Memorandum submitted by Paul Mobbs, Mobbs' Environmental Investigations
SUMMARY
The UK has an energy problem. . . we use too
much. As we enter an era of declining energy resources we must
recognise and address this fact in the shortest possible time-scale.
Electricity is a means of carrying energy between
two points. There is nothing intrinsically special about electricity
as a carrier of energy, as compared to other conventional fuels.
Therefore, in evaluating the future for electricity generation,
we need to open up the debate to a far wider evaluation of how
we use energy today. In fact, electricity consumption in the UK
is only 18% of the final quantity of energy supplied to the economy;
the amount of energy consumed as natural gas in the UK is far
larger than the amount of energy consumed as electrical power.
Consequently, the Committee must address the wider trends in energy
use in order to ensure that the other 82% of the energy we consumed
in the UK is not omitted from their deliberations.
Another issue not addressed in the questions
posed by the Committee are the effects of global trends in future
energy supply, in particular the global peak in both oil and natural
gas production. Very simply, peak oil/peak gas is the point at
which the level of production that can be sustained from the world's
oil and gas fields can no longer meet the demands placed upon
them. Our own North Sea oil production peaked in 2000, and most
current projections place the global peak in oil production in
2007. Our North Sea gas production peaked recently, and the Parliamentary
Office of Science and Technology cites a peak in global natural
gas production occurring between 2020 and 2030.
The Environmental Audit Committee's inquiry
puts emphasis on the "new build" of nuclear power plants.
However, there is a key question omitted from the list of matters
provided by the Committee—uranium resources. Most of the
nuclear reactors around the globe use thermal reactor technology.
The problem for the nuclear industry is that only 1% of the uranium
resource can be utilised by thermal reactors—the rest is
ultimately rejected.
The seemingly unlimited amounts of uranium alluded
to by the nuclear industry are a fallacy because the figures do
not take account of the energy required to extract the uranium.
In reality there is a cut-off point beyond which the extraction
of uranium is futile because the processing requires more energy
than the uranium will ultimately produce. Primary uranium currently
supplies around half the world's 64,000 tonnes/year demand, with
the other half coming from ex-military uranium stocks. If we take
global reserves at 4 million tonnes, this gives a resource lifetime
of 62.5 years. However, if the nuclear industry were to expand
by five times, and assuming there is no significant increase in
thermal efficiency in nuclear plants, then uranium demand would
rise to 320,000 tonnes per year, and the lifetime of the resource
reduces to 12.5 years. Consequently, it would be unwise to discuss
building new nuclear capacity without a thorough investigation
of uranium resources, and the effect of reactor technologies and
uranium production on the longevity of the nuclear option.
Renewable energy sources are limited by the
area of land required to intercept a sufficient "flux"
of energy to meet our energy demands. For example, producing biodiesel
for just the cars registered on the UK's roads would require a
land area slightly larger than the UK, and growing biomass to
service our current electricity demand would require an area 2.5
times larger than the UK.
The first stage in the process of developing
truly sustainable energy resources within the UK would be to decentralise
the national grid. This would allow a greater proportion of our
energy demand to be met from local sources, which in turn allows
for a greater diversity of efficient generation and renewable
energy sources to be developed.
To ensure our future energy security we should
look within our own borders to meet our energy needs. Across all
sources, 40% of our current energy demand could be met from renewable
energy sources. Using current technologies cutting energy consumption
by 60% to meet this target is achievable, but adapting to a low
energy economy would require a wholly new economic paradigm. This
may sound incredible, or unachievable, but it has happened before.
During the 18th Century the UK experienced a comparable change
in its social and economic organisation with the coming of the
Industrial Revolution.
We face a very simple choice. We cut our energy
consumption, or progressively higher energy prices over the next
two to three decades will cause immense damage to our national
well-being. Instead of focusing on building new generating capacity,
conventional or nuclear, the Committee should investigate the
the development of "negative capacity", or nega-Watts.
This will be more expensive in the short-term. However, an imminent
downturn in global energy supply, with a commensurate rise in
prices for all types of energy, means that it would be wrong to
evaluating the costs of a transition to a low energy society using
current prices as a baseline. Instead, the Committee should price
various strategies in terms of energy and economic impacts at
specific points in the future.
Unless we adopt such a course of action soon,
the economic damage wrought by a declining global economy, as
global energy resources shrink, will make the process of transition
far more unpleasant. In order to adapt to a contracting global
energy supply over the next century our future well-being must
be linked to our capacity to use less energy.
INTRODUCTION
1. I have produced this paper to outline
a number of issues related to our future energy supply. Whilst
I understand that the Committee's primary interest in in the UK's
electricity generating system, I believe that any discussion of
electricity generation must take place within the wider debate
over resource use across society as a whole.
2. I set up Mobbs' Environmental Investigations
in early 1992, and since then I have worked as an independent
environmental consultant for community-based organisations across
the UK. My approach is multi-disciplinary, mixing environmental
science, engineering and law, in order to produce a holistic view
of the problems I am asked to investigate. Over the past 13 years
I have taken part in numerous public inquiries, I have assisted
individuals and organisations in remedying breaches of environmental
regulations, and I have assessed many applications for development
and pollution control authorisations.
3. More recently my work has involved in-depth
research into specific areas. For the last three years I have
been working, in association with networks of local community
organisations, on the issue of energy futures. This work led to
the publication of my recent book, Energy Beyond Oil [Mobbs,
2005]. My work on energy has also attracted interest from, and
the publication of articles by, organisations such as Chatham
House [RIIA, 2004], the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies [OIES,
2005] and the national media [Times, 2005].
4. The most important factor to bear in
mind when evaluating the future of the UK's generating capacity
is that electricity is a means of carrying energy between two
points. There is nothing intrinsically special about electricity
as a carrier of energy, as compared to other conventional fuels—other
than the far greater level of flexibility and control it provides
in comparison to other energy sources. Therefore in evaluating
the future for electricity generation this paper does not assume
that the prime decision should be on the future composition of
our generating capacity. Instead, by looking at the thermodynamics
of energy use within society as a whole, we need to open up the
debate to a far wider evaluation of how we use energy today.
5. One of the key features of the Environmental
Audit Committee's call for papers for its inquiry was the emphasis
on the "new build" of nuclear power plants for power
generation. Quite naturally then, the questions posed by the Committee
tend to focus on the practicality and acceptability of nuclear
powered generation. However, there is a key question omitted from
the list—the issue of uranium resources. I believe that
it is unwise to discuss building new nuclear capacity without
a thorough investigation of uranium resources, and the impact
of reactor technologies and uranium production on the longevity
of the nuclear option.
6. It is important that we phrase the debate
on electricity supply in terms of its relevance to the UK's energy
economy. In reality, electricity consumption in 2004 was only
18% of the energy supplied at the point of use [DUKES, 2005a].
In other words, the Committee must address the wider trends in
energy use in order to ensure that the other 82% of the energy
we use in the UK is not omitted from their deliberations.
7. Another issue that is not clearly addressed
in the questions posed by the Committee are the effects of national
and global trends in present and future energy use, and how these
might affect the electricity supply industry. Clearly the key
trends in the next two to three decades are the global peaks in
both oil and natural gas production. The UK's production of both
oil and natural gas has peaked in recent years, but the global
peaks in oil and gas production create a far greater challenge
to our economic and social well-being. The role of electricity,
and the extent to which renewable sources of energy can make-up
the shortfall in oil and gas, is a critical factor in how we address
a global downturn in the availability of energy.
8. Finally, if we are looking at a downturn
in global energy supply, with the obvious effect that prices for
all types of energy will be higher, then it would be wrong for
the Committee to look at the costs of different energy sources
in terms of today's prices. In deciding what strategy to adopt
in the future the Committee must review the various energy technologies
available in terms of their relative costs in the future, not
with reference to today's energy prices.
ELECTRICITY VS
ENERGY—ELECTRICITY
AS A
SUBSET OF
ENERGY USE
9. As noted in the introduction, electricity
is not an energy source, it is a carrier of energy. We must therefore
draw a distinction between the use of electricity in society and
the overall demand for energy. Whilst electricity may be able
to supplant the use of other fuels, it is produced, inefficiently,
from a narrow range of other energy sources. Expanding the use
of electricity in society has a serious effect on energy efficiency,
the consumption of fuel, and consequently the emission of pollutants.
But these impacts relate directly to the fuels used to generate
power, not the the process of electricity generation itself.
10. By definition, within the government's
current framing of the debate, any inquiry into the future of
nuclear or renewable energy is an inquiry into electricity generation.
However, concentrating on electricity production ignores perhaps
the most valuable contribution of renewable energy in a temperate
zone—heat. For each £1 invested, thermal solar systems
provide 30 to 40 times more energy as heat than photovoltaic systems
provide as electrical power. Likewise, the use of heat pumps to
extract low-grade energy and to recover/recycle the energy discarded
via waste air and water can reduce the demand for energy by two-thirds
or more. Therefore if the Committee ignores the heat generating
renewable energy sources, when in reality a large part of the
energy we consume is to produce heat (around 70% in the average
household), it will significantly under-estimate the role that
renewable energy sources might play in our future energy economy.
11. Electricity is not, perhaps contrary
to the popular conception of our energy supply, the largest source
of energy within the UK economy. I believe that it is important
for the Committee to analyse the energy question in terms of our
total use of energy, not just electricity. It's also important
to understand that, in 2004, although nuclear power provided just
under 20% of the UK's electricity, it provided less than 8% of
the UK's entire energy supply [DUKES, 2005a]. Using the million
tonne of oil equivalent (mtoe) as a common measure across all
fuel sources, in 2004 the UK economy (or rather, the UK's primary
energy supply) took in 234.9mtoe [DUKES, 2005c]. Of this total,
primary electricity—the power produced by nuclear plants
in the UK—made up only 18.3mtoe, or 7.8% of the UK's primary
energy supply. Renewable sources accounted for just 0.82mtoe (0.3%)
of the primary energy supply, and waste combustion/digestion,
which the DTI also regard as "renewable"", 3.3mtoe
(1.4%) [DUKES, 2005h].
12. A significant proportion of the energy
consumed by the UK is supplied to power plants where it is "transformed"
into electrical power (see table 1). Currently just under one-third
of the UK's primary energy supply is used to produce electrical
power by the "major electricity generators". However,
electricity only makes up 29.2mtoe of the 161.1mtoe (or 18.1%)
of the energy that is directly "consumed" by the UK
economy (the final supply or final consumption of energy) [DTI,
2005a]. This difference between the proportion of primary fuel
consumed, and the balance of electricity within final supply,
exists because 60% of the energy utilised by the major power generation
companies is "wasted"—lost to the environment
as a result of inefficient power generation.
Table 1
ENERGY SUPPLY AND THE ENERGY USED FOR POWER GENERATION, 2004
|
Oil |
Coal |
Gas |
Nuclear |
Other |
Total |
| Primary energy supply |
76.5 |
39.3 |
96.1 |
18.2 |
4.8 |
234.9 |
| Used for power generation |
0.6 |
30.4 |
26.2 | 18.2 |
1.6 |
76.8 |
| —proportion of primary supply |
0.7% |
77.3% |
27.2% |
100.0% |
32.3% |
32.7% |
| Power produced (gross) |
0.2 |
11.0 |
12.1 |
6.9 |
0.7 |
30.8 |
| —efficiency of generation |
28% |
36% |
46% |
38% |
46% |
40% |
| Energy "wasted" |
0.4 |
19.4 |
14.1 |
11.3 |
0.8 |
46 |
All figures are in million tonnes of oil equivalent—mtoe
Sources: DUKES, 2005c; DUKES, 2005d; DUKES, 2005e
13. Despite appearances, we still live in the steam age.
All of our conventional and nuclear power plants raise steam by
using an energy source to produce heat. Then, using steam turbines
(similar to the original system developed by Charles Parsons in
1884) the energy of the steam is converted into torque, which
drives generating sets to produce electrical power (the principles
of which were established by Faraday in the 1830s). In 2004, the
gross thermal efficiency of our power generation systems was 46%
for combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGTs), 38% for nuclear stations,
and 36% for coal-fired stations [DUKES, 2005b]. Spread over all
generating sources the efficiency of generation was 40%. In other
words, every 1kWh (kilo-Watt-hour) of power consumed in the UK
entails the wastage of 1.5kWh of energy, mostly as heat dumped
into the air or local rivers (note that in the South East and
East Anglia, where drought is a serious problem, this also incurs
a serious loss of water resources to the atmosphere). Consequently,
whether the fuel source is coal, oil, gas, renewable biomass or
nuclear, the thermal efficiency of steam-raising power generation
plants has a far greater impact on the economics and emissions
of power production than the fuel selected to produce the thermal
load.
14. In 2004, domestic energy consumption only accounted
for 30% of the UK's final energy consumption [DTI, 2005a]. The
transport sector consumed 36% and the industrial and service sectors
combined consume 34%. Energy consumption in the domestic sector
is dominated by natural gas (70% of domestic energy comes from
natural gas whilst only 20% comes from electricity [DUKES, 2005f]),
whilst in the industrial and manufacturing sector electricity
and natural gas are used in roughly equal amounts. Where electricity
does dominate is in the commercial and retail sectors, where it
makes up around two-thirds of the energy consumed.
15. The fact that electricity makes up only a minor part—18.1%
to be precise—of final consumption of energy in the UK means
that if the Committee concentrates solely on the generation of
electricity it will ignore the major part—81.9%—of
the energy problem. For example, the amount of natural gas consumed
directly in the UK is far larger than the amount of energy consumed
as electrical power. This issue is significant because of the
demise of natural gas as a major source of energy in the near
future (outlined below in relation to "peak gas"). In
this context, I believe it is valid to raise the question of whether
it is worthwhile worrying about the future of less than 8% (the
nuclear component) of the UK's energy supply when 84% (the oil
and gas) will soon begin to run short, and hence become very expensive,
in the next one or two decades.
FUTURE ENERGY
SUPPLY—PEAK
OIL, PEAK
GAS, AND
THE PRICE
OF ENERGY
16. Whilst not directly related to the questions posed
by the Committee, I believe that it is important that the Committee
consider two trends that have the potential to cause serious problems
for the UK's energy economy in the near future: Peak Oil and Peak
Gas.
17. Most global authorities on energy quote the future
lifetime of energy reserves in terms of a reserves/production
ratio (or R/P ratio)—dividing the available reserve by the
current consumption in order to produce an availability in years.
In fact, the geophysical restrictions on the production of energy
minerals mean that such a linear relationship does not exist,
and in reality production follows a bell-curve. This is because
the production of energy minerals is dependent not just upon the
available proven or probable reserve, but also the quality of
the reserves and the speed at which the minerals may be extracted.
18. In the late 1940s a leading US geologist, Marion
King Hubbert, looked at the production of oil from oil fields
in the "lower 48" states of the USA. He published various
papers on his research, but the most important is considered to
be his 1956 paper produced for the annual meeting of the American
Petroleum Institute. In this paper he predicted that, based on
trends in the discovery and growing consumption of oil in the
USA, US oil production would peak in 1970 (see figure 1). Despite
various criticisms of Hubbert over the intervening period, it
was shown in the early 1970s that US oil production did indeed
peak in that year, and the trend in the production of oil before
and after the peak matched Hubbert's predictions.
19. Very simply, peak oil is the point at which the level
of production that can be sustained from any oilfield can no longer
meet the demands placed upon it. Our own North Sea oil production
peaked in 2000 (in fact, production fell by over 10% between 2003
and 2004), and other major oil fields around the globe are following
predicted trends as they either progress towards or pass their
peak of production. The controversial issue today is the use of
Hubbert's method to predict a global peak in oil production.
20. Currently, most of the studies that use proven oil
reserves as their basis predict a global peak in 2007. In fact,
recent data from the US Energy Information Administration tends
to confirm this date as they predict [USEIA, 2005] that average
global oil demand will equal average global oil supply in late
2006. This is in contrast to the position of the US Geological
Survey (USGS—whose figures in turn form the basis of the
predictions of the International Energy Agency) who predict that
global oil production will peak around 2035. However, the USGS's
2035 figure was produced as part of a probabilistic analysis
of future oil production, and it only has a 50/50 chance of
being right. If we work at the 95% confidence level, the USGS
data in fact suggests a peak nearer 2015.
21. There are many variables involved, such as the dynamic
interaction between rising prices and consumer demand which, at
the global scale, may turn the neat Gaussian peak predicted by
Hubbert into a more drawn-out plateau or bumpy peak. In
any case, the concerns recently expressed about the accuracy of
Middle Eastern oil reserve data could mean that recent supply
problems may be indicative of an impending peak. It's not just
the inability of OPEC to produce more oil that is indicative of
a peak, but also the fact that more of the oil produced by the
Gulf states is now heavy (or sour) crude, not the light (or sweet)
crude that the world relies upon for the production of fuel oil.
22. Natural gas production undergoes a similar trend
to oil. The UK's natural gas production plateaued between 2001
and 2003, and production is now falling. This decline in production,
coupled with strongly increasing demand for power generation,
means that the UK is now importing ever greater volumes of gas
each year. In fact, even with the development of liquefied natural
gas (LNG) import terminals near London and in West Wales, concerns
are already being expressed as to whether the UK can supply its
demand for gas during a severe Winter [NGT, 2005]. According to
the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, global natural
gas production is likely to peak sometime between 2020 and 2030
[POST, 2004] with similar consequences to the peak in oil supply.
However, Peak Gas represents a more significant point in time
because from that date the globe's total energy supply will steadily
contract until a new, primarily renewable-powered, equilibrium
is reached (perhaps at the end of this century).
23. The peaking of global oil and gas production does
not mean that we are going to imminently run out. Peaking occurs
half way through the lifetime of the resource, and so an amount
of oil/gas equal to that already extracted is likely to be available
from that date on. What will be problematic for the UK is that
the year-on-year fall in production capacity will drive prices
for oil and gas ever higher, as countries compete on price to
secure access to the remaining production. This has significant
implications for the UK economy because we are so dependent upon
petroleum products. However, if current trends continue (and we
ignore the economic effect of rising prices), by the date of Peak
Gas the UK could be dependent on gas-fired generating capacity
for the majority of its electricity supply, and the majority of
its space heating requirements.
NUCLEAR POWER
AND URANIUM
SUPPLY
24. Nuclear power may appear to be a solution to a downturn
in gas supplies. However, nuclear plants also have a potential
fuel supply problem in the future, depending upon how fast the
nuclear states develop their generating capacity over the next
few decades.
25. Globally, using BP's global dataset, nuclear power
provides 6.1% of global energy consumption [BP, 2005]. Using this
same dataset, the UK produces around 8.0% of it's primary energy
consumption from nuclear. However, to make any significant difference
to a downturn in global oil and gas supply, or at a debatable
level, to climate change (for example, by displacing the use of
coal), the capacity of the nuclear sector would have to grow by
at least five times. This has significant implications for the
future of the globe's uranium reserve.
26. Most of the nuclear reactors around the globe use
thermal reactor technology. Slow neutrons are used to fission
atoms of one uranium isotope, uranium-235 (235U), to produce heat.
At the same time some neutrons are captured by another isotope
of uranium, uranium-238 (238U), and are converted (indirectly)
to plutonium-239 (239Pu). The fissioning of this "bred"
plutonium produces around one-third of the heat load created by
the thermal reactor. In terms of the uranium resource, the problem
for the nuclear industry is that 235U only makes up around 0.7%
of the world's uranium. Therefore, including the uranium converted
to plutonium, only about 1% of the uranium resource can be utilised
by thermal reactors—the rest (made up of 238U) is ultimately
rejected.
27. Rather like oil reserves, there is some debate over
how much usable uranium there is available around the globe. The
International Energy Agency assess uranium reserves in terms of
the costs of production—they estimate there are around 4
million tonnes of uranium recoverable for less than $130/kilo
[IEA, 2001]. The European Commission have put the figure at 2
million tonnes [EC, 2001]. However, some figures in the nuclear
industry quote the amount of recoverable uranium as being in excess
of 4 billion tonnes [Price, 2002]: this figure is based on the
theoretical amount of uranium on the Earth's surface irrespective
of whether its recovery is feasible/economic or not. However,
the seemingly unlimited amounts of uranium alluded to by the nuclear
industry are a fallacy because the figures do not take account
of the energy required to extract the uranium in a form suitable
for the production of nuclear fuel. In reality there is a cut-off
point beyond which the extraction of uranium is futile because
the extraction and processing operations require more energy than
the uranium will produce. This concept, called the Energy Return
On Energy Invested (EROEI), is ultimately the limiting factor
on how much energy we can produce from nuclear energy.
28. The EROEI for uranium is linked to the quality of
the ore used to produce nuclear fuel. The lower the ore quality,
the more rock must be processed, with a consequential increase
in energy consumption. Recent data from the World Nuclear Association
[WNA, 2005a] puts the energy cost of running a reactor (including
uranium production and operation/decommissioning of the plant—but
not the final disposal of radioactive wastes) at a few percent
of the plant's output. However, this analysis is based upon ore
with a uranium content of 0.2% (2,000 parts per million, or ppm).
As lower quality ores are utilised the proportion of the plant's
output used in the production of the fuel will grow, and hence,
progressively, the net energy production of the nuclear sector
as a whole will fall. A 1975 study put the cut-off point, where
the energy used to produce power exceeded the energy content of
the uranium ore, at 0.002% (20ppm) [Chapman, 1975]. Such a value
would exclude many of the more diffuse sources of uranium, and
would reduce the amount of usable uranium to just a few million
tonnes.
29. Currently the low price for uranium, in part created
by the release of ex-military stocks of uranium onto the market,
means that only the highest quality ores are mined. Primary uranium
currently supplies around half the world's 64,000 tonnes/year
demand, with the other half coming from ex-military uranium stocks.
If we take global reserves at 4 million tonnes, this gives an
R/P ratio of 62.5 years. However, if the nuclear industry were
to expand by five times, and assuming there is no significant
increase in thermal efficiency in nuclear plants, then uranium
demand would rise to 320,000 tonnes per year, and the R/P ratio
would be 12.5 years.
30. The limited nature of the uranium resource has a
very clear implication: If the world increased its nuclear capacity
by five times, in order to displace the use of fossil fuels or
forestall the effects of Peak Oil/Peak Gas, none of the hypothetical
new reactors built in the UK would reach the end of their design
lifetime before the world's proven uranium resource was exhausted.
This problem was highlighted at the beginning of the commercial
nuclear industry, and was the catalyst behind Britain's early
experimentation with fast reactors (see below), subsequently abandoned
in the 1980s.
31. In relation to the use of nuclear energy to off-set
the use of fossil fuels, recent research published by the OECD
[OECD, 1999] suggests that there is insufficient uranium to make
a significant impact on the use of fossil fuels unless fast breeder
reactors are developed in the near future. It should also be noted
that the longevity of uranium resources were not considered as
part of the government's recent Energy White Paper [HMSO, 2003].
In fact, without any real analysis of the uranium resource issue,
whilst outlining issues for the white paper, the Downing Street
Performance and Innovation Unit described uranium as [PIU, 2002]:
". . . plentiful, easy and cheap to store, and likely
to remain cheap. This means that nuclear power is essentially
an indigenous form of energy."
32. Clearly, the position of the PIU would only be valid
if the entire uranium resource were usable, but that is not the
case. Britain has a lot of uranium in storage, but it is depleted
uranium—238U—left over from uranium enrichment/fuel
fabrication. In order to use the other 99% of the uranium resource
we would have to successfully develop fast reactors, which fission
239Pu whilst at the same time "breeding" more 239Pu
from the unused 238U. As yet, there is no commercially marketable
fast breeder design, and the recent MIT study of the future of
nuclear power [MIT, 2003] did not consider fast reactors to be
a realistic prospect for a few decades. This is because, to date,
the problems inherent in the design of fast reactors have hindered
the development of a large-scale, usable prototype. The major
nuclear power states—Britain, the USA, France, Germany and
Japan—have all invested in fast reactor research programmes
and today the only significant work on prototype designs is being
carried out by India and Russia [WNA, 2005b].
RENEWABLE SOURCES—CAPACITY
VS SPATIAL
DEVELOPMENT
33. If fossil fuels and nuclear power have capacity problems
due to the limited availability of fuel, then renewable resources
should have a clear advantage. Being renewable, their energy sources
are continually renewed by the natural environment. However, the
limitation here is area required to intercept a sufficient "flux"
of energy in order to produce enough energy to meet our demand.
34. It is often said that we only use a minute fraction
of the energy that the Earth receives from the Sun each year.
Whilst factually true, these statements show a clear misunderstanding
of the cycling of energy through the natural environment. The
energy that the Earth receives from the Sun each year creates
a specific energy environment within the Earth's biosphere. If
we intercept more energy from the Sun, reducing the energy reflected
back into space, then the Earth will get hotter (the amount of
energy radiated by the planet sets up a thermal equilibrium that
determines the global temperature). Likewise, if we intercept
a greater proportion of the energy that goes into the hydrological
cycle, or the other climate cycles, it will affect our weather
and climate.
35. The human race already uses a very large quantity
of energy. The 428 exa-Joules (EJ) of energy [BP, 2005] used in
2004 represents about half of the energy that could be produced
by burning all the terrestrial biomass (plant matter) produced
around the globe each year in conventional power plants. The reason
we can use such a large amount of energy is because fossil fuels
represent solar energy that was collected for millions of years,
and which has been processed using geothermal heat for tens of
millions of years to produce very dense sources of fuel (oil,
gas and coal). In order to utilise renewable energy sources the
first obstacle we must overcome is cutting our use of energy down
to a level where renewable sources are a realistic option without
restricting other important activities—such as food production—because
of the amount of land which must be devoted to energy production.
36. The Sun radiates a fixed amount of energy onto the
Earth, which varies according to latitude. Intercepting solar
energy directly using solar heat or photovoltaic (PV) systems,
or indirectly using biomass, is therefore limited according to
the amount of land we are able to devote to collecting the Sun's
radiation. Some advocates of renewable energy believe that certain
countries around the world, because of their large land area,
could become "exporters" of renewable energy—principally
biomass or vegetable oils. However, given the problems created
by climate change, and the global erosion of the agricultural
land resource [UNEP, 2002], I do not believe that this is a realistic
issue.
37. The production of energy from biomass is a good example.
Southern England receives, on average, 36,000 giga-Joules of energy
per hectare per year (GJ/ha/yr) [OU, 2004]. Of this figure, on
average, only 5% (1,836GJ/ha/yr) of this energy will actually
be absorbed by the plant, and only 0.6%, or 230GJ/ha/yr, will
be converted into usable biomass. Depending on the form of combustion
used, the moisture content, and the amount of energy used for
harvesting and transport, the net energy production might be as
little as 10% of the energy contained in the biomass (23GJ/ha),
which in terms of electricity is about 6.4 mega-Watt-hours per
hectare per year (MWh/ha/year). Given that in 2004 the UK's power
consumption was 400,000,000MWh, it would require 62.5 million
hectares of land to produce the UK's electricity demand—which
is about 2.5 times the UK's total land area.
38. The production of biodiesel is equally restricted.
Using figures from a Defra sponsored study [Hallam, 2003], one
hectare of intensively grown oilseed rape can produce 3.1 tonnes
of seed, which will yield biodiesel with a calorific value of
41.4GJ/ha/yr. Assuming a fuel consumption equivalent to 45 miles
per gallon, a diesel car would require 0.85 hectares of land to
fuel it for the average 9,000 miles travelled each year. Consequently,
producing biodiesel for the 30 million cars registered on the
UK's roads would require about 25 million hectares of land, which
is slightly larger than the UK's total land area.
39. Wind power, tidal power and water power are more
dense sources of renewable energy, but these too are limited.
However, these limitations are being made worse by the manner
in which they are being developed. In order to connect economically
to the national grid, and in order to maximise the return on investment,
renewable energy projects are becoming far larger than they need
to be. Instead of diffusely collecting energy from many sites,
government policy is concentrating development, using large scale
engineering, on a small number of sites. As a result these developments
have received a greater level of opposition from the public.
40. Wind power is a good example of how the target of
"industrial scale" energy production is wastefully using
land, and creating a public backlash against renewable energy
in the process. The larger the wind turbine, the further apart
they must be spaced within wind farms, and consequently the lower
the energy yield per hectare of land. Working theoretically, a
large wind 2.3MW turbine (such as a Nordic N90 turbine) spaced
five hub heights apart (an average separation distance) from other
turbines has a capacity of 108 kiloWatts per hectare (kW/ha).
However three 850kW turbines (such the Vestas V52) would occupy
the same area of land, and even though they are 40% shorter they
produce more power—111kW/ha (note, this figure includes
a weighting that reflects the V52's lower height). The reason
that wind farm developers are building ever larger turbines is
quite simple: Whilst capital costs can be discounted over future
years, maintenance costs are always at the present value. Consequently
the development of fewer, larger turbines increases the power
output whilst reducing maintenance costs—increasing the
return on the capital invested.
41. Taking the 111kW/ha figure as a representative energy
density for wind, to match the UK's major electricity generators
73,308 mega-Watts (MW) of net installed capacity [DUKES, 2005g],
and assuming that the turbines generated for 30% of the time and
that an additional 40% of capacity was required to charge batteries/fuel
cells to provide a continuous power output, just over 3,000,000
hectares of turbines would be required—equivalent to around
13% of the UK's land area. Theoretically then, we could generate
our power requirements from wind turbines. But, as noted above,
electricity is less than one-fifth of the UK's total energy consumption,
so this solution this would only answers a small part of the UK's
energy problem—for a total solution we'd have to densely
cover half the UK's land area in wind turbines.
42. The first stage in the process of developing truly
sustainable energy resources within the UK would be to decentralise
the national grid. This would allow a greater proportion of our
energy demand to be met from local sources, which in turn allows
for a greater diversity of efficient generation (eg, combined
heat and power) and renewable energy sources to be developed.
Such an option was outlined by the Parliamentary Office of Science
and Technology in their report on UK Electricity Networks [POST,
2001]. Some campaign groups are also supporting initiatives to
enable a greater decentralisation of the UK's energy supply [GPeace,
2005]. Decentralising the grid would mean that the generating
capacity of individual generating plants would fall, however the
greater opportunity for the development of combined heat and power
systems would mean that the efficiency with which we utilise fuel
sources could rise from the current 40% to 60% or higher. Such
a system would also allow embedded storage systems to be employed,
and this would mean that smaller and intermittent renewable energy
sources could have their output buffered in order to meet the
peaks in local energy demand.
43. To ensure our future energy security we should look
within our own borders to meet our energy needs. Across all sources,
it's possible to produce around 40% of our current energy demand
from renewable energy sources. Consequently, we need to cut energy
use by 60%. This is, using current technologies, achievable—for
example, in the domestic sector we can look to Oxford University's
recent work on energy efficient housing [OXECI, 2005]. However,
when evaluating the costs of this transition, it would be wrong
to use current prices as a baseline. Realistically, Peak Oil will
mean that energy prices could rise 10%, year-on-year, for one
or two decades—until a new equilibrium develops between
the availability of energy resources and our demand for energy.
For this reason we cannot value the future energy prices in terms
of those today. Instead we should price various strategies in
terms of certain energy and economic indicators, based at fixed
points in the future, in order to provide a relative comparison.
CONCLUSION—THE
NEED TO
SIGNIFICANTLY CUT
ENERGY DEMAND
44. The UK has an energy problem. . . we use too much.
As we enter an era of declining energy we must recognise and address
this fact in the shortest possible time-scale.
45. Rather than focusing on building new capacity, the
Committee should investigate the development of "negative
capacity", or using the phrase coined by the Rocky Mountain
Institute, nega-Watts [RMI, 1990]. We face a very simple choice.
We cut our energy consumption, displacing demand through renewable
sources and cutting energy use, or progressively higher energy
prices over the next two to three decades will cause immense damage
to our national well-being.
46. Peak Oil, perhaps as soon as 2007, is going to make
oil prices rise far further than their current historically high
levels. Between 2020 and 2030, Peak Gas will make the overall
energy situation even worse—especially if current trends
continue and we are dependent upon natural gas for much of our
energy requirements by that time. As a country, which is now in
the process of becoming a net energy importer of oil and gas due
to the peaking of our own oil and gas reserves, building more
generating capacity will mean that over the coming years a greater
proportion of our national wealth will flow out of the country.
47. The alternative is, logically, simple—we cut
energy demand significantly in order to meet more of our requirements
from within our own borders. This will be more expensive in the
short-term, but unless we adopt such a course of action soon the
economic damage wrought by a declining global economy, as global
energy resources shrink, will make the process of transition far
more unpleasant.
48. The Committee must not narrowly focus on electricity.
Electricity is less than one-fifth of the UK's energy consumption,
and the problems facing the generating industry today will be
replicated in other sectors within a decade or so due to the effects
of Peak Oil. Likewise, some of the renewable sources better suited
to the domestic and commercial environment produce heat, not power.
Therefore the Committee must look at measures across all energy
sources that will manage energy demand.
49. Nuclear power, quite apart from the environmental
and safety objections, has a fundamental limitation on its use
imposed by the thermal reactor system. Expanding our nuclear capacity
in order to off-set the use of fossil fuels will, if replicated
around the globe, shorten the already brief lifetime of the uranium
resource by the same proportion. The projections by the nuclear
industry, and by inference the government's own white paper on
energy, assume that fast reactors will be available to use the
depleted uranium produced by the thermal reactor cycle. However
(rather like fusion reactors) there is no realistic prospect that
this will happen in the near future.
50. Renewable sources of energy produce less power compared
to conventional energy sources because of the land area they require.
However, in an era where all conventional energy sources will
go into decline, there are few other options. Therefore, if we
are to develop truly sustainable renewable energy sources, we
must match our energy demand to the amount of power that renewable
energy sources can develop.
51. Adapting to a low energy economy would require, over
the course of the next 60 to 80 years, that we evolve a wholly
new economic paradigm. This may sound incredible, or unachievable,
but it has happened before. During the 18th Century the UK experienced
a comparable change in its social and economic organisation with
the coming of the Industrial Revolution (and still, today, we
use the inefficient steam turbines and power generators developed
during this era). This Industrial Revolution marked the transition,
within a few decades, to a society that progressed through an
ever-higher level of energy consumption. Cutting energy demand
by 60% will require a "post-industrialisation", as we
use modern technologies to cut energy demand, and decentralise
many of the energy intensive systems that were built up over the
course of industrialisation. In order to adapt to a contracting
global energy supply over the next century, our future well-being
must be linked to our capacity to use less energy.
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|
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21 September 2005
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