Memorandum submitted by the Welsh Anti
Nuclear Alliance
INTRODUCTION
The Welsh Anti Nuclear Alliance was formed 25
years ago as an "umbrella" organisation for individuals
and groups of people opposed to the expansion of nuclear power
and the dumping of radioactive waste, and in favour of the conservation
and rational use of energy.
It has presented evidence to three major public
inquiries, and submitted evidence to a House of Commons committee,
and to the Government's Energy Review.
KEEPING THE
LIGHTS ON
A number of myths have recently been put about
by the proponents of nuclear power in order to "soften up"
the public, and make Government support more likely.
Nuclear power produces no carbon dioxide, and
can therefore help reduce global warming.
It can be built in time to make a difference
to global warming.
It is economic compared with renewables such
as wind.
Advanced reactors are safer than current reactors.
Nuclear reactors are tough enough to withstand
terrorist attacks.
There are acceptable ways of getting rid of
radioactive waste.
The development of nuclear energy can take place
alongside other measures.
More large power stations are needed to "keep
the lights on".
In responding to the questions posed by the
Environmental Audit committee it is our intention to establish
the truth regarding these claims, particularly as one of them
is included in the title of the inquiry.
In order to assist the committee we have adopted
the format as set out in July.
THE EXTENT
OF THE
"GENERATION GAP"
DUE TO
THE PHASE-OUT
OF EXISTING
NUCLEAR POWER
STATIONS
There is a long and inglorious history of the
proponents of nuclear power pointing to a projected gap in generating
capacity that could or should be met by building more nuclear
power stations with the taxpayer's support.
In February 1979 the primary energy use forecast
on the left was put forward by civil servants at the Department
of Energy. A rapid decline in oil and gas supplies from the North
Sea was forecast, requiring imports, despite a gradual increase
in the use of coal. The forecasts were used to convince Margaret
Thatcher's incoming Government that a huge increase in nuclear
power generation was necessary.
The forecast accompanying the launch of the
Government's 2001 energy review is on the right.[378]
The 1979 forecast is overlaid for comparison. It indicates that
the forecast primary energy use for 1980 was only exceeded at
the turn of the century. The gap between the 1979 projected primary
energy use for 2000 and the actual primary energy use for that
year is striking. That energy gap approximates to the primary
energy that was forecast to come from new nuclear power stations.
Consider what met that energy gap in reality.
The answer, apart from industrial restructuring away from heavy
metal-bashing, is energy conservation. We used far less in the
year 2000 to run an economy that had grown considerably. The vertical
shading on the right indicates the size of the nuclear "wedge"
implied by replacing old reactors with new. It is well within
our capabilities to achieve a further reduction in fixed energy
consumption on this scale.
However, all of our combined efforts to combat
global warming through energy reduction in buildings and industrial
processes could easily be set at nought by an "out of control"
transport sector.
As far as electricity is concerned, any "gap"
is between supply and demand. It is wrong to characterise it as
a generation gap. If they are to survive the scrutiny of committees
such as your own, all Governments have to demonstrate that they
are supporting the most cost effective, as well as sustainable
ways of achieving their policy objectives. Investment in reducing
demand for electricity is not only more immediate in its effect,
it is far more cost effective. Furthermore, money saved through
demand reduction is available for reinvestment in the economy
rather than contributing to greenhouse gas emissions or becoming
"locked up" in radioactive materials that will burden
future generations.
WHAT
ARE THE
MAIN INVESTMENT
OPTIONS FOR
ELECTRICITY GENERATING
CAPACITY?
It very much depends on the scale. As the Microgeneration
strategy and low carbon buildings programme: consultation document
(June 2005) states in its foreword "In the 1980s power stations
were built on a scale to supply entire cities."
The continuation of a 1980s type strategy, implied
by the adoption of a new nuclear programme, would be a recipe
for disaster:
(a) Resume shutting down the smaller power
stations that are sited in the cities, close to the demand.
(b) Aim at relatively few, but very large,
power stations.
(c) Connect these units with heavy dependence
on a few critical links.
(d) Choose an inherently dangerous technology
with complex safety requirements for power generation so that
power plants have to be sited remotely, and the links to the demand
centres are long, and have well known vulnerabilities, which offer
opportunities to malevolent individuals or groups.
(e) Use a technology that requires large
capital investments and has long lead times, so that there is
little or no scope to adapt to changing circumstances.
(f) Connect up all the units into a synchronous
system so that each unit's operation depends significantly on
the operation of all the other units, and failures can affect
the whole system.
Since the 1980s greater security of supply,
with a smaller planning margin, and hence greater economy, has
been achieved partly through the introduction of many, small generating
units, with shorter lead times, than one large one.
Innovation is continuing to lead to smaller
and smaller scales of electricity generation becoming more viable,
and it is these—micro-CHP, micro-wind, micro-hydro, solar
thermal and photovoltaics, ground and air source heat pumps, fuel
cells supplying individual customers and buildings that are likely
to become the most relevant and resilient options over the next
twenty years.
The solution for fixed energy use in Britain
is to exploit the huge gap between primary energy demand and energy
consumed by final user. This gap consists of the huge waste heat
dumped by large centralised electricity generators, and the approximately
20 TWhrs of electricity lost in transmission. Micro CHP addresses
both of these waste streams at the same time, but will require
institutional and some technical barriers to be removed. The removal
of these barriers should be addressed by the Committee.
Because individual consumers of micro-generated
electricity are going to be have their own generator operating
at peak times of day and during the heating season the cumulative
effect on the electricity supply network is to reduce peak demand
from centrally located power stations. Similarly the first 3 GW
of additional electricity load from wind cooling of cities is
most appropriately met by wind turbines.
It is the robustness, resilience and elegance
of renewables and microgeneration that is at stake if the decision
is taken to continue dependence on large nuclear power stations.
WHAT
WOULD BE
THE LIKELY
COSTS AND
TIMESCALES OF
DIFFERENT GENERATING
TECHNOLOGIES?
Electricity generation, by any means, will not
touch the central problem faced by the UK over the next 30 years.
The 10 year plan for transport has not yet begun to make any impact.
A reduction in final energy consumption by the industrial sector
since 1980 has been more than offset by the increase in transport
use.
The PIU scoping papers for the Energy Review
indicated that energy use by the transport sector is set to grow
by 20% over the next 10 years, (over three times the total 20
year projected domestic energy growth) and a further 10% from
2010 to 2020.
Maintaining a nuclear sector up to and after
the year 2020 will not only miss the point, but will sequester
the resources that are needed to address the true problems. Some
new electricity generating capacity will be needed. But intelligent
criteria should be adopted to determine which capacity should
be selected for development, as well as the appropriate scale.
Nuclear power stations require huge capital
investments over long construction periods.
Electricity generating capacity should be promoted
where it confers advantages in meeting other Government objectives.
Two examples illustrate this:
The Forestry Commission was established for national
strategic reasons, not simply to provide pit props for our mining
industry in times of war, but to act as a land purchaser and land
user "of last resort" for an agricultural sector in
crisis. There are parallels with the present except that our current
strategic needs are for modernised biomass (short rotation willow
rather than conifers) that can be a "lifeline" crop
for farmers to grow and harvest. Biomass electricity works best
in relatively small 1 to 20 MW units in associated forest areas.
Offshore wave power generators can be built as
modules in our under employed shipyards, towed to where they are
best located and bolted together to build into massive arrays.
Offshore wind power could then tap into the same grid. Britain
is well placed to develop this energy source as an export industry.
Again as the units of generation are small, and modular, their
use confers flexibility in terms of matching supply and demand.
At the domestic scale micro-CHP as replacement
central heating boilers could follow the same trajectory in terms
of their introduction to the mass market as other pieces of household
equipment. The average replacement cycle for central heating boilers
is 15 years. Thus a long term strategy for electricity generation
in say 2050 would have three full cycles of domestic central heating
boiler replacement to achieve that strategy.
Although institutional barriers are coming down,
there is still technical work to be done. It is no use expecting
that the Building Regulations alone can produce the necessary
changes. A typical sized house built to the latest Building Regulations
standards requires a boiler of only about 6kW output for peak
winter demand (2kW for heat loss, 2kW for ventilation loss, and
2kW for water heating) but the smallest boilers currently available
start at 12kW while the smallest micro CHP boilers currently available
start at over 40kW.
These things in particular are required:
Small, efficient, micro CHP units. Much smaller
units are needed to meet the reduced energy needs of well insulated
homes. If they are based on Sterling Engines they can readily
use bio-fuels instead of fossil fuels such as oil and gas.
"import-export" meters will have to
become commonplace and readily available, and
a price paid to the householder for their excess
electricity which is sufficient to act as an incentive to invest
in micro-CHP.
The Energy Review comments (para 43) on projected
cost reductions over time for new nuclear stations:
"The pace and extent of learning may however
be slower for nuclear than for renewables Because: relatively
long lead times for nuclear power mean that feedback from operating
experience is slower; relicensing of nuclear designs further delays
the introduction of design changes; and the scope for economies
of large-scale manufacturing of components is less for nuclear
because production runs are much shorter than for renewables,
where hundreds and even thousands of units may be installed."
It was in 1987 that the Brundtland Commission
stated that renewable energy: "should form the foundation
of the global energy structure during the 21 century".[379]
WHAT
IS THE
ATTITUDE OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
TO THE
RISKS INVOLVED
IN NUCLEAR
NEW BUILD
AND THE
SCALE OF
THE INVESTMENT
REQUIRED?
They are reluctant to invest. As the World Bank
puts it: "world experiences with high investment costs, time-consuming
and costly approval processes, lack of sustainable waste disposal
options, risks of major accidents—together with the Chernobyl
disaster—have raised grave doubts about the future viability
of nuclear power. Private investors shy away from such risky high-cost
investments[380]".
These arguments, together with concerns about proliferation, explain
its own decision not to invest in nuclear power, even as part
of the fight against global warming.
It is the possibility that a huge investment
can be transformed into a huge liability in minutes that lies
at the heart of reluctance of prudent investors to invest in new
nuclear stations. The added problem for investors is that another
severe reactor accident anywhere in the world could lead to a
moratorium on reactor construction in the UK.
Since the May 1995 White Paper (Cm 2860), private
sector operators in the UK have been encouraged to investigate
new nuclear build on a purely commercial basis. In July 2001 British
Energy told the Government that they "cannot make the business
case" for new reactors. In other words they were not commercially
viable. The fact that no applications have been forthcoming confirms
that without large taxpayers subsidy the risks and uncertainties
are sufficient to deter any investment.
WHAT
IMPACT WOULD
A MAJOR
PROGRAMME OF
INVESTMENT IN
NUCLEAR HAVE
ON INVESTMENT
IN RENEWABLES
AND ENERGY
EFFICIENCY?
Disastrous. The decision to "go nuclear"
might appeal to political minds that require a "quick fix"
in order that their attention can move on to other things, but
in reality it would sequester available capital funding over a
very long period, and throttle investment in renewables and energy
efficiency. The government will not spend this money twice: it
will either invest massively in nuclear generation or invest massively
in energy-saving and alternative power. Such a decision would
also send a strong but misleading message to individuals and businesses
that the energy problem has been "sorted" by central
government, and that they can go on consuming energy the way they
have in the past.
Finland is often cited by the proponents of
nuclear power as the path they wish us to follow. In Finland,
once the decision to build a fifth reactor had been taken, plans
to phase-out coal production and electric heating were forgotten
and targets for wind and biomass energy are being missed, resulting
in an increase in carbon dioxide emissions.
TO
WHAT EXTENT
AND OVER
WHAT TIMEFRAME
WOULD NUCLEAR
NEW BUILD
REDUCE CARBON
EMISSIONS?
Mining uranium, and building and decommissioning
power stations all use oil. When the whole nuclear cycle is taken
into account a nuclear station is responsible for about a third
of the CO2 emissions of a gas fired plant, but this
can only be maintained while there are rich uranium ores. The
earliest realistic date for delivery of power from a new UK reactor
is around 2020.[381]
By far the largest part of uranium reserves
are found in very poor ores, and the energy costs of mining, milling
and refining reach the point at which one would get more energy
out of burning the fossil fuels directly. This will happen within
the lifetime of the cited reactors. The energy costs of conditioning
and managing radioactive wastes from uranium tailings to spent
fuel will be imposed on future generations. A programme of new
nuclear plants would not contribute to carbon reductions for at
least twenty years, and would take many years to balance the "carbon
debt" that had been built up during construction.
The investment in new nuclear reactors will
be thus be self defeating on every timescale:
During the 20 year construction period
Paying off the carbon debt during the early years
of operation, and subsequently in 25 years time, as poorer and
poorer ores increase the carbon emissions of mining, milling and
refining.
Into the indefinite future where carbon emissions
will be incurred by generations decommissioning nuclear reactors
and conditioning, storing, monitoring and repackaging radioactive
waste.
IS
NUCLEAR NEW
BUILD COMPATIBLE
WITH THE
GOVERNMENT'S
AIMS ON
SECURITY AND
TERRORISM BOTH
WITHIN THE
UK AND WORLDWIDE?
No. The mastermind of the September 11th attacks,
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, reportedly told his US captors that the
original plan called for 10 airliners to be hijacked. They were
to be crashed into targets including nuclear power stations.
The extremely remote risk of an accidental aircraft
strike has been replaced by the very much greater risk of an aircraft
being deliberately crashed into a reactor. Nuclear power represents
a concentration of power—making it a target for terrorists
The Westinghouse AP1000 design is particularly vulnerable because
of the relatively thin containment structures and the water tank
on the roof. To protect them it would require vastly strengthened
containments, and possibly that they be built underground, making
them even less economically viable. Finland rejected the Westinghouse
AP1000 as the design for its fifth reactor, because it would be
vulnerable to being struck by an aircraft.
But the strength or otherwise of a reactor building
misses the point. There are more vulnerable parts of a nuclear
site. For economic reasons, the spent fuel from new reactors would
be stored on site rather than reprocessed at Sellafield so the
sites would in effect become huge radioactive waste dumps. On
site spent-fuel stores would require to be terrorist proof, as
well as the reactors.
In this context, the political will necessary
to maintain a publicly financed investment programme in a new
nuclear construction programme lasting for over 25 years is incompatible
with a parliamentary democracy. Even an unsuccessful attack on
any of the 480 nuclear sites worldwide is likely to adversely
affect the confidence of investors and lead to the abandonment
of reactors under construction.
Quite apart from circumventing non-proliferation
agreements, the export of MOX fuel containing plutonium is regarded
as compromising the country's security and giving opportunities
for the diversion of such material to terrorists.
IN
RESPECT OF
THESE ISSUES,
HOW DOES
THE NUCLEAR
OPTION COMPARE
WITH A
MAJOR PROGRAMME
OF INVESTMENT
IN RENEWABLES,
MICROGENERATION,
AND ENERGY
EFFICIENCY?
It doesn't compare. Energy conservation, microgeneration
and renewable forms of energy make poor targets for terrorists
and are a more immediate and robust response to global warming
than nuclear power stations. They are also compatible with a liberalised
generation market, whereas nuclear investment violates that market
through subsidies.
HOW CARBON-FREE
IS NUCLEAR
ENERGY?
Nuclear power isn't carbon-free. See above
SHOULD
NUCLEAR NEW
BUILD BE
CONDITIONAL ON
THE DEVELOPMENT
OF SCIENTIFICALLY
AND PUBLICLY
ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS
TO THE
PROBLEMS OF
MANAGING NUCLEAR
WASTE?
The conditionality lies in a different direction.
Solutions that might be regarded as acceptable
to some people at a point in time are unlikely to be so regarded
by others either now or in the future. After at least three unsuccessful
attempts to establish radioactive waste dumps through the usual
"decide, announce, defend" route the Government has
instigated two consultation processes to tackle higher level radioactive
wastes (CoRWM) and lower level radioactive wastes (lead by DEFRA).
If there is to be an overarching public "contract"
with the Government about the systematic and progressive reduction
of hazards from nuclear sites, it will be conditional on there
being no more radioactive waste created.
We cannot relinquish control of radioactive
waste because it may enter the biosphere in the future. Public
acceptance of radioactive waste facilities is more likely if the
problem is seen as finite because no more radioactive waste is
being created.
13 September 2005
378 Project Scoping Note-Energy Policy, Cabinet Office
PIUnit, Annex 1, Table 1. Back
379
World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common
Future, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1987. Back
380
World Bank web site http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/faq/faqf98-128.htm Back
381
MacKerron, G (September 2004) "Nuclear Power and the Characteristics
of Ordinariness-the Case of UK Energy Policy" NERA Economic
Consulting. Back
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