Further memorandum submitted by the National
Union of Teachers (NUT)
SUMMARY
This submission from the National Union of Teachers
(NUT) focuses on the new inspection arrangements for schools and
for children's services. The submission also addresses issues
arising from the Education and Inspections Bill, including the
extended remit of Ofsted and parental complaints procedures.
There are a number of questions which arise
from the submission which members of the Select Committee may
wish to consider in their interview with Her Majesty's Chief Inspector.
These questions are as follows:
SECTION 5 INSPECTION
— In what way(s) does the Chief Inspector
believe that the new inspection arrangements have improved the
overall picture of each school's strengths and weaknesses?
— In what way(s) does the Chief Inspector
believe that the new arrangements for school inspection have contributed
to improvement in the reliability and validity of judgements about
the quality of teaching?
— How does the Chief Inspector ensure
that the new inspection arrangements do not lead to an increase
in teachers' and head teachers' workload on an ongoing basis?
— Has Ofsted undertaken any assessment
of the impact of its new inspection arrangements on schools? If
it has, would the Chief Inspector outline its main findings and
how he intends to respond to them?
— Would the Chief Inspector investigate
whether this (cancellation of teachers' CPD) is a growing problem?
— Will the Chief Inspector outline
the criteria under which schools might request a deferment on
inspection? Does the Chief inspector intend to publish this information?
— Will the Chief Inspector acknowledge
the limitations of data analysis in assessing schools' effectiveness?
How confident is the Chief Inspector that the new arrangements
enable inspectors to make accurate judgements on all that a school
does, beyond its examination results?
— Will the Chief Inspector acknowledge
the need for sensitivity in the use of value added data?
— How do the new inspection arrangements
ensure that the Chief Inspector has access to a genuinely representative
picture of provision relating to the foundation subjects, without
placing additional inspection burdens on schools?
— Can the Chief Inspector confirm that
the decision to distribute the pupil letter remains subject to
the professional judgement of head teachers? Would the Chief Inspector
agree that the Ofsted pupil letters may in fact be counter productive
to schools' efforts to improve pupil behaviour and motivation?
— Will the Chief Inspector agree that
the new arrangements involve self-inspection, rather than self-evaluation
by schools?
— Will the Chief Inspector agree that
the new SEF has increased head teachers' workload? What lessons
have Ofsted learnt from the introduction of the SEF which might
inform the introduction of new inspection arrangements in the
future?
— Will the Chief Inspector acknowledge
that the SEF has had the effect of increasing observation of teachers?
What measures, if any, does he plan to encourage schools and local
authorities to limit the number of observations to which a teacher
may be subject as evidence for the SEF?
— Will the Chief Inspector agree that
external validation of the school's self-evaluation could be just
as beneficial and even more cost effective than the new inspection
arrangements?
— Will the Chief Inspector agree that
the new school inspection framework should have included appropriate
direct support and guidance to schools in addition to the identification
of weaknesses? Does he envisage that such an approach may be taken
in the further revisions to inspection arrangements, particularly
in terms of schools requiring an "improvement notice",
that are expected in September 2006?
JOINT AREA
REVIEWS OF
CHILDREN'S
SERVICES
— How will the Chief Inspector ensure
that information on the quality of local authorities' support
for school improvement is not lost under the new arrangements?
— Would the Chief Inspector outline
the findings of any evaluations conducted by Ofsted on the bureaucratic
burden of Joint Area Reviews? How does he believe this might be
reduced in future?
— Would the Chief Inspector agree that
the inspection process should generate a professional dialogue
between the national inspectorates and, in particular, local advisors
and inspectors?
— Would the Chief Inspector agree that
further consideration needs to be given to the weighting of evidence
provided by consultative work undertaken by local authorities?
— Would the Chief Inspector agree that
the composition of inspection teams must be suitable in terms
of the qualifications, training and experience of the inspectors
themselves, in order to accurately assess the provision being
inspected? How does the Chief Inspector ensure that this is reflected
in the composition of individual JAR teams?
— Would the Chief Inspector agree that
there is a need for explicit guidance on the inspection of those
local authority children's services which are delivered by the
private sector, either as the result of intervention or through
voluntary outsourcing?
— Does the Chief Inspector believe
that elected members are sufficiently engaged in the JAR process
currently? Does he have any suggestions about how such engagement
could be strengthened in the future?
— Would the Chief Inspector provide
further details of JAR evaluation arrangements, in particular,
what would constitute the "independent perspective"
referred to in the consultation document? Would the Chief Inspector
agree that such an evaluation should be independent, in order
to give it credibility with local authorities and the staff who
work within children's services?
THE EDUCATION
AND INSPECTIONS
BILL
Clause 47—"Warning Notice by the Local
Education Authority"
— Why has the Government varied its
own recent guidance which says currently that schools with such
notices should have a minimum period of a month to comply (DfES/1549/2005,
paragraph 55)? Does the Chief Inspector agree that the proposed
deadline is potentially unreasonable and too rigid?
Clause 48—"Schools Requiring Significant
Improvement"/Clause 49—"Schools Requiring Special
Measures
— Would the Chief Inspector confirm
that, if an inspection team judged a sixth form provision to be
"failing", this would result in the whole school being
placed into a category of concern? If this was the case, would
the Chief Inspector agree that such a consequence would be unfair
and inaccurate, as it would be based on a partial inspection of
the school's provision?
Clause 50—"Power of the LEA to Require
the Governing Body to Enter into Arrangements"
— Does the Chief Inspector believe
that the intervention proposed would be proportionate to the level
of need?
Clause 55—"Power of the Secretary of
State to Direct the Closure of a School"
— Does the Chief Inspector believe
that this power is reasonable?
Clause 104—Functions of a Chief Inspector
— Would the Chief Inspector confirm
whether Ofsted intends to change its current approach to Section
5 inspections, including reporting to parents and pupils, as a
result of this new requirement?
Clause 120—"Abolition of Adult Learning
Inspectorate"/Clause 134 "Transfer of Certain CSCI Functions
to the Chief Inspector"
— Would the Chief Inspector describe
how the transfer of ALI and CSCI functions to Ofsted will be managed,
particularly in terms of the deployment of existing ALI and CSCI
inspectors?
— Would the Chief Inspector agree that
valuable support functions will be lost as a result of CSCI and
ALI being subsumed within Ofsted? How does the Chief Inspector
justify the removal of these functions, given that they have been
undertaken for a number of years without either inspectorate being
accused of bias?
Clause 145 (11A)—"Power of the Chief
Inspector to Investigate Complaints by Parents about Schools"
— How will the Chief Inspector ensure
that the introduction of a parental complaints mechanism would
not undermine schools and local authorities? What filtering mechanisms
would be employed to ensure that only substantive complaints would
be investigated?
Schedule 11—"The Office for Standards
in Education, Children's Services and Skills"
— Would the Chief Inspector agree that
the application of inspection arrangements and the impact of policy
developments need to be understood fully by those with responsibility
for monitoring it, through direct experience of the Ofsted inspection
system?
— Can the Chief Inspector give any
preliminary view about the composition and selection of the Ofsted
Board and Chair?
ONE YEAR
TURN-AROUND
FOR FAILING
SCHOOLS
— Would the Chief Inspector describe
the evidence base for the proposed reduced "turn around"
period for failing schools? How will schools be able to demonstrate
the kind of "gradual improvement" which HMCI equates
with sustainable improvement in his current Annual Report? Would
the Chief Inspector agree that more schools would be closed or
replaced as a result of this proposal?
— Does the Chief Inspector believe
that Academies should be the first choice solution to improving
standards at a "failing school"? Does the Chief Inspector
agree that local authority support could have been beneficial
for some of the Academies where Ofsted has identified weaknesses?
FULL SUBMISSION
1. This submission from the National Union
of Teachers (NUT) focuses on the new inspection arrangements for
schools and for children's services. The submission also addresses
issues arising from the Education and Inspections Bill, including
the extended remit of Ofsted and parental complaints procedures.
SECTION 5 INSPECTION
2. The new school inspection arrangements
are predicated on the belief that inspectors are able not only
to "see" schools as they are but are able to understand
and convey the complexity and "dynamic" of a school's
character during a visit lasting no longer than two days. Snapshots
of a school's performance, which still lie at the heart of the
new inspection model, are by nature limited by both the inspection
framework and focus. In what way(s) does the Chief Inspector believe
that the new inspection arrangements have improved the overall
picture of each school's strengths and weaknesses?
3. The NUT has a number of concerns about specific
aspects of the new inspection arrangements. Whether or not the
proposed reduction in lesson observations is a positive move,
is finely balanced. As Ofsted itself recognises, such observations
are extremely stressful to many teachers and place considerable
pressure on them to "perform" well on the day in front
of inspectors. There is a danger, however, that, by observing
teachers in the classroom only once, pressure is being intensified
on the single occasion when they are observed. In addition, the
credibility of inspectors' judgements on the quality of teaching
could be argued to be further reduced, as a single observation
of a maximum 30 minutes duration may be used to determine teaching
quality. In what way(s) does the Chief Inspector believe that
the new arrangements for school inspection have contributed to
improvement in the reliability and validity of judgements about
the quality of teaching?
4. Although Ofsted centrally has stressed
its intention to reduce bureaucratic and administrative burdens
on schools, this has yet to have an impact at school level. Under
the new arrangements, the majority of schools appear to feel under
increased pressure to have a wide range of documentary evidence
available "just in case" they are inspected, especially
as there is less time when inspectors are on-site to observe evidence
at first hand.
5. Reducing the number of inspector days
for schools and the short notice of inspections appears to have
had a marginal impact on the preparation and stress experienced
by schools. Schools feel under intense pressure to have prepared
documentation and to update it regularly with inspection, rather
than school improvement, in mind. Combined with the new three-year
cycle, the pre-Ofsted preparation and accompanying tension is
now felt all the time by teachers. In short, schools are always
in a state of "battle readiness". How does the Chief
Inspector ensure that the new inspection arrangements do not lead
to an increase in teachers' and head teachers' workload on an
ongoing basis?
6. The NUT has stated previously to the
Committee its concerns about the "no notice" model of
inspection and the difficulty of achieving it in practice because
of the day-to-day operational realities of schools. The new arrangements
have particular significance for head teachers, both in terms
of having to re-organise pre-arranged meetings and also the disruption
to teaching, as a considerable number of primary head teachers
have teaching commitments.
7. Similarly, teachers' professional development
planned in advance is being disrupted by the new inspection arrangements,
as schools are, understandably, unwilling to release members of
staff when an inspection is taking place. Not only does this deprive
teachers of important professional development opportunities which
have already been agreed in advance, but it also affects schools'
planned improvement and development work. In addition, this practice
results in schools losing money as a result of withdrawing from
courses at short notice. Given the current financial climate in
schools in general and the lack of resourcing for professional
developments in particular, the application of this new inspection
procedure could hardly be described as "value for money".
Has Ofsted undertaken any assessment of the impact of its new
inspection arrangements on schools? If it has, would the Chief
Inspector outline its main findings and how he intends to respond
to them?
8. The NUT has some evidence that head teachers
are reducing teachers' access to externally provided CPD because
of the introduction of Planning Preparation and Assessment (PPA).
Head teachers are simply cutting back CPD because they cannot
release teachers beyond the PPA time they already have. Would
the Chief Inspector investigate whether this is a growing problem?
9. The NUT understands that Ofsted will
consider rescheduling an inspection if a "significant event"
was planned, such as a school trip which involved large numbers
of pupils. The NUT is unaware of any indication of this flexibility
or its nature in Ofsted documentation to date. Will the Chief
Inspector outline the criteria under which schools might request
a deferment on inspection? Does the Chief inspector intend to
publish this information?
10. The new inspection arrangements rely
even more heavily on inspectors' interpretation of performance
data, as measured against national standards, even though it is
widely recognised that the accuracy and reliability of such quantitative
data is not necessarily secure. The structure of Ofsted's "Performance
and Assessment Data" report (PANDA), which aims to allow
comparison of each school's academic results with similar schools,
is flawed. The bands used for comparison of poverty are based
on free school meals (FSM). The bands get wider as the percentage
of FSM eligibility increases. All schools with more than 36% FSM
pupils are included in one category.
11. Thus, schools which may have significantly
different levels of poverty are evaluated as if they have the
same background circumstances. These arrangements place schools
in disadvantaged areas in the invidious position of being judged
on crude examination or test results, alongside schools with young
people from more advantaged backgrounds. Will the Chief Inspector
acknowledge the limitations of data analysis in assessing schools'
effectiveness? How confident is the Chief Inspector that the new
arrangements enable inspectors to make accurate judgements on
all that a school does, beyond its examination results?
12. Value added mechanisms for the statistical
data available to inspectors about schools can lead to greater
accuracy in reflecting school achievement. The absence of value
added progress, however, does not necessarily mean a school is
failing. All schools experience fluctuations in achievement. These
fluctuations will have everything to do with changes in pupil
intake, including high mobility, and nothing to do with a drop
in the quality of teaching. In fact, value added can mask the
achievements of schools by providing a spurious authenticity to
results related solely to prior attainment. Will the Chief Inspector
acknowledge the need for sensitivity in the use of value added
data?
13. The new model of inspection focuses
on the core curriculum only. Foundation subjects are examined
through a separate programme of subject inspections. Two concerns
arise from this model. Firstly, the new inspection arrangements
do nothing to mitigate the "two-tier curriculum", which
HMCI has rightly identified in his Annual Report for a number
of years. Indeed, such an approach in the new inspection model
could exacerbate this divide still further and send out ambiguous
messages to teachers, pupils and parents about the worth and value
of the foundation subjects.
14. Secondly, the use of separate subject
inspections to gather information about the foundation subjects
must be seen as a retrograde step. This involves additional inspection
visits to schools. Secondary schools for example will typically
have one Section 5 and one subject inspection within the three
year cycle, which increases the inspection burden significantly,
as they are subject to two different inspections for two different,
although inextricably linked, purposes. How do the new inspection
arrangements ensure that the Chief Inspector has access to a genuinely
representative picture of provision relating to the foundation
subjects, without placing additional inspection burdens on schools?
15. A letter addressed to the School Council
is now attached to every Ofsted school inspection report. The
NUT is aware of a number of instances where the language or contents
of the pupil letter has caused concern to the school involved,
for example:
— "We have told your teachers
they must try harder";
— "You need to be more involved
in lessons and not just sit quietly in class";
— "A lot of you do not do well
enough in your work after you leave the reception classes";
— "We have also asked teachers
to plan more suitable work for you."
Such examples illustrate that this has been
a particularly difficult innovation to manage for schools which
are struggling to raise levels of pupils' self-esteem or are tackling
poor pupil behaviour.
16. Paragraph 45 of the school inspection
framework says, "HMCI expects schools to ensure that all
pupils are made aware of the findings of the inspection".
Some inspectors have, however, interpreted this to mean that head
teachers must distribute the letter to all pupils. David Bell,
the former HMCI, stated previously to the NUT that head teachers
should use their professional judgement when deciding how to make
pupils aware of the findings of inspection. Can the Chief Inspector
confirm that the decision to distribute the pupil letter remains
subject to the professional judgement of head teachers? Would
the Chief Inspector agree that the Ofsted pupil letters may in
fact be counter productive to schools' efforts to improve pupil
behaviour and motivation?
17. The NUT has welcomed previously the
increased emphasis on school self-evaluation within the new school
inspection framework for inspecting schools. Self-evaluation as
conceived by Ofsted, however, provides schools with the criteria
and methodology to apply in evaluating and reporting on themselves.
Schools are not involved in the formulation of these, only in
their application.
18. The work of Professor John MacBeath,
to which the attention of the Committee has been drawn in many
previous NUT submissions, has emphasised the critical importance
of the process by which schools can take ownership of and can
engage in the process of self-evaluation. For criteria, indicators
and outcome data to be useful to teachers and their pupils they
need to be negotiable, open to interpretation and alternative
views. Without this they cannot capturing the essential qualities
of schools. Will the Chief Inspector agree that the new arrangements
involve self-inspection, rather than self-evaluation by schools?
19. The Ofsted self-evaluation form (SEF)
is at the heart of the new inspection arrangements. It serves
as the main document when planning the inspection, and provides
the key evidence in evaluating the quality of leadership and management
and the school's capacity to improve. What actually happens during
the inspection depends, therefore, to a large extent on the lead
inspector's analysis of the school's self-evaluation.
20. Given its importance, it is unsurprising
that many head teachers have reported that completion of the SEF
has been a time consuming and stressful process. 70% of respondents
in a recent survey of NUT head teacher and Leadership Group members
indicated that the effect of the SEF on their workload had been
significant. One respondent stated that they had spent 39 hours
working on Ofsted Form S4, the documentation which preceded the
SEF, and then found that the SEF was not comparable with Form
S4 data. Whilst it is to be expected that workload associated
with the SEF will reduce as head teachers become more familiar
with its requirements, in the short term it has had a very detrimental
effect. Will the Chief Inspector agree that the new SEF has increased
head teachers' workload? What lessons have Ofsted learnt from
the introduction of the SEF which might inform the introduction
of new inspection arrangements in the future?
21. The NUT has supported members in a number
of schools where either the local authority or head teachers has
treated self-evaluation as self-inspection. This has manifested
itself in particular through increased frequency of classroom
observation of teachers, undertaken specifically as preparation
for inspection, by either the school's senior management or local
authority personnel, who assess teaching performance against,
but have no training in using, Ofsted inspection criteria and
grades. Will the Chief Inspector acknowledge that the SEF has
had the effect of increasing observation of teachers? What measures,
if any, does he plan to encourage schools and local authorities
to limit the number of observations to which a teacher may be
subject as evidence for the SEF?
22. The inclusion of inspectors' judgements
on the accuracy of the self-evaluation raises the question of
why this approach cannot be applied across the board as the sole
method of evaluation. Will the Chief Inspector agree that external
validation of the school's self-evaluation could be just as beneficial
and even more cost effective than the new inspection arrangements?
23. It has been a matter of long-standing
concern for the NUT that Section 5 inspections have not been seen
by schools as supportive to their developmental needs and that
inspectors should, as well as identifying problems, also offer
potential solutions or approaches for schools to consider when
addressing issues highlighted for attention as a result of external
inspection. Ofsted has missed the opportunity presented by the
new arrangements of redressing this situation. Will the Chief
Inspector agree that the new school inspection framework should
have included appropriate direct support and guidance to schools
in addition to the identification of weaknesses? Does he envisage
that such an approach may be taken in the further revisions to
inspection arrangements, particularly in terms of schools requiring
an "improvement notice", that are expected in September
2006?
JOINT AREA
REVIEWS OF
CHILDREN'S
SERVICES
24. The NUT believes that it is imperative
that local authorities provide good quality services, maintain
good relationships with all stakeholders, prepare high quality
collaborative policies and provide high quality, consistent support
for all those involved in front-line delivery of local services.
In principle, therefore, the NUT has welcomed the greater public
accountability of local authority services currently secured through
Ofsted, the Audit Commission and other relevant national inspectorates
and commissions.
25. The NUT has welcomed previously the
greater co-ordination of inspection frameworks relating to children's
services by Ofsted as a sensible development in light of national
developments such as the increased provision of childcare by schools,
14-19 reform and Every Child Matters. This should ensure
consistency of approach in inspection and allow for more accurate
comparison of provision in different settings.
26. The operational arrangements for inspection
through Joint Area Reviews (JARs) support the holistic approach
to children's services required by the Children Bill and Every
Child Matters. The set of outcomes inspection should consider
are particularly welcome, as they appear to be more balanced and
liable to give a more accurate picture of local service provision
than previous performance indicators, which were concerned almost
exclusively with educational attainment as defined by performance
in National Curriculum tests and GCSE examinations.
27. "Education and training" represents
only one out of the five Every Child Matters outcomes.
As a result, the importance of local authorities' school improvement
functions may be lost in the new inspection arrangements, as there
appear to be several areas of local authorities' work which may
not be directly reviewed, such as support for school leadership
and management, governors and teachers' CPD. How will the Chief
Inspector ensure that information on the quality of local authorities'
support for school improvement is not lost under the new arrangements?
28. The new arrangements continue to be
underpinned by Ofsted's commitment to reduce the preparation required
for inspection. Reports from NUT Soulbury members, however, suggests
that, together with the Annual Performance Assessment requirements,
the new inspection regime has in fact increased the amount of
"paperwork" needed, with the preparation of the neighbourhood
study and individual child "tracking" being particularly
onerous and limiting the amount of time local authority officers
may spend on other areas of work. Would the Chief Inspector outline
the findings of any evaluations conducted by Ofsted on the bureaucratic
burden of Joint Area Reviews? How does he believe this might be
reduced in future?
29. It is vital that the new inspection
procedures for children's services do not reduce the opportunities
for proper dialogue to develop between inspectors and those being
inspected. The much greater emphasis given to scrutiny of performance
data could, however, lead to less direct contact between inspectors,
officers, members and stakeholders. It is in the long-term interests
of all of the children's services that the relationship between
inspectors and the employees of local authorities is one of mutual
respect and partnership, rather than that of being caught up in
a political debate about the future of local authorities. Would
the Chief Inspector agree that the inspection process should generate
a professional dialogue between the national inspectorates and,
in particular, local advisors and inspectors?
30. In addition, there is anecdotal evidence
to suggest that evidence of user perceptions gathered by local
authorities as part of their on-going self-evaluation work has
been given less weighting by inspectors compared to the focus
group discussions organised by the inspectorates, despite the
fact that local authorities' consultative work may involve the
views of thousands of people, compared to the very small scale
focus group feedback. Would the Chief Inspector agree that further
consideration needs to be given to the weighting of evidence provided
by consultative work undertaken by local authorities?
31. All of the 10 national inspectorates
and commissions contribute to the compilation of information for
JARs but inspection teams usually comprise inspectors from four
different bodies, one of which is Ofsted. Given the wide range
of functions which are examined, even with the focus on no more
than 10 areas of action, this would seem insufficient for an informed,
in depth evaluation.
32. The knowledge, experience and expertise
of inspectors working with the Adult Learning Inspectorate, for
example, is very different from that of school inspectors, which
in turn is different from those working with early years settings.
Similarly, social care is very different from health care. Whilst
inspectors from the various disciplines will have some skills
which would be transferable to other contexts, this is no substitute
for in-depth knowledge and experience of each dedicated strand
of children's services.
33. The most productive form of inspection
is undoubtedly one in which the inspector understands the processes
at work and there is a clear link to advice. Those being inspected
must have confidence in and be able to respect the judgements
being made. Where such understanding is not present, inspectors'
judgements may lack relevance or credibility. Would the Chief
Inspector agree that the composition of inspection teams must
be suitable in terms of the qualifications, training and experience
of the inspectors themselves, in order to accurately assess the
provision being inspected? How does the Chief Inspector ensure
that this is reflected in the composition of individual JAR teams?
34. Unlike the previous inspection frameworks
for local education authority inspection, the JAR framework does
not contain specific guidance on the inspection of outsourced
services, as it is stated that all services should be inspected
in the same way, regardless of who provides them. Such an approach
is problematic. How, for example, is the "collective contribution"
of such services assessed? This has not previously been a central
feature of private sector contracts with local authorities, which
are usually concerned primarily with performance targets relating
to relevant discrete areas of operation and which are unlikely
to be re-negotiated easily mid-way through the term of the contract.
Given that these performance targets are often closely linked
to payment or financial incentives, it is unlikely that private
sector providers would give priority to areas for which no payment
was attached. Would the Chief Inspector agree that there is a
need for explicit guidance on the inspection of those local authority
children's services which are delivered by the private sector,
either as the result of intervention or through voluntary outsourcing?
35. The increased emphasis on "corporate
issues" within Joint Area Reviews of Children's Services
is a welcome acknowledgement that local authority support for
service improvement takes place in the context of a council-wide
framework. The most effective local authorities are those that
work well corporately in integrating important local authority
functions and where there is effective local political and professional
leadership. The opposite is true of those local authorities which
have tended to attract most criticism.
36. Ultimately, the local authority's functions
are the responsibility of the elected members. It is therefore
essential that involvement of elected members in the inspection
process, not merely at the feedback meeting with the inspection
team stage, is a key feature of any inspection arrangements for
authority-wide children's services. Does the Chief Inspector believe
that elected members are sufficiently engaged in the JAR process
currently? Does he have any suggestions about how such engagement
could be strengthened in the future?
37. The consultation document on the Joint
Area Review arrangements gave a welcome commitment to an evaluation
of the new arrangements. Would the Chief Inspector provide further
details of JAR evaluation arrangements, in particular, what would
constitute the "independent perspective" referred to
in the consultation document? Would the Chief Inspector agree
that such an evaluation should be independent, in order to give
it credibility with local authorities and the staff who work within
children's services?
THE EDUCATION
AND INSPECTIONS
BILL
38. The Committee has focused previously
on the White Paper's proposals on admissions and on the organisation
and type of school. The NUT believes there are important questions
to ask of the HMCI in relation to the Inspections Section of the
Bill.
39. There are a number of issues relating
to the work of Ofsted contained within the Education and Inspections
Bill to which the NUT would wish to draw the Committee's attention.
Clause 47—"Warning Notice by the Local
Education Authority"
40. Clause 47 gives the LEA the power to
issue a warning notice giving a school in receipt of such a notice
a deadline of 15 days to secure compliance with the contents of
the notice, and the school the right to make representations to
Ofsted if it wishes.
41. Obviously, as now, a local education
authority should be able to intervene immediately if it believes
the safety of pupils or staff is threatened. Why has the Government
varied its own recent guidance which says currently that schools
with such notices should have a minimum period of a month to comply
(DfES/1549/2005, paragraph 55)? Does the Chief Inspector agree
that the proposed deadline is potentially unreasonable and too
rigid?
Clause 48—"Schools Requiring Significant
Improvement"/Clause 49—"Schools Requiring Special
Measures"
42. As currently worded in the Bill, it
would appear that a school found to have a "failing"
sixth form, following a post-16 area wide inspection, would be
the trigger for the whole school to be categorised as requiring
significant improvement or special measures. Would the Chief Inspector
confirm that, if an inspection team judged a sixth form provision
to be "failing", this would result in the whole school
being placed into a category of concern? If this was the case,
would the Chief Inspector agree that such a consequence would
be unfair and inaccurate, as it would be based on a partial inspection
of the school's provision?
Clause 50—"Power of the LEA to Require
the Governing Body to Enter into Arrangements"
43. The extension of LEA intervention powers
to schools which do not comply with a warning notice, including
being able to require a school to enter into a contract with a
private company, is a very blunt instrument. The degree of intervention
should be proportionate to whether a school is under a notice
to improve or whether it is under special measures. LEAs should
also be required to take into account improvement measures already
in place in a school. Does the Chief Inspector believe that the
intervention proposed would be proportionate to the level of need?
Clause 55—"Power of the Secretary of
State to Direct the Closure of a School"
44. The current power given to the Secretary
of State to be able to close a school requiring special measures
"at any time" remains a matter of deep concern. Such
a power even contradicts the White Paper's intention that schools
under special measures should be able, within a year, to demonstrate
significant improvements. The suspicion accompanying this power
must be that the Secretary of State may use such a power for purposes
other than school improvement such as placing an LEA under pressure
to establish an Academy. In this context, recent DfES guidance
(DfES/1549/2005, paragraph 76) sets out explicit advice that LEAs
"would normally be allowed time to implement recovery plans
within the agreed timescale".
Does the Chief Inspector believe that this power
is reasonable?
Clause 104—Functions of a Chief Inspector
45. Clause 104 (1)(c) says that the Chief
Inspector should report to the Secretary of State about the extent
to which the Chief Inspector's activities are being carried out
as user-focused activities.
Would the Chief Inspector confirm whether Ofsted
intends to change its current approach to Section 5 inspections,
including reporting to parents and pupils, as a result of this
new requirement?
Clause 120—"Abolition of Adult Learning
Inspectorate"/Clause 134 "Transfer of Certain CSCI Functions
to the Chief Inspector"
46. The proposal for a single Ofsted inspectorate
to take responsibility for the functions currently undertaken
by the Adult Learning inspectorate (ALI) and the Commission for
Social Care Inspection's (CSCI) is sensible as it would bring
together all forms of inspection of educational provision within
a single body, reinforcing the Government's policy aim of life
long learning. Current developments involving 14-19 provision
would make the proposed merger particularly timely.
47. It is essential, however, that the distinctive
expertise of these inspectorates is not lost as a result of the
merger and that existing inspectors are deployed appropriately.
There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that currently misunderstandings
have arisen where Ofsted and ALI have undertaken joint inspections.
For example, Ofsted inspectors have questioned why students were
not lining up outside a room in an FE college or ALI inspectors
have shown lack of understanding about schools' sixth form academic
provision. The proposed merger should be seen as an opportunity
to address directly cultural differences between sectors and should
lead to increased understanding about them. Would the Chief Inspector
describe how the transfer of ALI and CSCI functions to Ofsted
will be managed, particularly in terms of the deployment of existing
ALI and CSCI inspectors?
48. The Education and Inspections Bill would
provide a useful opportunity to clarify within legislation the
core purpose and duties of the new single inspectorate. The consultation
document which heralded the proposed change to the legislation
implied in paragraph 33 that the new single inspectorate would
undermine "the important principle of impartiality"
if it had "detailed engagement with individual services"
as part of a broad support function. Both CSCI and ALI have undertaken
inspection as well as provided support for a number of years without
losing credibility or being seen as biased in favour of providers.
Indeed, it could be argued that their credibility has been enhanced
by their closer engagement with those being inspected and the
practical contribution they have made to service improvement.
Would the Chief Inspector agree that valuable support functions
will be lost as a result of CSCI and ALI being subsumed within
Ofsted? How does the Chief Inspector justify the removal of these
functions, given that they have been undertaken for a number of
years without either inspectorate being accused of bias?
Clause 145 (11A)—"Power of the Chief
Inspector to Investigate Complaints by Parents about Schools"
49. This clause gives the Chief Inspector
the power to investigate a complaint made by a parent against
a school and to require a parents meeting to be held at a time
of the inspector's choosing.
50. The fact that this power is not qualified
by a reference to an explicit requirement on the Chief Inspector
to investigate and filter out vexatious complaints is a matter
of real concern. There may be a parent whose child has received
a statement of special educational needs who objects to the school
in which the child has been placed. The parent's formal objection
might be that the child's needs were not being met by the school
but the reality of the objection could be that the parent did
not agree with the child's placement and that no matter what the
school did, it would not satisfy that parent. There may be a number
of such complaints which, in essence, are vexatious and which
need a filter prior to any Ofsted investigation. As currently
worded, it would appear that any complaint, however groundless,
could be the trigger for an inspection.
How will the Chief Inspector ensure that the
introduction of a parental complaints mechanism would not undermine
schools and local authorities? What filtering mechanisms would
be employed to ensure that only substantive complaints would be
investigated?
Schedule 11— "The Office for Standards
in Education, Children's Services and Skills"
51. The proposal to introduce accountability
through the establishment of a statutory board and non-executive
chair, whilst retaining HMCI's direct accountability to Parliament,
is welcome and should contribute to developing the credibility
of the new inspectorate. The new arrangements would provide an
additional means of holding the Chief Inspector accountable whilst
also providing support in terms of policy direction and internal
management arrangements.
52. The composition of the board will be
crucial to its success. It would be essential to achieve a suitable
level of representation of persons who have direct relevant knowledge
and experience of the services being inspected if the board is
to be able to fulfil its functions effectively and have credibility
with its stakeholders. Would the Chief Inspector agree that the
application of inspection arrangements and the impact of policy
developments need to be understood fully by those with responsibility
for monitoring it, through direct experience of the Ofsted inspection
system?
53. In addition, further detail is needed
about the practicalities of the board, in particular, how representatives
would be selected and by whom. In order for the board to have
credibility, it would be vital that neither the inspectorate nor
Government is seen as having undue influence over the selection
process. Can the Chief Inspector give any preliminary view about
the composition and selection of the Ofsted board and Chair?
ONE YEAR
TURN-AROUND
FOR FAILING
SCHOOLS
54. Although not actually appearing in the
Education and Inspections Bill itself, the DfES press release
which accompanied the publication of the Bill stated that "inadequate
schools will be put on one year's notice to improve, and if progress
is not made within a year, will enter Special Measures. Failing
schools will be given one year to turn around, and if there has
been no progress the presumption will be that the school will
be closed, with a replacement school or Academy normally opened
on the same site." (DfES Press Notice 2006/0018)
55. These proposed new arrangements are
contrary to evidence about the nature of effective school improvement.
The National Audit Office report Improving Poorly Performing
Schools in England, commissioned by the DfES and published
in 2005, noted that "turning a school around takes time and
can be expensive". It found that "Of the schools that
do not close soon after going in to Special Measures, currently
less than 10% make a full recovery within 12 months, although
around two-thirds of the schools make at least reasonable progress
over the first 12 months."
56. In addition, there is evidence to suggest
that the current time scales are appropriate and realistic. Only
5% of schools that recover from Special Measures after two years
are assessed by Ofsted as "unsatisfactory" or worse
two years later, while 60% of them are assessed as good or better.
HMCI's Annual Report 2004-05 states that "gradual improvements
in national test and examination results" can be observed
in most such schools over time. (Paragraph 107). Two years would
therefore appear to be the minimum for the kinds of change which
need to become embedded in school practice if improvements are
to be sustained. Would the Chief Inspector describe the evidence
base for the proposed reduced "turn around" period for
failing schools? How will schools be able to demonstrate the kind
of "gradual improvement" which HMCI equates with sustainable
improvement in his current Annual Report? Would the Chief Inspector
agree that more schools would be closed or replaced as a result
of this proposal?
57. Although the Government suggests that
failing schools would be replaced with Academies, Academies themselves
may be equally underperforming and in need of intervention. Evidence
from Ofsted suggests standards in some Academies are a cause for
concern which would trigger the sorts of local authority intervention
outlined in the Bill in maintained schools:
— May 2005: Unity City Academy in Middlesbrough
became the first Academy to be placed in special measures. Ofsted
reported a wide range of weaknesses including "fragile"
leadership, inappropriate futuristic buildings, high staff absence
and poor pupil learning, behaviour and attitudes;
— June 2005: Ofsted expressed serious
concerns about the standard of education in Ealing Academy. It
said that the curriculum lacked breadth and balance and that there
were high rates of exclusion, three times the rate of the previous
year;
— August 2005: Ofsted expressed serious
concerns about standards at West London Academy;
— December 2005: Ofsted reported that
whilst the City Of London Academy at Southwark was "satisfactory"
overall, there was an urgent need to further strengthen the quality
of teaching and learning, particularly with regard to improving
pupils' literacy and in the use of assessment;
— January 2006: Ofsted were damning
about the quality of teaching and learning at Bexley Business
Academy, where much publicity has been given to the innovation
of spending one day a week on the school's "City Trading
Floor" with teaching of the National Curriculum limited to
the other four days. However, it recorded the worst results in
the borough at KS3 in 2005.
— February 2006: Inspectors rated Manchester
Academy as "satisfactory" overall but reported that
the standards reached by pupils at all levels were "exceptionally
low"—the worst rating possible.
— February 2006: The Academy at Peckham,
in south London, was graded by Ofsted as "satisfactory"
overall, although the standards reached by learners in both the
sixth form and school overall were "exceptionally low".
In addition, half of Academies were classified
as among the worst performing schools in England in the current
school performance tables.
58. Currently, local authorities do not
have the right to scrutinise, monitor or hold accountable Academies
in the same way as it does for maintained schools. In Middlesbrough,
for example, it has been reported that local authority support
for the Academy was prevented by the DfES, despite the local authority
being aware of serious problems at the school, which were confirmed
by a subsequent Ofsted inspection. Does the Chief Inspector believe
that Academies should be the first choice solution to improving
standards at a "failing school"? Does the Chief Inspector
agree that local authority support could have been beneficial
for some of the Academies where Ofsted has identified weaknesses?
March 2006
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