Memorandum submitted by the Green Party
of England and Wales
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps a better title for this Inquiry might
have been "Learning to turn the lights off when they're not
needed". This may seen trivial, but behind the comment lays
the serious point that a major culture change is needed, that
continuing wasteful energy use is unsustainable, and that energy
reduction and efficiencies have a vitally important part to play
in reducing carbon emissions and combating global warming.
This memorandum is in three parts. Part One
is a general overview with key material considerations for the
committee's consideration. Part Two directs itself toward the
Inquiry issues, whilst Part Three contains reports, public-domain
source material and notes.
This submission argues that now is the time
to recognise both the challenges of global warming and the dangers
inherent in the UK's continuing reliance on oil, the supply of
which is vulnerable in political and military terms. Now is the
time for an environmental leadership that sees these circumstances
as an opportunity for a sea change to sustainable, local and renewable
low carbon energy systems that do not leave a hazardous nuclear
legacy for future generations.
Fossil fuels are not the only thing in finite
supply. So is cash. The astronomical costs of a new nuclear power
programme would divert money away from creating a low-carbon economy,
the real solution to global warming.
PART ONE—OVERVIEW
Economic concerns
1.1 Nuclear power is expensive in comparison
to other forms of generation, once the state subsidies have been
removed.
1.2 The construction, reprocessing and decommissioning
costs of nuclear power stations are enormous. The same resources
invested in renewable energy generation will generate equivalent
power without creating nuclear waste that no one knows how to
dispose of.
1.3 The AP1000 reactor has never been built;
no first-hand operating experience exists. This would inevitably
lead to unforeseen and unquantified "learning-costs".
1.4 There are historic construction cost
overruns in previous nuclear power station projects.
1.5 The extended design and build phase
means that new power stations would not be operational for 10-15
years from commissioning.
1.6 The high risk of nuclear power generation
is evidenced by no commercial insurer being able to provide affordable
cover, leading to government needing to underwrite power stations.
1.7 The government subsidises nuclear power
creating a false competitive advantage at the expense of alternative
methods of generation.
Power demand and handling
1.8 Greater emphasis needs to be placed
on reducing demand for power. Projected energy growth assumptions
of 3% per annum would mean a doubling of production and consumption
every 25 years. This is not sustainable, either in terms of resource
use or climate change.
1.9 In considering new reactors serious
note should be taken of the power losses during transmission.
Far better to have smaller generating sources serving local communities.
Regeneration opportunities offered by renewable
energy over nuclear
1.10 By focusing resources on a small number
of new power stations there is a lost opportunity to invest and
invigorate the renewable energy sector. Proactive government measures
could attract investment and create employment in product development/manufacture/installation.
Both social and employment regeneration as well as export market
potential exists in UK.
1.11 Government should use taxation and
a proactive regulatory framework to enable development and encourage
business to invest in renewable energy research, development and
production.
Environmental concerns
"At least three million children in Belarus,
Ukraine and the Russian Federation require physical treatment
[due to the Chernobyl accident]. Not until 2016 at the earliest
will we know the full number of those likely to develop serious
medical conditions." Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General, July
2004.
1.12 There is no agreed, proven or demonstrably
safe storage method for radioactive materials. Creation of nuclear
waste bequeaths an expensive and dangerous legacy that future
generations have to deal with.
1.13 Nuclear production carries with it
unacceptable accident risk. Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, Thorp
and Drigg have all been sites of accidents and/or leakage.
1.14 Many UK nuclear power stations are
sited in coastal areas, some in acknowledged high flood risk areas.
As global warming takes effect, coastal power stations become
more vulnerable.
1.15 Commissioning, operation and decommissioning
of nuclear power stations carries inherent long term environmental
risks and major expense. Set against renewable power generation
the nuclear option equals high capital costs and major long term
irreversible impacts, versus low impact sustainable regeneration,
the effects of which are reversible.
1.16 Identifying sites and securing planning
permission for new nuclear power stations will be politically
damaging and difficult.
1.17 There are finite reserves of uranium.
1.18 Electricity produced by nuclear power
is not carbon free.
1.19 In using renewables we're living off
income, not capital.
Health
1.20 Routine discharges from nuclear power stations
carry adverse health impacts, as well evidenced by cancer and
leukaemia clusters around reactors. (see note 1). Additionally
there are major health risks from accidents and spillage.
Security
1.21 Expansion of "breeder" technology
would create large amounts of plutonium that can be used in nuclear
weapons. With increased quantities of plutonium, there is an increased
risk of nuclear weapon proliferation.
1.22 Nuclear power stations, and the transit
and storage of nuclear materials are a target for terrorist attack.
1.23 In the medium term, the effects of
Peak Oil and Peak Gas will serve to increase energy prices. This
will increase the potential for political, commercial and possible
military conflicts over the control of those resources and means
of distribution. By remaining largely reliant on foreign fossil
fuels, over the supply of which we have no direct control, the
UK runs the risk of becoming a "hostage to fortune".
A prudent government would move to identify and develop local
energy supplies under UK ownership and control.
PART TWO—INQUIRY
ISSUES
A. THE EXTENT
OF THE
"GENERATION GAP"
2.1 (Inquiry question 1) What are the latest
estimates of the likely shortfall in electricity generating capacity
caused by the phase-out of existing nuclear power stations and
some older coal plant? How do these relate to electricity demand
forecasts and to the effectiveness of energy efficiency policies?
Electricity demand is increasing by 1% per annum
on average (700 MW per annum). When all 12 UK nuclear stations
close down, 12,000 MW of generation out of 74,000 MW will be lost.
In the next 10 years, 19,000 MW will have to be found at current
consumption projections, or 12,000 MW if electricity demand can
be kept flat.
However in fixing estimates of demand, insufficient
account is taken of the effect of rising fossil fuel costs, including
"Peak Oil/Gas" effects. Additionally as the resultant
electricity prices rise and with the increasing needs to reduce
carbon emissions, there will be added incentives for low carbon
energy generation. An important part of national strategy must
concentrate on demand management and reduction. The regulatory
framework should be employed to require and enable energy efficiency
measures, rather than for government to merely champion them.
The Performance & Innovation Unit (PIU)
(later renamed the Cabinet Office Strategy Unit) report for the
2001 energy review (see note 2) confirmed that energy efficiency
measures have either negative or low costs because of significant
resource savings.
B. FINANCIAL
COSTS AND
INVESTMENT CONSIDERATION
2.2 (Inquiry question 2) What are the main
investment options for electricity generating capacity? What would
be the likely costs and timescales of different generating technologies?
A construction programme of eight AP1000 stations
would be in the order of £8 billion, and each one would produce
1,100 MW. An additional £300 million per year is required
for fuel re-processing costs, and decommissioning could well top
£100 billion.
By comparison the latest solar thermal or micro
wind turbine installations cost in the region of £2,000 with
each one generating a (conservative) 1kW. To match the 8,000 MW
anticipated power output of eight AP1000 reactors, fitting either
of the two renewable options to 8.8m UK homes would cost £17.6
billion (if economies of scale are totally ignored).
That would be the same level of power generation
with no fuel re-processing required and no nuclear decommissioning
required.
It is as economically plausible to give away,
at the taxpayer's expense, a renewable energy installation to
half the homes in the country, and let them keep the free electricity,
as it is to build nuclear power stations to a new design that
has never been tested in production. It is probably more popular
as well.
The bottom line of all this is that even setting
aside its accident risks, proliferation dangers and waste problems,
nuclear power is just plain too expensive and in all likelihood
always will be.
"Because it's so expensive, investing in
nuclear power makes climate change worse, and because capital
is finite; sinking it into an expensive solution means it's not
available for cheaper ones. In the United States, each dollar
invested in electric efficiency displaces nearly seven times as
much carbon dioxide as a dollar invested in nuclear power—without
any nasty side effects".
(Source: Rocky Mountain Institute—see
note 3).
2.3 (Inquiry question 2—Bullet 1) What
are the likely construction and on-going operating costs of different
large-scale technologies (eg nuclear new build, CCGT, clean coal,
on-shore wind, off-shore wind, wave and tidal) in terms of the
total investment required and in terms of the likely costs of
generation (p/kWh)? Over what timescale could they become operational?
Construction and on-going operating costs of
different large-scale technologies should not be the only major
considerations. Regeneration, export and employment potentials
exist through developing and operating renewable energy systems.
On the negative side the long lasting risk and expense of nuclear
waste storage together with the risk of terrorism, weapons proliferation
or accident are difficult to quantify in purely economic terms.
Comparative costs and timescales
| Construction £/kW
| Estimated p/kWh | Timescale
|
| Nuclear new build | 500-3,000 PSIRU
| 3.4-8.3 NEF | 10-15 years |
| CCGT | 280 | 2.3 PSIRU
| 1-2 years |
| On shore wind | 650-850 BWEA
| 1.5-2.5 NEF | 6-12 months |
| Off shore wind | 1,000-1,200 BWEA
| 3-4 NEF | 6-12 months |
PSIRU—Public Services International Research Unit
BWEA—British Wind Energy Association
NEF—New Economics Foundation
The conclusion that may be drawn from looking at these comparative
costs is that wind turbines, both on and off shore offer economic
savings within a short timescale. CCGT produces an economically
viable supply, and can be regarded as a lower carbon emitter but
still depends on finite resource raw materials, and therefore
subject to supply and price uncertainties. CCGT would be an acceptable
short-term measure, certainly in comparison to new nuclear generation.
An additional attraction of developing wind turbine generation
is UK experience in offshore engineering. Added to new employment
and social regeneration an expansion of this sector would bring,
there is a thriving potential to export technology and expertise.
2.4 (Inquiry question 2—Bullet 2) With regard to
nuclear new build, how realistic and robust are cost estimates
in the light of past experience? What are the hidden costs (eg
waste, insurance, security) associated with nuclear? How do the
waste and decommissioning costs of nuclear new build relate to
the costs of dealing with the current nuclear waste legacy, and
how confident can we be that the nuclear industry would invest
adequately in funds ring-fenced for future waste disposal?
According to the PIU report, (see note 2) the final cost
of Sizewell B power station was twice the original budget. Such
cost overruns are not unusual, as estimates for other projects
have proved to be notoriously inaccurate. Construction costs are
crucial in determining the final cost of generated power because
capital repayments have to be factored in as an operating expense.
An additional important factor to consider is that an AP1000
reactor has never been built, and the estimated construction and
operating costs are not robust, in the view of the Public Services
Institute Research Unit report. (See note 4)
Currently The Vienna Treaty 1963 (amended 1997) imposes a
limit on nuclear operators' liabilities and in the UK, the Energy
Act 1983 set a limit of liability for particular installations.
In 1994 this limit was increased to £140 million for each
major installation, so that the operator is liable for claims
up to this amount and must insure accordingly. UK government underwrites
risks in excess of £140 million.
Considering the Chernobyl disaster, where the costs may be
in the order of hundreds of £ billion, conventional cover
would probably not be available, and where it was offered may
not be credible as a major accident would bankrupt the insurance
companies.
There is much uncertainty about the true cost of decommissioning
and the treatment of waste. In fact, regarding the storage, handling
and disposal of waste the only apparent certainty is that there
is no agreement whatever on identifying safe solutions.
Another certainty is that it will ultimately be government
that has to step in to safeguard communities in the event of the
commercial failure or underprovision in funding for decommissioning
or waste handling. The question of waste and decommissioning funding
is too important to be left to the vagaries of politics and the
market. As an example the government subsidy 1990-96 described
by Michael Heseltine as "to decommission old, unsafe nuclear
plants" was in fact spent as cashflow by the company owning
the generating plant.
Considering the serious risks and uncertainties that surround
nuclear power, there is an overwhelming case against a new nuclear
programme.
2.5 (Inquiry question 2—Bullet 3) Is there the technical
and physical capacity for renewables to deliver the scale of generation
required? If there is the capacity, are any policy changes required
to enable it to do so?
At this time annual electricity generation from onshore wind
power is 1,100 MW, with 300 MW being added during the last year
under the current minimal government intervention programme. According
to the British Wind Energy Association, (See note 5) offshore
wind has huge generating capacity potential; they state that wind
power has the potential to generate 590,000 MW, or eight times
the UKs electricity needs.
Taken with the generative potential of micro-wind generation,
domestic solar heating, domestic PV electricity, low carbon local
CHP generators etc, there is no doubt that renewables can deliver
the scale of generation required.
Realising this renewable energy supply will require political
will and a supportive regulatory framework. Tax incentives can
be used to create and stimulate investment opportunities, which
will lead to increased employment. Embedding renewable energy
generation requirements in Planning Policy Guidelines and development
control protocols will help deliver the required "culture
change" in the business sector and at the public level.
2.6 (Inquiry question 2—Bullet 4) What are the relative
efficiencies of different generating technologies? In particular,
what contribution can micro-generation (micro-CHP, micro-wind,
PV) make, and how would it affect investment in large-scale generating
capacity?
A major relative efficiency of micro-generation over grid-supplied
power is a saving on distribution losses. Grid distribution loses
electricity as heat, noise, or as theft on distribution networks
as it is transported through the grid. In UK this accounts for
approximately 6.5% of electricity (valued at around £900
million). (see note 6)
Mention is made of the intermittent nature of some renewable
energy generators, and the PIU report (see note 2) considered
this. It concluded "the design and operation of the electricity
network can be modified to accommodate increasing levels of intermittent
power". There is no inherent obstacle to variable output
generators, but there are two significant components that have
to be addressed as renewable outputs increase—the ability
of the system to balance variable supply and demand, and the allocation
of costs to achieve the equivalence of "firm" power.
With an evaluation of how our energy needs are to be met,
and bearing in mind the strictures imposed by the need to reduce
carbon emissions there is an opportunity to move toward a more
flexible, decentralised model of energy generation, as envisaged
by the Energy White Paper (note 7).
There is little consensus on the costs of new nuclear power
with estimates of between 1-6p/kWh.
Best estimates in the Green Alliance (note 8) report put
costs for renewables at 4.6-7p/kWh for micro wind.
For Solar PV, the PIU forecast a sustained cost reduction
from the present high of 70p/kWh to 10-16p kWh within a twenty-year
time frame.
Micro CHP (mCHP) boilers can be installed in homes instead
of conventional boilers. They cost about £500 more than a
standard boiler and provide electricity as well as heat. The PIU
report estimates mCHP costs at 3.5p/kWh, perhaps falling to 2.5p/kWh
as the market grows. Although gas fired, and therefore not renewable,
they can be regarded as low carbon in view of their efficiency.
Every year 1.3 million boilers are replaced—if at least
some of these could be mCHP there would be a steady decrease in
grid power requirement and carbon emissions.
AN ALTERNATIVE
SCENARIO FOR
ENERGY CREATION
Taken that 8 AP100 reactors would cost £8.8 billion
plus fuel processing costs of £300 million per annum and
generate 8,800 MW, an alternative scenario could be;
mCHP—If half the 1.3 million boilers replaced annually
(650,000 units) were mCHP there would be a cost of £325 million,
or £6.5 billion for 13 million units over 20 years. Assuming
a capacity of 1kW per unit this results in 13GW capacity (ie 13,000Mw).
Solar PV—A £3 billion investment at £6,000
per kW capacity would yield a further 500 MW. In practice solar
PV operates at a fraction of this capacity.
Micro wind—£3.25 billion invested in 2.17 million
micro wind turbines would provide over 2GW capacity. Although
as for solar PV, micro wind operates at a fraction of this capacity.
It can be demonstrated therefore that an investment of £12.75
billion over 20 years could yield up to 15.5GW of renewable energy,
compared to an £8.8 billion construction cost plus £6.4
billion fuel processing charges totalling £15.2 billion producing
8.8GW of nuclear power.
2.7 (Inquiry question 3) What is the attitude of financial
institutions to investment in different forms of generation?
NO RESPONSE
2.8 (Inquiry question 3—Bullet 1) What is the attitude
of financial institutions to the risks involved in nuclear new
build and the scale of the investment required? How does this
compare with attitudes towards investment in CCGT and renewables?
Financial institutions are risk averse, and unlikely to offer
significant investment without comprehensive underwriting and
indemnities from government, particularly relating to issues around
waste and accidents. Where the regulatory framework leads, the
market will follow. An example of this is the way in which the
CCGT sector has improved after government signposted it offered
the prospects of an improved rate of return on investment.
2.9 (Inquiry question 3—Bullet 2) How much Government
financial support would be required to facilitate private sector
investment in nuclear new build? How would such support be provided?
How compatible is such support with liberalised energy markets?
NO RESPONSE
2.10 (Inquiry question 3—Bullet 3) What impact would
a major programme of investment in nuclear have on investment
in renewables and energy efficiency?
The astronomical costs of a new nuclear power programme would
divert money away from the real, long-term solutions to global
warming. Conservation measures are far more efficient on a monetary
basis than nuclear power investment. Renewable energy sources
can be exploited—wind, tides, geothermal heat and solar
influx will not run out, unlike uranium.
If government directs investment toward the nuclear industry,
the willingness of the private sector to invest in efficiency
or renewables will be diminished. Investment (or government subsidy)
in nuclear power will distort the energy market by artificially
depressing electricity prices whilst increasing the financial
burden on the taxpayer.
C. STRATEGIC BENEFITS
2.11 (Inquiry question 4) If nuclear new build requires
Government financial support, on what basis would such support
be justified? What public good(s) would it deliver?
Any attempts to justify a new build programme will ultimately
fail, both in terms of short-term energy security or longer-term
strategic objectives.
2.12 (Inquiry question 4—Bullet 1) To what extent
and over what timeframe would nuclear new build reduce carbon
emissions?
Contrary to popular belief, electricity produced by nuclear
power is not CO2 free. Construction of the station
itself would be a major carbon emitter and to keep it running
requires the burning of fossil fuels in mining and refining the
ore, with extra emissions from operating the station, and reprocessing
and storage activities.
Carbon emissions from mining and refining will increase as
the uranium ore quality diminishes. A report by Jan-Willem Storm
van Leeuwen and Philip Smith (see note 9) concludes "The
use of nuclear power causes, at the end of the road and under
the most favourable conditions, approximately one-third as much
CO2-emission as gas-fired electricity production. The
rich uranium ores required to achieve this reduction are however
so limited that if the entire present world electricity demand
were to be provided by nuclear power, these ores would be exhausted
within three years. Use of the remaining poorer ores in nuclear
reactors would produce more CO2 emission than burning
fossil fuels directly."
2.13 (Inquiry question 4—Bullet 2) To what extent
would nuclear new build contribute to security of supply (ie keeping
the lights on)?
Amongst the main considerations in fuel security is the sensitivity
and potential vulnerability of existing oil and gas supplies to
the UK. To enhance and protect national security, we need to reduce
our dependence on finite resources and foreign resources.
Further we need to commit to transferring clean technology
to developing countries free of charge. By doing so we will play
an important part in shifting the global economy toward low-carbon
power generation.
2.14 (Inquiry question 4—Bullet 3) Is nuclear new
build compatible with the Government's aims on security and terrorism
both within the UK and worldwide?
UK security should be based on securing continuing, stable
and sustainable local energy supplies. In striving to achieve
this, priority should be given to ensuring the methods of generation
which are as benign as possible. Further, those measures should
not create or increase vulnerability to terrorist attack.
Since conventional nuclear fission can make only a short
lived and minor contribution to world energy supply, advocates
of nuclear energy look to "breeder" technology as the
solution. Some of the vast amounts of plutonium—the material
for nuclear weapons—that would be created in a breeder programme
would inevitably leak into the hands of terrorists. In a plutonium
breeder economy, the hope of curtailing the proliferation of nuclear
weapons would be gone forever.
2.15 (Inquiry question 5) In respect of these issues [Q
4], how does the nuclear option compare with a major programme
of investment in renewables, microgeneration, and energy efficiency?
How compatible are the various options with each other and with
the strategy set out in the Energy White Paper?
Government endorsement and investment in a nuclear new build
programme will undermine progress in developing the renewable
energy sector. As such, a decision to endorse the nuclear option
would be contrary to the aspirations and vision of the Energy
White Paper.
Extracts of the White Paper's vision for the energy system
of 2020 include:
— That the backbone of the electricity system
will still be a market-based grid, balancing the supply of large
power stations. But some of those large power stations will be
offshore marine plants, including wave, tidal and windfarms. Generally
smaller onshore windfarms will also be generating. The market
will need to be able to handle intermittent generation by using
backup capacity when weather conditions reduce or cut off these
sources.
— There will be much more local generation,
in part from medium to small local/community power plants, fuelled
by locally grown biomass, from locally generated waste, from local
wind sources, or possibly from local wave and tidal generators.
These will feed local distributed networks, which can sell excess
capacity into the grid. Plant will also increasingly generate
heat for local use.
— There will be much more micro-generation,
for example from CHP plant, fuel cells in buildings, or photovoltaics.
This will also generate excess capacity from time to time, which
will be sold back into the local distributed network.
— Energy efficiency improvements will reduce
demand overall, despite new demand for electricity, for example
as homes move to digital television and as computers further penetrate
the domestic market. Air conditioning may become more widespread.
— New homes will be designed to need very little
energy and will perhaps even achieve zero carbon emissions . The
existing building stock will increasingly adopt energy efficiency
measures. Many buildings will have the capacity at least to reduce
their demand on the grid, for example by using solar heating systems
to provide some of their water heating needs, if not to generate
electricity to sell back into the local network.
— Gas will form a large part of the energy
mix as the savings from more efficient boiler technologies are
offset by demand for gas for CHP (which in turn displaces electricity
demand).
— Coal fired generation will either play a
smaller part than today in the energy mix or be linked to CO2
capture and storage (if that proves technically, environmentally
and economically feasible).
— The existing fleet of nuclear power stations
will almost all have reached the end of their working lives. If
new nuclear power plant is needed to help meet the UKs carbon
aims, this will be subject to later decision.
— Fuel cells will be playing a greater part
in the economy, initially in static form in industry or as a means
of storing energy, for example to back up intermittent renewables,
but increasingly in transport. The hydrogen will be generated
primarily by non-carbon electricity.
— In transport, hybrid (internal combustion)
vehicles will be commonplace in the car and light goods sectors,
delivering significant efficiency savings. There will be substantial
and increasing use of low carbon biofuels. Hydrogen will be increasingly
fuelling the public service vehicle fleet (for example buses)
and utility vehicles. It could also be breaking into the car market.
— Nuclear fusion will be at an advanced stage
of research and development.
— People generally will be much more aware
of the challenge of climate change and of the part they can play
in reducing carbon emissions. Carbon content will increasingly
become a commercial differentiator as the cost of carbon is reflected
in prices and people choose lower carbon options.
This vision of energy in 2020 paints a picture of a range
of diverse options for generation. We would argue that in this
diversity lies security.
Further it should be noted that currently research is being
conducted by Southampton University to investigate the feasibility
of "microgrids" (a collection of small generators for
close proximity users) to provide peer-to-peer energy. The lead
researcher, Dr Tom Markvart concludes that microgrids could make
substantial efficiency savings and cuts to carbon emissions of
20-30% without major changes to lifestyles. (see note 10)
D. OTHER ISSUES
2.16 (Inquiry question 6) How carbon-free is nuclear energy?
What level of carbon emissions would be associated with (a) construction
and (b) operation of a new nuclear power station? How carbon-intensive
is the mining and processing of uranium ore?
Nuclear power is responsible for considerable carbon emissions
from every stage of its production, apart from fission itself.
Carbon emissions from construction will be on a par with other
major projects, and there will be an increasing amount of carbon
emitted in mining the necessary raw materials.
This is because nuclear power depends on a supply of uranium
ores from scarce, rich deposits, which face a depletion problem
every bit as serious as that of oil and gas. That rich ore will
soon no longer be available. The poorer grades of ore that would
then have to be used take more energy to process than they yield.
As uranium-rich ores reduce (see note 10), extractors will
have to use raw materials with lower uranium content and be reduced
to milling soft ores (sandstone) with a uranium oxide content
of just 0.01% —10,000 tonnes of ore to be mined, milled
and disposed of for every tonne of uranium oxide extracted. It
is with ores at these grades that nuclear power hits its limits;
this is where the energy balance turns against it. Therefore carbon
emissions will increase (by virtue of the fossil fuel energy required
for extraction) as uranium richness decreases. If ores any poorer
than this were to be used, while at the same time maintaining
proper standards of waste control in all operations, nuclear power
production would go into energy deficit: it would be putting more
energy into the process than it could extract from it.
2.17 (Inquiry question 7) Should nuclear new build be conditional
on the development of scientifically and publicly acceptable solutions
to the problems of managing nuclear waste, as recommended in 2000
by the RCEP?
Yes. The amount of radioactive waste currently in the UK
is enough to fill one of the Great Pyramids at Giza in Egypt—2.3
million cubic metres (see note 11). A new generation of power
stations as being envisaged will double the amount of waste. No
publicly acceptable way of dealing with this waste has been found
as yet, and it would be an act of gross irresponsibility to proceed
with a new programme in the anticipation that an acceptable storage
method will be developed at some point in the future.
PART THREE—NOTES
AND SUPPORTING
INFORMATION
Notes
1. The Low Level Radiation Campaign http://www.llrc.org/index.html
2. Performance and Innovation Unit (Cabinet Office Strategy
Unit) http://strategy.go.v.uk/2002/energy/workingpapers.shtml
3. Rocky Mountain Institute http://www.rmi.org/sitepages/pid642.php
4. Public Services International Research Unit www.psiru.org
5. British Wind Energy Association http://www.bwea.com/
6. Offgem http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem/microsites/microtemplate1.jsp?toplevel=/microsites/edist
00&assortment=/microsites/edist00/edist08
7. The Energy White Paper http://www.dti.gov.uk/energy/whitepaper/wp—text.pdf
8. Green Alliance http://www.green-alliance.org.uk/publications/PubSmallOrAtomic/
9. Jan-Willem Storm van Leeuwen and Philip Smith report
http://www.oprit.rug.nl/deenen/
9. World Nuclear Association http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf11.htm
10. Royal Academy of Engineering's Ingenia magazine http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/4245584.stm
11. 2001 National Inventory—Nirex Report N3/99/01.
Supporting information
1. World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2004 (M Schneider
and A Frogatt. Commissioned by the European Parliament's Greens
EFA Group) http://www.greens-efa.org/pdf/documents/greensefa—documents—106—en.pdf
Plus public-domain reports
2. The Economics of nuclear power: an analysis of recent
studies (S Thomas. Public Services International Research Unit)
www.psiru.org
3. Nuclear Power: Economics and climate-protection potential
(A Lovins. Rocky Mountain Institute) www.rmi.org/sitepages/pid171.php@EO5-08
4. Is nuclear energy needed? (Green Alliance briefing)
http://www.green-alliance.org.uk/publications/PubIsNuclearEnergyNeeded/
5. Small or Atomic? Comparing the finances of nuclear
and micro-generated energy (R Willis. Green Alliance briefing)
http://www.green-alliance.org.uk/publications/PubSmallOrAtomic/
6. Green Party's Alternative Energy Review (D Toke &
D Olivier. Green Party of England & Wales) http://www.greenparty.org.uk/files/reports/2003/aer—2003.pdf
27 September 2005
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