Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Second Report


4  Proposed arrangements for compensating EU producers

Position after 2004 EFRA Committee inquiry into Reform of the Sugar Regime

In 2004, the Committee recognised that some form of producer compensation will be required to help farmers adjust to the new market conditions. To minimise market distortion, the Committee felt these payments should be "fully decoupled from production activity, following the principles of the CAP reform agreed in 2003".

In its response, the Government agreed that "any compensation should be fully decoupled as part of the Single Payment to farmers, which will start in other sectors from 2005".

Update: The Government continues to support fully decoupled compensation.[53] The Commission's proposals provide that growers should receive compensation of 60% of the estimated revenue loss from the institutional price reduction.

Grower compensation

'DECOUPLING' GROWER COMPENSATION

37. The centrepiece of the reorganised CAP introduced under the 2003 reforms is a single subsidy payment, made to all farms, but no longer connected to the production activity. This is known as the principle of 'decoupling'. This decoupling—breaking the link between support and the production activity—is desirable on economic grounds, as it allows farmers greater freedom to make their own farming decisions. The Commission has proposed making 'decoupled' payments to sugar growers, to compensate them for the loss of income associated with the reduction in prices.

38. In agreeing the 2003 reforms, a compromise was reached which allowed individual Member States the option of retaining some element of coupling within their subsidy systems. Given this historic background, some witnesses were concerned that the option of 'partial decoupling' could find its way into the final sugar package as well. The NFU argued that there was a "serious risk" that partial decoupling might be included in the reforms. The NFU insisted that such a compromise in the Council of Ministers must be avoided at all costs.[54] Reports from the October EU Farm Council seemed to bear out these fears, with the suggestion that it had become increasingly probable that "any compromise reform paper put forward by the Commission in time for the November Council will include the option of partial decoupling for Member States who feel they are worst hit by the price".[55]

39. If a compromise package did allow Member States flexibility in maintaining an element of coupling with their payments, farmers in countries that exercised this option would be obliged to stay in beet production in order to qualify for the full compensation. Clearly, this would fly in the face of the whole thrust of the reform, which is to ensure production is concentrated in the most efficient areas of the EU and not constrained by artificial policy instruments. Tying aid payments to the continued cultivation of sugar beet would also contradict the aims of the restructuring scheme, which is designed to decommission the most inefficient parts of Europe's sugar producing capacity.

40. Processors would benefit from coupled compensation as it would cushion the reduction in beet supply to factories after reform. In this context, it is interesting to note how British Sugar's thoughts on 'decoupling' have changed over time. In April 2004, it maintained that "compensation should be partly coupled to take account of the interdependent relationship between growers and processors".[56] But in written evidence to our current inquiry, it changed its stance, arguing against "any suggestion that partial coupling should be permitted at the discretion of individual Member States", since this would "introduce competitive distortions doing particular damage to the UK".[57]

41. This change in British Sugar's approach may reflect an acknowledgement that, if discretion were allowed, the UK Government would choose full decoupling, as a matter of principle, while other countries might not, thereby putting processors in those countries at a competitive advantage. The fact that the Dutch Beet Growers' Federation seemed prepared to consider partial coupling, at least in the first few years of reform, shows the symbiotic nature of the relationship between sugar beet growers and processors.[58]

42. Defra made its position clear, stating that it was "absolutely behind fully decoupled support" and indicating that it intended to implement the English payments in that form.[59] However, the Minister for Sustainable Farming and Food was initially somewhat reluctant to confirm that the UK would oppose any attempt to introduce the option of partial decoupling into a compromise package.[60] When pressed, Lord Bach did finally confirm that the UK would "argue pretty strongly for full decoupling".[61]

Our conclusions

43. Direct payments to growers must be fully decoupled from production, in order to minimise market distortion. We are pleased that Defra seems so committed to implementing direct payments to English farmers in a fully decoupled form.

44. The UK Government should strongly oppose any attempt to introduce the option of partial decoupling into a compromise package. Such a dilution of the original proposals could frustrate the success of the restructuring scheme and leave UK processors at a comparative disadvantage to processors in other parts of the EU.

APPLICATION OF GROWER COMPENSATION IN ENGLAND

45. Defra's RIA notes that, according to the Commission's paper, Member States would have two options for paying compensation: it could either be paid only to those farmers who have historically grown sugar beet; or to all those who receive the main Single Farm Payment on an area basis.[62] Defra pointed out that the decision regarding the method of payment is linked to its rationale and duration. If the payment is 'compensation', it would seem reasonable to make the payment on a historic reference basis to growers of beet. However, if payments are made indefinitely, they cease to be 'compensation' and become simply 'support'.[63]

46. Defra's model for implementing the Single Farm Payment (SFP), introduced under the 2003 CAP reforms, in England was complicated. It involved a combination of individual entitlements based on historic receipts and a flat-rate payment per hectare. Under this model, the individual historic receipts from existing schemes reduce over time, as the flat rate element increases. The proportions of the flat rate and historic elements are set out in Table 1.

Table 1: Proportions of flat rate and historic payment elements of the English SFP
Year
Proportion of flat

rate element (%)
Proportion of historic element (%)
2005
10
90
2006
15
85
2007
30
70
2008
45
55
2009
60
40
2010
75
25
2011
90
10
2012
100
0

Source: Official Report. 12 February 2004, col 1586

47. Defra calculates in the RIA that incorporating the sugar payments into the existing transitional hybrid system would see their value to an English beet grower diminish to around £10 per hectare by 2012, effectively making the payments time-limited for beet growers.[64] This contrasts sharply with Defra's estimate of a payment of £400 per hectare if the compensation were paid only to beet growers, entirely on a historic basis.[65] The Tenant Farmers Association warned against this effect, arguing the importance of ensuring "that any compensation payable remains with sugar producers and does not become dissipated across all Single Farm Payment entitlement".[66]

48. The NFU suspected the UK Government might favour a transitional hybrid compensation system for sugar that would ultimately lead to a system of fully flat-rate payments.[67] The NFU is "actively exploring all possible options and outcomes with the aim of establishing a set of principles that will provide UK growers with maximum benefit for as long as possible".[68] One such option could be to manage the integration of the sugar compensation into the general SFP, in such a way that the proportion of the historic component is even higher in the first few years of a transition. This would allow sugar growers in England to benefit more and longer from the direct payments.

49. Defra's RIA does not provide a full analysis of the distributional effects and financial impact on English sugar growers of a move to a purely flat-rate system of payments. Such a lack of analysis, prior to the Government's decisions in implementing the 2003 CAP reform, was strongly criticised by our predecessor Committee.[69] The Minister told us that as the proposals were still "under negotiation", Defra would "not be in a position to take a final view of implementation until the overall package is agreed".[70]

Our conclusions

50. In deciding how to implement the grower compensation element of the proposals, the Government must balance diverse and sometimes conflicting policy objectives, which include compensation, income support and the provision of environmental benefits. It is vital that Defra conduct a full impact analysis before reaching its implementation decision. Whatever implementation method the Government decides on, it should not allow a system of 'compensation' to become simply 'income support' in the longer term, as such payments would neither compensate for price reductions nor induce any further compliance with environmental standards.

LEVEL OF COMPENSATION

51. The Commission proposes that growers should be compensated for 60% of the estimated revenue loss from the institutional price reduction.[71] From 2007 onwards the total amount available for grower compensation will be almost €1.5 billion a year.[72] This rather dwarfs the €40 million offer of accompanying measures for the ACP states in the first year of the reform.[73]

52. We received differing views on whether the level of compensation to growers was adequate. Professor Sir John Marsh felt that a 60% rate of compensation might, in practice, be described as "over the top".[74] However, the NBF called for a compensation level of "at least 80%" and cited rice as an example of a previously reformed sector that had received 88% compensation.[75] A more appropriate comparison might be made with the 50% compensation provided to arable farmers for the price reductions in the Agenda 2000 reforms. Indeed, the Commission's own simulations, based on 50% compensation, forecast an average drop in income per beet holding of only 4%, with some growers being excessively compensated at this level.[76] Defra also drew attention to the potential 'risk of overcompensation' in its RIA, although this analysis overlooks the possible effect of diminishing levels of payments to beet growers, under a transitional hybrid compensation model.[77]

53. Joan Noble noted that, in the Commission's proposals, "there was no provision to allow a higher level of compensation to farmers in countries who have in the past been paid higher sugar beet prices than the common level".[78] We will return to this point when covering the changes to the quota arrangements, later in this report (see paragraphs 60-65 below).

Our conclusions

54. We received insufficient evidence to show conclusively whether the 60% figure proposed by the Commission represented an appropriate level of compensation for beet growers. However, it does seem broadly consistent with reforms in other sectors. Defra's RIA did not fully take into account the degressive nature of payments over time, as would be experienced by English sugar growers under an implementation model that moved to a purely flat-rate system. We call on the Government to carry out an urgent study to assess the long-term impact on growers of making payments on this basis.

THE RESTRUCTURING SCHEME

55. The Commission's original 2004 plan for a compulsory cut in production quotas was replaced in the 2005 proposals by a voluntary scheme under which the Commission would buy up quota, known as the 'restructuring scheme'. This is designed to lure inefficient sugar processors out of production and compensate for the closure of factories. The sugar beet price will be reduced at a faster rate than the white sugar price, with the extra margin generated for the beet processor being paid into a restructuring fund to finance the claims being made by those producers relinquishing quota. The refiners are excluded from participation in the restructuring fund. Instead of paying money into the fund, like the beet processors, the refiners' extra margin will be paid to suppliers from the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the least developed countries (LDCs), through a raw sugar price reduction which is slower and less severe than the cut in the minimum beet price.[79]

56. Defra noted that if British Sugar closed and dismantled one or two factories and relinquished 200,000 tonnes of quota sugar in 2008/9, it could claim restructuring aid of around €100m, which it could use to reinvest in its other plants.[80] However, British Sugar assured us that, as long as the beet sector was not discriminated against in a compromise deal, then it was planning "to continue to operate" and not avail itself of the restructuring scheme, although it did not rule out the possibility of reducing the number of its factories.[81]

57. The sugar users were particularly critical of the restructuring scheme. The BCCCA argued that "the proposed restructuring fund is excessively generous, will delay price reductions and will mean that industrial users and consumers of sugar are paying to compensate private shareholders in other countries".[82] It noted that the restructuring fund would amount to "a sum in excess of €4bn to help the sugar industry" and suggested it was "worth at least €360,000 per sugar processing employee in the EU".[83]

Our conclusions

58. The UK's beet growers will not be directly affected by the restructuring scheme, as British Sugar has stated it plans to continue production of sugar, although it will mean that benefits to manufacturers and consumers in terms of price cuts will be delayed.

59. The Committee calls on the Government to clarify the position over the rights of producers to use quota in the event of British Sugar closing one or more of its existing plants and the redundant plant being operated by sugar beet farmers or another third party.


53   Q 269 Back

54   Ev 46, para 4.1 Back

55   "Growing opposition as sugar reform deadline approaches", Agra Europe, 28 October 2005, EP/4-6 Back

56   Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, Twelfth Report of Session 2003-04, Reform of the Sugar Regime, HC 550-II, Ev 4 Back

57   Ev 62, para 8.3 Back

58   Q 148 Back

59   Qq 269, 305 Back

60   Qq 297-298 Back

61   Q 299 Back

62   Defra, Partial RIA, section 9.1.2 Back

63   IbidBack

64   This situation is analogous to the experience of English dairy farmers, who will see the value of their dairy premium payments diminish over time, under Defra's CAP implementation model. Back

65   Defra, Partial RIA, section 9.1.2. See also Commission's draft legislative proposals, p 58 Back

66   Ev 99, para 11 Back

67   Ev 47, para 4.8 Back

68   Ev 47, para 4.9 Back

69   Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2003-04, Implementation of CAP Reform in the UK, HC 226-I, para 11 Back

70   Q 296 Back

71   Moving from price policy to direct payments reduces deadweight losses and improves the efficiency of support, making full compensation unjustified. Back

72   European Commission, COM(2005) 263 final, Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, p 59 Back

73   Ev 139, para 48 Back

74   Ev 105, para 16 Back

75   Qq 131, 148 Back

76   European Commission, Reforming the European Union's sugar policy: Summary of impact assessment work, (Brussels, 2003), p 30 Back

77   Defra, Partial RIA, Box 7: The risk of overcompensation, pp 65-66 Back

78   Ev 129, para 5 Back

79   Ev 14, para 6 [Tate & Lyle] Back

80   Defra, Partial RIA, section 5.2.14 Back

81   Qq 213, 242 Back

82   Ev 24, para 19 Back

83   Ev 24, paras 18, 20 Back


 
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Prepared 17 November 2005