UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 682-i

House of COMMONS

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE

ENVIRONMENT, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

 

 

Avian Influenza

 

 

Tuesday 15 November 2005

MR BEN BRADSHAW, MP, MS GLENYS STACEY and MS DEBBY REYNOLDS

Evidence heard in Public Questions 1 - 99

 

 

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Oral Evidence

Taken before the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee

on Tuesday 15 November 2005

Members present

Mr Michael Jack, in the Chair

James Duddridge

Patrick Hall

Lynne Jones

Mrs Madeline Moon

Mr Dan Rogerson

Sir Peter Soulsby

David Taylor

Mr Roger Williams

________________

Witnesses: Mr Ben Bradshaw, a Member of the House, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ms Glenys Stacey, Chief Executive, State Veterinary Service, and Ms Debby Reynolds, Chief Veterinary Officer, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, examined.

Q1 Chairman: I am sure the Minister is capable of answering all the questions without necessarily the back-up of Glenys Stacey, the Chief Executive of the State Veterinary Service, and Debby Reynolds the Chief Veterinary Officer. So, for the record, we hope they will arrive. Minister, thank you very much for giving up your time. Just before we move to some questions on Avian Influenza, there have been reports of a foot-and-mouth outbreak in Brazil. I gather that three provinces have had their exports banned but the United Kingdom continues to import beef from other parts of Brazil. What is the Defra position on that, bearing in mind the devastating effect that the foot-and-mouth outbreak had in the United Kingdom last time we had that problem?

Mr Bradshaw: It is not the UK, it is the EU, as you will be aware from your previous ministerial experience. These matters are decided at EU level. The EU vets are satisfied that the regionalisation of export bans with this sort of exotic disease are safe, and they have satisfied themselves that it is safe to ban imports on a regional basis rather than a national basis. That is common practice with these sorts of precautions.

Q2 Chairman: I am aware that beef-off-the-bone is also part of the precautionary activity that is being proposed, but can you find out - because, in fairness, you may not know off the top of your head - as to whether there has been any recent European Union veterinary inspection carried out in Brazil to establish, for example, there is absolutely no chance of meat from areas where the foot-and-mouth outbreak has taken place coming into an export chain by being put into areas where it presently has not had an outbreak?

Mr Bradshaw: The Chief Vet may be able to answer whether there has been a recent EU investigation in Brazil itself, but I have asked exactly the same question as you are asking me about the possibility of intraregional movement within Brazil, and I have been assured that that does not take place and that the European Union has satisfied itself that the regional ban is sufficient. Debby, we have kicked off on foot-and-mouth. Do you want to answer the Chairman's question about whether there has been a recent investigation in Brazil?

Ms Reynolds: I am afraid I would have to let the Committee know the date of the last FEO mission to Brazil, but the European Commission will have very carefully assessed the potential for regionalisation and only on that basis will have taken a decision to allow exports from Brazil and from parts of the country not affected by foot-and-mouth disease. I am afraid I cannot give you the date of the last visit.

Q3 Mr Williams: I am told by some farmers in my area (it might be a myth) that the division between the areas in Brazil from which beef can be exported and from which beef cannot be exported is a fence. Do you know how sound that fence is?

Mr Bradshaw: All I can say, Mr Chairman, is that I have sought assurances myself that the precautions that the EU have placed on the imports of beef from Brazil are sufficient. We ourselves benefit from the regionalisation of bans on produce when we have outbreaks of disease, as we had recently with Newcastle Disease, where our poultry was not banned for export all over the United Kingdom but it was banned from a particular part of the United Kingdom affected. So these bans work both ways and they are based on veterinary and epidemiological advice.

Q4 Chairman: I think, Minister, we recognise the bans have a sound basis in both practicality and science but there are many who are fearful, with livestock businesses of their own, whenever they hear the words "foot-and-mouth". I think people are also aware, Minister, that there are limited number of European Union veterinary inspectors, and I think it would be reassuring if, in the light of the inquiries you have made, you could furnish the Committee at your earliest convenience with a statement to advise us on what you have heard, what the European Union are doing to make certain that their advice is being followed in Brazil and what checks are being made on any beef that is imported into the European Union to ensure that in no way it becomes a vector for the carriage of foot-and-mouth. That would be very reassuring.

Mr Bradshaw: I would be happy to do that, Mr Chairman. I have read the same allegations as you and Mr Williams have. I have seen no evidence to support them, and I would simply add that were evidence to be forthcoming that there was intraregional trade within Brazil and exports from the non-banned areas that would be pretty serious for the Brazilian beef industry and it is not something that I would think the Brazilians themselves would want to risk.

Q5 Chairman: I am sure that would be the case, but, as I say, I think there will be certainly livestock farmers here who would welcome some reassurance. Thank you for taking that question slightly out of line with what I know you had come prepared to talk to us about. You have come on a very interesting and important day, as far as our further understanding of some of the factors affecting Avian Influenza is concerned. Can I, at the outset, on behalf of the Committee, thank your department and, particularly, the Chief Vet for laying on a very helpful briefing for us; I think it helped a lot of us to understand some of the difficulties in an area of unfolding science and experience. Nonetheless, just for the record, given that Avian Influenza has been prevalent for sometime in the Far East, can you give us a brief chronology as to what your department did, if you like, when the outbreaks first started to happen within the last couple of years to re-examine our own domestic preparations for dealing with this disease and the way it might arrive in the United Kingdom?

Mr Bradshaw: Yes, and you are right to draw attention to the fact that this has been prevalent in South East Asia for some years and it is certainly something that has been on Defra's radar long before it hit the newspaper headlines in the last few months. We have been constantly monitoring the situation in South East Asia, we have been constantly updating our risk assessment, and, at the same time, developing and updating our own contingency plan to tackle Avian Influenza, the latest version of which was published in July. Again, it is being regularly updated as we learn new things about, for example, the possible role of wild birds. I initiated discussions with colleagues in the Department for Health, I think, three years ago when I was first appointed to this department to make sure that within government departments we were working very closely on AI as well.

Q6 Chairman: When, as a result of that three-year-ago piece of work, did you actually put together your, if your like, first contingency plan? When was that done?

Mr Bradshaw: The first contingency plan was when, Debby?

Ms Reynolds: The first generic contingency plan was put together for consultation and issued in July, I believe. So earlier this year.

Q7 Chairman: July 2005, and yet your perceptive Minister in 2002 organised some discussions with other government departments. I cannot believe you were unprepared for the entire duration of that time, but it does sound like there is a rather large gap.

Ms Reynolds: The first generic contingency plan was the one I was referring to for the summer of this year. The components of foot-and-mouth disease, classical swine fever, avian influenza and Newcastle disease were brought together for the first time, and there had been components of that before. As a result of the Lessons Learnt inquiry after foot-and-mouth disease it was decided that there should be an annual update and that the opportunity for consultation and laying before the Houses of Parliament should be taken each year.

Q8 Chairman: On the question of foot-and-mouth, you have had an exercise to test out your contingency plans. When did you last have one to test out the Avian Influenza plan?

Mr Bradshaw: We have only had the latest plan since July. We have already held what is called the "table top" contingency exercise involving people from all over government and we intend to hold a similar one to the one we held on foot-and-mouth some time in the first half of next year.

Q9 Chairman: Some time in the first half of next year. I have been advised that that might be as long as June. Can you tell us why, if it is June, it is going to take so long?

Mr Bradshaw: If we can bring it forward, Mr Chairman, we will.

Q10 Chairman: Do I imply from that that it is June?

Mr Bradshaw: That is the current plan.

Q11 Chairman: Debby Reynolds is nodding in my direction. Given the unfolding nature of this, why do you think it was wise to wait until June? Do you not think it should have been done earlier so that you can learn your lessons and keep evolving your plan?

Mr Bradshaw: The June date is already an earlier date than the one that was previously in position. We brought forward the table-top exercise which I have just described, which was originally going to be later in the autumn - we brought it forward to last month.

Q12 Chairman: Why the delay? It does seem a bit odd.

Ms Reynolds: May I add something? In June last year there was an exercise of the overall plan which applied to foot-and-mouth disease, and a number of the principles are the same. I fully appreciate that the application to foot-and-mouth disease is to a different industry, the poultry industry and birds with Avian Influenza, but a good deal of the generic elements apply. That was a two-day simulation. There was a report published on exercise Hornbeam so there had been a great deal of preparation around that. I think what was learned from that was that not only were there elements that we could strengthen but there was a need for considerable preparation around the scenarios and the thought was, one year later, by preparation of a good scenario which really tested the system we would be able to apply that for Avian Influenza. However, as the Minister says, if we are able to bring it forward we can do so. We should not forget, however, that in July this year we had a single incident of Newcastle disease virus and insofar as the generic plan applies and various aspects of working with the poultry industry apply there was quite a significant test to our arrangements then as well.

Mr Bradshaw: A real test; a real, live exercise of a real disease. It did not get very much publicity because it was very successfully handled.

Q13 Chairman: So you are giving it active consideration to bringing it forward from June?

Mr Bradshaw: Yes.

Q14 Chairman: Let us have a look at what the odds are in terms of having an outbreak of Avian Influenza. If you were in the betting business, Minister, what odds would you give us?

Mr Bradshaw: At some stage in the future it is inevitable that there will be another outbreak of Avian Influenza in this country. The last one was 1992 and we had one more recently in the Netherlands in 2003. If it is certain that the current strain H5N1 will spread to this country in the near future; no, I do not think that is certain, but the risk has increased although it is still low. That is the current official assessment which you will see in the latest risk assessment that we published last week.

Q15 Chairman: Your working hypothesis is odds on, then?

Mr Bradshaw: I have not been into a betting shop recently, Mr Chairman. They may even be offering odds, so I would not want to put my own. I do not really have anything to add to what I have already said. At some stage in the history of this country there will be an outbreak of Avian Influenza. Our job is to make that less likely and to make sure that if and when it does happen we are in a very good position to deal with it quickly, because swift containment and eradication is the secret of tackling AI, whether in this country or South East Asia. We know that from our last experience of the disease in 1992 and we also know it from when the Dutch had a much more serious outbreak in 2003.

Q16 Chairman: Minister, you have been working hard in the context of Britain's Presidency on the new European Directive to deal with Avian Influenza. Can you give us an update as to whether matters will be concluded by the end of our Presidency?

Mr Bradshaw: We are very hopeful that they will be. If it would be helpful to the Committee I can write with a list of the main elements of the proposed Directive and what changes from present. Just to go back to the point you raised earlier, just because we only published our latest generic contingency plan in July does not mean to say that we did not know what to do in the event of an AI outbreak. What to do - biosecurity action - in the event of an outbreak is all laid down in pre-existing European Union animal health legislation, so it is not as if there was nothing in existence before July.

Q17 Chairman: Minister, I am sitting at my computer and I see a little thing on the BBC's ticker tape going by at lunchtime and it says: "Parrot did not die of bird flu". So it was not the parrot "what did it". I suppose that was some modest reassurance, but rather than plunge into a whole series of questions on this perhaps you and the Chief Vet might like to explain to us what the more complex announcement which came from your department actually means. I think people would be rather surprised to learn that, after all the publicity given, what occurred at these premises in Essex pointed very firmly to the parrot as being the source, as matters have unfolded and matters connected with the blending of tissue samples have been understood we now find that, effectively, it was one of other species which came from a country which currently says there is no Avian Influenza. We need some explanation as to how we seem to have, literally, put all our eggs in the parrot basket only to find now it is the mesias "what did it". Perhaps you would like to explain what is going on.

Mr Bradshaw: We published today the final epidemiological report of the investigation that had been ongoing in the Essex quarantine facility. I think we did try to get copies to Members of your Committee on time, but I am sorry if you have not had time to digest it. What it basically shows is that although you are right to suggest, Mr Chairman, that it looks as if it was not the parrot "what did it" we will never know that for certain because the original sample was a pool sample of a parrot and a of a mesia. That pooling was done - it is common practice in quarantine procedures - by the vet, sent to the VLA and the VLA tested the sample. When the information was then passed on to Defra we were told the positive test had been in a parrot. That was on 21 October, when we made the initial announcement. As soon as we realised that it had been a pool sample, in fact on 23 October, we put out a press release saying that, in actual fact, this is a pool sample. That meant we could not be sure that it was the parrot, and in fact the working hypothesis was then that it was more likely to be the mesia because the epidemiological investigation showed that the strain in question was closest to a strain in ducks from China. That epidemiological investigation has been ongoing ever since then. We have tested a lot more of the other birds that died. We have found no positive virus in any of the other birds, except some of the other mesias. So that leads us really to strengthen our hypothesis, following the knowledge of the pooling, that the infection was from the mesias from Taiwan. You say Taiwan has no history or it is not currently an AI-infected country, but you may recall that on the day before the parrot was wrongly blamed, if you like, on 20 October, Taiwan announced that they had intercepted an illegal shipment of birds being imported from China. So the very strong conclusion of this epidemiological report is that it came via Taiwan in some case with the mesias. The most significant element of the epidemiological report which has not so far been picked up by the media but I think probably will be in the days to come is that in spite of being in close proximity with all the other birds in this quarantine facility, including sentinel chickens (whose role it is, as I am sure Members will know, to be there to test for AI and Newcastle disease and others) none of the other birds was infected. That has potentially very significant implications for how the world as a whole tackles AI, and the current debate that is ongoing about the potential role or otherwise of wild birds in spreading it.

Q18 Chairman: One thing which I did find odd, from the point of view of keeping an eye on what comes into this country, is that I would have thought it would have been a requirement to have known absolutely where, or give yourself absolutely the best chance of knowing absolutely where, something came from. Notwithstanding the fact that I can understand, where samples of birds are kept in the same airspace, why there might be a mixing up of the tissues (I can understand that) but given that you wanted to know where the strain of Avian Influenza had come from, would it not have been sensible on this occasion not to have pooled them?

Mr Bradshaw: It may well have been, and one of the things that the independent review of our quarantine procedures that the Secretary of State announced is looking into is the issue of pooling, the issue of shared airspace. However, I would point out that in this particular instance the quarantine procedure has worked: we detected the disease, we contained it, and we eradicated it. The pooling is, as I say, a normal part of the procedure.

Q19 Lynne Jones: Why? Why is it common practice?

Mr Bradshaw: Because the quarantine process works in the following way: no bird can be released from a quarantine facility until it has been in for 30 days; all birds are tested for AI and Newcastle disease before they are released; if another batch of birds comes in, as in this case they did, at a later date, the clock starts ticking all over again, so none of the birds that are in quarantine are released until 30 days after that date. That means that the batch of birds that came in earlier have to do a longer quarantine, and by that stage if they have got anything they are going to be dead.

Q20 Lynne Jones: So it does not matter if you do not know which is the bird?

Mr Bradshaw: I think it is helpful, for the reasons the Chairman outlined, although I think I would also add that in spite of the pooling in this case the epidemiological study did manage to trace the fact that the strain this was closest to was the Chinese duck strain. That gave us a very strong indication that it was the mesias and not the parrot.

Q21 Lynne Jones: Is it not important to get this information as quickly as possible rather than wait until the birds might die over 20 days, or whatever?

Mr Bradshaw: It is very important to get the information as quickly as possible, and as soon as birds die they are supposed to be sent away for testing, although there is always, I have to stress, Mr Chairman, an element of conflict between getting quick and speedy results and getting results you can be absolutely certain of. I suspect that one of the reasons that the initial information was put out incorrectly about the parrot was because in that case there is a lot of pressure to put out information quickly. Given that, there is always a danger that perhaps the information is not going to be 100 per cent accurate, and in this case it was not. In the end, in terms of the substance, it did not matter.

Q22 Lynne Jones: Do you think you would be carrying out this inquiry into quarantine facilities had there not been this outbreak? If so, why? Should you not have predicted the importance of quarantine in relation to the possibility of an Avian Flu outbreak and actually made sure that you doubled-check, treble-checked that our procedures were the best they possibly could be?

Mr Bradshaw: Quarantine facilities are regularly inspected and they have to be approved. I was not aware before this instance of any concern that the procedures in our quarantine facilities were not being followed correctly. In fact, one or two of the arguments made by some of the NGOs who have for a long time been calling for a ban on the import of wild birds was not because our quarantine facilities were not up to scratch but because they were worried about the quality of quarantine facilities in other countries. I think you are right, Miss Jones, this episode has raised some questions about general quarantine policy, and it makes absolute sense that we have a look at it.

Q23 Lynne Jones: It does worry us about the precautionary principle that you are saying this pooling of samples is common practice and it is only after this incident that you are now looking to see whether that common practice should be changed. That does not indicate looking forward for potential problems, does it?

Mr Bradshaw: I would simply stress that the quarantine practice we have in this circumstance worked, in spite of the pooling of the sample and in spite of the birds sharing the same airspace.

Q24 Chairman: Just following on that point, before I bring in my colleagues, can I just ask the Chief Vet, again for the record, when you were devising your strategy, which appeared in its final form in July, did you review at that point the quarantine procedures which had been adopted up to then?

Ms Reynolds: For the contingency plan? The contingency plan did not particularly cover the question of finding a positive in quarantine; it dealt with the need to identify quickly on UK soil and then deal with Avian Influenza in British poultry or other birds.

Q25 Chairman: So the answer is no?

Ms Reynolds: It was not particularly covering quarantine, no.

Q26 Sir Peter Soulsby: Just on the pooling of samples, presumably the pooling is done in order to keep down the number of tests and, therefore, the cost? Is that right, or are there any other reasons for pooling the sample?

Ms Reynolds: Pooling is a practice that takes place fairly frequently in the laboratory. The reason is that you can, as you say, bring together tissues from more than one bird or more than one animal, and then actually identify in the test procedure whether or not it is positive. The pooling approach is, therefore, used widely for reasons of efficiency in part and sometimes it is possible to go back to the individual tissues and identify the bird or animal or origin. In this case that has not been possible and the pooling does not allow us to say whether or not it was the parrot or the mesia.

Ms Stacey: My understanding is that sometimes it can also increase the sensitivity of the test. So pooling is common, for example, when we are doing large-scale research because it does vastly increase sensitivity of results. That can be helpful.

Q27 Mr Williams: I am concerned really about the number of birds that die in quarantine. As a result of a question to you, Minister, I think you said that no record is kept of the number of birds that die in quarantine. Also, in this particular case, a large number of birds died and were incinerated before being tested. What triggers an investigation? Following on from questions that have been asked, surely this should be done as soon as possible to identify any disease.

Mr Bradshaw: Although, Mr Chairman, the epidemiological investigation has finished and that is what we published today, there is an investigation still going on being conducted by Essex Trading Standards and that constrains me slightly (I am not suggesting it should constrain Committee Members) in what we can actually say about what may or may not have happened in this quarantine facility, because that could jeopardise possible action. However, in general principle, it would not be compatible with quarantine regulations for birds to be incinerated unless a vet had given explicit permission for that to happen. On the point, Mr Williams, you make about mortality, yes, there is a high level of mortality involved in the trade in wild birds and there is a debate going on - a more high-profile debate in the wake of this quarantine incident and the EU-wide ban on the temporary ban on the import of wild birds - as to whether that ban should be extended, but the arguments you are using there are different from animal or bird health arguments; they are bird welfare and, maybe, ethical arguments, which will be taken into consideration. However, they are not specifically relevant to the issue of Avian Influenza.

Mrs Moon: Chairman, before I ask my questions can I just register the interest that my husband does work on a contractual basis for Defra as a wildlife inspector in Wales for, in particular, birds of prey.

Chairman: It is always nice to hear people registering an interest in their husbands. That is good!

Mrs Moon: I have a number of questions in relation to some of the issues you have raised in relation to quarantine. You have said that there have been concerns in relation to the pre-entry quarantine arrangements in other countries. Are you confirming to this Committee that there will be an investigation into those and a review of our quarantine regulations if we feel that particular countries are particularly lax? We had a submission from the RSPCA citing a number of countries where there are particularly poor regulations in place. Will you be looking at that? That is my first question. It comes to something when you start reading about "bird laundering", which is quite a frightening issue here. I heard your response in terms of animal health and animal welfare to my colleague's question about the number of deaths of birds in captivity, and in one of the reports that I think we have from your department there was 100 per cent mortality in one species. Given that the EU is responsible for 93 per cent of global imports of CITES bird species would you not agree that there is also a conservation issue here; this is not just a case of animal welfare, this is a world conservation issue that we are also addressing? Will you personally be recommending a continuation of the ban on movement and sale of wild birds to the European Union? In terms of the funding of the quarantine services ----

Q28 Chairman: Madeline, can I suggest the Minister has a crack at those and you come back on the funding one?

Mr Bradshaw: On the last question, I think the relevant EU committee is meeting tomorrow to discuss an extension to the ban, and the UK will certainly be arguing in favour of an extension to the ban, at the very least until the independent review of our quarantine procedures is concluded and has reported. On whether there is a conservation argument against the trade in wild birds, there is a conservation argument against the trade in wild birds but there are also some people making a conservation argument in favour of it, as long as it is properly monitored and enforced under CITES. They make the argument (this is not me making it, I am just saying what they say) that in some of the communities and under-developed countries that export the birds, giving these birds value is a conservation incentive to those communities. As long as one can guarantee that welfare and other standards are met then there is no conservation - and this is what CITES argues as well - argument against the trade. I think, Mrs Moon, you are right to point to the issue of the quality of both welfare and quarantine arrangements pre-export, and those are certainly issues that we want to consider very carefully before coming to a decision as to whether this is an issue we need to address for the long term. I think I am right in saying that the United States, which has passed legislation banning the import of wild birds, has done so on those grounds by, basically, putting the barrier too high for any country to be able to meet.

Q29 Mrs Moon: Minister, are you happy, given the particular stress that must be on our quarantine services at the moment, that there is sufficient funding and sufficient veterinary services available to actually carry out the number of tests that will be required to meet the pressure that is coming our way?

Mr Bradshaw: Glenys may want to comment on capacity at the SVS and among the veterinary profession. I think I am right in saying that at the moment the ban is in place. Are we aware of any birds still being held in a quarantine facility, or have they all now been tested and released?

Ms Stacey: There are still birds.

Mr Bradshaw: There are still birds being held in some quarantine facilities. Do you want to say something about capacity?

Ms Stacey: I do not have the figures to-hand but there are only a limited number of quarantine premises in the UK. Actually, it is a very small proportion of our work and our overall responsibility, so it does not create a particular problem for us in capacity terms at all.

Q30 Mrs Moon: Given that we were told that there was an inevitable outbreak, do we have enough veterinary capacity to do the monitoring that we could have if this did actually explode?

Ms Stacey: I am sorry, I misunderstood your question; I thought it was about maintaining the current quarantine arrangements. Are you asking me whether we have sufficient capacity to manage an outbreak?

Q31 Mrs Moon: Yes.

Mr Bradshaw: In poultry?

Q32 Mrs Moon: Both. One, I was questioning the quarantine arrangements and, second, was in relation to veterinary services if there was an outbreak of Avian Flu.

Ms Stacey: The position is that we currently have several hundred vets employed directly by the State Veterinary Service - more than we have had in recent years, in fact. We also have a programme in place to train an extra 100 contingency vets from private practitioners. That is in train and should be completed in the next couple of months. We have also got some 7,000 private veterinarians that work for us on a contractual basis who would, to a large extent, come to our assistance in an emergency and, also, we have arrangements with our European colleagues and Commonwealth colleagues to call on their assistance if they are able to provide it. So veterinary resource is not my immediate concern in relation to managing an AI outbreak.

Mr Bradshaw: I think it is important that Committee Members recognise the difference between Avian Flu and foot-and-mouth. Avian Flu is a disease that is spread by faeces; it is not airborne, so the likelihood of the kind of geographical spread that you saw with foot-and-mouth, given the nature of our poultry industry is pretty low, I would say. On the issue of laundering, which you also raised, Mrs Moon, I think this highlights the dilemma we have in the debate over whether to make the import ban permanent, because there are those who fear (and, CITES again, fear this) that if you ban it then you force more of it underground. By its very nature it is then more difficult to control.

Q33 David Taylor: What steps do you intend to take to ensure that bird traders and importers no longer take responsibility for quarantine? Do you not think there is an inevitable conflict of interest in this area?

Mr Bradshaw: That is one of the things our review is looking at.

Q34 David Taylor: Is that something that you broadly agree with, that there is a substantial conflict of interest there?

Mr Bradshaw: I hear what you say, Mr Taylor, but I would not want to pre-empt the outcome of the independent review. It is something that the review is looking at.

Q35 David Taylor: And will report when?

Mr Bradshaw: Two to three weeks. It is a short, month-long review.

Q36 Mr Rogerson: You have talked about the regular inspection of the facilities. What is the inspection regime for these facilities?

Ms Stacey: It is an annual inspection of all premises.

Q37 Mr Rogerson: Is that something that the review is looking at?

Mr Bradshaw: It is not just an annual inspection of the premises, it is also an inspection of the birds in quarantine.

Ms Stacey: There is a different regime for the inspection of birds if they enter quarantine premises, but apart from that there is an annual inspection requirement. Indeed, this particular premises was inspected within the last 12 months and was found to be fully compliant.

Q38 Mr Rogerson: It is just that things have come to light since the incident in terms of the nature of the businesses and the people who own them. I understand they tend to be fairly small enterprises. Is that felt to be the appropriate way of dealing with it, given the potential risks there are particularly in terms of the bird population?

Mr Bradshaw: They are mainly small enterprises run by individuals contracted to others, in some cases, but they still need to be inspected and vets need to satisfy themselves that the biosecurity and the sealing of the premises is adequate. Ventilation is another issue that has to be addressed, and that the only people who go in and out of the facility are the people who run it.

Q39 Mr Williams: You talk about the inspection of premises. Are they actually licensed or registered in some way? Who does the inspection? Is it the State Veterinary Service or is it local government officers?

Ms Stacey: The State Veterinary Service undertakes the inspection and they are licensed, yes, annually.

Q40 Mr Williams: So somebody has a physical licence?

Ms Stacey: Yes.

Q41 Mr Williams: I asked this question of the Minister and I do not think I have had a reply yet, but have any premises been refused their licence in recent years?

Ms Stacey: I am not aware of any but I could not swear to it. I would need to look into that.

Mr Williams: Perhaps you could let us know.

Q42 James Duddridge: Minister, with permission I would like to touch on communications of outbreaks. When the Secretary of State was here she said there was a very, very longstanding matter of policy not to inform Members of Parliament if there was a potential outbreak of an animal disease within a constituency. I expressed great surprise at that. In my constituency I was 'phoned by a member of the local press and told that there was an outbreak in my constituency. Clearly, when something like that happens you act with great caution. In fact, there was not an outbreak in my constituency but the Ashingdon site was just to the north of the constituency. It would have been very useful to receive a briefing; even now I do not feel I know exactly what is going on - constantly referring to "the Essex site" rather than the "Brentwood" or "Ashingdon" site. Yesterday in my local paper there was talk of people on the Ashingdon site being delayed in having the injection at Southend Hospital. Again, I am trying not to comment because I do not want to fuel these problems, but there seems to be poor communication with Members of Parliament and with the Primary Care Trust in Southend. Also, I was surprised that whilst the Secretary of State said "all relevant authorities would be consulted" Rochford District, the district authority, was not told of the situation in Ashenden.

Mr Bradshaw: Clearly, Mr Chairman, while there is an epidemiological and potential criminal investigation going on it is not common practice for any government to reveal the exact location of a disease outbreak. That policy was followed in this case. However, it is common practice, and it was during foot-and-mouth, for Members of Parliament in constituencies affected to be told that there was disease in their constituency without the location being given. This is the first time we have had an outbreak, I think, of Avian Flu in quarantine. My view, and this is now policy, is that the Member of Parliament in whose constituency it was should have been told, and indeed now has been told, but that will be the policy from now on: that if there is an outbreak in quarantine it will be the same as if there is an outbreak on a poultry farm. We will not really reveal the exact location because we do not want the media tramping all over what is an epidemiological site.

Lynne Jones: Although you do not know the exact location, there are MPs from adjacent constituencies that could be drawn in. Could you just bear that in mind?

James Duddridge: Just on that point, and as a member of the Defra Committee, we were well-consulted and I appreciate that, and from that I learned there was a one-mile zone around the outside, which would indeed include my constituency. I very much welcome the information that Members of Parliament will be notified, but just extending that to the district authority, I believe, perhaps Essex County Council were consulted but not the district authority, and it would be useful to have that coded into whatever contingency plan you have for future outbreaks of various other animal diseases.

Q43 Chairman: For the record, just to clear up the point, you mentioned a criminal inquiry. What kind of crimes are being investigated and by whom?

Mr Bradshaw: I was using this as a hypothetical example, Chairman, as to why I would not want to reveal the identity of a particular premises while there is any sort of inquiry going on, be it epidemiological or an inquiry that might lead to prosecution. I have already touched on the fact that Essex County Council is conducting its own inquiry at the moment as to what happened in this quarantine facility and whether everything that happened in it was in accordance with the quarantine rules. I think we need to be careful about how much we talk about that because I would not want to say anything in this Committee that might jeopardise any possible action in the future.

Q44 Chairman: I was trying to establish how many inquiries were going on and who was conducting them. On the one you have talked about there are inquires that your department may be conducting and, in this case, the local authority. That would appear to be it. Can you also clear up, for the record, the number of different samples, if you call it that, or groups of birds that were in place in quarantine at the time when this discovery was made? We know we have the mesias and we know we have got the parrots. Were any other groups of birds on the site at the same time, and if so what has happened to those, if there were any?

Mr Bradshaw: I can let you have a table that neatly summarises all the numbers and when they were in.

Q45 Chairman: Is this the one attached to the press release?

Mr Bradshaw: It is Table 1B of the epidemiological report. It is in the press release. I can ask Glenys to talk you through that in detail, if you like. I think the most important thing to recognise is that certain allegations have been made that birds may have been let out or escaped from quarantine before the end of their quarantine period. We have found no evidence to support those allegations whatsoever, and in fact all of the birds that were registered as having arrived at this quarantine facility are now accounted for. Those that did not die were killed.

Q46 Chairman: I think it would be helpful to understand the table. On the document that is attached to your press release, whilst Tables 1A and 1B indicate that the species concerned were imported, they do not actually give any dates as to when they were imported.

Mr Bradshaw: There is another table which, if you have not got it, you should see, which is the timeline. You need to look at the timeline table along with this one, but there is a note at the bottom of that table which gives you the date I think you would be interested in: "The number of birds imported from Surinam by species on 16 September 2005; the number of fatalities reported to have been incinerated; the number of carcases stored in the freezer and fridge and the number of birds culled on 21 October".

Q47 Chairman: Does the same timeline also indicate when those birds had finished their period of quarantine and were subsequently released? Does it give that information as well?

Mr Bradshaw: There were not any birds that were released.

Q48 Chairman: So they are all still there?

Mr Bradshaw: No, they are dead. The ones that did not die have been killed.

Q49 Chairman: I am sorry. I am just trying to acquire information.

Ms Stacey: It might be helpful to explain that for the period of 9 March to 16 September the premises had no birds in at all. On 16 September the first consignment went in of 148 parrots and began its 30-day detention. Then the second consignment of the 186 birds came in on 28 September. So that took the clock back, so the 30 days started again. Before that 30 days expired, all of those birds from those two consignments, in one way or another, were dead. There are no birds currently in that premises.

Mr Bradshaw: Including the sentinel chickens.

Q50 Chairman: Including the poor sentinel chickens. I was just interested that in Table 1B, should not all the numbers at the bottom sum up to 186? You have got 10 that were incinerated, 133 that were killed and 38 in the fridge. If I add all of those together it does not quite come to 186.

Mr Bradshaw: We are trying to find out the explanation. I think there is a gap of four there. There were four dead on arrival.

Chairman: Four dead on arrival.

Q51 Mrs Moon: One more than recorded in the formal paperwork, Chairman. We have got a missing bird.

Mr Bradshaw: We have got an extra bird. It is quite common in large consignments of small birds that the figures are sometimes one or two out, because they are quite difficult to catch.

Chairman: They keep moving around. We have heard that joke before.

Q52 Mrs Moon: Can I ask a final question? The RSPB tell us that over 2.7 million birds are imported into Europe. Of those that come into the UK, do you have a percentage rate for testing? On what basis do you test?

Mr Bradshaw: For disease?

Q53 Mrs Moon: Yes.

Mr Bradshaw: All birds that go into quarantine are tested for disease during quarantine for AI and Newcastle disease before they leave. The only birds that are not tested are those that might be smuggled and, by that very definition, even the RSPB may make an estimate but nobody will know for sure how many birds we are talking about.

Q54 Mrs Moon: So the black-headed kayke (?) that died, died not in quarantine but on the way in? There was no examination of those. It says: "Date of reported incineration" and they vary considerably. They were not tested?

Mr Bradshaw: Were these ones tested or were they incinerated?

Mrs Moon: It says here there was no particular reason why they died, all 100 per cent of them, and the only symptom or clinical sign was moulting.

Q55 Mr Williams: If it helps, it is on the table there and it says: "Death in quarantine. Not examined."

Mr Bradshaw: My understanding is that it is normal practice for any death in quarantine to be subsequently tested.

Ms Stacey: If I can assist, we are all curious as to these alleged incinerated birds. The investigation that is being undertaken at the moment with trading standards is trying to identify exactly what the circumstances were in relation to these so-called incinerated birds. We await with interest the outcome.

Q56 Mrs Moon: I am particularly concerned that we have a "notably high" (that is an understatement, is it not, for 100 per cent?) morality but there was no examination as to why 100 per cent of the consignment died.

Ms Stacey: I am afraid we do not know as yet exactly whether or not there have been examinations of those birds. The investigation that is being undertaken will include, obviously, some specific evidence-gathering with the individuals concerned to identify what they have to say about what actually happened and to what extent the official veterinarian was actually involved.

Q57 Mrs Moon: The report just says: "From the laboratory investigations conducted there was no evidence that this species was infected when they arrived at the quarantine premise." I can understand that for lots of birds there must be no evidence that a species is infected but if they subsequently die, 100 per cent of them, I would have thought that would have been a good reason for testing.

Mr Bradshaw: Yes, I think you are right.

Q58 Lynne Jones: Or even to keep them in the freezer. They have gone.

Mr Bradshaw: As I said earlier, Mr Chairman, it is not in line with quarantine rules to incinerate birds without the specific authorisation of a vet. My understanding is, and admittedly this is something for Essex County Council (?), the vet concerned is still to be interviewed.

Ms Reynolds: Could I, perhaps, add something to that, which is that I understand that one of these black-headed kaykes, which was dead on arrival, was actually submitted for testing and came back negative. I appreciate that that is one of the birds but that is the only piece of evidence we have got in the epidemiological report on the virology from that consignment.

Q59 Mrs Moon: It does not say that in my report.

Ms Reynolds: It does say it in the web version of the epidemiological report, and in the report it actually refers to one dead-on-arrival kayke sent to the Veterinary Laboratory Agency and coming back negative.

Mr Bradshaw: I will hold up my sheet so that the Members might recognise it.

Q60 Chairman: It looks very pretty from where I am sitting but I cannot actually see a great deal of it. Have we got a copy of this one?

Mr Bradshaw: That gives the timeline that you were asking about as well.

Q61 Lynne Jones: I understand that biosecurity advice has been produced for poultry keepers including semi-commercial and hobby poultry-keepers. How is that information being disseminated and what checks have you made to ensure that it is being disseminated?

Mr Bradshaw: It is being disseminated directly by the department, it is available on our website and it is being physically sent to those poultry keepers that we know about, although we do not, as yet, have a full register of poultry keepers. That is something we are now drawing up and that is something that will feature in the new European Union Directive. It has also been disseminated by industry, by the NFU and by the British Agriculture Councils. We have taken out advertisements in a number of specialist magazines including Fancy Fowl, The Budgerigar, Budgerigar World, Bird Watch, and a number of others. We are doing everything we possibly can to communicate the biosecurity advice to those who keep birds. I would simply add, Mr Chairman, that anyone who keeps birds, poultry particularly, on a commercial basis has a responsibility themselves to be aware of sensible biosecurity measures and to make sure that they are informed. But not knowing where all of these people are - and there are more people in this country keeping poultry in backyard flocks than at any time since World War II - there is a responsibility on those too. Most of the big companies, I have to say, take biosecrity incredibly seriously, not least because there are massive financial risks involved if they get a disease outbreak. This is an unsupported and unsubsidised sector.

Q62 Lynne Jones: How do people know that that is their responsibility?

Mr Bradshaw: They know because it is the law. This is a notifiable disease and they are legally obliged to report any suspicion of it and have that investigated very quickly.

Q63 Lynne Jones: If I go along to a market and buy a couple of chickens - I have not done that but I do know friends that have got poultry and they have received no official notification. I take your point that people have that responsibility but if I go and buy a couple of hens how am I going to know or be alerted to this issue?

Mr Bradshaw: Hopefully, you are going to have the common sense to know or find out how to look after your hens properly: how to feed them and how to water them. That would include how to keep them healthy. We are not just talking about Avian Flu here; I had absolutely no idea before I took this job how many different diseases birds could get and die of, and there are lots of them. Anyone who has got chickens, it is in their interest to try to find out how you keep your birds safe and healthy. I would suspect that your friends probably subscribe to Poultry World or Fancy Fowl if they are interested in chickens and have a small number in their back yard or back garden. I would hope they would take concern for their health and welfare.

Q64 Lynne Jones: How would they know there was new advice? This is new guidance that is being produced. They may have read books when they acquired the fowl, or whatever.

Mr Bradshaw: As I say, the new and updated guidance is being published in adverts in the specialist magazines; our website is being constantly updated; it is in the newspapers both national and regional and there has been a lot of coverage of this in the local and regional newspapers, but if we do not know who these people are we cannot contact them, and that is one of the reasons we are establishing a database.

Q65 Lynne Jones: How are you getting on with that?

Mr Bradshaw: We are getting on with it very well. We have worked incredibly closely with the industry throughout the whole of this Avian Influenza scare, if you like. The industry is very supportive of what we are trying to do; it is very supportive of the risk assessment, the measures we are taking and the advice that we are giving out, and they are also co-operating very closely with us in helping to draw up a register.

Q66 Lynne Jones: That is supposed to include everybody who just has one or two chickens?

Mr Bradshaw: No, the proposed legal requirement will be for those who have 50 or more. That will not stop other people, if they would like to, like your friends, from being kept constantly informed by the Ministry as to what they should or should not do.

Q67 Lynne Jones: I wonder why 50. Why is 50 the number?

Mr Bradshaw: I think there was discussion around the definition of "commercial", and I think it is sensible for anyone with some poultry to register if they want to be kept fully informed, but I think it was felt that in terms of the disease risk from people, like your friends, who have a couple of chickens in their back yard and a proportionate requirement that was the balance that we arrived at.

Q68 Lynne Jones: However, you would encourage anybody who has poultry to register and to keep an eye on your website?

Mr Bradshaw: Absolutely, and Glenys wants to add something on that.

Ms Stacey: I just wanted to say that the poultry register, the technical solution we are adopting will focus, initially, on flocks of over 50 birds because it makes sense to prioritise registration in that way. Given that there are a large number of flocks out there, we anticipate it is going to take us between six weeks and three months to complete that registration process making it as easy as possible for people to register, with a number of different ways in which they can do that. So it is sensible for disease control purposes to undertake that exercise first and then look afresh at flocks below 50. One of the issues we have with registrations, of course, is that these birds do not stand still; people change their flock size and numbers all too regularly, unfortunately.

Q69 Lynne Jones: What about game birds released into the wild?

Mr Bradshaw: Game birds will be subject to the same rules until they are released, but as long as they are being reared in captivity they will be subject to the same rules of registration.

Q70 Mr Williams: One of the problems that was faced during foot-and-mouth was that just about all the vets we had in Britain had not seen foot-and-mouth and some of them had a great deal of difficulty in identifying the disease. I wonder what specific training vets have had in this country on identifying it. Then I am told that actually the disease is not identified on the farm or on the situation in which the poultry are kept; it is identified in the laboratory. So then my question really is: what sort of trigger do poultry keepers have to have for them to be alerted to a risk, and what sort of information is given to them in that regard?

Mr Bradshaw: This is all set out in the contingency plan, Mr Chairman. We are getting, at the moment, a much higher number of reports from all round the country from people who think that their poultry, ducks or turkeys might have Avian Influenza. That is as a result of the heightened level of awareness. You are right, it is not possible to say with any certainty in the field that, yes, these birds have died of AI; it has to depend on a proper epidemiological test. That takes sometime but once there is a confirmation of a positive that is when the contingency plan goes into action, with the control and protection zone around the infected premises and with extra biosecurity measures being required of people further afield as well.

Q71 Mr Williams: If somebody is keeping 20,000 chickens, presumably they have some of those chickens die every day. What triggers them to contact? The State Veterinary Service would not want that farm to be ringing up every day saying: "I have got one chicken dead" or "I have two chickens dead". Where is the trigger?

Ms Stacey: A number of symptoms would suggest that they should be concerned. For example, any increase in the mortality rate, which is generally monitored in these large units. Also, any increase in the morbidity of birds or any decrease in egg-laying capacity in egg-laying flocks. These are the indicators which would attract State Veterinary Service attention. Obviously, with any specific clinical symptoms that are associated with Avian Influenza the same thing would apply.

Mr Bradshaw: This is the most important element of this whole discussion, Mr Chairman, because speed of discovery and diagnosis is critical - it is of the essence. One of the things the VLA are working on at the moment is an accelerated test so that, in future, rather than having to wait a number of days until we can say with all certainty that there is positive AI, that can be speeded up. The sooner we can get the contingency plan going the more chance we have of containing and successfully eradicating an outbreak.

Q72 Mr Williams: The State Veterinary Service is sometimes overstretched. Now it has an additional burden on it to ensure and monitor that the new legislation is adhered to by poultry keepers. Have you got enough staff to do that work in any meaningful way?

Ms Stacey: We have more vets than we have had in recent times, as I said before. Indeed, we have more staff before than we had this time last year as well. We are in regular discussion with Defra and the devolved administrations about what our priorities are. Avian Influenza is not the only issue that we deliver on behalf of the department and administrations; there are other big animal health, welfare and food safety issues that we deliver as well. It is always a question of identifying and agreeing with our policy customers what the priorities are and how they are delivered.

Q73 Mr Williams: Were you consulted with before this new legislation was put in place?

Ms Stacey: Yes.

Q74 Mrs Moon: You have talked about how Avian Influenza is largely diagnosed in the laboratory, and I gather that at present the test takes about two weeks to run. If you have this time gap, are you going to have a restriction on the movement of poultry while the tests are carried out? Secondly, if the test does prove positive will you, as part of your contingency plan, also be looking at increased monitoring of wild birds in the region around a poultry farm where it has been identified?

Mr Bradshaw: Debby will say something about (I do not think it is two weeks) the exact length of time it currently takes to get a positive test. I do not think it would be practicable to implement movement restrictions on every report because we are having a lot of reports at the moment and they are all negative. If you were to impose movement restrictions up and down the country on the basis of suspicion you would bring everything to a standstill for no proper reason. On the issue of the monitoring of wild birds, we have increased the monitoring of wild birds significantly as a result of the further geographic spread west of the Urals and the discovery of AI in swans in Croatia, for example. It is not practical to think that we can deal with wild birds in terms of either stopping them coming or shooting them in and around an outbreak, but, yes, monitoring will be stepped up.

Q75 Lynne Jones: I was not suggesting shooting them.

Mr Bradshaw: I think Debby wanted to say something about the time it takes to get a positive test.

Ms Reynolds: In a situation where a report is made of a suspected notifiable disease and the State Veterinary Service investigates, were there to be a positive it is likely to be very quick; it might be a matter of two to three days. If there is an investigation that needs to take place which will require a test for virus and it needs to be repeated, that could take two weeks. So it takes much longer to get a negative than it does to get a positive. Just a quick comment on movement restrictions. Where a suspicion of avian notifiable disease is reported and the State Veterinary Service investigate and where they are unable to reject that suspicion, movement restrictions are put on that particular premises until it is actually negated.

Mr Bradshaw: Just on the speed, the VLA, it is worth pointing out, are doing a superb job at the moment, Mr Chairman. They are the international centre for the testing for AI. So all of these samples from Croatia, Greece, Turkey and elsewhere - and from the Far East - are being done at the VLA. It may be worth your while talking to them at some stage about the work they are doing. They are also working on a test that would enable us to confirm a positive within three hours rather than three days, which would add significantly, internationally, to the armoury to fight against AI.

Q76 David Taylor: It is still the latest departmental advice, is it not, that bird owners should plan to house their birds at short notice if this is required as a preventative measure? The CVO has said that the Government recognised the challenge that there would be for organic and free range producers, and the Government is working with the European Commission to find ways of protecting their status. Ways have been found in the Netherlands - that is correct, is it not - to protect their status in these sorts of circumstances? Are we looking at how they were able to protect that status, with a view to carrying it over to the UK should that be necessary?

Mr Bradshaw: Yes, we are. When the Netherlands, however, ordered the housing of their birds earlier in the summer without the support of the Commission or the rest of the European Union, there was an issue, I believe, as to whether they would be able in the medium term to retain their free-range status. If there is agreement on the need to house birds based on veterinary advice then it is possible to get a temporary preservation of the free-range status for egg-laying birds and for broilers, I believe, as long as half their life has been spent out of doors. The issue with organics is a more difficult one because, at the moment, the rules do not allow for organic status to be maintained if birds are compulsorily housed, and that is something we are actively talking to the Commission about, along with a number of other Member States who do not feel that is fair.

Q77 David Taylor: What extra steps would you take to inform and assist poultry keepers in the event of advice being required to house their birds at short notice?

Mr Bradshaw: I think it is quite important, Mr Chairman, that people understand where we are on the issue of housing of birds. Under the contingency plan, housing would only be required in the vicinity of an outbreak. However, that advice has subsequently been changed, following our latest risk assessment, because of the concern about the role played in the spread of the disease by wild birds. What we are now saying is that were there to be an outbreak confirmed in this country then housing would be required "where practicable". Clearly, it would be, in some cases, up to the poultry owners themselves as to whether they considered it to be practicable, and where it was not practicable there are a number of other sensible biosecurity measures you can take to separate poultry from wild birds. That is the crucial thing, basically - that separation.

Q78 David Taylor: Your animal disease contingency plan states that compensation is not payable for diseased or dead birds as an incentive to report suspicion as early as possible. In the event of an outbreak there are likely to be calls for compensation for dead birds. What would be your reaction to that?

Mr Bradshaw: To resist those calls.

Q79 David Taylor: How do you justify that, if it is on a large scale?

Mr Bradshaw: For the very reason that you indicated; that not compensating for diseased birds gives owners a very important incentive to report disease swiftly in the knowledge that they will be compensated for birds that are not diseased.

Q80 David Taylor: One further point, Chairman, if I may. I was pleased to hear you say earlier on (and I paraphrase) that the egg and poultry sectors are highly responsible farming sectors, and they do try their utmost, not just for commercial reasons, to minimise risk to poultry health from the risk of Avian Influenza. There will be food safety scare stories, will there not? At least one of your predecessors, some years ago, was seen off by a story in this particular area. Was she not? Would you care to say how strongly you endorse the FSA advice that, on the basis of current evidence, avian flu does not pose a safety risk to UK consumers and people cannot catch it from being in close contact with live poultry or through eating poultry and eggs? There is a real worry in the egg and poultry industry that a food scare of the sort which would be associated with an outbreak of avian influenza would be immensely damaging to them as well as to the status of their industry. What would you do to try and reassure people?

Mr Bradshaw: I would draw people's attention to the FSA advice you have just quoted which sounds to me to be spot on. I would also point out to the Committee that, hearteningly, in this country, unlike some other EU countries, there has not been a drop in poultry consumption or egg consumption as a result of some of the more lurid scare stories which I am afraid we are all too tired of reading in some of our tabloid newspapers.

Q81 David Taylor: Is it your view then that the coverage of the potential for avian influenza in the tabloid newspapers and the tabloid television has been somewhat alarmist and over-coloured?

Mr Bradshaw: I think some of it has been over the top, but at the same time I would not want to under-estimate the potential impact of either an avian flu outbreak or the possibility at some stage of the virus - I should not use the term mutating ----

Ms Reynolds: Reassorting.

Mr Bradshaw: ---- reassorting and leading to a human pandemic. Some of the coverage has been unnecessarily alarmist and does not help people to make rational decisions, which I am sure you and I would hope they will continue to make, about, for example, consuming poultry products.

Q82 Chairman: Minister, can you just up-date the Committee on what is happening about poultry auctions at the present time?

Mr Bradshaw: As far as I am aware, the EU has agreed a temporary ban on all poultry and bird gatherings subject to exemptions based on a case-by-case veterinary risk assessment.

Q83 Chairman: Have you any idea how long that policy stays in place?

Mr Bradshaw: Currently until the beginning December. The decision will have to be reviewed before then and discussions are going on, and will continue to go on, as to whether the measures which were agreed last month remain necessary and whether they were proportionate.

Q84 Chairman: Is it still the case that you are giving consideration to introducing a new Diseases of Poultry (England) Order, to re-make the 2003 version of it?

Mr Bradshaw: Yes. This is the one to give us the necessary powers in the event of an outbreak, some of which we have already touched on, such as the requirement for people to house their poultry outside the immediate infection zone.

Q85 Chairman: When do you plan to do that? You have obviously worked out a series of contingency situations which you need to legislate for. When are you going to do it?

Mr Bradshaw: I am advised it is being worked on at the moment, but as soon as possible.

Q86 Mrs Moon: You have talked about the surveillance programme in relation to wild birds. Can you give us an up-date on how that surveillance programme is going? Are you able to confirm that there is no risk as far as the Department is aware at the moment from the wild bird population?

Mr Bradshaw: I would not say there is no risk, Chairman. There is, we believe, still a low risk of spread of AI to this country, but we think that risk has increased as a result of the geographical spread in wild birds which has already occurred, although I would add there has been no evidence of further geographical spread for about a month further west than the west of the Urals or Croatia, where the discoveries have already been made. One of the other things which not only we but the international community are still not clear about is the exact relationship between high pathogenic AI in wild birds and its occurrence in poultry; whether wild birds can infect poultry directly. That is why the epidemiological investigation of the quarantine facility is in my view so significant, because that showed that even in close confinement there was not a spread.

Q87 Mrs Moon: I understand that Turkey and Romania introduced a ban on the shooting of game birds and wild birds as a result of the outbreak there. Have you considered that?

Mr Bradshaw: It is certainly something which has been discussed. We would want to consider any measure that did not add to the potential for spreading disease in the event of an outbreak in this country.

Q88 Mrs Moon: If there were an avian influenza outbreak which did cross over into the human population, do you have a contingency plan and what would that be in terms of protecting the public?

Mr Bradshaw: This is not really a question for me, Chairman. I do know the answer to it and I am happy to give it if you want.

Q89 Chairman: The potted version because I suspect it may take quite a long time.

Mr Bradshaw: My colleagues in the Department of Health have a contingency plan. The HPA has a plan. It is being up-dated all the time but certainly I saw a version of it published in August. As I say, questions on human health are not really for me.

Q90 Mrs Moon: As long as the plan is in place.

Mr Bradshaw: Yes.

Q91 Chairman: Can I try and draw together the risk factors as we see them at the moment. We have questioned now on the subject of the quarantine arrangements because one of the key routes is in imported birds with a disease, and we have talked about that. There is the question of migratory birds, but we are told we have come at this moment in time to the end of the major movements, so that as a risk factor goes down. In terms of migratory birds, when does it become a risk for the United Kingdom? When could the risk go up? The worry is that public awareness, and the awareness of the industry, has been on a high level of readiness whilst current events have been unfolding but, as you rightly pointed out, Minister, there has not been a spread westwards of the disease for a month and the number of incidents has dropped off the public radar, and people tend to relax. When should they start getting alert again?

Mr Bradshaw: This question is very interesting, is it not, because as soon as AI goes out of the newspaper headlines or the news headlines people do tend to relax and I think that would be a mistake. We are certainly not relaxing and we are constantly monitoring and up-dating our risk assessment. Just because there has not been any geographical spread for a month, does not mean to say there will not be. For example, were there to be, as the Meteorological Office has been predicting for some time, a very, very hard winter with anti-cyclonic weather, easterly winds blowing from Siberia in our direction, then our advice from ornithologists and others is that that may increase the risk again of geographical spread. The next usual migration period is February, March next year, the spring, when they will be going south-north by and large, and that will again add to the danger of further geographical spread. At the moment, we are not on a common migration route where there has already been an infection but that could change, as I say, if there is some very cold easterly weather.

Q92 Chairman: Can I make one special request? When newspapers refer to areas which are of importance to migratory birds, the public become interested if their area is fingered. Whilst you made reference, quite rightly, to the Defra website and information going out to those who are very close to the world of poultry and birds, could I ask you to look again at the way you might communicate with members of the public in wetland areas, estuarial areas and so on about what they ought to be aware of without obviously, as they say, frightening the horses? They are an additional source of eyes and ears over and above the wild fowlers and others who are close to bird life in those areas. I think the public, if for no other reason, would like a little reassurance, and I say that as somebody who represents a large chunk of the Ribble estuary. People are interested but, if you like, advice cameth there none.

Mr Bradshaw: We are already doing that and if it is not already on our website, I will make sure it is put on there. There are some very useful and interesting maps of bird migration routes and we have good relationships not just with the wild fowlers but with the RSPB and various wetland centres. Members of the public, through you, Chairman, if they see a very high level of unusual die-off in wild birds particularly wading birds, swans, ducks, then let us know.

Q93 Patrick Hall: Minister, the report which we discussed earlier by the National Emergencies Epidemiology Group, whilst it focuses entirely on the Pegasus Birds Centre in Essex, does reveal, does it not, almost incidentally a situation in which it would seem that the imported exotic wild-caught bird trade is associated with a high level of mortality and poor animal welfare conditions? That is hinted at in this report. Do you not think, on the back of the attention being paid to these matters now because of avian influenza, there is a case to extend the ban on that trade pending a thorough and public review into the nature of that trade?

Mr Bradshaw: These are issues we explored a little earlier, Chairman, and as I say the UK will argue for the ban to stay in place at least until the outcome of the review into the quarantine process. Mr Hall is right to highlight the fact there is a debate, and there has been a debate for a very long time, about whether this trade should continue on animal welfare and conservation grounds. It is a debate, it does not mean to say that one side of the argument is necessarily right or wrong. It certainly is a debate in which we will be taking part but we have not reached a settled view at this stage as to whether this trade should be banned permanently either on conservation or animal welfare grounds.

Q94 Patrick Hall: I am saying though is this not an opportunity? Are there not sound reasons to take the attention which is being paid now, for the understandable reasons of avian influenza, and look at that trade as a whole? When avian influenza, we hope, dies out, other issues will remain and it should not forever remain a debate between various parties. Perhaps there needs to be some stepping back from the intensity of those who take part in that debate, and maybe from a Defra point of view having a proper review into the issues which are raised by that. The trade may by its very nature increase the risk of avian influenza, for example, but there may be other issues which are relevant and indeed other diseases which could be associated with it. So there is a case not just for observing a debate but taking a lead in reviewing what happens and whether it should continue into this country, legally that is.

Mr Bradshaw: I accept that, Chairman, but I would simply point out that there are 2 million people in this country who own birds and take great pleasure from their birds and the vast majority of these people care very, very deeply about the welfare of their birds. It is desirable that more of those birds are bred in captivity in this country than are imported. I would simply point out to Mr Hall that there are those who make an argument on conservation grounds for a trade to continue, including CITES, which is the international organisation responsible for the conservation of rare species, so it is not a simple yes or no answer. Of course it is something we are thinking about all the time because we are being asked questions about it all the time, and I suspect the debate will move quite quickly as we come at successive times to reconsider the ban.

Q95 Patrick Hall: I am taking it then that you do not think this is an opportunity for Defra to look at that trade as such outwith the issues raised by avian influenza?

Mr Bradshaw: No, that is not what I am saying at all. I am saying we look at these things all the time and we are looking at them particularly intensively at the moment, given the fact there is a ban in place and we need to think about whether to extend it and what reasons there are for extending it.

Q96 Lynne Jones: The Defra contingency plan says that vaccination is not expected to be part of your avian influenza control strategy. Are you keeping this position under review and what evidence or opinion are you taking into consideration? What work are you doing to help other countries, particularly in the Far East and in Eastern Europe, to ensure they are on the ball in relation to ensuring not only the spread of avian flu does not take place but also avian flu mutating in humans? I know that is the role of the Department of Health but if there is going to be a mutation in humans, it is likely to occur in another country.

Mr Bradshaw: Ms Jones is absolutely right. This has been endemic in a number of South East Asian countries for a number of years in poultry, and so far, thankfully, the evidence would suggest it is very, very difficult to catch; you can only catch it by being in very close proximity to poultry either as a poultry worker or as a farmer who lives in close proximity to poultry. We are working very, very closely with the countries affected through all of the international organisations you would expect us to - the UN, the OIE, WHO. As I said earlier, VLA is the international centre for testing. I do not know whether Glenys or Debby have, but certainly Defra staff have visited the countries concerned. There is currently a visit going on in South East Asia. We have also offered and provided help to Russia, to the countries closer to hand which have had outbreaks. On vaccination, we are constantly reviewing the issue of vaccination, and we have set up an expert group to have another look at this and report back. Currently not just in this country but EU-wide, vaccination is not envisaged as a useful tool in the event of any outbreak, because you have to inject every single individual bird not once but twice with a gap of three weeks in between, by which stage they are going to be dead. So there is no vaccine which is currently authorised, I think is the right word to describe it, because it is not seen as an effective tool and it is very time-consuming and very expensive.

Q97 Lynne Jones: Are poultry not vaccinated against salmonella?

Mr Bradshaw: Yes, but that is orally. Is it orally?

Ms Reynolds: I think salmonella vaccines are by injection. The Newcastle Disease is commonly done by the aerosol route.

Mr Bradshaw: It is obviously much easier to vaccinate a large number of birds orally than it would be with an individual needle.

Q98 Lynne Jones: But they are injected against salmonella?

Ms Reynolds: The situation on vaccination is that for broilers in particular, with two injections required, the broilers would be dead by the time vaccination and immunity had kicked in. There is the question of vaccinating older birds but I think the main point on vaccination is that it does not necessarily prevent infection and it does not necessarily stop virus-shedding, so you have to envisage a situation with avian influenza where there would be on-going infection and on-going shedding. The evidence really is that the most effective disease control approach is to identify the infected premises, cull the birds there, put on movement controls, trace to dangerous contacts, cull those and deal quickly and effectively to actually remove the virus, rather than allow it to spread slowly in the face of vaccination.

Q99 Chairman: So you are not following the advice in the newspapers at the weekend to feed your birds sauerkraut?

Mr Bradshaw: I am a great fan of sauerkraut, Chairman? Anything that helps.

Chairman: I am going to draw this area of our questioning to a conclusion. We have had a very good session indeed. Can I thank you, Minister, and also for the contributions of Glenys Stacey and Debby Reynolds. I think the Committee would appreciate receiving from time to time regular up-dates on what is happening. If there were, and we hope there is not, to be any further outbreaks you have taken due note of our hope that Members of Parliament will be kept a little more in the picture as to what is happening in and around their constituencies than perhaps was the case on this occasion.