Select Committee on Education and Skills Written Evidence


Memorandum submitted by Campaign for State Education

  CASE is an education campaign group, which campaigns for the right of all to the highest quality state education, regardless of race, gender, home circumstances, ability or disability. CASE relies for its income entirely on membership, publications and donations and so speaks with an independent voice for the right of all children to the best.

1.  INTRODUCTION

  1.1  CASE is opposed to the Trust model which is at the heart of the White Paper. This model is based on a political agenda which furthers competition and the control of schools by the private sector, faith groups and "not for profit groups". P 10 of the Foreword describes the effective break up of the state education system in the secondary sector (with the primary sector to follow). Building on existing legislation, new and "failing" schools will be subject to competitive tendering process—and all will become self governing trusts.

  1.2  We do not believe that these fundamental and controversial changes are supported by evidence and many concepts are poorly defined. Indeed, some of the proposals are directly or inherently contradictory. There is a great deal of rhetoric in the White Paper, but there has been far too little evaluation of academies and specialist schools to allow the Government to make the claims set out in the White Paper. Despite all the assertions in the White Paper it is not clear to CASE how parental choice, fair admissions or the interests of the local community can be safeguarded. The White Paper itself talks about the number of good schools and the improvements that have been made, but then proposes to sacrifice this to an unproven and potentially destructive model of competition and privatisation.

  1.3  We believe that the local authority, representing the public sector, is best equipped to run schools as well as taking a strategic role in planning overall provision and taking responsibility for the Every Child Matters agenda. Nothing in the White Paper convinces us otherwise. There are no published criteria on what makes a faith or other group (often with no experience of education) more fit to run a school even within the confines of a charitable trust. It may be at odds with the community at large. Under the White Paper these Trust schools would become autonomous; local authorities can at least be changed after an election and their decision making and finance is a matter of public record. The White Paper therefore further undermines local democratic accountability.

  1.4  The Government commits to rebuild or renew all secondary schools and half of all primary schools in the next 15 years (1.14) through Building Schools for the Future. We presume this will bring those schools into a Private Finance Initiative, though this is not explicitly stated. It is not clear how this will link to a Trust model in which the school will control its assets. Existing PFI arrangements have been criticised for big capital and revenue deficits, less control over buildings and their out of school use, and less control over budgets (top sliced to cover PFI costs). Schools should not be pushed into more PFI arrangements without an open debate about the impact and costs. We assume academies will continue to be built under separate funding arrangements

  1.5  The White Paper does not address the role of faith schools in a multi faith society facing issues of social and racial cohesion and segregation. In October 2005, Margaret Hodge argued that faith schools should admit children of other faiths to prevent social and racial segregation, or face being closed. The same month, Ruth Kelly said faith schools should no longer interview parents to determine their religious commitment, but also supported the Oratory's right to do so because it was a "unique" case. CASE believes that the Government must clarify its thinking on the role and impact of faith schools.

2.  "FOCUS ON CHOICE"

  2.1  CASE supports the principle of parental choice in their child's schooling. In this context, our experience is that majority of parents prefer a good local comprehensive school that will meet the needs of all children in the area. The majority of parents do not want their 11 year olds to travel long distances, to have to choose a specialism or be tested for selective schools, especially if they can go to a local school that has diversity of provision. Many comprehensives already achieve this diversity; studies have shown that the most able students achieve better in this environment also.

  2.2  There is no option under the White Paper for parents to choose the "status quo" of a community, comprehensive school. There have already been cases of LEA comprehensives being turned into academies against wishes of parents (eg Thamesmead, turned from a secular comprehensive into a Catholic academy against the wishes of parents) It is likely that we will see far more examples of this under a dogmatic system which insists that "failing schools" and new schools must become Trusts

  2.3  Our belief is that in reality, many schools will continue to do the choosing—through academic selection (including grammar schools), faith, and specialisms. We believe this will be exacerbated if more schools become their own admissions authorities.

  2.4  Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the fragmentation of school admissions in the name of choice may actually be the problem. A recent "Times Educational Supplement"(TES) survey found that children living in areas with fragmented education systems, with large numbers of faith, foundation and academically selective schools, faced the worst admissions problems. London—where parents should have the greatest choice of schools—is actually the worst-affected area. In Barnet, north London, which has a high number of faith, foundation and grammar schools, just 52% of local pupils got into their preferred school. In Westminster, 59% of parents succeeded.

  2.5  There has been criticism that the White Paper is "London-centric" in its approach because it is here that choice and admissions are most difficult. Elsewhere in the country only 1 in 10 parents fail to get their first choice (TES survey) and we need to investigate why this is—is it specialisms, grammar schools, and other forms of selective education, being outside catchment areas, banding—and look at local solutions.

  2.6  Despite the assertion in 3.6, we believe the Government's drive for specialist schools and academies in itself reduces choice, particularly because specialisms are not co-ordinated. An area may have only two schools, both with the same specialism. In this instance parents and children are often deprived of choice, particularly if they feel the specialism does not suit their child. We do not believe that the vast majority of parents and children wish to choose a specialism at 11.

  2.7  This sort of choice also suggests that schools will have a number of unfilled places to facilitate; this cannot make sound economic sense and the White Paper makes it clear elsewhere that under-subscribed schools will be closed.

  2.8  The other obstacle to choice is over-subscription of popular schools. This is barely mentioned, but will remain problematic however admissions are organised and will continue to make choice illusory for some. CASE believes the way to minimise parental frustration is to focus on making every school a good, local comprehensive and encouraging parents to support this school. We believe this would prove a popular model, which already works well in many parts of the country.

  2.9  We also believe that "choice advisers" are only necessary because of the plethora of admissions arrangements and admissions authorities in some areas. Parents who are able to vote with their feet (p8) are usually middle class parents who have the resources to ensure children get into "better" and often more selective state schools. No amount of "choice advisers" will overcome this.

3.  FREEDOMS

  3.1  CASE challenges many of the statements the White Paper makes about "freedoms":

  There is an implicit assumption throughout that more freedom for schools is the solution with the academies/foundation/specialist schools quoted as examples of success (eg 1.19 assumption that the "energy" of a "diverse set of providers" is key).

  3.2  CASE has seen no indication or evidence that the private sector or "not for profit" organisations, possibly with no background in education, are more equipped to deliver education. Similarly there is no evidence that specialisms per se improve school performance—particularly when only some 10% of specialist schools use their right to select. It is more likely that success is due to factors such as the extra funding that specialist schools attract. Similarly, there has been no proper evaluation of academies—the first two PricewaterhouseCooper (PWC) reports are mixed; and the first suggested that academies might create a two tier system. It is also not clear that the projected £6 million capital spent on them is Value for Money, but again this injection of capital may be a key reason for any improvement.

  3.3  "The best state schools and there are five times as many as 1997 share these characteristics. But many would like to go further to develop new freedoms and strong relationships with sponsors." (p3) There is no evidence for this, and CASE believes that most schools and governing bodies want the resources to do their job well within the current local authority structure. Indeed there has been a significant lack of interest in the current enabling "fast track" legislation. The old Grant Maintained schools had a financial incentive; specialist schools uptake has been high but again there has been a financial incentive. There are currently no such incentives for Trust status.

  3.4  Already, the Government has struggled to find enough sponsors for its academies programmes. It is even harder to see where private Trust sponsors will be found given the stronger restrictions around charitable status preventing financial benefit, as well as safeguards to prevent permanent ownership of the school's building assets. Similarly if Trusts are bound by fair admissions policies and the interests of the local community they may consider there are not enough "freedoms". The White Paper (1.30) lists educational charities, faith groups, parents and community groups as possible "not for profit providers". CASE's view is supported by a TES article (25.11.05) in which the vast majority of identified potential sponsors say they are not interested in setting up Trusts. It is not clear what will happen if the local Authority tender for a Trust and there is no suitable bidder.

  3.5  We are also concerned that political dogma will lead to the speedy closure of "failing" schools so that they can be tendered out to the private sector through Trusts even if parents and the local community do not want this. (2.55) If schools are put into special measures, how will "real progress" in a year be measured? Examination results (for example) may well not improve in that timescale, even thought the school is making real progress.

  3.6  The White Paper (p10) also proposes giving "good" schools more freedoms and expansion. Expansion is not necessarily in the interests of schools—those that become too large may lose the very characteristics which make them popular and successful. It could also lead to bigger class sizes, against principles set out elsewhere in the White Paper.

  3.7  The Government has assumed in the White Paper that diversity is best provided by a "diverse set of providers." CASE still believes that this is best provided through a comprehensive school that offers diversity. "Diverse providers" are likely to promote divisions and inequalities. The White Paper also describes Trusts taking on further flexibilities which would then apply to all schools with that sponsor—effectively a "brand" of school. CASE believes this would also be deeply divisive should any Trust apply for these flexibilities.

  3.8  There is a fundamental contradiction between "putting parent's needs at the heart of our school system" and "freeing up schools to innovate and succeed". There is no guarantee that the two will necessarily coincide depending on parent wishes and student needs and the school's definition of success and freedom. In particular, parents will no longer have the option of a community, comprehensive school if they consider this their "need".

  3.9  How will personalised learning (Chapter 4) fit with freedoms for schools, particularly if Trust schools do not want part of the whole government agenda? (For example, inclusion of Traveller and Gypsy families.)

  Of acquiring "freedoms", the White Paper states: "They will do so without unnecessary bureaucratic interference in a system of fair admissions, fair funding and clear accountability". CASE believes that this sums up many of the shortcomings of the White paper.

3.10  "Unnecessary Bureaucracy"

  There is no definition of "unnecessary bureaucracy" and many teachers would argue that this describes the Government driven testing and assessment regime.

  In 1.35 the White Paper states "If parents want a school to expand to meet demand, it should be allowed to do so quickly and easily. If parents want a new provider to give their school clearer direction and ethos that should be simple too. And if parents want to open a school, then it should be the job of the local authority to help them make it happen". Given this statement, CASE believes that "unnecessary bureaucracy" could mean a local authority's efforts to fulfil its responsibilities in opposing or seeking to amend a particular proposal.

3.11  Fair funding

  The issue of "fair funding" and what this means is not really explored; especially fair funding to properly resource schools working with higher numbers of deprived children and casual admissions. However, the White Paper does commit to £335 million to local authorities with the largest number of underachieving and deprived children to be targeted to most challenging schools and £60 million for schools with the highest number of children who have fallen behind. CASE welcomes the recognition that such schools need additional resources and hopes that increased resources will be targeted in this way.

3.12  FAIR ADMISSIONS

  CASE does not believe proposals in the White Paper will deliver fair admissions; indeed it believes that they are likely to deliver the opposite. The 2004 Education and Skills Committee Report on Admissions highlighted many of the inequalities in admissions which this White Paper will perpetuate.

  3.13  The White Paper is not explicit that Trust schools are their own admissions authorities, but this is the case. The White Paper refers to them being bound by the Code of Practice on Admissions. However, the Government's recently revised draft states that schools which are their own admissions authorities need only "have regard" to the Code. Unless the Code of Practice is statutory on all schools and there is an end to selective practices, there is no guarantee of fair admissions.

  3.14  CASE welcomes admissions protocol for hard to place pupils, but again this will need statutory force and to apply equally to all schools. It is not clear how it will be implemented in academically selective schools, especially those which are their own admissions authorities. Currently the local authority cannot require an academy to take a pupil with special educational needs, even if that school was named in a statement.

  3.15  Trust school are able to implement admissions practices that "they think will best meet their local circumstances". (3.22) If they are not bound by the Code of Practice they could use it to their advantage at the expense of other schools. The good practice arrangements agreed with the local authority when a school becomes a Trust only apply for three years (3.27/ 8).

3.16  Clear accountability—parents and local communities

  Academies and Trust schools do not deliver clear accountability—they are accountable to a Governing Body the majority of which is appointed by a private sponsor or Trust. In the Education Act 2005, the Government took away some of the additional mechanisms of accountability including the requirement to produce an annual report and to hold a parents meeting.

  3.17  CASE believes there is a danger that the White Paper will encourage schools to be accountable to their Trust and Ofsted, but not the local community. This is far less accountable than a local authority, whatever its faults—and we would acknowledge that some local authorities have not responded well to a shortage of school places in their area. However, we believe this should be addressed on an individual basis with individual local authorities.

  3.18  New providers are often not rooted in the community (2.2) but may be distant businesses or church groups who appoint the majority of governors. Appointed governors may well not come from the local community and may know little about it. How will this community voice be safeguarded?

  3.19  It is not clear how local complaints procedures apply if schools operate outside the local authority eg in academies and trusts. (5.16) Involving Ofsted is Draconian (particularly if it results in the school being tendered to new providers) and the focus should be on local procedures and mechanisms for resolution, which empower parents.

  3.20  CASE has heard disturbing examples of the concerns outlined in paragraph 5.15 at academies where there is no requirement for basics such as a complaints procedure. There has been no culture of listening to parents or finding positive ways to resolve concerns. There is no accountability or "higher authority" for parents in these instances.

4.  IMPACT ON OTHER SCHOOLS

  4.1  The choice and expansion agenda does not talk about the impact on schools that lose pupils as a result. There is little mention of falling rolls and the White Paper does not fully address the fact that its proposals may be taking place against a backdrop of falling rolls. The White Paper talks about collaboration to meet the issues of falling rolls, but it seems unlikely that autonomous schools will collaborate when they are competing for pupils in this context. The "market economy" model of the White Paper suggests some will close and "fittest" will survive. They may also survive because they have been able to manipulate their "freedoms" to this end.

  4.2  We believe that the White Paper ignores the issues arising when local authorities have to close schools in the event of "surplus capacity" caused by falling rolls and other schools expanding or opening to bring "new dynamism to the system". It does not discuss the impact on pupils and parents who are part of a school which "fails" and closes, or the disruption to pupils who are then placed elsewhere. This is not a system focussed on "the needs of children" because having your school closed whilst you are in it is very traumatic. It is likely to hit the poorest children in the most disadvantaged areas—who may then need the transport proposals to get to any school at all. It also does not address the problems of rural areas faced with falling rolls and the potential loss of their local school, which will also need those proposals.

5.  "PARENTS DRIVING IMPROVEMENT"

  5.1  It is hard to reconcile this initiative with the position of parent governors, who are marginalised and only mentioned briefly in Chapter 7 of the White Paper. A key weakness is that academies are required to have only one parent governor. In new Trust schools, the Trust will appoint the majority of governors including parent governors and need have only one elected parent governor. Trusts will be tempted to appoint supportive or unchallenging governors. We believe the Select Committee should examine how much parents are able to shape existing academies and Foundation/Trust schools, and how much the school's autonomy works against the voice of parents.

  5.2  CASE believes that if the Government is serious about parent voice (5.21) they should recognise that one of the strongest influences is through elected parent governors, who could represent the genuine interests of parents more effectively. Similarly we do not understand the recommendation to reduce the size of Governing Bodies, so soon after legislation gave them the chance to reconstitute to include more governors. We are concerned that parent governors will be even more marginalised in this smaller model.

  5.3  Parents are assumed to be homogenous group. The reality is that they may well have different ideas and priorities and aspirations for a school and its pupils. In this case the more articulate and/or middle class parents are likely to win the argument.

6.  PARENT COUNCILS

  6.1  Only Trust schools will have statutory guidance on Parent Councils (5.21). In other schools it will be guidance and academies for example will not need to comply despite having a minimum of one parent governor. There are gross inconsistencies in these proposals. We believe the guidance should be statutory on all schools. The Education Act 2005 also abolished parents meeting with Ofsted making it harder to validate parents views as set out in the school's Self Evaluation Form. We believe this should be reinstated.

  6.2  CASE has been a strong supporter of parent Councils and we have attached our briefing entitled "Parent Voice" (Appendix 1). We hope the Government will develop a robust model of parent councils on that will have a powerful voice at every level.

7.  SELECTION AND THE 11+

  The White Paper says the 11+ is divisive and there will be no return to it, but apparently refuses to acknowledge that there are still 163 grammar schools. If the system is so divisive (in the Government's own words) why have they not acted to end it? And why have they not addressed the issue in this White Paper?

8.  LOCAL AUTHORITIES AS COMMISSIONERS

  8.1  CASE welcomes a strong, strategic role for the local authority, with its role in planning the number of schools, size and location. However we are fundamentally opposed to removing its power to run school as well as plan strategically.

  8.2  Should the Government pursue its plans to make the local authority a commissioner, we believe the White Paper is flawed with basic contradictions about the powers it will confer on the local authority. The local authority would already be limited in terms of the kind of school it could commission because it would be required to engage with Trusts and would be monitored by the new School Commissioner who is charged with developing Trust schools. There is also an inherent contradiction that the local authority must be responsive to parental choice, to plans for new schools and to expansion any of which they might oppose in their strategic or community role. Given the high profile of the this initiative, we believe their powers may well be sacrificed in order to ensure that new Trust schools are commissioned ("unnecessary bureaucracy"). The local authority will also be responsible for dealing with the effects of choice, if some schools become undersubscribed and are forced to close. The traumatic effect on children and communities of such a closure cannot be underestimated.

  8.3  CASE would stress that local authority's role and powers must not be undermined by conflicting tensions in the White Paper. The local authority must also retain strong, statutory powers to ensure the Every Child Matters agenda is not undermined by academy and Trust school's "freedoms".

9.  TRANSPORT

  CASE is concerned about the impact on children travelling greater distances to school and the environmental impact of more vehicles on the roads. To travel six miles (for example) by on either a yellow bus or public transport in London could take an 11 year old three hours a day.

10.  BANDING

  Banding is proposed as a new panacea in fair admissions. CASE asks that the Government and Select Committee review existing arrangements as we believe there are serious shortcomings:

    —  In schools which band in relation to national figures or by the spread of applicants, the results can produce a "favourable" intake with more children in higher bands.

    —  In local authorities which band, the reality can be that children in lower bands end up with less choice of schools (or sometimes no school).

11.  POSITIVE INITIATIVES

  CASE would like to express support for some principles and statements set out in the White Paper. For example:

    —  the focus on the needs of the child, personalised learning, transitional support and on the quality of teaching, and classroom support. In Chapter 5 (p 69) we support the good practice in home school liaison, and translation services. However, CASE believes that exemplary examples of this good practice already exist in many of our comprehensive schools and there is no reason why they cannot be implemented in the rest with the right resources and School Improvement support;

    —  the Government commitment to additional funding eg £335 million to deliver effective small group tuition (4.12);

    —  the positive acknowledgement of the role of the workforce in bringing about improvements, and the commitment to future development;

    —  the implementation of the recommendations of the Steer report although believe the Government must address all the recommendations and not only those which focus on discipline; and

    —  the principle of Parent Councils and better communication with parents.


 
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