Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Second Report


5  Changes to the quota arrangements

Disproportionate effect on UK of merging 'A' and 'B' quota

60. In an effort to simplify arrangements, the Commission proposes merging 'A' and 'B' quotas into one single quota. The distinction between 'A' and 'B' sugar stems from the origins of the market organisation in the 1960s, when the basic quota allocation was supplemented by an additional quantity of sugar, known as 'B' quota, intended for export and based on the market disposal potential of each Member State. Over time, however, this 'B' quota evolved to become part of the general production, and the export role initially assigned to 'B' quota was taken over by 'C' sugar. A price differential between 'A' and 'B' quota still remained because a higher levy was charged on the 'B' quota sugar beet to pay for the system of export refunds.

61. The UK imports more sugar than it produces, and is therefore known as a 'deficit area' within the sugar regime. This is due to its historic reliance on imports of sugar cane from its former colonies. These imports meant that, when it joined the EU, it received a small proportion of 'B' quota in comparison to its 'A' quota allocation. Consequently, if, as is intended, the Commission's proposed price cuts are imposed on the merged quota, countries like the UK, with a smaller 'B' quota, will suffer some price disadvantage in comparison to other countries. As producer levies on 'B' quota are currently higher than those on 'A' quota, the abolition of the distinction between the two is financially advantageous to those countries with large 'B' quotas, such as France and Germany.

62. In giving evidence, Defra acknowledged that:

The present regime has a differential pricing structure that rewards … Member States that are classed as deficit areas or deficit producers of sugar. The change is to abolish that distinction, to merge 'A' and 'B' quotas and have a new unified quota with a unified price. It follows that in changing from the one system to the other there is a differential impact.[84]

63. The NFU estimates that UK growers are likely to face "an effective price cut of 2.3% over and above the 42.6% proposed by the Commission". For this reason, the NFU has called on the Commission to "devise an alternative solution that is equitable, taking into account the differing proportion of 'A' and 'B' quota across the EU".[85] British Sugar suggested that the comparative disadvantage to the UK could be compensated for in a commensurate increase in the amount allocated to the UK for grower compensation.[86] Taking this idea further, the NFU calculated that this envelope needed to be increased by an additional €14 million in 2007, if the UK were to receive fair an equitable treatment in comparison with the other EU Member States.[87]

64. Defra noted that other Member States that are classed as deficit areas had also been making a similar case on behalf of their growers, and that this was "one of the issues that is under active discussion in the negotiations at the moment".[88] Defra did, however, underline the fact that the Commission's proposal are "designed to be budget neutral and the overall package for compensation has to be one that can be accommodated within the financial ceiling for agricultural expenditure".[89]

65. Joan Noble, an independent consultant, also pointed out another effect of the new quota arrangements that could disadvantage Member States, like the UK, that currently have a small 'B' quota. She noted that if future quota cuts were necessary, then they would most likely have an equal impact on all Member States whether they were in surplus or deficit.[90] This is despite existing provisions that recognise the deficit status of the UK by implementing any necessary quota cuts using a low reduction coefficient. This issue was also highlighted by the 11 dissenting countries that opposed the Commission's proposals at the October Farm Council. They suggested that production cuts, if necessary, should be applied initially to regions with a surplus of production, rather than to all countries.[91]

OUR CONCLUSIONS

66. We are concerned about the unfair impact on the UK of applying the proposed price cut to the new unified quota. The Committee regards this as an important issue and we recommend that the UK Government negotiate for a change in the proposals, so that the UK's status as a deficit country is adequately recognised in the compensation package. It would not be fair if the price cut for UK growers were amplified by an accident of history. An increase in the amount of compensation for the UK could go some way to reducing the disproportionately negative impact of the proposals on the UK beet sector. Since the proposals are designed to be budget neutral and contained within the financial ceiling for agricultural expenditure, such negotiations will require acceptance from surplus countries that their envelopes will have to be cut by an equivalent amount. Furthermore, if quota cuts are required in the future, they must be made on the current basis, so as not to further disadvantage the UK.

Legal ownership of additional quota

67. The Commission's proposals envisage that "an additional amount of 1 million tonnes of quota shall be made available to current 'C' sugar producing Member States".[92] UK companies would have the right to 82,847 tonnes of that amount, with a one-off, per-tonne amount being charged, equal to the level of the restructuring aid in the first year.[93]

68. The NFU raised some questions regarding the legal ownership of the production rights associated with this additional 82,847 tonnes of sugar quota. The NFU felt that the issue of legal ownership would have to be clearly established, particularly if the Government sought to recover the costs of acquiring the additional quota from the processor or grower.[94]

69. When asked about this issue, the Minister was unable to answer the question of whether sugar producers would take legal ownership of quotas they paid for. A Defra official confirmed that, under the existing regime, quotas were not owned but were allocated free of charge to processors, so the question of 'ownership' had not arisen before. He confirmed that the proposals envisaged that the processors would be the ones to pay, but admitted that the concept of a processor company paying to acquire new quota was "a novel idea" and there was no "actual legal doctrine on this at the moment".[95]

Further changes

QUOTA ABOLITION
Position after 2004 EFRA Committee inquiry into Reform of the Sugar Regime

In 2004, the Committee advocated the phasing out of the quota system, arguing that "competition will be increased more by abolishing quotas than through any other policy change".

In its response, the Government agreed the ending of quotas was a "highly desirable objective" and shared the analysis that the "current quota system gives rise to major issues of competition policy". In 2004, the Secretary of State urged a "swifter end" to quotas.

Update: The Government's ultimate aim remains the abolition of production quotas "in the long run".[96]

70. The Commission's draft legislative proposals envisage that the system of supply control through quotas will remain intact until the expiry of the new regime in 2014/15. The inefficiencies of the quota system were much criticised by our predecessor Committee's report into the EU sugar regime. The Committee summarised the problems associated with the quota system as follows:

Of all the components of the complex sugar regime, the system of production quotas does most to inhibit competition and efficiency. Due to the rigid division of sugar production into national quotas, sugar beet is grown in geographical areas that are climatically ill-suited for this type of agriculture. Production quotas also restrict the ability of the most efficient producers to expand, impose limits on the production of competing products and create barriers for new entrants. The removal of quotas would allow regional specialisation and the exploitation of comparative advantages within the single market. It would thus lead to increased efficiency in growing and producing sugar within Europe, as well as allowing other resources to move to more productive and competitive uses.[97]

71. The Government's response to that report noted that the Secretary of State had urged "a swifter end to quotas" at the Agriculture Council in 2004.[98] It also pointed out that the Commission's plans, as contained in the consultation paper of July 2004, "do not envisage the abolition of quotas during the initial phase of reform from 2005-08".[99] Reference here to an "initial phase" of reform alludes to the original proposal for a mid-term review of the sugar regime in 2008, which was dropped from the Commission's draft legislative proposals, published in June 2005.

72. The Minister told us that the Government's ultimate aim remained the abolition of production quotas, despite there being no provision in the draft legislative proposals for their abolition. He said: "we share the view as a Government that your Committee … expressed last July, which is that in the long run certainly we would be better off without a quota system at all with this particular commodity".[100]

CROSS BORDER QUOTA TRANSFERS

73. Several witnesses expressed regret that the idea floated in the Commission's communication of July 2004, that quota might be bought and sold by sugar processing companies across national borders, had been dropped. Joan Noble, UKISUG and the NFU were all united in supporting the concept of cross border transfers, so as to allow greater flexibility of the redistribution of production quota in the longer term.[101]

OUR CONCLUSIONS

74. We are disappointed that the Commission's reform proposals did not include the lifting of quota restrictions as a long-term objective, given the distortions caused by the existing system. We therefore recommend that the Government pursue the abolition of quota restrictions. While quotas do still exist, we believe that transferability between Member States would aid the relocation of sugar production from the least competitive sugar producing regions to the most competitive. The swift establishment of legal certainty on the issue of quota ownership, as well as being desirable in itself, would help facilitate future cross border trade in quotas.

75. The UK Government should negotiate for the reinstatement of the mid-term review clause in the final reform package, as this would provide an opportunity to revisit these important issues. Failure to secure such a clause could lock into the new regime all the distortions of the quota system for another 10 years.


84   Q 287 Back

85   Ev 44, para 1.10 Back

86   Ev 62, para 9.3 Back

87   Ev 46, paras 4.3-4.4 and Ev 50, appendix 2 Back

88   Qq 284-285 Back

89   Q 285 Back

90   Ev 130, para 12 Back

91   "Growing opposition as sugar reform deadline approaches", Agra Europe, 28 October 2005, EP/4-6 Back

92   European Commission, COM(2005) 263 final, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector, p 5 Back

93   Ibid., pp 5, 44 Back

94   Evs 47-48, paras 5.8-5.13 Back

95   Qq 308-310 Back

96   Q 311 Back

97   Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, Twelfth Report of Session 2003-04, Reform of the Sugar Regime, HC 550-I, para 34 Back

98   Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, Sixteenth Special Report of Session 2003-04, Reform of the Sugar Regime: Government Reply to the Committee's Report, HC 1129, p 4. Reports from the Council meeting in November 2004 also suggest that "the UK called into question the long-term viability of quotas". ("Hardliners take initiative over EU sugar reform", Agra Europe, 26 November 2006, EP/3-4) Back

99   HC 1129, p 6 Back

100   Q 311 Back

101   See: Ev 130, para 10; Ev 21, para 4.1; Q 84; Q 172. Back


 
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Prepared 17 November 2005