Examination of Witnesses (Questions 366-379)
MR RICHARD
MAYSON AND
MR ADRIAN
BULL
9 NOVEMBER 2005
Chairman: Good afternoon. Thank you for
coming and for your memorandum.
Q366 Colin Challen: Your memorandum discusses
the security aspects and emphasises the physical robustness of
reactors. It is the case, is it not, that in any new design security
in itself would not necessarily be the prime consideration in
terms of a new threat that we have been hearing about?
Mr Mayson: I think the first thing
to say is that, as you point out, security is a key consideration.
There is a wide range of potential threats as a result of the
terrorist problems that we face. Those do not just affect nuclear
but affect a wide range of facilities, as the Chairman pointed
out earlier. I take the view that because nuclear structures are
very robust structures, they are in a very good place when it
comes to security because they are built with several feet thickness
of reinforced concrete and the sites have ongoing and continuously
reviewed security arrangements.
Q367 Colin Challen: Has any testing been
done of the existing arrangements? I understand that the Finns,
for example, in the design of their new reactors have actually
tested concrete structures against potentially commercial airliners
crashing into them. Have you done anything like that?
Mr Mayson: There have been various
tests done looking at that. For example, in America they did a
test where they flew a Phantom jet at full speed into a simulated
containment building. The containment survived and the Phantom
jet disappeared. These sorts of tests have been done.
Q368 Colin Challen: A Phantom jet is
rather a small object compared to a modern commercial airline.
Mr Mayson: Carrying fuel and going
at considerable velocity, it has a fair impact. The other thing
to say of course is that the Office for Civil Nuclear Security
as the security regulator did, in the summer of this year, affirm
its confidence in the security provisions within the nuclear industry.
Q369 Colin Challen: On the information
available, you seem very relaxed about the security aspects and
that these facilities will withstand practically any kind of terrorist
attack. On the limited information available, how can the public
be so sure about that?
Mr Mayson: I think it is important
that we are as open as possible, bearing in mind that some of
the security arrangements themselves have to be reasonably secure
in relation to advising terrorists of such potential threats.
I think we should do as much reassurance as we can on these issues.
Particularly if we look forward to some of the newer technologies,
there is substantial evidence of even better protection than with
some of the older technologies.
Q370 Colin Challen: You clearly have
a vested interest in trying to sell new technology abroad. China
has been mentioned as perhaps a great growth market, but there
are other countries too, as we know, which are very interested
in civil nuclear power. Do you have any fears about proliferation
of civil nuclear power and the possible security implications
of that?
Mr Mayson: I take almost the opposite
view to the previous speakers. I think that the International
Atomic Agency's safeguard arrangements are thorough and extensive
and have been applied very successfully over the last few decades.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which pretty much every country
around the world with one or two very notable exceptions have
signed and support, has been a very powerful vehicle for delivering
protection against weapons proliferation. For me the comfort comes
from the fact that when a nation does look as though it is stepping
out of line, it is all over the front of the papers and the international
community is putting huge pressure on that nation to comply.
Q371 Colin Challen: We are increasingly
stepping out of line. We are already concerned about Iran. I notice
that Venezuela now has raised the hackles of George Bush in terms
of its nuclear ambitions. There have been other problems. In Pakistan
we have seen the leaking of information, which clearly is very
critical. Do you not share those concerns?
Mr Mayson: I obviously share the
concerns. I would point out that the international pressure is
on these countries to comply. I think the proof of the pudding
will be in the eating in relation to when they do comply. Both
those are signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty[58]
Q372 Colin Challen: If we are looking
at tackling climate change and the kinds of technologies that
we need to sell hopefully on other methods to transfer to developing
countries, would you see a future there for nuclear power? Would
that not greatly increase the dangers of proliferation and a growing
security threat?
Mr Mayson: This is where I do
take the view that you can in many ways separate the civil use
of nuclear from the military use of nuclear. The Non-Proliferation
Treaty is there specifically to avoid people taking it beyond
the civil use of nuclear. Civil nuclear does make a huge contribution
to avoiding global warming. It already avoids more carbon dioxide
in OECD nations than will be saved under the Kyoto Protocol, over
1000 million tonnes of carbon dioxide a year. That makes a huge
contribution to avoiding global warning. That is a very big issue
for the planet.
Q373 Colin Challen: Do you have a list
of countries that you would not sell the AP1000 to?
Mr Mayson: We do not have a list
of countries in that category.
Q374 Colin Challen: So you would sell
it to any country if they had the money?
Mr Mayson: I would have thought
that any country that has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty
and that is in compliance with that treaty would be considered
for commercial application.
Q375 Chairman: Would you sell them to
India?
Mr Mayson: They have not signed
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, so the answer would be no.
Q376 Dr Turner: The AP1000, in addition
to other Generation III and Generation IV reactors, either uses
MOX or for future reactors plutonium. Is this necessary? Are you
simply designing reactors to run on plutonium because we have
a large stock of plutonium?
Mr Mayson: It is not necessary.
If the committee would bear with me, I would like to explain the
generations of reactors from my perspective. This might help in
responding to the question. Generation III reactors are those
reactors that are really available for deployment today and, I
would argue, for about the next ten years. Within that category
you are talking about the European pressurised water reactor,
the AP1000 and some of the advanced CANDU designs that the Canadians
have developed, for example. If we look beyond that in timescales,
then you come into the serious application of the pebble bed modular
reactor that I would call a Generation III Plus reactor because
it has not been deployed commercially; it will be deployed commercially
but it will not be available for commercial deployment until about
the middle of the next decade. In that context, I do not like
betting on jam tomorrow, so I would say that that is not a technology
that one should bank on for the future. Beyond that, Generation
IV is a worthy venture that involves 11 nations doing long-term
research, looking 30 years out at some technologies that would,
around 2030, deliver improvements in relation to nuclear fission
technology. Again, it is one of these issues where, until that
technology is proven, which will be a long way out, at least two
decade out, then one should not bank on that being available when
it comes to looking at the nation's energy supply. Going back
to your question about MOX and the use of uranium, the reactors
are primarily designed just to burn standard uranium dioxide fuel.
Some of them also have the opportunity to burn mixed oxide fuel,
if that is appropriate. Clearly, the base case for any programme
going forward would be the use of uranium dioxide fuel.
Q377 Dr Turner: That is, rather than
MOX?
Mr Mayson: MOX is an option that
whoever builds the stations would have the opportunity to consider.
At the end of the day, it will be about fuel price and a whole
range of other considerations.
Q378 Dr Turner: If you are part of a
consortium pushing a new fleet of AP1000, for instance, in the
UK, are you telling us that they will operate on uranium fuel
rather than MOX?
Mr Mayson: I am saying there is
the opportunity to do either. I am sure that decision would not
just be down to BNFL or any consortium that might be set up.
Q379 Dr Turner: You will have a view.
You heard the concerns from our previous witnesses, the Oxford
Research Group, about the proliferation implications of the use
of either MOX or plutonium. It is all very well if the country
has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but if the plutonium
or the MOX falls into the wrong hands, it does not take much to
be a very real threat.
Mr Mayson: I have mentioned my
views on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I do not see that the use
of MOX fuel significantly alters those considerations.
58 Footnote inserted by witness 21.11.05: For clarification
"both" here refers to Iran and Venezuela, both of which
have indeed signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Pakistan has
not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Back
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