrow: You mentioned earlier, Minister, that you were reluctant to deal with an exit strategy; and I accept from where we are now it is difficult to set a date for the withdrawal of troops etc; but are you actually saying to the Committee you anticipate international involvement, including UK involvement, in Afghanistan for a long period of time in the future?

Mr Ingram: We are committed to the three years' commitment. There are 36 nations currently engaged. This can only be measured as a policy in the future, but as we begin to achieve success the mission will change anyway once the ISAF Stage 3 mission in the south does deliver (and I have every confidence it will because of the capabilities put there); and the direction in which it will move will create conditions and therefore Stage 4 then comes into the ambit of ISAF. I have given an indication there will probably still be a threat out there from terrorist elements that will have to be dealt with and that again is at some point in the future. When people talk about an "exit strategy", I think the entrance strategy defines the exit and that is what we are doing. That is why we have spent so long defining what it is we are seeking to achieve in the south, which is less benign, which has a lot of elements that have to be dealt with. If we can achieve that (and I am very positive that can be achieved) then that creates a flavour of success. It will be foolhardy to say, "At the end of three years it's over"; I think that would be wrong; or, "At the end of five years it's over". We do not know this will develop. All the indicators are of improvements that could suddenly become very rapid and then we would have to consider: why are we there; what more should we be doing; what less should we be doing, what the balance of all of this is; where is the threat; how we are achieving success in terms of counter-narcotics; and what other elements are out there that still have to be addressed? It is too futuristic to give definitions now.

Q141 Mr Hancock: If I could ask two quick questions. One is about the quality of intelligence. You said rightly, Minister, that some of the groups in Afghanistan decide in the morning when they get up which side they are going to be on. What does that do for our forces there and who they have to work with; and how good is the quality and nature of the intelligence we are working to? Secondly, when the Secretary General of the UN was in this room speaking he said that the biggest mistake in Afghanistan was not disarming the warlords. Do you really believe it is possible for an Afghan military force to have countrywide quality control of the country while there are so many armed groups who are significantly opposed to the central government and, unless they are removed in one way or another, the situation will be that an under-resourced army will never be able to compete with that situation?

Mr Ingram: I do not take your last point of an "under-resourced army" if you mean the force we are putting in.

Q142 Mr Hancock: No, not our army, the Afghan Army. You said, Minister, that there was a lack of resources for the Afghan Army and that was part of the failure at the present time?

Mr Ingram: It is part of the issue which has to be addressed. This failure at the present time, remember we are only a short number of years away from the end of the removal of the Taliban regime and for them to grow a modern army with all the attributes in that timescale is just not realistic and anyone who made such a demand would be living in a fantasy world, to think that someone could so produce it. The question of intelligence on the ground and the way in which the threat can reshape and refocus, that is what we seek best to do, to best understand that. It is what much of the activity of the PRT will be able, about getting buy-in from what wider community. There are a whole lot of things we will go into to encourage all of that, and engagement of the people to give us information so we have a better understanding and, indeed, that will mean talking to some of those people who are posing the threat. It is no different from any other approach we have had to adopt from Northern Ireland onwards, and perhaps even before Northern Ireland. You have to understand what is causing the problem; you have to see what measure you can put in place to mitigate that and deal with it; and to create the conditions so that does not continue to grow and manifest itself. It has taken us 30 years in Northern Ireland, which one would have thought was a much easier equation; but I do not want that to be used as an indicator that it is 30 years' commitment to Afghanistan, but I point out the problems. I think our knowledge now of dealing with all of this is so much better, by and large because we do not have the great standoffs that applied at the time of the Cold War and all the geopolitical manoeuvring that went on which allowed a lot of unrest to foster for other purposes. Those conditions do not really apply globally now the way they once did. There is a much clearer international focus to try and resolve these problems because everyone is at threat from that - everyone; because the minute they topple one part of the temple they will come for the next bit.

Chairman: We are falling behind. Could I ask for both short questions and for shorter answers please, Minister.

Q143 Mr Holloway: Notwithstanding the huge damage done by heroin in this country, are we not slightly confusing our aims? If we want to have stability in Afghanistan and also reduce the quantity of drugs coming into this and other countries, how can you do that? How can you get buy-in from the Afghan people if you are assisting the ANA in destroying their livelihoods?

Mr Holland: I guess the first point is that the vast majority of Afghan people actually are not involved in the drugs trade themselves - it is only about eight or nine per cent of the population who are directly involved in the trade. All the surveys which have been carried out do indicate that, there again, the majority of the population would like to see the back of the drugs trade. That said clearly there is a risk where you are tackling the trade, and particularly eradicating crops, that that does have a response. Eradication of crops is only one element of a much wider strategy in terms of tackling the drugs trade, and that encompasses building government institutions, building law enforcement capacity, the justice system as well as putting in place alternative livelihoods and development in those areas.

Chairman: We will come onto this in much greater detail. I keep saying this but we will, I promise. Can I move on to John Smith and NATO?

Q144 John Smith: NATO and the Stage 3 expansion. Minister, the delays experienced in the NATO force generation process, do you think that reveals a reluctance or an unwillingness on some contributor nations to get involved in the more dangerous work in the less benign south of Afghanistan?

Mr Ingram: I suppose every contributing nation, ourselves included, has to examine what it is they are seeking to do. Do we have the capability to do it? What is the public mood? Winning that public mood in some countries may be more difficult than here. It may even become difficult here in relation to what David Borrow asked about how you justify it. That is where I think we all have an obligation to play in this - to make sure that, hopefully, the way in which I have articulated it, the way in which the Secretary of State has and, even more so, the Prime Minister, as to the vitality of what we are seeking to do and the absolute importance of what we are seeking, encourages our own people in the UK, but also internationally as well. I do not think we need to convince the United States - being the victim of what happened I think they are very focussed and targeted - but there will still be noises off in the United States about it, but it is about the steely determination of government to define what the mission is and then do we have the capability? I think in many ways the way in which we have gone about it shows that we have not just jumped at the problem but have participated in most of the discussions, not all of the discussions, as this has begun to be put in place. It has been carefully analysed and there is not a military solution alone; there is no point just putting a military force into the country and expecting it all to be resolved; we have to have all of those other ingredients in place. The London conference was a good example and I am sure that encouraged other contributing nations to see the strength of the case; and that will then encourage both parliaments and, hopefully, the people to understand the importance of it. Will it go up and down? Yes, it will. It is the very nature of this, but the NATO force generation has unquestionably put in place a very importance force; and those who are preparing to resist it should well understand that. This is a powerful force that has been put in place here which will deliver on that mission and will create the conditions to let other things grow.

Q145 John Smith: Good. I think the answer was, yes!

Mr Ingram: I did not know you wanted that short an answer!

Chairman: We do want short answers!

Q146 John Smith: A good answer nonetheless! Are we confident that ISAF rules of engagement are sufficiently robust to help us tackle the challenges in the south? Is there any concern about national caveats undermining the consistency of response to insurgents across Afghanistan?

Mr Ingram: Yes, to the first part. We will have to see what caveats prevail, if any do prevail, and to encourage those (if they were coming in and putting caveats that were just making everybody else's job more difficult) not to do so. I think we have learnt considerably from some of those problems in the Balkans where the national caveats really were a constraint. People who are committing want to achieve the mission. I do not think they are there just for the tokenism of it.

Q147 John Smith: On the rules of engagement and the remit to protect and deter, will that allow our forces to take offensive action against forces that are threatening ours and pursue and destroy such forces if they attack us and then flee?

Mr Ingram: I think the answer to that is, yes, but we never discuss rules of engagement. I think it is wrong to explore it in any great detail. I think the way in which I have understood the question if you want a quick answer, then the answer to that would be, yes.

Q148 John Smith: You are satisfied?

Mr Ingram: We would not be doing it if we were not satisfied.

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: If I could reinforce the Minister's point. From a military perspective, and that is clearly where I focus in the PJHQ, we are content that the rules of engagement that are now contained in the NATO OPLAN are sufficient to match the tasks that we are going to be asked to do.

Q149 John Smith: Good. Are we prepared to reinforce UK troops if the numbers that we deploy prove to be insufficient?

Mr Ingram: We have said that we have to measure what the threat is and we have to have enough flexibility to deal with that threat; but it will be a NATO response and not a UK response.

Q150 John Smith: Finally, Chairman, when do we anticipate that the Stage 4 expansion will take place, and will we require more troops for that?

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: As I am sure the Committee understand Stage 3 expansion, the transfer of authority, is set against certain criteria. We anticipate that is going to happen probably in the late summer. Transfer of the Stage 4 area, again there are a number of conditions which will have to be met before that actually happens and NATO and the US coalition force at the moment will decide, depending on how the transition of Stage 3 goes, whether they are willing to transfer the Stage 4 area.

Q151 John Smith: They will decide the troop numbers?

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: Stage 4 effectively is a re-badging of the current US forces which are contained in that area underneath a NATO banner. I do not anticipate any significant change in the force levels which are contained in the Stage 4 area, which are predominantly US.

Dr Hutton: If I could just add to that, Chairman. We would be very keen for that transfer of authority to Stage 4 taking place during the tenure of HQ ARRC, the commander of ISAF, which ends in February next year.

Chairman: That was a very interesting answer you gave, Air Marshal, about a re-badging.

Q152 Mr Hancock: If I could ask a couple of brief questions relating to the relationship between ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom. In the memorandum you said that the command and control elements there still needed to be finalised and brought up to a better understanding. Can you tell us how that will be achieved, and when you would expect that to be in place? Are you satisfied that the "double-hatted" arrangements - for the US officer embedded in the ISAF command, your senior officers and, indeed, the British general who will command the whole operation - are clearly understood by all sides; and our general or NATO's general will not have to take second place to the American command structure back in the United States? Finally, can I ask about reinforcements? If reinforcements were required, do you believe that any other country (other than the UK) in NATO currently (excluding the Americans) would be able to furnish further troops if they were needed; or would it solely be down to the UK?

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: If I can deal, first of all, with the command control. I know the Committee has received a note following the last session which articulates that and things have moved on slightly in terms of clarification. Basically, as the Committee is aware, Stage 1 and Stage 2 areas come under the current ISAF headquarters which is based around the Italian High Readiness Headquarters at the moment; and that will transfer to COMARRC in May of this year. The Stage 3 and Stage 4 area are under their American coalition-led headquarters. The command and control structure which will be put in place in ARRC's tenure to transfer the Stage 3 and Stage 4 area, we hope, will basically consist of the three-star ISAF commander, which will be Lieutenant General David Richards, a British commander, and his headquarters. Underneath that will be three two-star officers: one will be responsible for managing all of the air resources; one will be responsible for stability operations, and that really focussed on the PRTs and enabling the PRTs. The final two-star officer will be responsible for securing, and that will be a US two-star officer, and his responsibility under ISAF will be providing a secure environment under which the PRTs can carry out their reconstruction and redevelopment work; but he will also be responsible for coordinating the activity of the relatively small US force which will be conducting counterterrorist operations. Within one headquarters we will have the ability to ensure that there is a proper level of de-confliction and coordination of both the ISAF force and the relatively small American force which will be conducting counterterrorist operations.

Q153 Mr Hancock: Before you answer the other parts of my question could I ask (as I asked the Secretary of State in questions in the House last week) about the use of NATO assets in Afghanistan. They will be solely at the discretion of the commander of ISAF, including the American-deployed NATO assets?

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: That is absolutely correct.

Q154 Mr Hancock: So he can make a decision to use those without having that countermanded by an American officer who says, "No, these are American assets and they are not to be deployed"?

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: That is exactly right.

Q155 Mr Hancock: That is fine. What about the second half of the question, about the reinforcements?

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: The point about the reinforcements, this is very much a job for NATO. It is a NATO commanded and generated force. COMISAF David Richards will clearly have the ability to move forces around Afghanistan to take account of a deteriorating security situation in any particular area. If he believes that he needs reinforcement from out of the theatre then he would go back to NATO and seek NATO to secure those forces from nations, exactly as it will be done during the Fourth Generation Process.

Q156 Mr Hancock: Are you saying, Air Marshal, that NATO troops or service personnel deployed in any part of Afghanistan can be deployed if necessary to Helmand Province?

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: This is where some national continents will have caveats on the use of their forces. What NATO is seeking to do is ensure that there are an absolute minimum number of caveats, and that is what we are seeing from the bulk of the nations.

Q157 Mr Hancock: It would be helpful from this Committee's point of view and this report if we had that information about those countries which have caveated the use of NATO-deployed troops to Afghanistan to areas where only they will agree when they are deployed; because it makes the burden on the British troops deployed there greater, does it not?

Mr Ingram: I do not know whether that is information we are in a position to release. These are matters for individual governments. It is not a matter for this Committee to decide to comment on the lay-down of other countries. We always say that it is a matter for that country. We do not comment publicly adversely on what is happening. It is a matter for those governments and for military commanders who have responsibility reporting to those governments, and ultimately the people of those countries to determine what it is they are seeking to do. I think everyone has learnt lessons about national caveats and we cannot deliver effective capabilities if it is too restrictive. All of those discussions go on all of the time to try and ensure there are no disconnects between what the overall mission is what a particular country may be putting in place.

Q158 Mr Hancock: It is a fair question, Minister, is it not? If NATO deployed troops in Afghanistan under a unified NATO commander and if some of the troops have restrictions placed upon them by their national government about where they can and cannot be deployed, and there are troops there from the UK who have an agreement that they will go anywhere and do anything, then the burden on reinforcements falls surely on the shoulders of those who will fall into that category. That is unfair if you are in a shared alliance, is it not?

Mr Ingram: What you are asking is a fair question now you have come to a conclusion. I do not think that is appropriate because that is not a given - what you have said. What we see all the time is all of the contributing nations have to talk about what it is they are doing, and if a particular country puts a condition on their participation then that has to be dealt with by the force commanders. They have to try and make sure that does not cause points of conflict and threat to other people. This is then into the military assessment of all of that and all the efforts are to minimise that and we do not have those worry lines. If you want to prove there are worry lines then I think you have got to take evidence from someone else in this, probably the most contributing nations.

Q159 Chairman: But the consequence might be, might it not, getting onto the question that John Smith asked, that there might be a need for reinforcement from the UK if other member nations of NATO are exercising these caveats?

Mr Ingram: Yes.

Dr Hutton: I would just make one point there. There is an over-the-horizon option already available for reinforcement in Afghanistan and that is the Strategic Reserve Force that NATO keeps for all its operational theatres. There is also the NATO Response Force for which reinforcement in Afghanistan is not a primary mission but in extremis you could use the NRF to reinforce Afghanistan. As you are well aware, that is a considerable force.

Mr Ingram: The point is that here we have a very concerted international focus in dealing with this problem. A lot of effort has been thrown into it. It is not just a military arrangement; it is all those other ingredients that come into play. People are not going in here for tokenistic reasons or simply flag-waving to say, "Well, I'm here". This is a non-benign environment; the prospects of success are high if we get all of those aspects right. To talk about failure without any evidence that there is even an indication of failure and then saying, "What if?" - I know, if military planners then look at a range of factors, what we do not do is play out those issues in a public way. This is why that support mechanism is in place within NATO to achieve any immediate demand that may arise. It is easy to say that if such-and-such a thing applies you could then have strategic failure because those things do not apply, so therefore why examine it.

Q160 Mr Hancock: It is unfair of the Minister to allege that we are talking about failure. We are here to ask legitimate questions and they were, in my opinion, legitimate questions. Nobody in this room, to my knowledge, has talked about "failure". We all want it to succeed, Minister. It is wrong of you to imply that we do not.

Mr Ingram: I have given my answer.

Q161 Mr Hamilton: For the record, could you tell us where in Helmand the UK's deployment will take place and what its objectives are?

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: If I go back first of all to what are the ISAF objectives, because clearly we would be under their command, those I think fall down into three areas: first of all, what we are aiming to do is to maintain and establish a secure environment throughout Afghanistan so that will enable the reconstruction and stabilisation of the country. What we are going to be focused on, on the military side, is, first of all, providing a secure environment; and, secondly, capacity-building with the Afghan National Army and supporting also development of the Afghan National Police. In doing that we are enabling the PRT activity, which is focussed on reconstruction and development activities. I think those are the broad principles of what the UK force is going to be contributing to. In terms of where we are actually located, we will have our main logistic and aviation located at Kandahar airfield, which is the main airfield in the region, in the south. That is also where the multinational brigade headquarters is located and, as the Committee is aware, the first rotation will be commanded by the Canadians - and they took command on 1 March. Our forces in Helmand, the PRT, will be located at Lashkar Gar, and that is going to be about 100 strong with a mix of military, FCO, DFID and US representatives from state departments and their agriculture ministry as well, and there will be appropriate force protection. Then we are also located at two other locations, Camp Bastion where we will be training the Afghan National Army, which is their main location; and another forward-operating base at Gereshk.

Q162 Mr Hamilton: Mindful of the fact that the Americans (whom we will be going in to replace in many cases) will spending millions of pounds in infrastructure and building a substantial amount of buildings and so on, when we go in there will we be going under the same amount of money which will allow us to do that reconstruction that we talk about? Are you talking about Camp Bastion, or are you talking about an area where the British troops are going in and replacing, as I understand it, the United States? The United States has a substantial amount of money it has been putting into the area.

Mr Ingram: You mean for their own troops?

Q163 Mr Hamilton: No, for the people involved there and to help the Afghanistan people.

Mr Ingram: What was committed in terms of the London conference again was a very significant sum of money - £500 million, I think - over the three-year period overall and not for the south. DFID, from our own country, are contributing £30 million into that area; the $100 million which the US were committed to remains for another year at least. There is more money going in and the way that is spent will be driven by how best we can get a good return from it, in the sense of alternative livelihoods and in terms of what it is people need - is it roads, is it infrastructure or whatever else? In one sense, if you are producing alternative crop livelihood you have got to get the crop to market so all these things have to be taken into consideration. It is really not, in one sense, a matter for me - although clearly there is good cross-departmental working in all of this. The definition of this and the way that will be delivered is really a matter for DFID and other agencies that they will be supporting.

Q164 Mr Hamilton: But that has a direct effect in relation to how our troops function?

Mr Ingram: Absolutely.

Q165 Mr Hamilton: It is important if we are talking in terms of reconstruction and winning the hearts and minds that the question really is: are we in a position where we can do that and will we have the wherewithal i.e. finance to establish that?

Mr Ingram: There are significant additional contributions going in because it is recognised that has to be achieved.

Q166 Mr Hamilton: Finally, have we learnt lessons from Iraq that we can transfer across to Afghanistan in relation to winning the hearts and minds of the people there? Minister, I am mindful of the pictures that came up in Iraq where we have seen the American troops stood there armed up to the teeth, and then we have seen the British troops with their helmets off in the initial stages. Are we in a position where we can downsize as part of winning the hearts and the minds of the people in that area?

Mr Ingram: Really it becomes a matter for the commanders in the field as to how they then interface with the people and the potential threat. These are very fine judgements that we ask them to perform. I think we have a very significant measure of success and we do up the protection and we lower it and we up it and all the time people are trained to get to that point of engagement. That type of measure and that type of approach can only succeed when you have the willingness amongst the people themselves to so engage. If the threat level is high then the full commanders will not put the people at risk.

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: I would just add, because I happened to have been in Afghanistan last week, I was walking around Lashkar Gar with our PRT people whom we have got down there as part of the initial team, and I went and talked to some of the Afghans. I think consent is high and their two major concerns are security and employment. That is what we have got to deliver for them.

Q167 Chairman: There are some questions I would have liked to have asked about the Spring Supplementary Estimates and costs.

Mr Ingram: I would have loved to have answered them!

Q168 Chairman: I am sure you would, Minister. Instead you will be able to answer them in a letter because I will write to you; but I will need an answer within the next couple of days. I will write today if that is okay. If you could do your utmost to get me an answer within the next couple of days.

Mr Ingram: Yes.

Chairman: Moving onto the equipment that the Armed Forces will have.

Q169 Mr Lancaster: Minister, just to look at the change of threat really and, in particular, from Improvised Explosive Devices. Traditionally IEDs were improvised claymores or covert mines which would only really be effective against soft-skinned vehicles, but in recent times we have seen the use of shaped chargers where plastic explosive superheats the soft metal white copper and then drills the molten slug through armour. This is very much an increase in the threat. Are you confident that we are sending the right quantity of armoured vehicles to Afghanistan; and has there been any review in view of this increase in threat from the use of shaped chargers?

Mr Ingram: Addressing your second point first, we are always alert to what the new threat will be. Even in terms of the means of delivery of it countermeasures are being developed all the time, and I know you will appreciate it is not appropriate to talk about and the efficacy of how we tackle all of that. If the threat changes and it is new to us then we very quickly analyse it, and if it is technically possible we very quickly find a countermeasure. If we do not find a technical solution other approaches have to be adopted to minimise that threat. I think we have got to live in the real world, that it is impossible to remove every threat. We cannot have a perfect environment. Are there vulnerabilities: probably. Do we try to minimise those vulnerabilities: 100 per cent as they are identified. We take the care over people very high, and where lessons have to be learned they are learned. If there is need for additional equipment or new protective measures then they are brought forward if it can be proven that they will prove to be effective. There is no point spending money simply as a reaction. It has got to be proven that it will deliver that protection which we are then seeking to apply. In terms of what we have on the ground, in terms of the right type of equipment, this has all been analysed. What the commanders seek they will be given. Are they stretched at times? Yes, they are. All forces find themselves in this position, not just the UK; even the mighty US will find itself in those stretched positions as well. What we have got to seek to do is identify the threat levels, hear what the commanders are saying through the Chain of Command and then, if remedies can be found, put those remedies in place.

Q170 Mr Lancaster: Can I press you on that, because technology is not really the answer. Shaped chargers have been around since the Second World War, and everybody knows what the threat is.

Mr Ingram: I was talking about the method of delivery as well.

Q171 Mr Lancaster: The point really is that recently commanders in Iraq are concerned, and have voiced their concern in things like Defence News, that we are simply not sending enough armour to Afghanistan. The question is specifically: has there been a recent review of the amount of armour that has been sent to Afghanistan in light of the current threat?

Mr Ingram: What we have done is we have defined what it is we need in terms of equipment and people. Remembering there is a very significant air component in all of this, a very powerful potent force has been put in place to provide greater agility, to keep the threat more remote from the direct attack. I am very reluctant to go into "vulnerabilities" because there are points where, if we discuss things, all it does is give to those willing to carry out the attacks some indication of where the weak points are. I do not think that serves our people in any way whatsoever in this. I would say to you, with all respect, we cannot be perfect, and do not ask us to be perfect. We will get as near to that as we possibly can, but we do not live in a perfect world, no Armed Forces do.

Q172 Mr Lancaster: I am not asking you to be perfect. I am simply asking in the light of recent events in Iraq and the increased threat, has there been a review of the amount of armoured vehicles being sent to Afghanistan? That is all I am asking.

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: Yes, there has. Without going into details of the IED threat, for the reasons the Minister has explained, we keep that under continuous review. As you mentioned, to defeat that sort of threat relies on equipment, tactics, training and procedures; and you will know that from our experience in Iraq. I believe we are sending the right force to match the threat which exists at the moment. If the threat changes we will then have to review the full structure.

Q173 Mr Havard: Part of what is generating the question is whether or not there are enough Warriors, whether you are sending Warriors and whether or not the changes that are happening in terms of the support system for the Warrior are actually going to be sufficient to achieve the trick in both Afghanistan and Iraq. When we are talking about armoured vehicles we are largely talking about Warriors.

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: I think the other thing which has to be taken into account is the environment in which you are putting the force. At the moment Afghanistan does not have main battle tanks; it does not have armoured fighting vehicles. I am not convinced that if those were put into that environment we would maintain the sort of environment that we are looking to develop - the security environment - and also the reconstruction effort. I go back to the point about maintaining the consent of the Afghan people so that we can actually carry out the mission. That has to be balanced against the risks we are taking against the threat as well.

Mr Ingram: The core message here is, yes, we have analysed the threat; and, yes, we have defined what force is required to deal with it; we are confident there is a sufficiency of that. If that threat changes then we would subject that to further consideration to see what could be done to deal with that.

Q174 Chairman: There was an article in Defence News this morning in which it was stated that army commanders had asked for new-wheeled vehicles to be sent to Afghanistan. What you said a few minutes ago was, what commanders seek they will be given. Would you reassure us that what you have just said remains?

Mr Ingram: I also said "through the Chain of Command". I know you understand this, Chairman, if it comes to ministerial decision the big filter is: what are the military saying; what are the requirements; what are the priorities? We have a very good close relationship within the Ministry of Defence, which has been there well before my time, and probably before your time when you were a minister, in terms of understanding each other as to what can be done. When I say it is through the Chain of Command, it is a question of the experienced heads analysing what it is that has been sought. Sometimes what is sought may not be available. Therefore, how then do we deal with the new threat that has been identified? It may well even be that we do not have the technical capability to do it. We may not have the support capable to do it and put in place and it could take you months before you get to that point. I could give examples of previous conflicts where the demand is there and the supply is not - not because of unwillingness to deliver where you are purchasing it from but because of other manufacturing issues. There are a lot of issues out there and there are a lot of subtleties to that. If it becomes a priority then we seek to meet it.

Q175 Chairman: One of the things that inserts itself into the Chain of Command somehow always seems to be the Treasury.

Mr Ingram: That is genuinely unfair. The Treasury have a very important role to play. That is to hold us all to account as spending departments and that is a difficult job as well, but they have to say, "What is it you are seeking?" because the money that is being committed is not being committed elsewhere and every other department is claiming access to that. They have to prioritise as well but they have not shown resistance when we look at the sums that we have contributed both to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Q176 Mr Hancock: Could you give an indication to the Committee whether you believe, as the political responsible person, that all reasonable requests made by commanders on the ground arrive at you for new equipment or for extra equipment; or are they filtered by other officers before they get to you, because the suggestion that the Chairman made was that there was a genuine request for more wheeled vehicles to be put into Afghanistan and that came from a commander on the ground. You said immediately, "That has to go through the Chain of Command." I am interested to know whether the Chain of Command says no before it gets to you. That is why they end up being requested through newspapers rather than the Chain of Command.

Mr Ingram: I have not had time to read The Defence News this morning and I am always a bit wary of anything that I read given the fact that in one newspaper there is a glaring headline that does not even relate to the answer I gave. Interpretation by journalists can be - I will be careful what I say here, but they can over-interpret; they can deliberately interpret. If they have a particular angle, they can take you down a particular route and ignore the facts, or they never even ask the centre source - not the person who may have made a side comment - because they would rather have the story than the truth. We are always chasing rumours, stories and things which are already being addressed, so I am not accepting the scenario as being a given until I have seen what has been said and how it has been addressed.

Q177 Mr Hancock: Have you, Minister, turned down any requests for extra equipment for our troops to be deployed in Afghanistan from commanders?

Mr Ingram: No.

Q178 Mr Hancock: If I could return to the air capability, you said earlier that there was a significant air component there. The Secretary of State, on 26 January, mentioned providing fast jets and transport aircraft for the Helmand deployment. What capabilities have been asked for, what has been provided and who by?

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: You have to look at the whole air package both in terms of the rotary wing aviation and the fixed wing aircraft which are available in Afghanistan as well. We put what I think is a pretty robust package together on the aviation side. As the Committee is aware, we have eight Apache going, six Chinooks and four Lynx. There are also upwards of more than 20 American helicopters which will be operating in the southern region, together with some Dutch helicopters as well. In terms of mobility and fire power on the rotary wing aviation, I think we are pretty well served. In terms of fixed wing air assets, again the Committee is aware we have six Harriers based down at Kandahar and the Dutch have committed six F16 in the fourth generation process as well. Up at Bagram the US have a number of A10s and out of theatre there is a range of US resources which they have committed to Afghanistan as well in terms of intelligence surveillance, reconnaissance aircraft, air to air refuelling aircraft and strategic aircraft such as B52s which can carry out a precision attack. Overall, there is a robust air package. It is all commanded through the coalition air component operation centre in Al Udeid in Qatar, where there are NATO and UK officers embedded in that, to ensure that the air is properly coordinated for Afghanistan and that US resources predominantly which could be used in Iraq or Afghanistan can be properly prioritised.

Q179 Mr Hancock: Are you absolutely sure that the Americans will continue to provide the sort of support they have done? You are nodding so you have obviously had that discussion. You are satisfied that our troops will not find themselves somewhat isolated because of the withdrawal of American aircraft from Afghanistan?

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: No. I go back to one of my earlier statements that the US forces in the stage four area are coming under ISAF so it is in the US interest to ensure that their air resources are available to support the ISAF mission which they will be.

Q180 Mr Hancock: Is it still, in your opinion, the easiest way to transport large numbers of troops around Afghanistan, by aircraft?

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: Given the distances and the terrain, a combination of fixed wing air transport and rotary wing is one of the most practical ways, given that there is only one major road.

Q181 Mr Hancock: Is it the safest way?

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: It is also probably the safest way as well.

Q182 Robert Key: I thought the Harrier GR7 squadron in Kandahar was going to be replaced in June.

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: What the Secretary of State said was that we kept the Harriers there until June because that was when the runway at Kandahar was going to be refurbished and the refurbishment of the runway would be complete. At that stage, we would review the K30 to see if there were sufficient NATO resources to provide an adequate level of air support and we are just in the process of doing exactly that.

Q183 Robert Key: Are all the Hercules deployed in Afghanistan fitted with full defensive aid suites?

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: They are.

Q184 Robert Key: Can you define what you mean by "full"?

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: They have adequate defensive aids to match the threat that we are going to face in Afghanistan, without going into the detail of the defensive aids.

Q185 Robert Key: This is quite important because yesterday in the House of Lords Lord Drayson said in column 524 that we use aircraft only when they have the appropriate defensive aid suites. Later on, in answer to Lord Luke, he said that the aircraft go into those areas having in all cases the defensive aid suites that they require. Can you confirm that in 2004/5 the programme to equip the 15J Hercules with the latest generation defensive aid suites was cancelled?

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: I cannot confirm that.

Mr Ingram: We will write to you on that. I do not have the detail. I used the word "vulnerability" earlier. We are up against a very clever, intelligent enemy. The more we want to examine in minutiae everything that we are doing, the more we are telling those who are going to pose a threat. I am not saying they are not legitimate or fair questions. I am telling you why there is a reluctance to expose too much knowledge. The knowledge may be interesting to you but it is much more interesting to those who pose a threat.

Q186 Robert Key: It is not just of interest to this Committee; it is of interest to all the military personnel involved and their families as well as the taxpayer. I suggest that there is a case for moving into closed session to explore some of these in detail because of the evidence that has been reaching the Defence Committee.

Mr Ingram: If it is evidence reaching the Defence Committee, on the basis of cooperation and willingness to give best information, we need the evidence. Let us make sure it is evidence and not tittle tattle.

Robert Key: I do not think that is a sensible thing for the Minister to have said.

Mr Hancock: Can I ask the Air Marshal to clarify his answer to Mr Key? Mr Key asked a specific question. He said, "Were the C130 Hercules deployed to Afghanistan fitted with full defensive aid suites?" You said, "Yes." You went on to say that there was a qualitative nature. They were adequate for what they were expected to do. I want to know if full is the same as adequate.

Q187 Robert Key: It is not, is it?

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: There is a range of defensive aids that you can put on any aircraft. There are radar warning receivers, missile warning receivers and other defensive aids and I would not want to go into the details of those. We will never put an aircraft into Afghanistan which does not have a defensive aid suite that we think is capable of taking on the threat which they may be faced with.

Q188 Chairman: It has been suggested that we should move into closed session which we will consider doing towards the end of this at about ten to twelve.

Mr Ingram: I am not sure that we have the answers you are seeking.

Chairman: You may not have the answers but in the questions which we will be able to put in closed session you will be able to go away and think about those answers.

Q189 John Smith: Are we satisfied that the forward support for fixed wing is adequate at Kandahar for maintaining and repairing the Harrier?

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: Absolutely, and we have been operating them there since September 2004.

Q190 Mr Havard: When I visited 16 Air Assault Brigade, they were quite clear to me about their own particular concept of air manoeuvre and what they wanted to try and do and how they were going to do it. It is a different way of working given that we are using the Apaches in the way that we are in particular circumstances. The question is about tactical lift and it partly relates to the question earlier on about armour. It is a question of how you manoeuvre on the ground what are essentially going to be infantry troops supported by air. There are a number of assets that you have described, both rotary and fixed, that are supposed to help to do that. How is that combination going to work with the ground assets as well? Are you confident that this process of getting the people to the right place, at the right time, in the right way and evacuated from it is sufficient to do the job?

Mr Ingram: This is not an experiment or a test. I know you have spoken to those commanders who have thought long and hard about the mix of the assets to have and how best they can utilise them to achieve their objective. As ever, they will learn on the ground. It is on the basis of what is the threat; how has it been assessed? Does that change things and how do they then reshape what our response would be to all of that? There is nothing new, I would guess - I am not a military person - in terms of air assets to other assets we have.

Chairman: Because of the time, we need to get on to the issue of narcotics.

Q191 Linda Gilroy: I wonder if Mr Holland could give us a very quick overview and tell us about ADIDU, how it is staffed, what its budget is and what its purpose is?

Mr Holland: ADIDU is a departmental unit. It was set up a year ago on 1 February with approval from the Prime Minister. It is an interdepartmental unit. We have staff in it from the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, DFID, HMRC soon to be SOCA and the Home Office. It was deliberately put together as an interdepartmental unit because it recognised that the counter narcotics issue and the approach we needed to take needed to bring together all the resources across government. We have a counterpart organisation, the British Embassy Drugs Team, based in the embassy in Kabul, who are in a sense the implementing agency on the ground. Our role is to set the strategy and coordinate the UK approach to counter narcotics in Afghanistan and also to coordinate and work with international partners on that because we are the key partner nation, as you will be aware, on counter narcotics in the key G8 partner nations. In terms of resources, the government has committed £270 million over three years starting this financial year to the counter narcotics issue in Afghanistan. Of that, 130 million will be provided by DFID towards primarily alternative livelihoods programmes. The remaining £140 million which we are responsible for overseeing is provided by the other stakeholder departments.

Q192 Linda Gilroy: You have spoken about the role, but the Committee will probably be interested to know more about whether that is going to concentrate on breaking the narcotics supply chain or on eradicating the supply.

Mr Holland: Our role and our policy are very much in support of the government of Afghanistan's national drug control strategy which was published at the London conference. They identified four main priorities which are targeting the trafficker and the trade, so disrupting the networks, building strong and diversified legal livelihoods, building strong government institutions and tackling the demand side, because there is an increasing demand problem within Afghanistan. In terms of our own priorities, we are particularly focusing on the first three of those. 70 per cent of the resources that ADIDU is overseeing are being targeted at the trafficker and the trade, building effective police forces and criminal justice institutions. DFID's programme, 130 million, is primarily focused on alternative livelihoods and the rest of what we are putting in is mainly focused on building government institutions, both central and local government. We are putting a small element into supporting the elimination campaign. That is primarily led by the US. The areas that we are particularly focusing on is providing targeting information to make sure that any eradication is carried out in areas where alternative livelihoods already exist, so it is targeting those we describe as the greedy, not the needy, and supporting the UN Office for Drugs and Crime and the government of Afghanistan to verify that eradication has taken place.

Q193 Linda Gilroy: On the building of institutions, what is your assessment of the capability and willingness of the judicial system to prosecute those who are involved in drug trafficking particularly?

Mr Holland: It is beginning to develop. It is at a pretty early stage. We have particularly concentrated on building a specific strand within the overall criminal justice institutions to focus on counter narcotics. The elements of that have included, first of all, a new counter narcotics law passed in December which sets very clearly the legal framework for that and the responsibilities. We have also, through the support of the UN Office for Drugs and Crime, trained a criminal justice task force. That is a task force of about 80 people, prosecutors, investigators and judges. Within that there has been a separate division of the central court set up to specifically prosecute drugs cases. Since it was established in May, it has had about 90 convictions. It is currently pursuing about 240 cases so it is really accelerating its effort. We have not yet seen the first conviction of a really significant trafficker. There have been some low to medium value traffickers but at the moment it is pursuing its first case of a significant trafficker.

Q194 Linda Gilroy: Do the intelligence and the experience of the court system suggest that the Taliban is now involved in the narcotics trade?

Mr Holland: We have not seen direct experience until very recently of those kinds of links. There are some indications, particularly in the south, that the Taliban have been encouraging farmers to grow poppy this year and offering them protection against law enforcement forces, yes.

Q195 Linda Gilroy: On the alternative livelihoods, there is big investment going into those. Have you looked at the arguments to have licensed opium production as proposed by the Senlis Council? Do they have any merit?

Mr Holland: Yes. We have looked at this in some detail and I can give the Committee a paper that analyses this. We did some analysis of this before the Senlis Council's report. We share the view of the government of Afghanistan that, at this time, it is not an appropriate solution for Afghanistan. We would identify two main reasons. The one which the government of Afghanistan is particularly concerned about is that, if you have illicit license systems, there are not sufficient control mechanisms yet in place to prevent diversion from that. What you would have is a risk of not reducing the illicit trade but potentially increasing it. The other aspect is the economic side of it. At the moment, farmers receive around $100 per kilo from traffickers for their opium crop. The nearest comparable country that currently has an illicit system is India. For them the greatest price that farmers receive is about $35 a kilo. An illicit system would not compete directly with an illicit system. On both the economic side and on the control side, we do not think at this stage a licensing system is appropriate.

Q196 Mr Havard: We know from descriptions you have given us that the NATO rules of engagement allow people to detain someone. The question about what happens to them subsequently is a matter of debate and discussion country by country and for the Afghan government to establish. You say that you were negotiating a process with them to do that. Has that now been concluded? Can you say something about what it would be?

Mr Ingram: It has not been concluded but we are coming to the conclusions of it. These are detailed matters. It relates to the applicability of domestic UK law, defined as English law, our international obligations, what is permissible or not under the Security Council resolutions. They are very detailed issues to be addressed. If I was asked if I am confident we will get there, I think we will get there but we are not there yet. We know the importance of getting this in place as soon as possible because we now have a considerable number of troops already there who may find themselves in the position of having to deal with this.

Q197 Mr Havard: This operates at a number of levels. We are concerned obviously for the human rights of the people who are interdicted as well as the situation of the forces themselves and where they rest in terms of their legal protection in these circumstances. That is the main driver for us, to be sure that there is clarity both for the individual soldier in this circumstance and through the Chain of Command as to exactly where they sit in relation to their duties, what the processes are and that they are properly carried out, monitored and so on.

Mr Ingram: Absolutely. I give you that commitment. This is uppermost in our minds, to make sure that our people are not put into a position of uncertainty as to how to deal with it because there are too many critics out there who will have a go at our people without even beginning to understand the complexity of the environment which they are in. Therefore, we owe it to them to give the best clarity. There are two key players in this of course in terms of our own government and the Afghan government and we are working our way to a conclusion in all of this.

Q198 Chairman: We have suggested going into private session. If the Committee is agreed we will do that.

Air Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy: Could I clarify on defensive aid suites? Maybe I did not make myself completely clear. Defensive aid suites mean exactly what they say. There is a range of capabilities which are brigaded under that. Some are for warning and some are for countering the threats which are then picked up by those systems. All of our aircraft will have an appropriate suite of those capabilities to match the threat that our intelligence indicates is going to be faced in Afghanistan.

Chairman: I think we still have some questions we would like to ask.