Select Committee on European Scrutiny Eighth Report


4 Civil aviation security

(a)

(26859)

11263/05

COM(05) 428

(b)

(26861)

12588/05

COM(05) 429


Commission Report: First Report on the implementation of Regulation (EC) 2320/2002 on civil aviation security


Draft Regulation on common rules in the field of civil aviation security

Legal base(a) —

(b) Article 80(2) EC; co-decision; QMV

Document originated(a) 22 September 2005

(b) 22 September 2005

Deposited in Parliament(a) 27 September 2005

(b) 27 September 2005

DepartmentTransport
Basis of consideration(a) EM of 13 October 2005

(b) EM of 13 October 2005

Previous Committee ReportNone
To be discussed in Council(a) 6 October 2005

(b) Not known

Committee's assessmentPolitically important
Committee's decision(a) Cleared

(b) Not cleared, further information awaited

Background

4.1 In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack the framework Civil Aviation Security Regulation, (EC) 2320/2002, was adopted in order to set common standards in the matter of civil aviation security and to create a system of inspections.

The documents

4.2 Document (a) is the first annual report, based on inspections which began in February 2004, which the Commission is required to make under the Civil Aviation Security Regulation about its implementation. The report, which covers the period until the end of June 2005, concludes that, while there have been considerable improvements across the 25 Member States, there remains a clear need for improvement in both the legislative framework and standards of application.

4.3 The report shows:

  • that by the end of the period all Member States had complied with the obligation to produce a National Aviation Security Programme and all but two had completed a quality control (compliance monitoring) programme. Most of these were considered as fully meeting requirements;
  • the Commission has produced seven supplementary Regulations, mainly adding more detail to the framework Regulation, but also addressing specific issues such as national compliance monitoring programmes and the procedures for Commission inspections;
  • the Commission published a study it had funded on the financing of aviation security during the period. This issue will now be considered as part of a wider study of security funding for all transport modes;
  • details of the 43 inspections carried out by the Commission in the period. 14 of these were audits of Member States' Appropriate Authorities (the national body responsible for the implementation of the legislation) and 29 were at airports. The airports chosen were a random but representative sample covering all fifteen pre-enlargement Member States as well as some new Member States;
  • that standards were generally regarded as satisfactory, although a number of serious deficiencies which could be considered as comprising a risk to other Member States were identified. Areas of weakness identified related to insufficient numbers of national inspectors, delays in rectification of deficiencies, staff screening, aircraft protection and freight handling. Some of these difficulties are being addressed through legislative amendments; and
  • that the Commission thinks the Civil Aviation Security Regulation itself needs considerable simplification and clarification.

4.4 The draft Regulation in document (b) is intended to be a simplified and updated replacement for the Civil Aviation Security Regulation. The Commission says the existing Regulation was adopted as an urgent response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It proved subsequently to lack clarity and to be open to divergent interpretations, leading to marked differences in implementation amongst Member States. The level of detail in the Regulation, significantly more than is usual in framework legislation, also raised two particular concerns:

  • the Regulation, having no security classification, was published in full on the internet, so putting potentially sensitive security information in the public domain; and
  • amendment to the Regulation is subject to the co-decision procedure, making it a very inflexible instrument for responding to sudden changes in terrorist threat or technological advances.

4.5 The Commission says the draft Regulation reflects consultation with Member States and the industry. It is clearer and shorter than the present Regulation and is in step with the Commission's Better Regulation initiative, especially in providing a basis for cross reference to legislation in other areas, such as customs matters. Detail contained in the current Regulation will be transferred to an amended implementing Commission Regulation, currently No 622/03, which both carries a security classification and is subject to comitology.[12] Thus the finer points of implementation could be properly protected and more easily and quickly amended to strengthen the regime as necessary and to meet new threats.

4.6 The scope of the framework legislation would be almost unchanged. The draft Regulation requires security measures in respect of key matters such as:

  • access control;
  • screening passengers and baggage;
  • searching and checking aircraft;
  • testing equipment;
  • recruiting and training staff; and
  • air cargo.

Additionally there is a short chapter on in-flight security, which includes some elements already covered in the current legislation (unruly and disruptive passengers and control of firearms) and some which are new in Community legislation (protection of the flight deck and aircraft protection officers). Finally applicability to off-airport facilities, such as airline caterers and air cargo agents and other, is made more explicit.

4.7 A few provisions have been modified significantly:

  • under the current provision concerning the imposition by a Member State of measures more stringent than those laid down in the Regulation Member States are free to introduce such requirements where they judge this necessary in the interests of national security. The draft Regulation provides that such requirements should in the future be imposed only on the basis of a risk assessment and should be subject to the agreement of the Commission, with the possibility of appeal to the Council. This approval mechanism would not apply to measures adopted to cover individual flights;
  • similarly a new provision would mean that Member States, operators and other entities would not be able to accede to demands for more stringent measures made by third countries without the Commission's agreement. But again the provision would not apply in respect of individual flights; and
  • another new provision would allow the Commission to seek a mandate from the Council to conduct negotiations with a third country in order to establish whether its security regime could be considered as equivalent to that in force in the Community and whether it might, on that basis, be possible to exempt transfer traffic coming from that country from certain screening requirements within the Community.

The Government's view

4.8 The Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Department of Transport (Ms Karen Buck) says in relation to document (a) that it has no policy implications. This is clearly not wholly right since it foreshadows document (b).

4.9 On document (b) the Minister tells us that most of the draft Regulation, which echoes the current Regulation does not have any new policy implications. But this is not the case for all the new provisions. In relation to the provision which would constrain Member States in their ability to require the implementation of provisions more stringent than those set out in the Regulation. The Minister says that the imposition of such provisions would typically be a consequence of the Member State's assessment of sensitive security information. As this cannot, by its nature be shared with other parties, the Commission would not be in a position to make a properly informed decision. Moreover, the Minister says, national security is a national competence. Member States at higher threat levels, including the UK, have already said they oppose the draft Regulation in so far as it relates to a Commission and Council review process, arguing that only their own agencies are in a position to evaluate the threat and to determine the best response to it within their national borders.

4.10 The Minister says similar issues arise in respect of the proposal providing for Commission endorsement of acceptance of a third country's requirement for more stringent measures, where the intelligence available to it (but which it would not share with other parties) indicate that this were necessary. She adds that it is also unclear how this provision would sit with licensing agreements into which airlines may have entered with a third country, undertaking to comply with any extra measures that it might set.

4.11 As for Commission negotiations with third countries the Minister says there would need to be assurance that:

  • there would be no adverse implications for Member States' ability to enter into bilateral agreements with such countries, for example in respect of more stringent measures; and
  • determinations of equivalence would properly protect the integrity of aviation security in the Community.

4.12 The Minister mentions three further points of concern:

  • how the new text on in-flight measures sits with Member States' obligations under existing regulation by the International Civil Aviation Organisation and Member States will need to be confident that subsequent implementing legislation will not disrupt established programmes in these areas;
  • the draft Regulation's use in describing the scope of the concept of "other entities" needs clarification, in order to avoid uncertainty as to which kinds of organisation are embraced by it; and
  • clarification is needed as to why transfer cargo is treated differently to transfer passengers and transfer bags, so far as re-screening is concerned.

4.13 On the financial implications the Minister says that may be some costs both for the industry and for Government. But this will not become evident until the detail of the new implementing legislation is agreed. She continues that if it seems likely that there would be a significant impact on costs a Regulatory Impact assessment would be produced.

4.14 Finally, the Minister tells us that the draft Regulation would apply to Gibraltar. But she adds that in the present Civil Aviation Security Regulation Gibraltar has specifically been excluded until the arrangements set out in the 1987 Joint Declaration made by the UK and Spain have come into operation. The proposed revised text has no equivalent provision but she says it is quite likely that the omission of a clause excluding Gibraltar is simply an oversight and that Spain will insist on its reinstatement. She comments that if Gibraltar were to be included the only practical effect would be that it would be likely to become subject to Commission inspections. The airport is already required to meet UK security standards, which are higher than those in the Community legislation.

Conclusion

4.15 We clear document (a).

4.16 As for document (b) it seems implicit in the Minister's comments that the Government is open to the idea of a simplified and clearer framework Regulation, with the detail, much of which is better not publicised, included in subordinate legislation. We endorse the need for a better Regulation in this instance and should like confirmation that the Government does indeed generally support the measure. However we note that there are six issues, some significant, on which the Government wishes amendment or clarification. Before we consider the document further we should like to hear of progress on these issues. Meanwhile we do not clear the document.

4.17 We should also like to see the Regulatory Impact Assessment, should one become necessary, even if this after the new framework Regulation is adopted.

4.18 Finally we note the Minister's remarks about Gibraltar. Although the practical effect on security at Gibraltar Airport would seem minimal, whether or not the new measure is to apply to Gibraltar raises an issue that increasingly concerns us. That is the continued attempts at legislative interference by Spain in the running of Gibraltar Airport, so as to prejudice the security, comfort or convenience of those working at or using the facility. We should like the Government to comment on how serious the practical effects of the continued Spanish attitude are in relation to negotiation and implementation of Community legislation on aviation matters as it affects Gibraltar.


12   Comitology is the system of committees which oversee the exercise by the Commission of legislative powers delegated to it by the Council and the European Parliament. Comitology committees are made up of representatives of the Member States and chaired by the Commission. There are three types of procedure (advisory, management and regulatory), an important difference between which is the degree of involvement and power of Member States' representatives. Back


 
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Prepared 14 November 2005