Memorandum submitted by the Royal Society
for the Protection of Birds
1. SUMMARY
1.1 Despite a growing body of evidence,
including the European Union's own evidence, there is no sign
that EU WTO negotiators are integrating findings concerning the
sustainability impacts of trade liberalisation into their negotiating
positions, or indeed, that they are preparing environmental flanking
measures for the event of a successful Doha Round or the completion
of other trade agreements that are being negotiated. The RSPB
is, thus, deeply concerned about the impact that trade liberalisation
resulting from the WTO or regional trade agreements will continue
to have on the environment, including biodiversity.
1.2 In no specific sector is a change of
approach more urgently needed than in agricultural trade policy.
Of all trade areas, agricultural trade has the most far-reaching
impacts in terms of habitat destruction worldwide, due to the
widespread changes in land use that it provokes. Yet, agricultural
trade negotiations are taking place in the absence of any consideration
of environmental sustainability.
1.3 One consequence of increased liberalisation
that needs special highlighting is the increase of transport emissions
and the ensuing acceleration of climate change. This presents
us with the dilemma of trying to protect the climate on the one
hand whilst on the other, encouraging increased movement of goods
around the globe, which will be negative for the climate. This
is particularly true for agriculture, where the situation is made
more complex by the fact that agricultural trade is perceived
to be the way to lift millions out of poverty.
1.4 The decisions made at the WTO affect
our lives, the societies we live in and the health of our environment.
The goal of the rules-based trade system should be sustainable
development and, as such, the impacts of trade rules on people
and the environment, and on social and environmental policy-making
must be recognised and addressed. This requires developing an
understanding of these impacts and, where necessary, changing
the rules to deal with them, placing a burden of action on WTO
members, but also on the WTO itself.
1.5 One condition for an international trade
system which aims at sustainable development is coherence of policy
between the WTO and the other international mechanisms—such
as the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Framework Convention
on Climate Change—to which most WTO members are also signatories.
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) should have a right
to use trade restricting measures where they are deemed necessary
by signatory governments in the interests of achieving the objectives
of the MEA. Equally, trade rules and trade concerns must not be
used by governments to have a "chilling effect" on the
interpretation and implementation of existing MEAs and on the
development of new MEAs.
2. INTRODUCTION
2.1 The greatest threat to birds—and
biodiversity more widely—is habitat loss. The loss of habitats
all over the world is being driven by a wide range of factors,
many of which are inextricably linked with national and international
economic policies. International trade and the rules that govern
it thus have a direct and important bearing on the RSPB's core
concerns. Trade in agricultural products is of most concern.
2.2 The RSPB is well qualified to provide
evidence on this issue and has a track record in making the links
between trade and sustainable development issues. For example,
the RSPB submitted evidence to the Environmental Audit Committee
inquiry into "A Sustainable Millennium Round" in November
1999 and has attended several WTO Ministerial Conferences, including
the latest in Hong Kong.
QUESTIONS POSED
BY THE
COMMITTEE
3. THE IMPACT
OF INCREASED
TRADE LIBERALISATION,
AND THE
DOHA ROUND,
ON THE
ENVIRONMENT
3.1 The potential impact on the environment
of further trade liberalisation, be it in the framework of the
Doha Round, through regional trade agreements or at a sector-specific
level, has been the subject of numerous studies. Despite differences
in the methodology used, they coincide in highlighting negative
effects, unless a strong regulatory structure is in place in the
countries concerned or flanking policies are implemented in parallel
to liberalisation measures. What is more, both the modelling as
well as the empirical cases on which these studies are based tend
to coincide in showing up a negative assessment.
3.2 For example, the Sustainability Impact
Assessment Study (SIAs) of the Doha Round, commissioned by the
Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission, concludes
that "global environmental impacts are expected to be negative
as the volume of international trade increases. The impacts on
climate change and global biodiversity are adverse overall, arising
primarily through increased transport and pressures for increased
agricultural production in biologically sensitive areas. Local
effects occur for water, air and soil quality, water quantity,
soil erosion and biodiversity, and are particularly significant
in areas of high existing stress. These adverse environmental
effects can in principle be countered by technology or regulatory
measures. However, in many developing countries, environmental
regulation tends to be insufficiently strong to counter adverse
effects."
3.3 Likewise, the integrated assessment
of trade liberalisation in the rice sector, carried out by the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), revealed harmful
impacts on the environment and observed, on the decision about
the acceptability of associated risks for human health and biodiversity
that "this highlights the need to establish country-specific
environmental objectives or standards for acceptable environmental
change, which unfortunately do not exist yet in most countries."
3.4 Despite this growing body of evidence,
including the EU's own evidence, there is no sign that EU WTO
negotiators are integrating these findings into their negotiating
positions, or indeed, that they are preparing environmental flanking
measures for the event of a successful Doha Round or the completion
of other trade agreements that are being negotiated. That the
EU should be undertaking important and revealing assessments that
are subsequently ignored is extraordinary and regrettable. As
well as wasting time and resources it risks perpetuating and exacerbating
trade-related environmental impacts. The RSPB is, thus, deeply
concerned about the impact that trade liberalisation resulting
from the WTO or regional trade agreements will continue to have
on the environment.
3.5 In no specific sector is a change of
approach more urgently needed than in agricultural trade policy.
Of all trade areas, agricultural trade has the most far—reaching
impacts in terms of habitat destruction worldwide, due to the
widespread changes in land use that it provokes. Few of us would
get the agricultural products we need—the food, textiles,
industrial products—without trade. Only 10% of agricultural
trade is international, but international trade rules exert a
disproportionately large influence because they set the framework
within which agriculture operates. Yet, agricultural trade negotiations
are taking place in the absence of any consideration of sustainability.
For example, no holistic assessment has been made by negotiators
of the likely impact of changes on the global environment, even
though they will be significant. Trade rules should be designed
to regulate this system to promote the best outcomes for people,
society and the environment.
3.6 Externalities
Market-led policies consistently fail to
appreciate the value of the environment. International trade imposes
huge external costs on the environment that are rarely taken into
account by the market. These include the contamination of drinking
water, loss of biodiversity, the destruction of natural habitats,
soil erosion, water supply depletion, the displacement of communities,
and emissions of greenhouse gases. These costs affect standards
of living, even in countries where financial wealth is increasing,
and reduce long-term human welfare and prosperity. The greatest
losers are often the poorest countries and the poorest people.
3.7 Climate change
One consequence of increased liberalisation
that needs special highlighting is the increase of transport emissions
and the ensuing acceleration of climate change. This presents
us with the dilemma of trying to protect the climate on the one
hand whilst on the other, encouraging increased movement of goods
around the globe, which will be negative for the climate. This
is particularly true for agriculture, where the situation is made
more complex by the fact that agricultural trade is perceived
to be the way to lift millions out of poverty. Rather than seeking
magic formulae or ideologically-based solutions, we should see
these complex factors as an area requiring urgent action as an
integral part of the trade equation—something on which trade
negotiators cannot turn their backs.
3.8 Role of the EU
It is important that the EU, which since 1999
has been commissioning the production of SIAs, is seen to be taking
the results of its own assessment seriously and incorporating
them into their negotiating positions in an open and transparent
manner. Otherwise, we risk not only irreversibly harming the environment,
but also losing the credibility of those governments which need
to adopt flanking measures to strengthen the protection of the
environment in their countries.
3.9 In particular, there are several actions
with which the EU can contribute to a sustainable outcome of its
trade negotiations:
(a) If the sustainability impact assessments
indicate that liberalisation measures would have an irreversible
negative impact, then the EU should stop pushing for them and
desist or substantially modify those measures. For instance, the
SIA of agricultural trade liberalisation through the Doha Round
throws up important questions about the impacts that this will
have on the environment, including on deforestation, soil degradation
and emissions from transport. This calls for a review of the current
approach to agricultural trade policy. After all, trade liberalisation
is not an end in itself.
(b) If sustainability impact assessments
indicate that flanking measures need to be adopted to counter
trade liberalisation, then working towards their adoption within
the EU and outside its borders should become an aim of EU trade
policy. For instance, where SIAs recommend strengthening other
countries' capacity in environmental and economic regulation,
the EU could offer support to governments through capacity building,
direct financial aid or joint trade and environment projects.
(c) As an integral part of trade sustainability
impact assessments, the EU should carry out an ex post evaluation
of those same measures after they have been approved and implemented.
This is recommended in the Sustainability Impact Assessment Study
of the Doha Round commissioned by the EU and the Hong Kong Ministerial
Declaration lends further support to this view.
3.10 It is equally important that the EU
puts its own house in order, dismantling perverse subsidies and
reforming agricultural support systems to deliver public benefits.
Again, this is as much a necessity to achieve sustainable development
as an argument of credibility with our trading partners. How could
we expect other governments to take our environmental demands
seriously, when we ourselves uphold one of the most environmentally
and socially destructive incentive schemes for farming? All public
payments to agriculture should be transparently targeted at correcting
market failures and delivering public benefits, such as biodiversity
conservation, clean water and a healthy environment. These payments
should be designed to avoid negative impacts on developing countries.
4. ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSIDERATIONS IN
THE WTO PROCESS
4.1 The decisions made at the WTO affect
our lives, the societies we live in and the health of our environment.
The goal of the rules-based trade system should be sustainable
development and, as such, the impacts of trade rules on people
and the environment, and on social and environmental policy-making
must be recognised and addressed. This requires developing an
understanding of these impacts and, where necessary, changing
the rules to deal with them. This places a burden of action on
WTO members, but also on the international organisation of the
WTO itself.
4.2 On the one had, WTO members must put
in place strong environmental policies in their countries to avoid
harmful effects of trade liberalisation—and developed countries
should offer support to developing countries to do this. Trade
rules must not prohibit or limit legitimate measures taken by
governments to correct market failures or meet their environmental
commitments set through national policies and Multilateral Environmental
Agreements.
4.3 On the other hand, the WTO itself must
do more to dismantle illegitimate protectionist measures and to
promote environmental protection. Little has been done toward
removing trade barriers that are detrimental to the environment,
such as fishery, agricultural, coal and road transport subsidies.
In addition, the WTO's treatment of scientific uncertainty is
highly ambiguous and in urgent need of resolution. The incorporation
of the precautionary principle within WTO rules is fundamentally
unsatisfactory, being severely restricted in its scope and applicability.
4.4 All of the above does not, of course,
mean that the WTO should become some kind of environmental policy
making body. The WTO does not have the expertise or the legitimacy
to negotiate environmental specificities or to deal with complex
environmental issues. So, when conflicts between trade and environmental
issues arise, they should be passed on to international organisations
that do have the relevant expertise, such as Multilateral Environmental
Agreements (MEAs) or the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP). Even if WTO dispute panels seek the advice of outside
experts, they do not see it as their duty to deliver sustainability,
as it might be with an organisation with a wider remit.
5. COORDINATION
BETWEEN THE
WTO PROCESS AND
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS PROCESSES
5.1 One condition for an international trade
system which aims at sustainable development is coherence of policy
between the WTO and the other international mechanisms—such
as the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Framework Convention
on Climate Change—to which most WTO members are also signatories.
In a recent speech to the Commission on Sustainable Development,
the Secretary-General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, stated that "greater
coherence between different bodies of international law, and in
particular between the trade and environmental regimes, could
lead to improved global governance." However, coherence between
those two bodies of law does not exist currently, and there is
even a perception that Multilateral Environmental Agreement (MEAs)
are subordinated to the WTO.
5.2 MEAs should have a right to use trade
restricting measures where they are deemed necessary by signatory
governments in the interests of achieving the objectives of the
MEA. Equally, trade rules and trade concerns must not be used
by governments to have a "chilling effect" on the interpretation
and implementation of existing MEAs and on the development of
new MEAs. Conflicts should be resolved not through the WTO—as
this is not neutral territory and does not house the necessary
expertise—but through the corresponding MEA or an independent
international body, such as UNEP or an environmental chamber in
the International Court of Justice.
6. PROTECTING
NATURAL RESOURCES
AS A
RESOURCE FOR
THE VERY
POOR
6.1 The poor depend the most on a healthy
environment, fertile soils, clean water and healthy ecosystems,
for their survival. A recent comprehensive study estimated that
forests alone contribute over a fifth of household income in developing
countries. The World Bank estimates that the liquidation of environmental
assets costs developing countries 4-8% of Gross Domestic Product.
6.2 Several things can be done to reverse
or stop these developments. Firstly, we must support the protection
of important ecosystems that will be at risk from trade liberalisation.
Where the risk is considered too great liberalisation should not
be pursued, at least until this risk is managed, and alternative
development pathways should be explored. For instance, in the
cases of Indonesia and Malaysia the rate of rainforest clearance
has increased by over 50% a year in the last decade and approximately
29,000,000ha have been lost since 1990. Clearly, for the moment
at least, there is not an adequate system for protecting these
globally important forests. Agricultural trade liberalisation
will increase the rate of loss unacceptably and the WTO should
therefore, not facilitate the trade in the key commodities that
are fuelling this environmental disaster through further liberalisation.
6.3 Secondly, flanking measures, such as
the strengthening of domestic capacity in environmental and economic
regulation must be adopted and supported by developed countries.
Thirdly, developing countries must be assisted in the achievement
of international environmental and biodiversity protection target.
6.4 Obviously, trade policies alone will
not solve the problems that the environment and the poor face.
Feeding the hungry, conserving our environment and eradicating
poverty require integrated policies in all countries, across the
whole of government, including policies that address unsustainable
consumption.
7. COORDINATION
BETWEEN DTI, DFID AND
DEFRA
7.1 It appears that, on trade issues, DEFRA
is subsidiary to DTI and DFID, as their concerns are not seen
as important. DEFRA's Trade and Environment Team appeared to be
on the margins of decision making on trade issues and, at the
WTO ministerial meeting in Hong Kong, did not have an evident
grip on the environmental outcomes of the negotiations and on
how they should be fed into the Government's approach.
7.2 There does not appear to be clear government
coherence on trade issues. Sustainable development should be the
principle around which the UK Government structures its participation
in international events, leading its policy development and delivery.
This means that equal weight should be assigned to the delivery
of economic, social and environmental outcomes, and that where
unacceptable damage to one of these pillars may occur, this concern
should override the others.
7.3 Representation of environmental interests
in the trade debate
The interests of wildlife and environment organisations
tend to be ignored or marginalised from the trade agenda. Wildlife
and environmental organisations are considered to be indirect
stakeholders and are therefore not treated equally to business
stakeholders by trade officials. The perception is still that
trade policy operates in a kind of "vacuum", where other
interests are, at best, secondary or completely irrelevant. This
makes it extremely hard for those trying to influence it to maximise
its environmental and social benefits and to avoid unnecessary
harm. For instance, despite its enormous significance and the
fact of having been raised by various stakeholders, the impact
of increased international transport on greenhouse gas emissions
has yet to be picked up and dealt with by our trade negotiators.
June 2006
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