Select Committee on Environmental Audit Written Evidence


Memorandum submitted by the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds

INTRODUCTION

  1.  The RSPB is Europe's largest wildlife charity with over one million members. We manage one of the largest conservation estates in the UK with 196 nature reserves, covering more than 131,000 hectares. The RSPB is part of the BirdLife International partnership, a global alliance of independent national conservation organisations working in more than 100 countries worldwide.

  2.  We consider that human-induced climate change poses the biggest long-term threat to global biodiversity. A paper in Nature (Extinction risk from climate change, 8 January 2004) by a large group of scientists (including one from the RSPB) indicates that in sample regions covering about 20% of the Earth's land surface "15 to 37% of species in our sample of regions and taxa will be `committed to extinction' as a result of mid-range climate warming scenarios for 2050."

  3.  To avoid such a catastrophe, the anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions that cause climate change need to be cut hard and rapidly, with global emissions peaking within the next 10 years and then declining steeply. We therefore actively support the Climate Change Convention and Kyoto Protocol processes that provide the global framework for greenhouse gas emission reduction.

THE LIKELY OUTCOME FROM THE MEETINGS IN NAIROBI

  4.  In Nairobi, there will be four main strands concerning a post-2012 regime and we first discuss them separately here, before attempting to guess the likely outcome of the meeting as a whole. Any final post-2012 agreement will need to bring together all four strands but, for a variety of reasons, they are currently being pursued separately.

Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG 2)

  5.  This group is tasked with negotiating emission reduction commitments for developing countries after Kyoto's first commitment period ends in 2012. The group was established in Montreal in line with article 3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol which says that "consideration of such commitments [shall be initiated] at least seven years before the end of the first commitment period" (ie start in 2005).

  6.  Although the AWG was formally established in Montreal it will, in fact, only begin its real work in Nairobi. In took some time to set it up, and especially to elect a Chair, in Bonn in May, and its overall approach to how it pursues its work is not yet decided, although the Chair has issued a short paper on the subject.

  7.  On the positive side, the new Chair of the Group is very experienced, well known and highly respected by most negotiators; he is Michael Zammit Cutajar of Malta, for many years the Executive Secretary of the Climate Change Convention. It is clear that Mr Cutajar wants the group to proceed on a logical fashion, first analysing the science to determine the overall level of the targets required and them proceeding to negotiate appropriate national targets.

  8.  It is questionable, however, whether the Group will be able to make much progress on such a complex topic within the limited timetable it has set for itself so far, with only two meetings scheduled for 2007. A number of countries will, as they always do, try to slow the process down, notably some of the OPEC countries. Also, this is a group under the Kyoto Protocol and so non-members of the Protocol have little or no say in its conclusions. The United States can attend meetings and speak at them, but as an observer not an active participant. Whilst this is both inevitable and desirable, given the stance of the Bush Administration on Kyoto, it does raise potential concerns about future US participation in any agreement negotiated without its input.

Dialogue on long-term co-operative action

  9.  In parallel with the formal AWG negotiation process for developed countries under the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal also initiated an informal process under the Climate Change Convention to discuss "long-term co-operative action on climate change (without prejudice to any future negotiations)".

  10.  This is potentially a very useful process because it includes all nations and can, in theory, discuss issues such as the types on commitment that large developing countries might take on. So far, it has not lived up to expectations. Its first meeting in Bonn in May was uninspiring and does not give hope for much progress in the immediate future.

Group on reduced (avoided) tropical deforestation

  11.  In Montreal, Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, backed by a group of other, often very poor, developing countries, put forward a proposal under which countries might take on a commitment to limit their rates of deforestation and claim credit for the emissions thus avoided.

  12.  This is a very important proposal for any post-2012 regime because tropical deforestation accounts for between 20 and 25% of all human-induced greenhouse gas emissions and so anything that can be done to halt, or at least slow down, the process has important implications for climate change, quite apart from biodiversity and other co-benefits. (Note that the proposal does not concern crediting sequestration of carbon in forests but avoiding the emissions from cutting them down, in the same way that energy efficiency or renewables avoid emissions.)

  13.  The Papua New Guinea proposal is also important because it is for a so-called "sectoral commitment" for developing countries, which are not being formally debated elsewhere, although there is much informal discussion. Such a commitment would take the form of a developing country voluntarily taking on a commitment to limit emissions from a particular economic sector to a lower level than would otherwise occur. (Once made, a commitment would be binding for a particular period.) For example, China might take on a commitment to limit emissions from its electricity generation sector. If it emitted less than its commitment, it might then trade its surplus emissions in a continuation of the Kyoto emissions trading scheme, potentially unleashing considerable sums of money for investment in green energy.

  14.  In Montreal, a group was established under the Convention to examine the Papua New Guinea proposal in greater detail and report back to the Conference of Parties at the end of 2007. Discussions began in May, in Bonn, and most countries (including the EU and USA) welcomed the proposal, although it was widely agreed that it needed a lot more work to make it operational. The only major country to oppose the proposal was Brazil, for a number of reasons decided upon at a very high political level.

  15.  It is currently hard to tell how far the talks on avoided deforestation will get in Nairobi. It has too much goodwill from both powerful Northern blocs and some of the poorest developing countries to stop it. However, to be effective in terms of releasing substantial funding, the proposal probably needs to be included in the Kyoto Protocol, yet Brazil opposes this and it is hard for the USA to actively promote the inclusion of something it wants to work in an agreement to which it does not subscribe.

Review of the Kyoto Protocol (Article 9)

  16.  This process should begin in Nairobi. The Protocol (in its article 9) unambiguously states that the first such review should take place at the second meeting of the parties to the Protocol, which is the Nairobi meeting. The Protocol also says that the review should be coordinated with the reviews of both implementation and the adequacy of commitments in the Climate Change Convention.

  17.  The review should include everything, from the science to the level of emissions reduction commitments and should thus be the first step in considering what a whole post-2012 regime should look like. However, there is much that is contentious in a review. For example, the list of "developed countries" included in both the Convention and the Protocol is now out of dates, essentially comprising OECD members in 1992. There are not only a number of new OECD members (usually the definition of being "developed") but some prosperous countries that should, in fairness, be classified as developed, such as Singapore.

  18.  More importantly, it is increasingly clear that some of the large, rapidly industrialising countries will need to limit their emissions it substantial climate change is to be avoided. Whilst the developed countries should take the lead in cutting emissions, these cuts will be insufficient if not accompanied by some emission limitation effort by countries such as India, China, Brazil and South Africa. Even if the USA, the largest emitter, were to reduce its emissions to zero by 2025 and the other developed countries by 2020, if developing country emissions continued to rise then a 400ppm atmospheric concentration stabilisation goal would be missed shortly after 2025 and a 450ppm goal by about 2035. (To achieve the EU target of staying below a temperature rise of two degree Celsius atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases need to stay below 450ppm.)

  19.  However, the major developing countries have excellent negotiators and they are unlikely to wish to rush into talks that will result in their having to limit their emissions.

The whole Nairobi process

  20.  The RSPB is hopeful that the article 9 review will be started in Nairobi, which would constitute significant progress in itself. We do not anticipate breakthoughs in either the AWG 2 process or the avoided deforestation talks but this would not necessarily be disappointing. At this stage, there is still much groundwork to be done in terms of analysis which could also feed into the Article 9 review. If the review goes ahead, we anticipate that the steam there is will go out of the Dialogue because it will be largely replaced by the review, although it would be a pity if it did because the Dialogue has a potentially valuable role to play in doing both background and additional work to the other three processes.

  21.  A significant practical difficulty in Nairobi is likely to be that meetings will be held in the UN compound some distance from the centre of the city where most delegates will stay. It appears that conference sessions will consequently be restricted to the "normal" UN day of 10 am until 6 pm on weekdays, as opposed to working until at least 9 pm and over weekends as in the norm in the international climate process.

THE LIKELY SHAPE OF AN AGREEMENT POST 2012

  22.  Most countries, certainly most of those that are parties to the Kyoto Protocol, strongly advocate the continuance of a similar regime. In particular, they envisage continuing but more stringent developed country emission reduction commitments together with the Protocol's so-called flexibility instruments: the emissions trading mechanism, the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation. This is therefore what is likely to emerge.

  23.  However, beneath this headline position is host of other, more detailed positions which differ considerably. Whilst the science clearly indicates that the large, rapidly industrialising countries need to take on some sort of emission limitation commitment, there is no general agreement on this; indeed, there has been little or no formal discussion of it. Whilst there is considerable support for the Papua New Guinea avoided deforestation proposal, it is a moot point as to whether it should be included within the Kyoto Protocol or the broader Convention, and there are good arguments either way although, on balance, the RSPB considers that the Kyoto-based approach would work best. The precise shape of any agreement post-2012 is thus far from clear.

  24.  As the largest emitter in the world, the current stance of the USA on the Kyoto Protocol, and climate change more generally, is clearly very important and of concern to the nations remaining in the Protocol (ie currently the rest of the world with the minor exception of Australia). The Bush Administration's formal position in the international climate process has been detached, in that they have said that they will only concern themselves with Convention matters and not interfere in those concerning the Protocol. However, although nominally the same, this position has recently slipped considerably and the US is more actively trying to influence the post-2012 negotiations although, as mentioned earlier, the USA has no formal say in Kyoto-related decisions.

  25.  There is a widespread view that engaging with the Bush Administration on climate change is probably a waste of time and also counterproductive, in that they would probably try to wreck any constructive negotiations. However, it is obviously of concern that a treaty could be negotiated with no US input and which, for that reason alone, might be hard for any future administration to sign up to.

  26.  Fortunately, the situation in the USA is not a bad as it at first appears. There is considerable interest at US state level in cap and trade schemes, and the two biggest initiatives are led by states with Republican Governors: Governor Pataki in New York who led on the establishment of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the North Eastern states and Governor Schwarzenegger in California. Perhaps more importantly have been initiatives in the Senate, such as the McCain/Lieberman Climate Stewardship Bill for a US cap and trade scheme covering 85% of US emissions which narrowly failed by a vote of 43 to 55 in October 2003, and which may well be introduced. (John McCain is the Republican senior Senator for Arizona and Joe Lieberman is the Democrat a Senator for Connecticut.)

  27.  More recently, the "Sense of the Senate" in June 2005 was that "Congress should enact a comprehensive and effective national program of mandatory, market-based limits and incentives on emissions of greenhouse gases that slow, stop, and reverse the growth of such emissions...", adding a rider that this should not significantly harm the US economy, and in a way that will encourage comparable action by other nations, meaning the rapidly industrialising nations in particular. In May 2006, the House of Representatives adopted similar "sense of the Congress" language.

  28.  There are thus significant US initiatives on climate change outside of the White House. Indeed, it is possible that domestic legislation will be enacted to combat climate change before President Bush's term of office comes to an end. It seems likely that any future President would find it hard to ignore climate change and the international process as the current Administration has done, especially if Federal legislation is passed.

THE POSITION OF THE UK GOVERNMENT AND OF THE EU IN THE DISCUSSIONS

  29.  It is vital that the EU continues to take a lead in the climate negotiations, and that the UK with our major allies on climate change (primarily Germany and France) should continue to lead the EU. Whilst we have had some reservations about UK and EU leadership in the past, there are simply no other countries or blocs with either the inclination, ability or economic clout to lead, other than the EU. The developing countries have their own leaders, notably South Africa which is currently chair of the G77, but both developed and developing country leads are essential.

  30.  In the past, EU and UK leadership has sometimes been less competent than might have been hoped but it has, at least, been consistent. The Prime Minister's parallel international initiatives in the G8 and other fora have been generally helpful, although the environmental groups have disagreed about the detail.

  31.  The UK's rising carbon dioxide emissions have tended to undermine its leadership position in recent years, in spite of government protestations that they plan to rectify this deficiency. We are, however, likely to meet our Kyoto target. The fact that the EU countries have over-allocated allowances to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme has also damaged the EU's leadership credibility. However, it is a sad fact that most other countries are having even less success in curtailing emissions than we are, and so the UK and EU are still in a relative lead, but an unambiguous lead would clearly be better.

September 2006





 
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